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# The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury

(XII, XIII and XIV Centuries)

T. P. McLAUGHLIN

## IV. PUNISHMENT OF USURERS<sup>1</sup>

IN THIS section of our study we propose to examine a number of problems touching firstly, the nature of the penalties for the crime of usury, and secondly, the manner in which the crime is proven and the penalties applied.

### A. Penalties

THE number, variety and severity of the penalties incurred by usurers is indicative of how deeply rooted, persistent and widespread was the evil. At the same time is offered evidence of the belief that in order to stamp out this evil the efforts of the Church were doomed to failure unless they received the firm and constant support of the secular authorities. Throughout the period which is here being studied penalties are constantly being promulgated, renewed and multiplied. From decade to decade one witnesses an increasing severity as usurers become more numerous and bold in inventing new methods of obtaining usury in their attempt to circumvent the canons and as the Church finds her efforts to curb them in great part unavailing. These penalties are directed, not only against those who actually take usury, but also against their heirs and families, those who hesitate to denounce them, those who have any part in drawing up or executing their usurious contracts, notaries and judges; against those who make or enforce statutes opposed to the Canon Law on usury; against those who let houses for the purpose of money lending, and even against those in authority who allow usurers to reside within their territory; finally, against those who affirm that the taking of usury is not sinful. Whole groups, *collegia*, *universitates* and *communitates* may be punished. Special penalties exist for clerics guilty of the crime of usury or who fail to enforce the canons against usury.

The texts of the Decretum refuse usurers admission to the clerical ranks.<sup>2</sup> Severe penalties are inflicted upon clerics who receive usury and refuse to cease when admonished by the bishop. With their customary lack of precision as to the exact nature of penalties, these older canons declare that such clerics are to be denied communion,<sup>3</sup> are suspended from office,<sup>4</sup> are rejected from the ranks of the clergy,<sup>5</sup> are deposed,<sup>6</sup> or are degraded.<sup>7</sup>

The more recent texts of the Decretals are more precise. The penalty is suspension from office and benefice and it is understood that the cleric is first to be admonished to cease his usurious practices.<sup>8</sup> Rufinus understands the penalty to

<sup>1</sup> See *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939) 81-147.

<sup>2</sup> D.47.c.4.

<sup>3</sup> C.14.q.4.c.2: a communione abstinere.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*c.1: a clericalibus officiis abstinere cogantur.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*c.3: cohibeatur a clero; c.4: de gradu suo dejectus, alienus habeatur a clero; c.7:

dejiciatur a clero et alienus habeatur ab ecclesiastico gradu; D.47.c.1: dejiciatur a clero.

<sup>6</sup> D.47.c.1: deponatur.

<sup>7</sup> D.47.c.5: degradari.

<sup>8</sup> X.V.19.c.7: Qui si parere contempserint, si clerici sint, eos ab officio beneficioque suspendas.



be deposition; <sup>9</sup> Bernard of Pavia, first suspension from office, and then deposition if he continues to take usury.<sup>10</sup> Huguccio holds that he is first to be excluded from communion, sacramental Communion as well as the society of the faithful, and then if he remains obdurate he will be deposed, losing both his office and benefice.<sup>11</sup> Hostiensis has also a gradation of penalties. The clerk is first suspended from office and benefice and then degraded.<sup>12</sup> Most of the authors understand the text to mean deposition preceded by a temporary suspension from office and benefice, and that the bishop has power to reinstate one who has made restitution of his unjust gains and performed fitting penance.<sup>13</sup> Degradation may have been reserved as an extreme measure where the cleric's business of money lending was notorious and he remained contumacious. A more exhaustive examination than we have made of the records of the ecclesiastical courts might reveal examples of the degradation of a cleric for the crime of usury. Finally, these penalties are not incurred *ipso facto* but must be declared by the courts.<sup>14</sup>

Various local councils are concerned with the punishment of clerics who lend at usury. Two English councils of the second quarter of the twelfth century declare that they are to be degraded.<sup>15</sup> At the end of the thirteenth a council held at Exeter pronounces perpetual suspension from office and benefice of such clerics.<sup>16</sup> A council at Montpellier in 1195, recalling the council of Tours, adds that deposition will follow suspension if the cleric does not cease his avaricious practices.<sup>17</sup> The constitutions of the Church of Ferrara drawn up in 1332 decide that not only must the usury exacted by clerics be restored but that the principal itself is forfeited to the diocesan treasury.<sup>18</sup>

A cleric who does not cooperate in bringing usurers to justice incurs the penalty of suspension. This is clear from a canon of the Third Lateran Council which states that those who grant Christian burial to impenitent usurers or who receive their oblations must restore the latter and in addition will be suspended from office *ad arbitrium episcopi*.<sup>19</sup> Bernard of Pavia remarks that there are avaricious priests who consider that they are free to receive the offerings made by usurers because the money has committed no sin.<sup>20</sup> To whom are such offerings to be restored? Alanus, Goffredus, Innocent IV and Hostiensis teach that they are to be handed over to the bishop.<sup>21</sup> Bernard of Parma<sup>22</sup> and Guilielmus Naso<sup>23</sup> say that they are to be returned to the usurer who made them. Abbas Antiquus holds that it is a safer procedure to restore them to the debtors from whom usury has been exacted.<sup>24</sup> Joannes Andreae and Bohic consider that Bernard's opinion is to be followed when the usurer has begun to make restitution of his ill-gotten gain or is on

<sup>9</sup> *Summa Decretorum*, D.47.c.1, edit. Singer, p. 110: Tunc enim sine conditione deponeretur. Cf. also C.14.q.1. dictum ante c.1, p. 342.

<sup>10</sup> *Summa Decretalium*, V.15.n.11, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238: Si clericus est usurarius ab officio suspendatur et, nisi resipuerit, deponetur.

<sup>11</sup> *Summa*, D.47.c.5. *abstinere*, Paris, Bibl. Nat. Ms. Latin 3892, fol. 55<sup>r</sup>, col. 1: a communione sacramentorum et fidelium, sed nec sic vult cessare vel abstinere, ab officio et beneficio ecclesiastico tamquam depositum. Cf. also C.14.q.4.c.2. *a communione*, fol. 218<sup>r</sup>, col. 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Summa Aurea, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 376<sup>r</sup>: Et si usurarius clericus sit, ab officio beneficioque suspendatur . . . Et si nec adhuc clericus desistat, degradatus est.

<sup>13</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.7. *suspendas*; Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on the same word.

<sup>14</sup> See various commentaries on X.V.19.c.7.

<sup>15</sup> London, 1126, can. 14; Westminster, 1138, can. 9 (Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, p. 408, 415).

<sup>16</sup> Can. 24 (*Id.* II, p. 146).

<sup>17</sup> Mansi, 26, 670.

<sup>18</sup> Can. 32 (*Id.* 25, 917).

<sup>19</sup> X.V.19.c.3.

<sup>20</sup> *Summa*, V.15.n.11, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238.

<sup>21</sup> See Bohic, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3; Innocent IV, *Commentaria* on the same canon; Hostiensis, *Summa, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 375<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.7. *reddere*.

<sup>23</sup> His opinion is reported by Hostiensis, *Summa, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 375<sup>v</sup>. This canonist, a pupil of Alanus, taught at Bologna during the second quarter of the thirteenth century. Cf. Schulte, *Geschichte*, II, p. 78 ff.

<sup>24</sup> See Bohic, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3.

the point of doing so. Otherwise the offerings are to be entrusted to the bishop who will distribute them to those who paid usury, to their heirs or to the poor.<sup>25</sup>

The general council held at Lyons in 1274 deals with the conduct of clerics who grant usurers ecclesiastical burial and declares that they will suffer the penalties promulgated by the Lateran Council against usurers.<sup>26</sup> Does this mean that such clerics are to be punished in the same way as usurers? At first sight the canon seems to consider them as abettors in the crime of usury and to punish them in the same way as the principals. However this does not appear to be the sense of the text. The Council of Lyons is referring to the canon of the Lateran Council against usurers, a canon which contains in fact two sets of penalties, one for usurers, the other for clerics who grant them Christian burial or accept their offerings. It is the second clause which Lyons orders to be applied. This is the interpretation of Joannes Andreae<sup>27</sup> who adds that to-day this penalty is excommunication *ipso facto*.<sup>28</sup> This is clear from the canons of some of the local councils. Thus the statutes of the diocese of Paris of the year 1212 declare that such clerics are *ipso facto* excommunicated, that they are suspended from office and benefice and that only the Pope may absolve them.<sup>29</sup> In 1215 a council of Montpellier declares excommunicated and deposed clerics who administer the sacraments or grant ecclesiastical burial to usurers.<sup>30</sup> By a decree of the council of Vienne inserted in the *Clementinae* it becomes the general law that clerics who give Christian burial to usurers are *ipso facto* excommunicated.<sup>31</sup> This crime is listed in the work of Bérenger Frédol among the cases of excommunication where the confessor must demand special faculties from the bishop before proceeding to absolve a penitent.<sup>32</sup>

The same Council of Lyons threatens with severe penalties clerics of all ranks who do not co-operate in causing to be observed another of its canons concerning usurers. Ordering all foreigners who take usury to be expelled from the territory and forbidding anyone to rent them houses to carry on their business, the council declares that those who act against this decree will be suspended from office if they are patriarchs, archbishops or bishops; other ecclesiastics will be excommunicated; *collegia* and *universitates* will be placed under interdict. All of these penalties are incurred *ipso facto*. Moreover, if they remain under any of these penalties for one month and the usurers are still dwelling in their midst the whole territory falls under an interdict.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Commentaries of both authors on X.V. 19.c.3.

<sup>26</sup> VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.2: Omnes autem religiosos et alios qui manifestos usurarios contra praesentis sanctionis formam ad ecclesiasticam ausi fuerint admittere sepulturam, poenae Lateranensis concilii contra usurarios promulgatae, statui-mus subjacere.

<sup>27</sup> Gloss on preceding canon, *poenae*: Supple, statutae in Lateranense concilio, supra, contra usurarios. Hoc dico quia hic non habet locum poena contra usurarios statuta sed habet locum poena statuta in recipientes eos ad oblationes et ecclesiasticam sepulturam.

<sup>28</sup> Gloss on *subjacere*: Hodie sunt excommunicati ipso facto non obstante exceptionibus vel privilegiis.

<sup>29</sup> Part V, can. 7 (Mansi, 22, 851).

<sup>30</sup> Can. 29 (*Id.* 22, 941).

<sup>31</sup> *Clementinae*, III.7.c.1. We find some canonists accusing the religious of disregarding this canon: 'Et dicit dominus Antonius quod fratres et religiosi male servant hanc decretalem quia sepeliunt usurarios, non solum in ecclesia, sed

etiam ante altare.' See John of Anagni, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3.n.1, fol. 167<sup>v</sup>. Cf. A. Bernard, *La sépulture en droit canonique du Décret de Gratien au Concile de Trente* (Paris, 1933), p. 120.

<sup>32</sup> *Liber de Excommunicatione*, edit. E. Vernay (Paris, 1912), section III, compléments postérieurs, II, n. 5; III; IV; V, n.2; VI, n.3; VII (p. 60, 68, 77, 79, 84, 90). This work was composed in 1298-1299 and additions were made as new cases of excommunication appeared in the councils or papal decrees.

<sup>33</sup> VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.1: Qui vero contra fecerint, si personae fuerint ecclesiasticae, patriarchae, archiepiscopi, episcopi suspensionis, minores vero personae singulares excommunicationis, si autem collegium seu alia universitas, interdicti sententiam ipso facto se noverint incururos. Quam si per mensem animo sustinerint indurato: terrae ipsorum, quamdiu in eis iidem usurarii commorantur, extunc ecclesiastico subiaceant interdicto. The commentary of Joannes Andreae on this text does not suggest any difficulties.

We come now to the penalties incurred by laymen guilty of the crime of usury. The Third Lateran Council in 1179 lays down a threefold penalty for *usurarii manifesti*:<sup>34</sup> they are forbidden communion, their offerings are refused and if they die in their sin they are deprived of Christian burial.<sup>35</sup> Various texts of the Decretals,<sup>36</sup> and numerous local councils recall the same penalties.<sup>37</sup> As we have already seen, it was considered necessary for the enforcement of this regulation to threaten clerics with an additional penalty if they neglected to apply it to usurers.

The canonists ask what is meant by saying that usurers are not to be admitted *ad communionem altaris*. All the earlier commentators understand it to be a prohibition against the reception of the Eucharist.<sup>38</sup> Abbas Antiquus interprets it to mean that the usurer is not to be admitted to the church during divine services. Since those assisting at Mass should be admitted to Communion if they present themselves it seems that usurers should not be allowed to attend Mass. Panormitanus likes this interpretation and hopes that it will be followed in practice.<sup>39</sup> Alexander de Nevo<sup>40</sup> gives additional reasons why the text, in spite of the word *altaris*, must mean exclusion from the divine services and not simply from Communion. Theologians teach, he says, that an assistant at Mass who has perfect contrition and who has fulfilled the three necessary conditions, that is, received absolution, made restitution and loves his enemies, such a one, even though he does not approach the holy table to receive the Body of Christ materially, does gain the fruit of the Sacrifice. The mere assisting at Mass then can be called a *communio altaris*, a communion in the Sacrifice offered upon the altar and it is this which is denied to usurers. Moreover, the Lateran Council intended to inflict new penalties upon usurers. If the penalty were only refusal of Communion this would not be new because whoever is evidently in mortal sin must be denied the Eucharist.<sup>41</sup>

The penalties of the Lateran Council constitute an excommunication or, more correctly, a partial excommunication. Such a penalty had already been promulgated by an earlier Lateran Council in 1139,<sup>42</sup> and later synods refer to it as an excommunication to be announced by pastors several times a year, usually on all Sundays and feast days.<sup>43</sup> A text of Alexander III inserted in the Decretals likewise calls it an excommunication.<sup>44</sup> The canonists, however, teach that the penalties here constitute a minor excommunication, an excommunication as regards certain acts. The penalties of this canon are first to be applied and if the usurer does not cease his money lending and make restitution he will fall under a major excommunication which will cut him off from all intercourse with the faithful.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>34</sup> This term will be discussed below, p. 12 ff.

<sup>35</sup> X.V.19.c.3: *Constituimus quod usurarii manifesti nec ad communionem admittantur altaris, nec christianam, si in hoc peccato decesserint, accipiant sepulturam, sed nec oblationes eorum quisquam accipiat.*

<sup>36</sup> X.V.19.c.5 and 9.

<sup>37</sup> Montpellier, 1195; Avignon, 1209, can. 3; Trier, 1238, can. 34; Mainz, 1261, can. 25; Sens, 1269, can. 2; Cologne, 1280, can. 14, etc. (Mansi, 22, 670, 786; 23, 483, 1090; 24, 4, 359).

<sup>38</sup> Bernard of Pavia, *Summa*, V.15.n.11, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238; Innocent IV, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3. *ad communionem*; Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on the same canon.

<sup>39</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 232v.

<sup>40</sup> This canonist, professor at Padua, wrote before 1441 his *Consilia contra Judaeos foenerantes*. Cf. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 330.

<sup>41</sup> Additions to the *Commentaria* of Panormitanus, Vol. VII, fol. 232v. Cf. also John of Anagni, Bolognese professor in the first half of the fifteenth century, *Commentaria super quinto decretalium* (Lyons, 1553), V.19.c.3.n.9, fol. 168r.

<sup>42</sup> Canon 13 (Mansi, 21, 529).

<sup>43</sup> Avignon, 1209, can. 3; Châteaue-Gontier, 1231, can. 30; Mainz, 1261, can. 25; Arles, 1275, can. 18, etc. (Mansi, 22, 786; 23, 239, 1090; 24, 152).

<sup>44</sup> X.V.19.c.7: *Si laici fuerint, usque ad dignam satisfactionem ipsos vinculo excommunicationis astringas.*

<sup>45</sup> Raymund, *Summa*, II.7.n.7, p. 212: *Ipo jure sunt excommunicati quantum ad tria . . . Potest (judex) usurarium quemlibet cogere ad restituendas usuras, si necesse esset, etiam per majorem excommunicationem, omni appellatione remota*; Bernard of Parma, gloss on X.V.19.c.5. *per poenam* and on c. 7. *excommunicata*.

Innocent III in a letter of 1208 to the bishop of Arras counsels him to proceed cautiously in enforcing the decrees of the Lateran Council because usurers are so numerous that if all were punished many churches would have to be closed. The bishop is advised not to condemn all at once but to choose a few of the worst offenders of whom he will make an example and so without a personal condemnation frighten others into ceasing their usurious transactions.<sup>46</sup>

The councils also declare that the penalty is incurred *ipso facto* though some of them grant a few days grace after the promulgation made in the church.<sup>47</sup> The canonists are divided on the question of whether they are so incurred or whether they must be inflicted by the judge. Innocent IV<sup>48</sup> and Raymund of Pennafort<sup>49</sup> teach that they are incurred *ipso jure*. Bernard of Parma<sup>50</sup> and Hostiensis<sup>51</sup> hold that they are not *latae* but *ferendae sententiae*. Bohic prefers this more lenient opinion.<sup>52</sup> Dregon of Hautvillers says that usurers incur *ipso facto* a minor excommunication, that is exclusion from the sacraments but not from the society of the faithful.<sup>53</sup> Panormitanus holds the more rigorous opinion; a usurer is excommunicated without the necessity of any sentence.<sup>54</sup> He goes on to say that the judge may begin by the penalty which he chooses but he urges him to begin by excommunication which the usurer fears most because it affects him during his lifetime, whereas he has little fear of the penalty which deprives him of ecclesiastical burial.<sup>55</sup>

A number of canons forbid priests to absolve usurers in the confessional even when they promise to make restitution. The crime of usury is a reserved case and only the bishop or one having special faculties may absolve a penitent from this sin except, of course, in danger of death.<sup>56</sup>

The usurer is also to be held as infamous and consequently is ineligible for the reception of dignities and honours and his testimony will not be accepted in ecclesiastical courts.<sup>57</sup>

The penalties for the crime of usury are not all by any means of the spiritual order. There are some which affect the usurer in his property, especially when he comes to die. In 1212 a council of Paris declares that the property of one who dies a usurer is to be confiscated by the king and distributed to the poor.<sup>58</sup> At the same time it decrees that no usurer may make a last will bequeathing anything to his family, to religious establishments or to others since the fruits of rapine may not be the object of a gift.<sup>59</sup>

*tionis*; Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.5. *ulla poena*, and *Summa, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 376<sup>r</sup>: Sed et si laicus sit et prima poena inflicta se non emendaverit, majori excommunicatione percutitur.

<sup>46</sup> Potthast, 3382 (P.L.215, 1380).

<sup>47</sup> Avignon, 1282, can. 1 (Mansi, 24, 439).

<sup>48</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3. *christianam*.

<sup>49</sup> *Summa*, II.7.n.7, p. 212. John of Fribourg holds the same opinion according to Bohic, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, p. 169.

<sup>50</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.5. *privandos*: Et ita canon ille, *quia in omnibus* (can. 3) non est *latae sententiae* sed *ferendae*. Goffredus has the same teaching.

<sup>51</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3. *sepulturam*; c. 5. *privandos*.

<sup>52</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, p. 169.

<sup>53</sup> *Summa de omni facultate*, part I, n. XIV (*Archives législatives de la ville de Reims*, edit. Varin, Paris, 1840, Vol. I, part I, p. 391).

<sup>54</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 233<sup>r</sup>: Sed ego tenerem . . . ut non requiratur

*sententia hominis quia non est hic positum aliquod verbum per quod sententia hominis exigatur, nam in usurariis videtur ut non admittantur ad sepulturam, etc., et non dicit ut priventur*. He supports his argument also from the more recent texts of the *Liber Sextus* and the *Clementinae*.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.* on c. 7, Vol. VII, fol. 238<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>56</sup> Constitutions of Canterbury, 1222; Exeter, 1287, can. 24 (Wilkins, I, 597; II, 166); Avignon, 1282, can. 1; Lucca, 1308, can. 70 (Mansi, 24, 439; 25, 194).

<sup>57</sup> Lateran, 1139, can. 13 (Mansi, 21, 529): In tota vita infames habeantur; Hostiensis, *Summa, de usuris*, n. 3, fol. 372<sup>r</sup>: Sed secundum jura canonica in utraque (that is in exacting either *foenus sortis* or *foenus foenoris*) mortale peccatum committitur et infamia irrogatur. According to Roman Law only the second kind of usury carried the penalty of infamy.

<sup>58</sup> Part V, can. 5 (Mansi, 22, 850).

<sup>59</sup> Part V, can. 1 (*Id.* 22, 849).

A concordat drawn up to settle differences between the ecclesiastical and secular authorities of Normandy in 1190 states that whatever property is left by a cleric who has practiced usury is to be employed by the bishop for works of charity.<sup>60</sup> When it is established that a layman was a usurer at the time of his death, whatever property he has still in his possession is to be confiscated. However what he has alienated during his lifetime is not to be revoked under pretext that he was a usurer.<sup>61</sup> This last clause is a protest of the Church against the practice of the king's agents who refuse to allow bequests to ecclesiastical establishments but claim that the deceased was a usurer and so had forfeited all his property to the state. This same grievance is voiced by Innocent III in a letter to Louis VIII of France in 1212.<sup>62</sup> It is clear from a sentence concerning Normandy, pronounced by the Parlement of Paris in 1258, that the property of a deceased usurer is held by the king only until the first assize when the affair is examined. If the claim of usury is established the property is turned over to the bishop who with the bailiff undertakes to make restitution to those who have been defrauded through usury.<sup>63</sup> An act of the time of Philip Augustus for the same country declares that the distribution made personally by a usurer while on his death-bed is done lawfully but if he neglects to do so his property goes to the king provided it is proven that he loaned at usury during the year preceding his death.<sup>64</sup>

Most of the *coutumiers* treat of the same question. Thus the *Très ancien coutumier* of Normandy, belonging to the early thirteenth century, says that all the chattels of one who dies a usurer go to the Duke, none of them benefitting the family or the Church. The family retain the *hereditas*.<sup>65</sup> The *Établissements de Saint Louis*, written about 1273, state that the baron receives the chattels of one proven to have died a usurer.<sup>66</sup> The same regulation is to be found in the *Coutume de Touraine-Anjou*,<sup>67</sup> and in the *Abrégé Champenois*.<sup>68</sup> According to Glanvill all the movables and chattels of a deceased usurer are forfeit to the king whether the man dies intestate or not.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Art. 6 (Mansi, 22, 590): De bonis vero clericorum etsi dicantur fuisse usurarii, vel quocumque genere mortis praeventi, nihil pertinet ad saecularem potestatem, sed episcopali auctoritate in pias causas distribuentur. For the nature of this concordat see R. Génestal, *Le Privilègium Fori en France*, II (Paris, 1924), p. 107 ff.

<sup>61</sup> Art. 7 (*loc. cit.*): Item quicquid laici in vita sua donaverint vel quocumque titulo a se alienaverint, etsi usurarii fuisse dicantur, post mortem non revocabitur. Quae vero post mortem non alienata invenientur, si recognitum fuerit ipsos tempore mortis fuisse usurarios, confiscabuntur.

<sup>62</sup> Potthast, 4339 (P.L. 216, 487).

<sup>63</sup> *Les Olim*, edit. Beugnot, Vol. I (Paris, 1846), p. 62, n. 6. (*Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*).

<sup>64</sup> Text in Viollet's edition of the *Établissements de Saint Louis*, Vol. IV (Paris, 1886), p. 38: Nous deimes par nostre serement que des choses as usuriers, tant comme l'usurier sera el lict de sa maladie, se il distribue les choses de sa main propre, se sera chose ferme et estable; et se il ne le fait ainsi, toutes ses choses après sa mort seront à nostre sire le roy, pour tant que il soit prouvé que en chel an, el quel il mourut, il ait presté à usure. See H. Auffroy, *Évolution du testament en France* (Paris, 1899), p. 458-459.

<sup>65</sup> Part I, chap. 49, edit. Tardif (Rouen,

1881), p. 40: Si aliquis usurarius obierit et usuram notam sacramento duodecim vicinorum hominum per annum et diem ultimum vite sue tenuerit, omnia catalla ejus habebit Dux, in cujuscunque terra manserit usurarius; uxor enim et ejus liberi nichil habebunt de catallis, nec presbiteri similiter. Uxori et liberis hereditas remanebit.

<sup>66</sup> Liv. I, Chap. XCI, edit. Viollet, Vol. II, p. 148: Quant en la terre au baron a aucun userier ou en quel que terre que ce soit, et il en est provez, li mueble si en doivent estre au baron.

<sup>67</sup> In Viollet's edition of the *Établissements*, Vol. III, p. 50. This is one of the sources used by the author of the *Établissements*. The *Compilatio de usibus et consuetudinibus Andegavie*, somewhat later, probably after 1315, says: Il est droiz et usages que se usuriers communs muert in Enjo, ou en Poito, ou en Maine, que le meubles est le roy. Ce que l'en en puit trover en Touraine ne tient pas cest usage. Art. 21, edit. Viollet, Vol. III, p. 121.

<sup>68</sup> Abridged from the *Établissements* at the end of the thirteenth century. Art. 89, edit. Viollet. Vol. III, p. 164. See G. D'Espinay, *De l'influence du droit canonique sur la législation française* (Toulouse, 1856), p. 209-210.

<sup>69</sup> *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae*, edit. Woodbine (New Haven, 1932), Bk. VII, chap. 16, p. 112: Omnes res mobiles et omnia catalla quae fuerunt ipsius usurarii mortui, ad usus



Contrary to the rule of the *Très ancien coutumier* the *hereditas* does not remain to the family but returns to the lord who granted it.<sup>70</sup> It is to be noted that no penalty is provided for usurers provided they do not die in their sin. The contemporary *Dialogus de Scaccario* states that if a usurer dies without having made restitution his money and movables are confiscated by the king. The heirs retain the land and immovables.<sup>71</sup>

Gregory X in the Council of Lyons in 1274 makes a general law of the canon of the Council of Paris concerning the testamentary power of a usurer. Unless certain conditions are fulfilled the last will and testament of one who is proven guilty of usury is *ipso jure* null and void.<sup>72</sup> Even though by his last will a usurer orders restitution of what he has received from his business he is nevertheless to be denied Christian burial until full satisfaction has been made by his heirs or until sufficient guarantees have been given that such will be made. The bishop, the pastor or one delegated by either must be present at the drawing up of such a will to receive the guarantees because it often happens that the act orders restitution to be made but when the usurer has been buried the heirs find ways of preventing the execution of his last wishes. To obviate this injustice the council requires that such wills observe certain formalities and forbids all other persons, laymen or clerics, to assist at their writing unless acting as representatives of the ecclesiastical authority. It is hoped that effective restitution will result from the refusal of Christian burial to such testators who transmit to their heirs the obligation of satisfying for their unjust dealings.<sup>73</sup> This canon, inserted in the *Liber Sextus*, is recalled by numerous local councils during the following century and the testaments of usurers are pronounced null and void.<sup>74</sup> Every Sunday pastors are to read this canon to the faithful.<sup>75</sup> Notaries are forbidden to assist at the drawing up of last wills unless the parish priest be also present.<sup>76</sup>

Commenting upon the canon of Lyons, Joannes Andreae asks what is the value of a codicil which a usurer adds to his will. Though such codicils are not expressly forbidden and though penalties are to be interpreted strictly, he concludes, however, that a codicil is a will in a broad sense and consequently is without value when made by a usurer. His principal reason for this opinion is that if such codicils were allowed an excellent method would be provided the usurer for evading the law.<sup>77</sup> What is to be said of the last will and testament of a usurer which complies with the conditions required by the Canon Law but the testator has since been lending at usury in such a way that his crime cannot be hidden? Federicus of Siena,<sup>78</sup> a contemporary of Joannes Andreae, declares that such conduct destroys

domini regis capientur, penes quemcumque inveniantur res illae. Cf. *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939), p. 114, note 277.

<sup>70</sup> Heredes quoque ipsius hac eadem de causa exheredantur secundum jus regni et ad dominum vel dominos revertetur hereditas. *Loc. cit.*

<sup>71</sup> Edition of Hughes, Crump and Johnson (Oxford, 1902), II.X.G, p. 136: Pecunia ejus et omnia mobilia mox infiscantur et non summonita per officiales ad scaccarium deferuntur. Heres autem jam defuncti fundo paterno et ejus immobilibus sibi vix relictis gaudeat. See also II.X.I, p. 137.

<sup>72</sup> VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.2: Testamenta quoque manifestorum usurariorum aliter facta non valeant sed sint irrita ipso jure.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Statutes of Liège, 1287, tit. 33, can. 3; Councils of Cologne, about 1300, can. 12; Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; Ravenna, 1317, can. 15 (Mansi, 24, 936; 25, 21, 498, 613).

<sup>75</sup> Béziers, 1286, can. 6 (*Id.* 24, 636).

<sup>76</sup> Ravenna, 1286, can. 6 (*Id.* 24, 621).

<sup>77</sup> Gloss on VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.2. *aliter facta*: Quid dices de codicillis? Videtur quod valeant, diversa enim sunt . . . et haec constitutio est poenalis, ergo est restringenda . . . et prohibitis majoribus, minora petere non prohibetur . . . Dic contra secundum Guil[ielmum de Montelaudano] et Gar[siam Hispanum], et hoc patet ex principio ubi dixit, 'in ultima voluntate,' et . . . quia large codicilli sunt testamentum, quia mentis testatio . . . Alias facile esset constitutionem hanc in hoc eludere.

<sup>78</sup> See Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 237.

the validity of the previous will. Panormitanus holds the more lenient opinion that the will retains its value.<sup>79</sup>

The same penalties which are inflicted upon usurers also fall upon their heirs who oppose restitution of the ill-gotten gain and upon all others who had shared in this gain.<sup>80</sup> According to Vincentius Hispanus the heirs are bound *in solidum*, all their property being *obligata*, so that if one of them becomes insolvent before restitution is made the others are bound to repay all. Ignorance of the testator's crime does not excuse them from this obligation.<sup>81</sup> Hostiensis gives this as the common opinion of his day and hesitates to contradict it. However he proceeds to distinguish between heirs in the strict sense and *extranei*.<sup>82</sup> The former are bound *in solidum*, the latter are not. In introducing this distinction the great canonist is aiming at being practical. The common opinion, in fact, involved a difficulty of the practical order. An outsider might discover only after many years that his property came from the fruits of usury which he had received in good faith and now it is very difficult for him to make restitution. It is not the same with the direct heirs who are generally in a position to know how the property was acquired by the testator.<sup>83</sup> Joannes Andreae and others<sup>84</sup> follow the new doctrine so that Panormitanus can say that all modern authors reject the older opinion and hold for the distinction introduced by Hostiensis.<sup>85</sup>

A number of penalties directed against the family and servants of the usurer were aimed at bringing about the latter's conversion. The servants must leave their employ or incur the same punishment as their masters.<sup>86</sup> Again they are threatened with excommunication if they remain in their service.<sup>87</sup> The council held in Paris in 1212, so severe in its condemnation of the crime of usury, states that the wife of a usurer has no right to accept anything from her husband because he gives what is not his. However she is permitted to receive what is necessary while she attempts to convert him and persuades him to make restitution. When she discovers that he is incorrigible and that she can do nothing she is bound to seek a separation *quoad mensam et convivium* but not *quoad torum*. It is better that she beg than accept any support from her husband. If, however she becomes ill or is otherwise unable to beg, she may receive from him what she needs since she is reduced to the state of a beggar and is really providing him with the opportunity of making restitution to the poor in what he gives her. The same necessity permits children and grandchildren to receive support from their parents.<sup>88</sup>

A century later a council of Mainz has a similar procedure. If there is hope of correcting him the wife is to live with her usurious husband. If not, she and her children are to leave him and live off their own property if they possess any; if they have none they are to go to relatives and friends. If the husband does not allow this they are to denounce him to the bishop. If he still remains obstinate then

<sup>79</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 233v.

<sup>80</sup> X.V.19.c.9: Respondemus quod filii ad restituendas usuras ea sunt districtione cogendi qua parentes sui, si viverint, cogentur. Idipsum etiam contra heredes extraneos credimus exercendum. Cf. also c. 17; Alanus, gloss on c. 5, *vendi*, and Bernard of Pavia, *Summa*, V.15. n.10, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238.

<sup>81</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.9.

<sup>82</sup> As we have just seen, Alexander III affirmed the strict obligation upon the heirs to make restitution but hesitated to lay down the same rule for *extranei*.

<sup>83</sup> *Commentaria* on c. 9; *Summa, de usuris*, n.

10, fol. 376r.

<sup>84</sup> Reported by Bohic, *Commentaria* on c. 9, p. 174-175.

<sup>85</sup> *Commentaria* on c. 9, Vol. VII, fol. 239v.

<sup>86</sup> Paris, 1212, part V, can. 6 (Mansi, 22, 851).

<sup>87</sup> Mainz, 1310 (*Id.* 25, 340).

<sup>88</sup> Part V, can. 10 (*Id.* 22, 852). On the separation of husband and wife of which it is question in this canon, a *separatio quoad bona salvo jure tori*, consult H. Richardot, *Les pactes de séparation aimable entre époux* (Paris, 1930), p. 76 ff. and A. Esmein, *Le mariage en droit canonique*, 2nd ed. by R. Génestal and J. Dauvil- liers, II (Paris, 1935), p. 111-112; 348, n. 4.

they may live with him rather than become public beggars or starve.<sup>89</sup> Sometimes a usurer was willing to remain a long time under sentence of excommunication intending to arrange for restitution when he came to die. To prevent this and to forestall the new difficulty which then often arose from the opposition of the wife and family to the execution of his last will, the same council of Mainz decrees that if a usurer remain one month under sentence of excommunication the sacraments are to be refused his wife and children. An exception is made for baptism and also for the other sacraments in danger of death.<sup>90</sup>

Still other penalties are indirectly aimed at bringing about the punishment of usurers. Those who pay usury and do not within a month denounce their creditors are to be excommunicated.<sup>91</sup> The cemetery where a usurer has been buried will be placed under an interdict until the body is exhumed.<sup>92</sup> Sometimes also the church is closed.<sup>93</sup> Lawyers are forbidden, not only, as we have seen, to aid in drawing up last wills of usurers, but also to defend them in court just as they are forbidden to defend heretics. One who disregards this rule will be suspended from office and if he continues to defend such cases will be excommunicated.<sup>94</sup> He may, however, defend one accused of usury provided he swears to retire as soon as he is convinced that it is really a case of usury and not the case of a contract which, though charged with being usurious, is not such in fact or at least so far has not been officially branded as unjust.<sup>95</sup> Hostiensis remarks that even officials of the papal Curia sometimes defend usurers.<sup>96</sup> Notaries are forbidden to perform any service for usurers especially to help them in drawing up their usurious contracts or other contracts *in fraudem usurae*.<sup>97</sup> Hostiensis holds that a notary who acts against this canon incurs the penalty of infamy and his testimony is no longer to be accepted in a court of justice.<sup>98</sup>

New and more stringent measures against usurers are promulgated by the general council of Lyons in 1274. These have force of law everywhere and are inserted in the *Liber Sextus* by Boniface VIII in 1298. No person of any rank, whether an individual or juristic person, may rent or in any way grant a house to a stranger to the district who intends to practice usury, nor allow him to continue to occupy it if it is at present being used for such purposes. All such strangers are to be expelled from the territory within three months. Those who transgress this decree will be excommunicated if they are minor clerics, suspended if they are in major orders and placed under an interdict if they are corporations. The lands of those who remain under any of these penalties for the space of a month will fall under an interdict. If laymen offend against this law the bishop will punish them by ecclesiastical censures.<sup>99</sup> This canon is renewed by numerous local councils in the course of the century following.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Mainz, 1310 (*Id.* 25, 340).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* The same decree is to be found in a council of Trier, 1310, can. 141 (*Id.* 25, 289).

<sup>91</sup> Mainz, 1310 (*Id.* 25, 340).

<sup>92</sup> Würzburg, 1287, can. 23 (*Id.* 24, 859).

<sup>93</sup> Constitutions promulgated by the papal legate in Lombardy in 1287, can. 16 (*Id.* 24, 885).

<sup>94</sup> Paris, 1212, part V, can. 3 (*Id.* 22, 850); Cf. also canon 8 (*Ibid.*).

<sup>95</sup> Cologne, 1280, can. 14 (*Id.* 24, 359); Statuimus quod nullus omnino advocatus usurario in usurarum causis patrocinium praestet, nisi iuramentum faciat quod quam cito sciverit, vel scire potuerit, causam esse usurariam, eam ulterius non fovebit, nec patrocinium aliquod usurario ipsi clam vel aperte impertietur; Saint-Quentin, 1231, in *Archives administratives*

*de la ville de Reims*, edit. Varin, Vol. I, part 2, p. 552.

<sup>96</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.15. *tuentur*.

<sup>97</sup> Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; Florence, 1346 (Mansi, 25, 498; 26, 61).

<sup>98</sup> *Summa, de usuris*, n. 8, fol. 375<sup>r</sup>. Archidiaconus follows Hostiensis on this point, *Summa*, D.46.c.10.n.2, fol. 58<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>99</sup> VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.1. Beaumanoir, writing between 1279 and 1283, states that a baron who has forbidden lending at usury on his lands may seize a usurer and hold him until he has made restitution of the usury received since the prohibition and has also paid the fine for transgressing the law. *Coutumes de Beauvaisis*, edit. Salmon, II (Paris, 1900), n. 1933, p. 475.

<sup>100</sup> Tours, 1282, can. 6; Würzburg, 1287, can. 23; Auch, 1308, can. 3; Lucca, about 1308,



Discussing this decree, Joannes Andreae points out that this law does not concern usurers who belong to the territory since they are to be punished by the other penalties against usurers. Strangers give greater scandal by the practice of usury and moreover less scandal and inconvenience is caused by their expulsion. This explains the special measures directed against them.<sup>101</sup> If one lets a house to a stranger who is not known as a usurer or lets it to him for some other purpose he is nonetheless bound to evict him as soon as he becomes aware of the true nature of his business.<sup>102</sup> The canon speaks expressly only of renting houses. We are not surprised, therefore, to find usurers obtaining a house as security for a loan or under another title instead of renting it. According to the canonists such contracts come within the scope of this decree.<sup>103</sup> Joannes Andreae says that the canon does not seem to prohibit selling, donating or exchanging a house but only conceding its use to another. However, the terms of the law are general and he is forced to agree with another famous glossator of the *Liber Sextus*, Guillaume de Montlauzun,<sup>104</sup> that such contracts are presumed to have been made *in fraudem legis* if it is evident that the house is being used for purposes of moneylending.<sup>105</sup>

Another series of general decrees were formulated by Clement V in the Council of Vienne in 1311-1312 and incorporated in the *Clementinae*. The first part of the canon touches the question of whether the civil law may permit usury and declares excommunicated all secular officials of whatever rank who make, write or cause to be made or written any statute compelling debtors to pay usury which they have promised or which denies to them the right to recover usury already paid. The same penalty is incurred by those who judge according to such statutes, who enforce them or who, having the power to do so, do not within three months delete them from the statute books or suppress them if they are recognized, unwritten customs.<sup>106</sup> The same prohibition is to be found henceforth in other councils,<sup>107</sup> as well as in the *Liber de Excommunicatione* of Bérenger Frédol.<sup>108</sup>

As we have already seen in the first part of this study the canonists hold that such statutes have no binding force since they are opposed to both the divine and the ecclesiastical law.<sup>109</sup> Moreover, civil laws which affirm that a debtor who demands restitution in an ecclesiastical court can be obliged to lend the creditor an equal sum of money for the same length of time as the original loan are without value because a natural obligation may not be made the object of a civil contract.<sup>110</sup> Also stand condemned statutes which forbid demanding usury beyond a certain rate because they seem to implicitly approve the taking of usury provided it is not in excess of that rate.<sup>111</sup>

can. 56; Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; etc. (Mansi, 24, 470, 859; 25, 199, 188, 498).

<sup>101</sup> Gloss on VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.1. *alienigenas*.

<sup>102</sup> Gloss on *ad foenus*.

<sup>103</sup> Gloss on *titulo*.

<sup>104</sup> Guilielmus de Montelaudano, taught Canon Law at Toulouse, died 1343. His works belong to the period 1306-1319. See Paul Fournier, 'Guillaume de Montlauzun' in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXXV (Paris, 1921), p. 467-503; Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 197-199.

<sup>105</sup> Gloss on *titulo*.

<sup>106</sup> Clem. V.5.c.1.

<sup>107</sup> Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; Levaur, 1368, can. 120 (Mansi, 25, 500; 26, 538).

<sup>108</sup> Edit. Vernay (Paris, 1912), III Compléments postérieurs, II, n. 28-32; V, n. 12-14; p. 63, 80, 81.

<sup>109</sup> See the various commentators, especially

Innocent IV, Hostiensis and Joannes Andreae on X.1.2.c.7. Cf. *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939), p. 84 ff.

<sup>110</sup> Gloss on Clem. V.5.c.1. *onera*; Panormitanus, *Commentaria super clementinas epistolas* (Venice, 1588), on the same canon, Vol. VII, fol. 437v.

<sup>111</sup> Gloss on *facere*; Panormitanus on the same canon. The *Coutumes d'Alais*, of the thirteenth century, allow usury to be charged but no matter how long payment is delayed it may never exceed the principal; edit. Beugnot in appendix to *Les Olim*, Vol. III (Paris, 1848), p. 1496. The canonists discuss the case of the king of Aragon who forces the Jews and Saracens to pay a tax for their privilege of lending at usury and whose courts refuse to hear the claims of those who seek to recover usury paid. They conclude that by such conduct the king and

The same council provides a means of more easily ascertaining the nature of the business which a man is conducting. Those accused of lending at usury are to be compelled under threat of ecclesiastical censure to show the books in which they keep an account of their transactions.<sup>112</sup> Joannes Andreae would extend the same regulation to the heirs and others accused of having received something from a known usurer.<sup>113</sup> One accused of the crime of usury who claims that he does not keep books must prove this claim and his own oath to that effect does not suffice to establish it. In the case of an heir his own oath is sufficient when he otherwise enjoys a good reputation.<sup>114</sup> Faith is to be placed in the evidence furnished by accounts when it witnesses against the usurer but not when it is favorable to him. This is because they are documents of a private nature.<sup>115</sup> Joannes Andreae holds that the ecclesiastical authorities may not go beyond the use of penalties of the spiritual order to compel the accused to exhibit his accounts but Panormitanus declares that they may employ force or other means to gain access to them.<sup>116</sup>

A number of councils suspend from office and benefice clerics who, by assisting usurers in drawing up their contracts, by witnessing them or by keeping their accounts, lead men to believe that usury is not sinful.<sup>117</sup> In the fourteenth century it becomes necessary to take measures of a more sweeping and drastic kind to prevent the spread of the error that it is permitted to receive usury. The Council of Vienne declares that if one pertinaciously affirms that it is not sinful to take usury he is to be punished as a heretic. Bishops and inquisitors are strictly enjoined to proceed against persons known or suspected guilty of this error in the same way as they would against those guilty or suspected of heresy.<sup>118</sup> Earlier canonists had sometimes stated that one reason for the prohibition of usury was that it led to idolatry<sup>119</sup> but this is far from saying that it is a form of heresy to act concerning usury as if it were not forbidden. This is the first indication we have found of this point of view but it is recalled by later councils.<sup>120</sup>

This decree is directed not only against usurers but against all who encourage the practice of exacting usury in any way by affirming that it is not a sin.<sup>121</sup> Some are teaching that there is no obligation to make restitution of usury received; others admit that the usurer is bound to make restitution but that when this is done he is not bound to do penance, no more than is one who restores to the owner the house which he has rented. All these assertions are equivalent to saying that usury is not sinful.<sup>122</sup> Such persons, say the canonists, are heretical in a broad sense. One who denies an article of faith or holds incorrect notions concerning the sacraments or who propagates perverse and novel opinions on matters of faith is a heretic in the strict sense. In the case of usury one is a heretic because he affirms something op-

his officials incur an excommunication. John of Imola affirms that for the same reason 'omnes domini et omnes communitates sunt excommunicati.' See John of Anagni, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.7.n.2, fol. 181<sup>r</sup>. One of the reasons for the opposition of the ecclesiastical authorities to the communes was that the latter often permitted lending at usury. Cf. P. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions politiques et administratives de la France*, III (Paris, 1903), p. 36-37; 201-203. See also R. Aubenas, *Recueil de lettres des officialités de Marseille et d'Aix*, Vol. I (Paris, 1937) p. 49, note 4.

<sup>112</sup> Clem. V.5.c.1.

<sup>113</sup> Gloss on word *ipsos*; See also Panormitanus, *loc. cit.*, for this and notes following.

<sup>114</sup> Gloss on *compellendos*.

<sup>115</sup> Gloss on *rationum*.

<sup>116</sup> Gloss on *censura*.

<sup>117</sup> Paris, 1212, part V, can. 3; Sens, 1269, can. 2 (Mansi, 22, 850; 24, 4).

<sup>118</sup> Clem. V.5.c.1. In 1210 Foulques, bishop of Toulouse, exhorts the faithful to take up arms against heretics and usurers. Cf. Guillaume de Puylaurens, *Historia Albigensium*, chap. XV in Bouquet, *Recueil des historiens de la France*, XIX, p. 203.

<sup>119</sup> Innocent IV on rubric to X.V.19: *Quia in dividendo pecuniam et diligendo vix evitatur idolatria*. Repeated by Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on V.19.c.2. *periculosum*.

<sup>120</sup> For example, in the canons adopted by a provincial council held at Prague in 1349 (Mansi, 26, 98).

<sup>121</sup> Gloss on Clem. V.5.c.2. *si quis*.

<sup>122</sup> Gloss on *non est peccatum*.

posed, not to the articles of faith or the sacraments, but to the clear teaching of the Church.<sup>123</sup>

### B. *Application of the penalties*

A NUMBER of problems remain to be discussed, problems concerning the actual inflicting of the penalties which we have just seen. When is one considered a usurer? How is the fact established? What court is competent in cases of usury? A number of points touching the procedure and also a special case where oaths of various kinds are taken by the debtor in a loan at usury will be given some attention.

The Lateran Council of 1179 and other decrees referred to above declare that the penalties are incurred by *usurarii manifesti*. When is one to be considered a manifest usurer? Some of the councils understand the word *manifestus* to mean notorious; the penalties are incurred by usurers who are notorious.<sup>124</sup> Others, showing the influence of the teaching of the canonists, provide a more exact and complete explanation of the term. Those are manifest who have been convicted of the crime, who have confessed it before the judge or whose usurious business is carried on so openly that it cannot be concealed.<sup>125</sup> Without being notorious one may be defamed by common report of the crime of usury. Such a one becomes manifest, say the councils, if he does not submit to the *purgatio canonica* within the time fixed by the bishop.<sup>126</sup> Some councils of the fourteenth century in their attempt to stamp out the vice of usury indicate even simpler methods of establishing proof of the crime of usury. A man is to be held as a manifest usurer if he confesses it extrajudicially before the parish priest or a notary public.<sup>127</sup> Again, two witnesses suffice to establish the fact that one is a usurer and such evidence renders him manifest.<sup>128</sup> Another canon affirms that the common opinion of people that one is a usurer taken together with certain indications is sufficient to prove the same fact.<sup>129</sup>

These canons have gradually incorporated brief statements of the teaching of the canonists who developed their theories in the course of the thirteenth century. Whereas Innocent IV is content to state briefly that manifest usurers are those who have been convicted by the courts,<sup>130</sup> Bernard Bottoni discusses the question more thoroughly. A usurer, he says, may be notorious or not. If he is notorious, then no further proof is required; his crime is manifest and the penalties may be applied. If, however, he is not notorious, then a judicial examination is required to establish the fact of usury and so make his crime manifest. The general report that one is a usurer is not sufficient to bring about his condemnation. To it must be added certain other arguments which tend to show that the report is well founded.<sup>131</sup>

According to Hostiensis one is a manifest usurer whose crime is notorious. But we must distinguish notoriety of fact and notoriety of law. A man is *notorius facti*

<sup>123</sup> Gloss on *haereticum*.

<sup>124</sup> Mainz, 1261, can. 25; Mainz, 1310 (Mansi, 23, 1090; 25, 320).

<sup>125</sup> Cologne, 1280, can. 14 (*Id.* 24, 359): Manifestos autem usurarios esse dicimus et vocamus qui per sententiam vel confessionem factam in iure vel evidentiam rei quae tergiversatione celari non poterit, comprobantur.

<sup>126</sup> Cologne, 1300, can. 12; Statutes of Liège, 1287, tit. 33, can. 4 (*Id.* 25, 21; 24, 936).

<sup>127</sup> Statutes of Aquileia, 1339 (*Id.* 25, 1120).

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> Salzburg, 1386, can. 13 (*Id.* 26, 731).

<sup>130</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3. *manifesti*.

<sup>131</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.15. *manifestos*: Si intelligas manifestos, id est notorios, non est opus aliis argumentis. . . . Si autem loquitur de manifestis non notoriis, secundum hoc evidens probatio requiritur secundum juris ordinem. . . . Ad hoc posset dici quod illud notorium non habet facti perseverentiam, unde aliqua requiruntur argumenta. Vel dic quod solemnitas fama docet ipsos esse usurarios et ideo per famam et alia argumenta puniuntur, quia sola fama non sufficit ad condemnationem.

if, for example, he conducts a bank or place of business where he is prepared to lend at usury to all comers. In this case he suffers *ipso facto* the penalties provided in the law. A man is *notorius juris* when he has been publicly condemned as such by the Church. If he has merely the reputation of being a usurer he is not a notorious or manifest usurer nor do the penalties affect him until he has been publicly condemned. This sentence will become public when he has been called to answer the charge and either confesses his guilt or denying it is yet proved to be a usurer by the testimony of witnesses. Having equated the terms notorious and manifest, Hostiensis is bound to provide for another eventuality which seems to have frequently arisen. What if one is reputed a usurer but no witnesses appear against him? He answers that he falls into the same category of manifest usurers when he is thought to be a usurer and certain indications point to the correctness of this opinion.<sup>132</sup>

Joannes Andreae witnesses to the intense efforts being made at the beginning of the fourteenth century to bring usurers to justice. He accepts the teaching of Hostiensis<sup>133</sup> but adds another method by which one may be proved to be a manifest usurer. He becomes such by an extrajudicial confession made publicly before a priest<sup>134</sup> and witnesses, promising at the same time to make restitution.<sup>135</sup> This opinion does not meet with the approval of all the canonists,<sup>136</sup> some of whom are unwilling to go to such lengths to secure a condemnation for usury. Thus Federicus of Siena, a contemporary, says that an extrajudicial confession alone does not suffice to render a usurer's crime manifest. Even if a man orders restitution to those who claim that they have paid him usury this act does not make him a manifest usurer because he does not confess that he is a usurer but simply orders to be paid to others what they maintain he owes them. The opinion of Joannes will prevail only when all the other conditions laid down in the canons have been fulfilled, that is when the books have been turned over to the competent authority and from the accounts it is clearly evident that the man has been exacting usury. But it is this circumstance and not the confession which makes his crime manifest.<sup>137</sup> Panormitanus simply accepts the teaching of Hostiensis with the additions of Joannes Andreae.<sup>138</sup>

No attempt will be made to outline the whole procedure of the courts in dealing with cases of usury,<sup>139</sup> but we shall confine ourselves to noting a few points specially touching this crime. The earlier method which seems to have been usually relied upon to bring usurers to justice was to hear the claims brought by those who maintained that they had paid usury and now demanded its return. The Church taught that the usurer was bound to make restitution and that those who had paid usury could always claim it because they had suffered an injustice. Recovery of what they

<sup>132</sup> *Summa, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 375<sup>v</sup>-376<sup>r</sup>; *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3. *manifesti*; c. 15 *non dubitatur*.

<sup>133</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3. and Gloss on VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.1. *manifestos*.

<sup>134</sup> He does not say that he must be the parish priest.

<sup>135</sup> Gloss on VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.2. *manifesti*: Tamen quoad casum nostrum satis posset dici manifestus si coram sacerdote et testibus publice fatetur se usurarium et usuras restitui mandat forte libros rationum tradens secundum Guil[ielmum de Monte Laudano].

<sup>136</sup> Bohic in his *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, p. 169, repeats Hostiensis and, without noting the

addition of Joannes, says that the latter's teaching sufficiently agrees with it.

<sup>137</sup> His opinion is reported by Panormitanus, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 233<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>138</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.15, Vol. VII, fol. 243<sup>r</sup>; *Consilia*, part II, n. 2, Vol. VIII, p. 175 and part I, n. 22, p. 30.

<sup>139</sup> See among other works, Paul Fournier, *Les officialités au moyen âge* (Paris, 1880); A. Esmein, *Histoire de la procédure criminelle* (Paris, 1881); A. Tardif, *La procédure civile et criminelle aux XIII et XIV siècles* (Paris, 1885); L. Tanon, *Histoire des tribunaux de l'inquisition* (Paris, 1893); F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, *History of English Law*, 2nd. edit. (Cambridge, 1911), Vol. II, chap. IX.

had parted with in time of difficulty when they were obliged to contract a usurious debt was the incentive held out to encourage debtors to reveal the usurious practices of their creditors. Against those who openly and publicly engaged in the business of money lending at usury even such appeals were unnecessary. They were *notorii facti* and after being given a triple admonition they were excommunicated by name and the penalties of the Lateran council applied.<sup>140</sup>

For various reasons, however, debtors were often reluctant to appear as accusers and the Canon Law devised other means of bringing usurers to justice. Thus in 1212 the council of Paris commands all the faithful under threat of ecclesiastical censure to divulge to the authorities all the information they possess concerning the operations of usurers.<sup>141</sup> This measure does not appear to have been widely applied and another method was used. A letter of Innocent III addressed to the bishop of Auxerre in 1207 and later inserted in the Decretals of Gregory IX,<sup>142</sup> relates that many persons are reputed usurers and yet through fear of princes and powerful men no accuser appears to denounce them or to furnish proof of the fact with the result that they escape punishment. The Pope orders the ecclesiastical judges to proceed *ex officio* against persons who enjoy such a reputation and adds that certain arguments taken in conjunction with it suffice to prove the crime of usury. Such arguments or indications, the canonists add, would be the discovery of accounts revealing the nature of their business; the fact that they sell on credit; their practice of entering into contracts which, though apparently contracts of sale, are in reality loans on security arranged in such a way that they receive the fruits of the pledge placed in their hands.<sup>143</sup>

Some earlier canonists, Tancredus and Joannes,<sup>144</sup> taught that if no one appeared to demand restitution from one accused of usury the same procedure was to be followed as in the case of one who has found an article belonging to another. The accusation is publicly made known and if no claimants appear the accused is cleared of the charge.<sup>145</sup> Bernard Bottoni combats this opinion and holds that a usurer is not to be acquitted because no one seeks restitution. He is obliged to restore the usury which he has received to the poor.<sup>146</sup> Hostiensis follows Bernard on this point and insists that power is given the judge to proceed with the examination of the charge against the usurer even in the absence of a plaintiff demanding restitution.<sup>147</sup>

The councils often repeat the rule that the ecclesiastical judge may act *ex officio* without the necessity of any accuser. One who without being notorious is suspected of lending at usury is first to be warned to cease such business practices. If he does not appear to heed the warning his case is examined by the court. If he is acquitted but his reputation as a usurer persists he is forced to submit to the compurgation and clear himself by means of oath-helpers in order to repair scandal caused. If he

<sup>140</sup> See, for example, the council of Avignon, 1209, can. 3 (Mansi, 22, 786).

<sup>141</sup> Part V, can. 5 (*Id.* 22, 850). At a later date the Jews are admonished under threat of being cut off from the society of the faithful to reveal the names of Christians who have placed money in their hands to be loaned out at usury. See R. Aubenas, *Recueil de lettres des officialités*, Vol. II, n. 239, p. 73.

<sup>142</sup> X.V.19.c.15.

<sup>143</sup> Innocent IV, *Commentaria* on word *argumentum* of this canon; Hostiensis on the same word and in the *Summa*, *de usuris*, n. 9, fol. 375v.

<sup>144</sup> This is probably John of Wales whose gloss we have not been able to consult. In any

case no such teaching has been found in the gloss of Joannes Teutonicus.

<sup>145</sup> Tancredus, Gloss on *Comp. Tertia*. V.10. c.5, in Ms. Vat. Lat. 1377, p. 175, col. 1; Cf. also Vincentius on *Comp. Tertia*. V.10.c.4 in Ms. Vat. Lat. 1378, fol. 87r, col. 1.

<sup>146</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.14. *restituerit*: Quid si nullus agit contra istum pro usuris? Dixit Jo[annes] et T[ancredus] quod facta denunciazione in publico, si nullus apparet qui petit, debet isti audiri per litteras sicut facit qui rem alienam invenit . . . Hoc non credo sufficere. Non enim excusatur usurarius si nullus repetat ab eo vel si denunciaret.

<sup>147</sup> *Commentaria* on the same word and *Summa*, *de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 377r.

fails to clear himself in this manner he is punished by the penalties prescribed by the canons.<sup>148</sup>

Clement V decreed in the Council of Vienne that in cases concerning benefices and tithes as well as in matrimonial and usury cases the examination by the judges in the ecclesiastical courts could be made *simpliciter et de plano, sine strepitu judicii et figura*.<sup>149</sup> These words are explained in another canon of the same council.<sup>150</sup> The procedure is rendered simpler in that the judge is not obliged to observe all the solemn forms of the regular procedure but is allowed to suppress many of its parts. For example, the complaint may be made orally; the delays, exceptions and appeals may be shortened or eliminated; lengthy disputes between opposing counsels are thrown out; the number of witnesses is reduced. Many other details of a highly complicated procedure which often hampered the administration of justice in giving rise to innumerable delays and appeals the judge may at his discretion modify or suppress.<sup>151</sup>

The widespread use of oaths in all contracts during the Middle Ages is a well known fact,<sup>152</sup> and is clearly seen in this problem of usury. The creditors compel their debtors to swear that they will pay the usury promised. Since usury is forbidden by the canons it cannot be demanded and a claim for usury will not be heard in the ecclesiastical courts. Consequently usurers rely upon other means to obtain their ends and oblige their victims to reinforce a simple promise by an oath. What is the obligation of such oaths in the eyes of the Canon Law and what effect have they on the procedure in cases of usury?

Gregory VIII orders the bishops to compel creditors to release debtors from their oath to pay usury. This is to be done especially in favour of debtors who desire to become crusaders.<sup>153</sup> Alexander III lays down the general principle that no one is obliged to pay usury unless he has sworn to do so. In this case he must pay but pressure is to be brought to bear upon the creditor that he may release his debtor from the oath.<sup>154</sup> In another case he himself actually frees all debtors from their promise to pay usury unless to this promise has been added an oath. In this event the ecclesiastical authority is to compel the creditors under threat of censure to make restitution.<sup>155</sup> This is the method advocated by Innocent III. First compulsion is to be used upon the usurer to obtain release from the oath. If this fails the oath is to be kept and further compulsion employed to obtain restitution.<sup>156</sup> A number of letters of the same Pope free all debtors from the promise to pay usury if they wish to go to the aid of the Holy Land and order the bishops to secure release from any oaths which have been taken.<sup>157</sup> Others grant the same privilege to those who are willing to aid in stamping out heresy in Provence.<sup>158</sup> Secular rulers are called upon to use the same procedure against Jewish creditors

<sup>148</sup> Château-Gontier, 1231, can. 30; Noyon, about 1280, can. 3; Avignon, 1282, can. 1; Mainz, 1310 (Mansi, 23, 239; 24, 375, 439; 25, 340); Saint-Quentin, 1231, in *Archives administratives de la ville de Reims*, edit. Varin (Paris, 1839), Vol. I, part 2, p. 551.

<sup>149</sup> Clem. II.1.c.2.

<sup>150</sup> Clem. V.11.c.2. The observance of this decree is commanded by a council of Paris in 1346, can. 12 (Mansi, 26, 22).

<sup>151</sup> See the gloss of Joannes Andreae on these two canons.

<sup>152</sup> See A. Esmein, 'Le serment promissoire dans le droit canonique,' *Nouvelle revue historique de droit français*, 1888, p. 248-277.

<sup>153</sup> X.II.24.c.1. In 1248 Innocent IV absolves from the payment of usury some nobles who have given evidence of particular fidelity to him. See Potthast, 13125.

<sup>154</sup> Jaffé, 14151, letter inserted in the collection designated *Appendix Concilii Lateranensis*, XVI, c. 6 (Mansi, 22, 344).

<sup>155</sup> X.II.24.c.6.

<sup>156</sup> X.V.19.c.13, addressed in 1200 to the bishop of Modena.

<sup>157</sup> Potthast, 1045, of the year 1200 to all French bishops (P.L. 214, col. cxxxvii).

<sup>158</sup> Potthast, 3511, written in 1208 to all the bishops of France, and Potthast, 3828, addressed in 1209 to the bishops of the province of Arles (P.L. 215, 1469; 216, 158).

who ignore the ecclesiastical threats and censures.<sup>159</sup> None of these letters go as far as does one of Eugene III in 1145 by which the Pope himself absolves from their oath all who have sworn to pay usury and now wish to go on the Crusades.<sup>160</sup> His successors, Alexander, Gregory and Innocent do not absolve from the oath but strive to obtain release from it. If unsuccessful it is to be fulfilled and then an attempt is made to obtain restitution.

Commenting upon some of these texts which were given a place in the Decretals, the canonists discuss not only the oath of which it is here question but also two others which do not appear to have been purely hypothetical cases but oaths actually employed by usurers in their struggle to evade the Church's canons. A debtor may, in fact, be asked to take any one or all of a threefold oath: 1) he swears to pay the usury; 2) he swears to pay and also that he will not demand restitution; 3) he swears in addition that he will not denounce the usurer.

In the first case, which is that envisaged by the decretals, all the canonists agree that the oath must be kept. Such an oath is in itself licit and consequently must be fulfilled. It is not opposed to the salvation of one's soul and does not cause injury to another.<sup>161</sup> From this they argue that paying usury is not in itself sinful and though it is forbidden to lend at usury one may under certain conditions borrow at usury.<sup>162</sup> In the case where such an oath has been taken the debtor must pay the usury agreed upon but he may demand restitution and the creditor is to be compelled to restore what he has received.<sup>163</sup> The debtor should, however, denounce the usurer before paying him and only when he resists the pressure brought to bear upon him to obtain release from the oath is the usury to be paid. Then the compulsion is to be directed toward obtaining restitution.<sup>164</sup> It is not forbidden to seek restitution or release from the oath because these have not been the object of an oath. In swearing to pay usury the debtor does not renounce his right to do these things.<sup>165</sup>

The effect of this oath being nullified by the canons, usurers compel their debtors to take a further oath. They swear not only to pay usury but also that they will not seek its restitution. Such an oath is also valid, say the canonists, and must be faithfully observed. The debtor cannot directly demand restitution, states Raymund of Pennafort. He can do so indirectly, however, in denouncing the crime of the usurer to the ecclesiastical authority. By his oath he has not sworn to refrain from this act. The usurer will be compelled to do penance and he cannot do this unless he first restore his ill-gotten gain. In this way the debtor will recover what he has paid in usury.<sup>166</sup> The canonists are unanimous in permitting this method of denunciation.<sup>167</sup> Must the debtor's primary motive in so acting be the salvation of the usurer's soul in forcing him to do penance or may it be simply to obtain resti-

<sup>159</sup> Potthast, 3512, to Philip of France in 1208 (P.L. 215, 1470).

<sup>160</sup> Jaffé, 8796, written to the king and all the faithful of France (P.L. 180, 1064).

<sup>161</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on X.II.24.c.6. *cogendi sunt*; *Summa, de iurejurando*, fol. 156<sup>r</sup>; Archidiaconus, *Summa* on C.14.q.3. *quod autem*, fol. 239<sup>v</sup>; Joannes Andreae, gloss on Clem. V.5.c.1. *juramento*. The latter observes that an oath taken to enforce statutes which permit the taking of usury or reject claims for restitution is illicit and hence not to be kept.

<sup>162</sup> See *Mediaeval Studies*, Vol. I (1939), p. 108 ff.

<sup>163</sup> Bernard of Pavia, *Summa*. V.15.n.14, edit. Laspeyres, p. 239: *Illud etiam notandum quod si debitor juravit se soluturum usuras, debet*

*eas solvere et suum juramentum servare; sed postea creditor ad eas restituendas est compellendus.*

<sup>164</sup> Innocent, *Summa* on X.II.24.c.6. *restituendos*; Raymund, *Summa*. II.7.n.8, p. 215; Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.13. *restituere* and on II.24.c.6. *cogendi sunt*; Bernard, gloss on X.II.24.c.6. *non debent* and on V.19.c.13. *desistere*; Boich, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.13, p. 175.

<sup>165</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.13. *desistere*; Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on V.19.c.13. *postquam*.

<sup>166</sup> *Summa*. II.7.n.8, p. 215.

<sup>167</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.13. *desistere*; Hostiensis, *Commentaria* on X.II.24.c.1. *mandamus*, and on X.V.19.c.13. *postquam*; *Summa, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 376<sup>r</sup>; Bohic on X.V.19.c.13, p. 175.



tution? Some would seem to require that fraternal charity be the primary motive in the denunciation.<sup>168</sup> This belongs, however, to the internal forum and the authors note that even though the debtor act from purely personal interest he is to be heard.<sup>169</sup>

The canonists have thus removed another safeguard to the interests of the usurer and he is forced to take a further precaution for his protection. He compels his debtor to swear in addition to the above oaths that he will not denounce him as a usurer. Here again he is opposed by the canonists who declare unanimously that such an oath is illicit and consequently must not be kept. It is opposed to the salvation of another's soul and contrary to the precept of love of one's neighbour. In spite of this oath the creditor is to be denounced since it is for his soul's benefit that he be brought to do penance.<sup>170</sup>

Usurers thus find themselves barred at every turn by the teaching of the canonists concerning the oath. Nevertheless they did make great use of them and that because on account of the first oath they obtained possession of the usury paid and then they were willing and able to resist the threats and penalties employed by the Church to force them to make restitution. Hostiensis admits that usurers are often willing to remain excommunicated for a long time and exhorts the secular authority to punish them because the Church has exhausted the means at her disposal.<sup>171</sup> For reasons which do not come within the scope of this article to discuss, the secular power was not always willing to co-operate to the extent desired by the Church.

The canonists encounter another difficulty in treating the question of restitution of usury. The Roman Law contains a number of texts declaring that one who pays what he knows is not owed may not demand its recovery but is considered to have made a donation.<sup>172</sup> Now all know that usury is forbidden by the law of the Church. Therefore the debtor in paying usury, either because of an oath or without an oath, pays what he knows is unowed. How then may he demand restitution of what is to be considered a donation?

Innocent IV discusses only the case where usury is paid on account of the oath. The right to demand restitution is an exception to the rule of Roman Law and is granted because of the oath of which the observance is to be favoured in every way.<sup>173</sup> Bernard of Parma has the same teaching. The usury has been paid out of fear of violating the oath and hence its recovery may be sought.<sup>174</sup>

<sup>168</sup> Bohic, *loc. cit.*: Et quod dictum est quod non obstante juramento potest denunciare, intellige verum si denunciatur principaliter intentione fraternae salutis compatiens animae periclitanti. Si vero denunciatur principaliter intentione recuperandi illud quod solvit, tunc tutius est abstinere ut notant Hostiensis et Joannes Andreae.

<sup>169</sup> Gloss on X.V.19.c.13. *desistere*: Et licet ob privatum commodum denunciatur non tamen repellitur ab ea quia prodest usurario cum poenituerit; Hostiensis on the same canon, on word *postquam*.

<sup>170</sup> Raymund, *Summa*. II.7.n.8, p. 215: Si vero juravit etiam quod non denunciaret, non tenet in hac parte juramentum cum sit illicitum ut puta contra salutem proximi et per consequens contra praeceptum de proximo diligendo. Unde non obstante juramento potest procedere in modum denunciationis et ita concurrunt fraudibus usurariorum; Hostiensis, *Summa, de usuris*, n. 10, fol. 376<sup>r</sup>. Panormitanus, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.13, Vol. VII, fol.

242<sup>r</sup>, says that such an oath is invalid but requires that in this case the denunciation be motivated by the desire to obtain the salvation of the creditor and not by personal interest in the money to be recovered.

<sup>171</sup> *Summa, de jurejurando*, fol. 156<sup>r</sup>. Si vult potius excommunicationem tolerare quam relaxare juramentum, per temporalem potestatem puniri potest contumacia nimia exigente, cum ecclesia non habeat plus quid faciat.

<sup>172</sup> *Cod. Just.* IV.5.9: Indebitum solum sciens non repeti; *Dig.* XII.6.1: Sed si sciens se non debere solvit, cessat repetitio; *Dig.* L.17.53: Cujus per errorem dati repetitio est; ejus consulto dati donatio est.

<sup>173</sup> *Commentaria* on II.24.c.6. *solvet*: Sed postea repetit ut hic. Contra: quia scienter solvit etiam indebitum, ergo non poterit repetere ut *Dig.* . . . *Solutio*: ad omnia praedicta quia sic speciale est hoc propter favorem observantiae jurisjurandi.

<sup>174</sup> Gloss on X.II.24.c.6. *cogendi*; Non obstat



In his commentary on the Decretals, Hostiensis simply repeats the explanation of Innocent that an exception is permitted on account of the oath. He adds that it is also to prevent the creditor from realizing a profit from his malice and sin, a profit which is opposed to his own good.<sup>175</sup> In his *Summa Aurea* he gives a broader basis for the exception. The earlier canonists in teaching that the exception is allowed on account of the oath would seem to hold, though without discussing the point, that usury which has been paid where there was no oath could not be recovered. Hostiensis opposes this view.<sup>176</sup> In every case the borrower may demand restitution of usury paid because of the sinful agreement upon which the payment is based. Not only is the usury not owed but the usurer may not receive or retain it without committing sin. One may not accept a donation when such an act constitutes a sin. The texts of Roman Law which speak of what is unowed have in mind what is not in itself prohibited by law. Moreover the canons even go so far as to compel a usurer to restore usury which he has received without any agreement, which indicates that usury cannot be considered a donation because it is in itself sinful.<sup>177</sup>

Are cases concerning usury to be tried in the secular or in the ecclesiastical court? The canons in the Decretals do not clearly answer this question but there seems to be little doubt that they presuppose that these cases belong to the ecclesiastical judge.<sup>178</sup> However in no case do the canons exclude the competency of the civil courts as well; the latter are condemned only in so far as they refuse to admit claims for the recovery of usury already paid or compel it to be paid.<sup>179</sup>

The canonists discuss the question either in dealing with the title on usury or in commenting upon the canon *cum sit generale*<sup>180</sup> concerning the competency of the various tribunals. Until the fourteenth century they usually hold that the ecclesiastical courts alone are competent to try cases of usury but sometimes it is not clear that they exclude the competency of the secular judge. Huguccio, for example, says that ecclesiastical cases are of three kinds, spiritual, civil and criminal. Examples of criminal cases are usury, heresy and adultery where the examination and condemnation belong to the ecclesiastical judge.<sup>181</sup> From this it seems that cases of usury are to be tried in the Church's courts but elsewhere the same author states that the secular judge can and must force a usurer to make restitution,<sup>182</sup> and this is held by later writers to have been the opinion of Huguccio as well as of Laurentius Hispanus.<sup>183</sup>

Bernard of Pavia clearly teaches that usury is an ecclesiastical crime and conse-

eo quod dicitur, 'indebitum scienter solutum non repetitur,' quia hoc fit metu iuramenti.

<sup>175</sup> X.II.24.c.6. *cogendi*.

<sup>176</sup> *Summa*, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 376<sup>r</sup>: Ideo posset dici quod si solvo cum non iuraverim repetere non potero. . . . Sed non credo hoc verum.

<sup>177</sup> *Loc. cit.*: Et dic quod repetere possum propter pravam actionem praecedentem propter quam adeo est pecunia indebita quod non potest retineri sine peccato. Objectio ergo locum habet indebitis quorum solutio per legem non reprobat et hoc patet ex eo quia si solvo usuras usurario nulla pactione praemissa ipsas mihi nihilominus restituere debet.

<sup>178</sup> See especially X.V.19.c.3, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17; II.24.c.32; Clem. II.1.c.2; V.5.c.1.

<sup>179</sup> Clem. V.5.c.1. Cf. also Gratian, C.14.q.4. c.11.

<sup>180</sup> X.II.2.c.8.

<sup>181</sup> *Summa* on C.11.q.1, dictum *quod clericus* preceding c. 1, fol. 183<sup>v</sup>, col. 1: Notandum quod causarum alia est ecclesiastica, alia regularis sive forensis. . . . Ecclesiasticarum, alia est criminalis, alia est spiritualis, alia civilis sive pecuniaris. . . . Criminalis ecclesiastica est ubi agitur de crimine ecclesiastico, scilicet cujus examinatio et condemnatio impettat ad ecclesiasticum iudicem, ut est crimen usurarum, crimen haeresis et adulterii quoad separationem tori.

<sup>182</sup> *Id.* on C.14.q.4.c.11. *quo iudice*, fol. 218<sup>v</sup>, col. 1: Scilicet saeculari. . . . Ergo sicut ecclesiasticus ita et saecularis debet et potest cogere usurarium ad restitutionem usurarum.

<sup>183</sup> See Archidiaconus, *Summa* on C.14.q.4. c.11. *iudice*, fol. 240<sup>v</sup>; Joannes Andreae, gloss on Clem. II.1.c.2. *usuris*.

quently is to be dealt with by the ecclesiastical, never by the secular tribunals.<sup>184</sup> In several places of his gloss, Bernard Bottoni calls usury an offence against the canons whose examination belongs to the church courts as do the crimes of heresy, simony, sacrilege, adultery and perjury.<sup>185</sup> Hostiensis has the same teaching.<sup>186</sup>

Against this common opinion of the thirteenth century we find with Archidiaconus at the beginning of the fourteenth, a recognition of the competency of the secular authorities in these cases. After a long discussion of the question, he chooses to follow the opinion of Huguccio and Laurentius which he claims was also held by Goffredus. Though the crime does regard the Church, laymen are to be summoned before the secular judge to answer to the charge of usury.<sup>187</sup> He adds, however, that the bishop may inquire into the case of anyone suspected of receiving usury in order to impose a canonical penance.<sup>188</sup> Yet a few years later Jean Le-moine teaches that the examination and punishment of this crime belong to the court Christian because the usurer sins against the natural law and so principally against God Himself. Usury is forbidden by both divine and Canon Law and it should be punished by the Vicar of Christ and the maker of ecclesiastical laws.<sup>189</sup> Following this canonist, Joannes Andreae holds that usury is an ecclesiastical case in which only the ecclesiastical court is competent.<sup>190</sup> This is also the opinion of Joannes Lopus Castilioneus<sup>191</sup> who maintains that it is supported by the doctrine and practice of the Roman Curia.

The two opinions continue to exist side by side but from the fourteenth century those who do not exclude all competency of the secular judge in this matter introduce a useful distinction. When there is doubt as to whether such and such a type of contract is usurious or not, only the ecclesiastical judge is competent to deal with the case. The prohibition of usury is from divine law and the decision which is given in the case, declaring a contract usurious or not, decides whether it is sinful or lawful. Only the Church can pronounce upon this question because it alone has the right to interpret the divine law which it does in declaring that a certain act is sinful. When, however, there is no doubt that a certain contract is usurious but there is a doubt regarding the facts of the case, when, for example it is disputed whether the usury of which the recovery is sought has actually been paid, or when it is necessary to establish other facts by means of witnesses or documents, then the

<sup>184</sup> *Summa*, V.15.n.14, edit. Laspeyres, p. 239: Praeterea de recipiendis usuris non est sub seculari iudice litigandum. . . . Ceterum, cum hoc crimen sit ecclesiasticum, semper est in hujusmodi ad ecclesiasticum iudicem recurrendum.

<sup>185</sup> Gloss on X.I.31.c.1. *canones*: Ad episcopos enim pertinet inquirere de hujusmodi criminibus ecclesiasticis . . . Item crimen usurarum, sacrilegii, simoniae et similia proprie spectant ad ecclesiasticum iudicem; II.24.c.32. *veritate*: Et quia causa usurarum est quasi spiritualis cum sit ecclesiastica; II.2.c.8. *malefactores*: Item crimen usurarum, haeresis, simoniae, perjurii et adulterii. Haec pertinent ad ecclesiam.

<sup>186</sup> *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.17. *Michael*: Et nihilominus potest impetrare contra laicum in hoc casu, ut sequitur, quia cognitio hujus criminis ad ecclesiam spectat.

<sup>187</sup> *Rosarium* on C.14.q.4.c.11. *iudice*, fol. 240<sup>v</sup>: Dic secundum Gof[redum] sententiam Lau[rentii] esse veram rejectis omnibus aliis et hoc tenendum quod in crimine usurarum licet illud

crimen spectet ad ecclesiam . . . laici coram saeculari, clerici vero coram ecclesiastico iudice conveniuntur.

<sup>188</sup> *Id.* Dic ergo quod episcopus contra aliquem quem suspectum haberet, posset inquirere de usura, sicut de aliis criminibus, ad imponendam ei poenitentiam canonicam.

<sup>189</sup> See Panormitanus, *Commentaria* on rubric to X.V.19, Vol. VII, fol. 231<sup>r</sup>: Et per hanc rationem dixit Jo[annes] Mo[nachus] in VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.1, quod ecclesia hoc casu vendicat sibi jurisdictionem in laicos quia usurarii committunt precipititer in Deum abutendo rerum usu; ideo ad ejus vicarium spectat punitio. Item usura est peccatum inductum ex veteri et novo testamento et ex lege canonica et ideo punitio spectat ad conditorem canonum et ad vicarium Christi.

<sup>190</sup> Gloss on VI<sup>o</sup>.V.5.c.2. *aliter facta* and on Clem. II.1.c.2. *usuris*.

<sup>191</sup> Died 1381 (Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 270). His opinion has been quoted from Panormitanus, *Commentaria* on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94<sup>v</sup>.

secular as well as the ecclesiastical tribunal is competent to examine the case and pass sentence.<sup>192</sup>

This opinion is held by Paul de Liazariis<sup>193</sup> against his master, Joannes Andreae, by Antonius de Butrio,<sup>194</sup> Zabarella,<sup>195</sup> Bartolus and others of the second half of the fourteenth century so that in the fifteenth Panormitanus calls it the *opinio communis*.<sup>196</sup> Butrio declares that there is no other reason for designating usury as a spiritual case than that it involves sin. The thing itself, namely the usury paid, the contract and the whole matter belong to the temporal order. In such cases where a sinful act is present the secular judge is competent provided the principal question examined does not concern the sin and he does not pretend to decide whether an act is sinful or not. If, he says, every case where sin is involved fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts then the secular tribunals would have few or no crimes to try.<sup>197</sup> Baldus, commenting upon the Authentic *ad haec*, raises the same objection.<sup>198</sup> Cases do not pertain to the ecclesiastical tribunal *ratione peccati* unless they are special ecclesiastical cases or some others expressly named in the law.<sup>199</sup> Elsewhere he teaches that in cases of usury, whether it is a question of the law or of the facts, only the ecclesiastical judge is competent to decide.<sup>200</sup> In another place he seems to accept the teaching of Bartolus.<sup>201</sup>

The latter is quite clear on the point. If both parties in a case of a claim for the recovery of usury admit the facts but there is doubt whether the contract is usurious, the case is to be examined before the bishop since a decision must be given declaring a certain contract licit or illicit. But if the facts are disputed, the two parties offering different versions of them, the creditor, for example, maintaining that there was a contract of sale, the debtor that it was a pretended sale *in fraudem usurae*, then the affair may be examined in the lay court.<sup>202</sup>

Though the two opinions persist, Panormitanus adopts the common opinion that the lay judge is competent in cases of usury where it is a question, not of the nature of the contract, but of the facts concerning the transaction.<sup>203</sup> We may be

<sup>192</sup> The question is clearly resumed by Panormitanus on X.V.19.c.12, Vol. VII, fol. 241<sup>r</sup>: Est ergo istud crimen mixtum seu mixti fori, ut possit fieri restitutio seu repetitio tam in foro saeculari quam ecclesiastico, et hoc ubi non dubitatur contractum usurarium est. Si autem dubitaretur, cognitio pertinet ad forum ecclesiasticum ut plene notatur in can. *cum sit generale*. . . . Et tene menti in hoc istum textum quia multi tenuerunt quod iudex saecularis nullo modo potest se intromittere de usuris. The same author gives a lengthy treatment of the whole problem in his commentary on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94<sup>r</sup>–94<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>193</sup> This canonist who wrote several works on the *Clementinae* died in 1356. Cf. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 246.

<sup>194</sup> Antonius de Butrio (Budrio), canonist and civilian, died 1408. Cf. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 289.

<sup>195</sup> Franciscus de Zabarella, cardinal, glossator of the *Clementinae*, 1139–1417. Cf. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 283.

<sup>196</sup> *Commentaria* on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> Cod. IV.32. *ad haec*, fol. 85<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>199</sup> *Id.*: Quaero numquid quaelibet causa ratione peccati pertineat ad forum ecclesiasti-

cum et videtur quod non, nisi speciales ecclesiasticae sunt, et nisi in quibusdam aliis casibus expressis in jure.

<sup>200</sup> Cod. III.1.3, fol. 146<sup>r</sup>: Tu dic quod sive sit quaestio facti, sive juris, cum sit ecclesiastica, non pertinet ad iudicem saecularem ejus disceptatio vel iudicium.

<sup>201</sup> Cod. IV.32. *ad haec*, fol. 85<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>202</sup> Dig. XXIV.3.34, Vol. III, fol. 22<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>203</sup> *Commentaria* on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94<sup>v</sup>: Et hoc etiam fuit de mente Bartoli et aliorum hanc opinionem sequentium et asserentiam. Nam haec opinio communis mihi placet. In another place he would seem to accept the contrary opinion, on V.19.c.2, Vol. VII, fol. 232<sup>r</sup>: Nota primo ex textu, laicos esse compellendos ad restitutionem usurarum per ecclesiam, nam hoc delictum seu ejus coercitio spectat ad ecclesiam. Again on V.19.c.12, fol. 241<sup>v</sup>, he says that usury is an ecclesiastical crime and it is for this reason, he argues, that the ecclesiastical judge may compel Jews to restore usury received: Nam cum hoc crimen sit ecclesiasticum et judaei peccant contra legem suam et contra naturam exercendo usuras, licite possunt compelli per iudicem ecclesiasticum. However he does not hold for exclusive jurisdiction here but admits that usually the Jews will be compelled by the secular judge

sure that the hesitation and contrary opinions of the canonists are reflected in the actual practice of the courts during this period, a question which it has not been our purpose to examine.<sup>204</sup>

to restore the usury which they have received. This is also the teaching of John of Anagni, *Commentaria* on X.V.19.c.12.n.5 ff, fol. 186<sup>v</sup>-188<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>204</sup> We find the *officialis* of the bishop claiming jurisdiction over all cases of usury. As evidence of this attitude note a number of model letters dating from the end of the fourteenth to the end of the fifteenth century found in the recently published *Recueil de lettres des officialités de Marseille et d'Aix*, edit. R. Aubenas, 2 vols. (Paris, 1937-1938). The heirs of a certain debtor accuse the creditor of the crime of usury. The official writes to the pastor of the place ordering him to notify the secular judge that he is to suspend the examination of the charge of debt which the creditor has laid until the ecclesiastical court has settled the charge of usury. The creditor is summoned to answer in the official's court. Vol. I, n. 44, p. 49 and Vol. II, n. 125, p. 21; The official orders the lay judge to set free a woman imprisoned for a debt which she claims was usurious and who is prepared to prove her claim if she is permitted to appear before the ecclesiastical court. Meantime the secular court must suspend the trial of the case of debt. Vol. I, n. 64, p. 75; In spite of a similar admonition in another case the secular judge seized the debtor's property. The official warns him that such an action has merited an excommunication but he chooses to order him under threat of excommunication to revoke the measure which he has taken. Vol. I, n. 108, p. 114; A question of usury is being tried by the ecclesiastical court but the debtor failing to appear, doubtless because he is unable to prove the charge of usury, is declared contumacious and the official turns the affair over to the king's court which will examine the action for debt. Vol. II, n. 332, p. 116; Again the official summons to appear before him a man whose debtor maintains that the debt was usurious. Vol. II, n. 241, p. 75. The editor of these texts believes that the ecclesiastical courts of Provence more successfully maintained their competency in cases of usury than in other regions of France, Vol. I, p. 49, note 4.

Relative to this conflict of jurisdiction, the council of Saint-Quentin in 1231 promulgated the following decree: Item compellantur iudices saeculares per censuras ecclesiasticas, auctoritate concilii, ne de crimine usurae, de sacrilegio, aut alio crimine ecclesiastico aliquatenus cognoscant; ne super huiusmodi cognitione detur eis auctoritas a prelati. See *Archives administratives de la ville de Reims*, edit. Varin (Paris, 1839), Vol. I, part 2, p. 555.

A libellus in the *Ordo Iudicarius* compiled by Aegidius de Fuscariis between 1262 and 1266, begs the Bishop of Bologna to impose silence upon a creditor who is seeking thirty pounds usury and requests him to warn the secular judge not to hear the case while it is being examined by the ecclesiastical court.

Libellus CLII, edit. Wahrmund, *Quellen zur Geschichte der römisch-kanonischen Prozesses im Mittelalter*, Vol. III, part I (Innsbruck, 1916), p. 215.

According to the *Établissements de Saint-Louis*, about 1273, cases of usury are tried in the lay court and if the charge is proven the chattels are confiscated and the usurer is punished by the ecclesiastical court for his sin. Quant en la terre au baron a aucun userier ou en quel que terre que ce soit, et il en est provez, li mueble si en doivent estre au baron. Et puis si doit estre puniz par sainte Eglise por lou pechié, car il appartient a sainte Eglise de chastoier chascun pecheor de son pechié, selon droit escrit es Decretales. Lib. I, chap. XCI, edit. Viollet, Vol. II, p. 148. In Anjou a mixed tribunal tries cases of usury in the eleventh century but the *Coutume de Touraine-Anjou* does not determine which court punishes the crime in the fourteenth. The last sentence of the preceding text of the *Établissements* has been added to the original but it is clearly a borrowing by the compiler. Cf. Viollet, *Établissements*, I, 255. The same is also true for the *Abrégé Champonois* of the end of the thirteenth century (*Id.*, III, n. LXXXIX, p. 164). The *Grand Coutumier de France* supposes that cases of usury are tried by the secular court. See edit. Laboulaye and Dareste (Paris, 1868), Lib. III, chap. LXXI, p. 573-575.

The *Coutumes de Beauvaisis* affirm the general principle that it belongs to the ecclesiastical court to try cases of usury. Since, however, the lay court is competent in questions of debt, it may sometimes incidentally examine the charge of usury. If the debtor, after having paid the debt, seeks its recovery, making a claim of usury, the accused is not obliged to answer it outside the court of Christianity unless he chooses to do so (n. 1932, edit. Salmon, Vol. II, p. 475). If, on the other hand, the debt is still unpaid and the creditor demands it before the lay court, but the debtor enters a plea of usury, then this court is competent to examine the charge of usury. It is the creditor, now become the defendant, who chooses the court before which he will appear to defend himself. But once he has begun to plead in one court he may not choose to go to the other (n. 1925, p. 471). If, while the case of debt is being tried by the secular judge, the debtor appeals to the ecclesiastical court on the grounds of usury, and the latter summons the creditor and forbids the lay judge to continue the case of debt until that of usury has been settled, the secular court is not bound to heed this prohibition unless it chooses to do so. It may proceed to pass sentence on the question of debt. However the debtor may still maintain his plea of usury in the ecclesiastical court and if he proves it the creditor will be excommunicated until he has restored the money which the secular tribunal has obliged the debtor to pay over to him (n. 1926, p. 472).

## MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

According to the twelfth century works, *Dialogus de Scaccario*, edit. Hughes, Crump and Johnson (Oxford, 1902), II, X, I, p. 137, and Glanvill, *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae*, edit. Woodbine (New Haven, 1932), Bk. VII, chap. 16 and Bk. X, chap. 8, p. 112, 139, usury is treated as a sin only and not as an offense against the law of the realm while the usurer is living, but if he dies in his sin the king seizes his chattels. However if in theory the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction over living usurers the practice shows that

it was far otherwise. As yet no satisfactory study has been made of this conflict of jurisdiction for any region. One may consult P. Fournier, *Les officialités au moyen âge* (Paris, 1880), p. 91-92; P. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions*, Vol. II (Paris, 1898), p. 309; G. D'Espinay, *De l'influence du droit canonique sur la législation française* (Toulouse, 1856), p. 210; F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, *History of English Law*, 2nd. edit. (Cambridge, 1911), Vol. I, p. 130; W. S. Holdsworth, *History of English Law*, 4th. edit. Vol. VIII (London, 1927), p. 100 ff.

# The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus

Edited by J. T. MUCKLE, C.S.B., with an introduction  
by Etienne Gilson

## Introduction

### I. THE INTERPRETATION OF A. LOEWENTHAL

THE DE ANIMA was first published by A. LOEWENTHAL, *Pseudo-Aristoteles über die Seele—Eine psychologische Schrift des 11 Jahrhunderts und ihre Beziehungen zu Salomo ibn Gebirol (Avicebron)*, Berlin, Mayer und Muller, 1891. This work had already been partially published as a doctorate thesis (Königsberg) under the title: *Dominicus Gundisalvi und sein psychologisches Compendium—Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der philosophischen Litteratur bei Arabern, Juden und Christen*.

This first edition did not contain the text of the *De Anima*. Loewenthal regards his study as a continuation of his article in the *Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, 1890, pp. 217–224: *Fragmente eines pseudaristotelischen Werkes über die Seele in hebr. Sprache*. For information on his position it is sufficient to refer to the first of these three publications, which contains all that is found in the others, and even more. We shall consider separately the text which he presents and the interpretation which he gives of it.

1. TEXT—Loewenthal has published some important extracts from the *De Anima*, pp. 77–131; practically the whole treatise, with the exception of Chap. VIII (cf. p. 119). For his edition he used “die Pariser Handschrift Bibl. Nat. Lanterne 16613” (p. 76). This “Lanterne” (which is not a slip of the pen for it is found in another place: p. 59) seems to imply that the editor had never set foot in the Department of Manuscripts of the Bibliothèque Nationale; he must have misread *lateinische* in the letter of a correspondent. Ms. 16613 is well known for the deplorable quality of its text. Even without adding to this the faulty readings with which his transcription is littered, neither Loewenthal nor anyone else would have ever been capable of obtaining from it an intelligible edition. In order to correct this worthless manuscript, which he had chosen as a base, A. Loewenthal used that of Gonville-Caius College, no. 504. Many judicious corrections are due to it, for this text is clearly better than that of Paris; but the final result is not thereby rendered any less mediocre. It would not be difficult to prove this if there were not something essentially unpleasant and unjust in those lists of reproaches addressed to predecessors whose efforts have always aided, in some measure, our own work. Let us say simply that the text as presented is incomplete and almost constantly defective.

2. INTERPRETATION—It is difficult to sum up the confused considerations by which Loewenthal arrived at his conclusions with regard to the origin of his text. We must, however, at least know what are his conclusions, and perhaps it will even be sufficient to set them down just as they are in order that their lack of probability be apparent to all.

To explain the existence of the *De Anima* as he knew it, Loewenthal asks us to take into consideration four different works (*op. cit.* pp. 72–73).

1. An original Arabic treatise on the soul in ten books, the author of which would probably be Ibn Gebirol.
2. An original Latin translation of the work by Johannes Toletanus.
3. A Hebrew translation from the Arabic original of which certain fragments would still be conserved in Gerson ben Salomo.
4. The treatise of Dominicus Gundissalvi which contains the greater part of Johannes Toletanus' translation.

Of these four works we only know the last, although, on Loewenthal's own admission, to explain its existence we would have to suppose the existence of three other works of which we do not even know whether they have ever existed or not. These are certainly hypotheses which demand a great deal of us. But above all, they are improbable hypotheses. Loewenthal had at least the merit of noticing that several fragments of his text were literally borrowed from *Liber VI Naturalium* of Avicenna. It was even because of this that he decided not to publish Ch. VIII (*op. cit.* p. 119). This single fact should have been sufficient to prove to him that his whole argument was worthless. In any case, this fact should have moved him to extend his inquiry; for, the slightest attention would have shown him that almost all his treatise was composed of borrowings from various authors: Avicenna, above all, Gebirol, also, whose *Fons Vitae* was used by the compiler. So the sources of almost the whole treatise can be found simply by consulting texts already known and published, without having recourse to fantastic and unverifiable hypotheses. Cl. Baeumker had the great merit of pointing this out.

## II. THE INTERPRETATION OF CL. BAEUMKER

In the article of CL. BAEUMKER, *Dominicus Gundissalinus als philosophischer Schriftsteller*, in *Compte Rendu du IV<sup>e</sup> Congrès scientifique international des Catholiques*, Fribourg (Suisse); III<sup>e</sup> sect., pp. 39-58 (1898), the problem for the first time entered the path which was to lead to its solution. This appreciation of the work of Gundissalinus as a whole contains some very good and penetrating pages on the *De Anima*. After recalling the adventurous hypotheses of his predecessors on the nature of the work (and one must remember that they were the only ones which had been proposed), Baeumker remarks that there seems no reason for refusing to admit that Gundissalinus himself was the author of the compilation to which he put his name. Baeumker's arguments are marked with the most elementary good sense but it is fitting to recall them since no one else before him had advanced them.

1. It is granted that fragments of Avicenna are found word for word in the *De Anima*; now Gundissalinus had taken part in the Latin translation of texts of Avicenna which are found in this treatise; why not admit that he had himself used his own translation? (p. 51).

2. The supposition is all the more probable since these borrowings perfectly agree with the method followed by Gundissalinus in his other works. He consciously made what is actually a mosaic, composing his treatise from small fragments borrowed here and there and juxtaposed in such a way as to form a whole. This manner of composing, however, which fits in so well with the habits of Gundissalinus, would, on the contrary, be little in harmony with those of a mind as original as that of Gebirol (p. 52).

3. Finally Baeumker adds to these observations a list of eighteen passages from the *De Anima* edited by Loewenthal, which are all borrowed from the *Fons Vitae* of Gebirol (p. 52, note 2). We know, however, that Gundissalinus was the co-translator of this work, along with John of Spain; hence it became quite unjustifi-

able to grant any intermediary between Gundissalinus and the sources which he evidently knew very well since he had himself taken part in their redaction.

Baeumker's conclusion was, is and will remain henceforth incontestable; the *De Anima* is a compilation of Gundissalinus himself, like his *De Unitate* and his *De Processione Mundi*; he borrowed numerous elements of it from his own translations of AVICENNA, *Liber VI Naturalium*, and from GEBIROL, *Fons Vitae*; the hypothesis which regards his work as a translation of a treatise of Gerson ben Salomon must, therefore, be completely abandoned.

### III. THE INTERPRETATION OF J. TEICHER

An article of J. Teicher, published in May 1934 in the *Rivista di Filosofia neoscolastica* (pp. 252-258), under the title *Gundissalino e l'Agostonismo avicennizante*, argues against the thesis which I had maintained in that same review in 1929 with regard to this treatise. I said, in substance, that Gundissalinus had tried to substitute Saint Augustine and Denys for Avicenna in order to explain the origin of our knowledge. J. Teichert attributes to me some very improbable notions on the importance and the rôle of Gundissalinus (in whom I have never seen anything but a first witness, and how slight a one! of a movement which was to develop after him). Whatever may be the truth on this point, the author denies that there can be found in this treatise the least trace of a synthesis of Avicenna's psychology and Christian illumination (p. 254). The mystical conclusion of the *De Anima* has, therefore, nothing in common with the theory of natural knowledge which Gundissalinus borrows from Avicenna; it is imposed on it but does not combine with it (p. 255). But, then, whence comes this mystical conclusion whose source, I admit, I have never discovered? J. Teicher has discovered it. It is Plotinus, known to Gundissalinus through the Mohammedan mystics; "la source d'inspiration du mysticisme de Gundissalinus est d'origine musulmane plutôt que chrétienne" and, consequently, my "construction" has no foundation (p. 258). That is quite possible.

### IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF P.R. DE VAUX, O.P.

With the work of P.R. DE VAUX, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des XII et XIII siècles* (Bibliothèque Thomiste, XX, Paris, J. Vrin, 1934), we return to serious things. There is to be found in this work the text of the conclusion of the *De Anima*, published according to the ms. of the Bib. Nat., lat. 8802, fol. 154r-171r. This text, previously unknown, forms a very valuable addition to our information. Its principal variants will be found in the notes to the text published below. With regard to the nature of the doctrine itself, P. de Vaux agrees with J. Teicher in the sense that he sees in Gundissalinus, not a case of "augustinisme avicennisant," but a case of "avicennisme latin" pure and simple.

I have no intention of discussing at this time this thesis which deserves serious consideration under the form in which P. de Vaux presents it. I will content myself with a single observation: Is it fully realized what we are trying to prove the existence of, in trying to demonstrate that there was in the Middle Ages an "avicennisme latin" parallel to "averroisme latin"? What Christian thinker, of whom we actually have knowledge has ever thought that we receive our knowledge from a separated substance which would be the active intellect common to the human species and consequently its final end? I do not say that there have never been any; I only ask that, if there have been any, they be cited. The author of the *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis* is not one of them. As he conceived it, God illumines us through the Intelligences, but the text of the *Soliloquia* which he cites



(I, 8, 15; P.L. 32, c. 877) testified to the fact that his God is beyond a doubt the God of Saint Augustine. Can a doctrine in which Avicenna is combined, not only with Erigena but even with Augustine, be qualified as "avicennisme" pure and simple?

As for Gundissalinus and his *De Anima*, they present an analogous problem. To maintain, with J. Teicher, that the source for the conclusion is more Arabian than Christian, without even citing a single precise text in support of it, is clearly a gratuitous assertion. It is also contradicted by the facts; for I have found in that work formulae copied word for word from Saint Augustine, Boethius and Saint Bernard of Clairvaux. Saint James, and above all, Saint Paul, are cited in many places in the work. P. de Vaux has also found in the text of Gundissalinus striking analogies with the *Epistola de Anima* of the Cistercian, Isaac of Stella. It is very difficult to believe that pages so full of Christian texts come from Arabian sources.

But can one believe at least that this is a case of "avicennisme latin"? It is a question of terminology and names are arbitrary. When, however, Jean de Jeandun is called an "averroiste latin," it expresses exactly what is meant. Here we have a Latin on whose mind the philosophy of Averroes imposes itself as the only philosophy that is rationally demonstrable. A true Averroist is a man who, as a philosopher, is content with Averroes. His faith, when he has one, does not descend into his philosophy to reform it; if it does, he is no longer a simple "averroiste latin" but rather a man who is striving to establish some sort of "averroïsme chrétien." His mysticism, if he has one, is neither the completion nor the extension of his philosophy; if it is, he is a man whose doctrine thereby becomes quite different from that of Averroes and it ceases to be a simple Averroism.

If we wish, at present, to read over again the text of Gundissalinus—Where will we find his first citation of St. Augustine? In the very place where he is copying the definition of the separated active Intellect such as it is found in Avicenna. Are we to believe that, for a reader of the Middle Ages, such a precaution could have passed unnoticed or seem lacking in meaning? Let us consider the text without changing a word of it: "Sicut enim sine luce exteriori non fit visio, sic sine luce intelligentiae agentis in nos nulla fit veritatis rei comprehensio" (ed. De Vaux, p. 153, 11–16). There is certainly the active Intelligence of Avicenna; but let us read further: "Hoc enim est menti ratio, quod est aspectus oculo." On this point we are referred to SAINT AUGUSTINE, *Solil.*, I, 6, 12 (P.L. 32; c. 875). But what does this text of Saint Augustine say? "Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat. Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus." Is it too much to suppose that the one who cites these latter words in that precise place, remembers that in the text which he cites it is God Who illumines? Is it, in truth, to attribute to him some intention which he never had, to suppose that Saint Augustine is here inserted, not without reason, into Avicenna? At this very point are we not, on the contrary, witnessing the grafting of Augustinianism on the trunk of Avicenna?

However little attention we pay it, we will see numerous indications of this sort. P. 151, 7: "ad contemplandum suum superius quod est Deus." P. de Vaux's note is: "*quod est Deus*, est une glose de l'auteur au texte d'Avicenne"—Yes, and it is significant: for Avicenna, *suum superius*, is the created, separated substance; for Gundissalinus, it is God. That is an important difference. P. 155, 1–2: "quia ipsa forma in se nuda est a materia, ut angelica essentia." *Ut angelica essentia* is another gloss and a Christian one which puts an angel in the place of the *Dator formarum*. P. 172, 20–23: "Ideo sola intelligentia deus gustari dicitur quia ex omnibus anime ea sola in presenti et futuro nullo mediante tangitur." Once we say *nullo mediante*, what becomes of the Active Intellect of Avicenna? Who then illumines us if not,

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*nulla natura interposita*, the Christian God of Saint Augustine? It is indeed He, *ipse* (and not *ipsa*, ed. cit. p. 153, 11) who, according to the words of the *Soliloquia*, enlightens our thought. The substitution of the God of St. Augustine for the *Intelligencia agens* of Avicenna is there explicitly in the very text which P. de Vaux publishes; it is difficult to call a doctrine "avicennisme" in which there is so much of Saint Augustine.

ETIENNE GILSON

## Preface

In preparing this edition of the *De Anima* attributed to Gundissalinus,<sup>1</sup> I have used the following manuscripts:

V. Vat. Lat. 2186,<sup>2</sup> ff. 104r-119v. These folios are, I should say, in thirteenth century Gothic, carefully written. The *De Anima* begins on f. 104r with the title, *Tractatus de Anima* with no ascription of the treatise to Gundissalinus. The colophon on f. 119v is *finitus est liber* and below in a later hand is *Lege tractatum et fuge errores*. This is the best manuscript of all those I have used and I have made it the base of the text. The scribe has a few capricious traits. Words beginning with the syllable *par* such as *partes*, *paratus*, are often written out in full but the letter *p* has a horizontal stroke through the lower part of the vertical line as in the *nota* for *per*; again the imperfect subjunctive of a verb is often written with an abbreviation which is generally used to express the third person plural of the present indicative, e.g. *movet* with a horizontal stroke over the *e*. Often the form *extimatio* is read where the other manuscripts give *aestimatio*. The form *extimatio* is also found in the *Liber Sextus Nat.* of Avicenna. I have noted these peculiarities when they occur for the first time. All readings not in the text, even corruptions, I have placed among the variants. In constructing the text of this treatise I have departed from the reading of this manuscript as often as I have considered that of another manuscript better.

M. Venice, B.N. Marciana Cod. 181, a. 203, l. 144 (Z.L. CCXCIII), ff. 1-38r. It is listed in the catalogue<sup>3</sup> as fifteenth century; it may be late fourteenth Italian Gothic. It is very well written in a clear, not too angular, hand. It carries neither title nor name of the author. Where chapter headings appear in any of the other manuscripts, it has the letter *q* between dots in the margin for *quaestio*. The colophon is *finitur est liber de anima*. This manuscript belongs to the same tradition as V, blended slightly with C and P, and furnishes a very good text except that there are numerous omissions due to homoeoteuton. Its chief value lies in confirming the readings of V. I have listed all variant readings from this manuscript except omissions just noted, manifest corruptions of which there are a few, and unimportant transpositions of words unsupported by another manuscript.

C. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 504, ff. 146v-169v. Thirteenth century Gothic. This manuscript is very well written but abounds in omissions, and transpositions of words especially in the case of two- or three-word groups such as *simplex una* for *una simplex*. The title is *liber dominici (dni) gundisalinii de anima ex dictis plurium philosophorum collectus*. No colophon. It belongs to the same family as P but gives a much better text. While it is not as good a manuscript as either of the above, I have in some instances adopted its reading especially when supported by another manuscript as the critical apparatus shows. I also list all variants which could be of possible use. Unimportant inversions of words found only in it, evident corruptions and omissions due to homoeoteuton I have not listed.

P. Paris B.N. Lat. 16613, ff. 2r-42v. Thirteenth Century. This is a wretched manuscript, full of corruptions and false readings. The title is *liber de anima a*

<sup>1</sup> All the manuscripts for this treatise give the spelling, Gundissalinus, though C gives Gundissalinus in the treatise *de Creatione Mundi et Caeli*. f. 169v, col. 1.

<sup>2</sup> This manuscript has been fully described by Jeanne Bignami-Odier, *Le Manuscrit Vatican Latin 2186 in Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du M.A.* 12-13, 1937-38, pp. 133

sqq. and by Ludwig Bauer, *Dominicus Gundissalinus, de Divisione philosophiae* in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der philosophie des Mittelalters*. (1903) Band IV, Heft. 2-3, pp. 147-151. The first is the more accurate.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Valentinielli, *Bibliotheca Manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum* (Venetiis, 1868), Vol. IV, p. 131.

*dominico (dno) gundisalino ab arabico in latinum translatus continens X capitula*. The colophon is *Explicit commentum de anima*. It gives more chapter headings than all the others combined. I have, as a rule, used it only when supported by another manuscript, and seldom listed its myriad corruptions, false readings and blunders. In a non-literary text, I can see no advantage in perpetuating the mistakes of an ignorant scribe.

N. Paris, B.N. Lat. 8802. A fragment, part of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. In this manuscript the Latin translation of Avicenna *Liber Sextus Nat.* begins on f.79r and continues on to almost the end of f.142v. It ends in the middle of a phrase within a sentence. A cursive hand has finished the sentence which closes a paragraph near the beginning of Chapter 7 of Part III, f.15v. I: *Propter hoc autem quod una . . . res impletur*, etc. The book hand ceases with *una* and the cursive continues the sentence from *res* on. Then on f.143r in a different hand Gundissalinus' *de Anima* begins, starting in the middle of Chapter 9 with the heading *de Interioribus Virtutibus Animalium*, (p. 56 of this edition). It appears that a scribe who was writing out the Avicenna got as far as *quod una* at the end of the day's work and for some reason or other never resumed it. Another completed the sentence in a free hand. Later, another scribe began with the latter part of Gundissalinus and continued on to the end of his treatise (f.171r). The *de Intellectu* of Alexander of Aphrodisius starts on 171v. This manuscript is well written and gives a good text. It is close to V but agrees with C or P or both in some instances. I would say that the script of the *de Anima* of Gundissalinus is early thirteenth century. I have given all variants found in it. Chapter X, ff.154r—171r, pages 73–98, has been edited by Father De Vaux, O.P. in his work, *L'Avicennisme Latin*, Paris, Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1934, pp. 147–178.

None of these manuscripts is descended directly from another.

My division of the treatise into chapters is based on the topics of the work given by the author himself (see p. 31). None of the manuscripts gives complete chapter headings or divisions into chapters, and P gives some of them in places which do not accord with the plan furnished by the author. The heading and first sentence of *Capitulum Sextum*, p. 52, really belong to *Capitulum Septimum*, p. 53, but I have left them as I find them in the manuscripts and placed them in parentheses.

My references to Avicenna's *Liber Sextus Naturalium (de anima)* follow the Venice edition of 1508.<sup>4</sup> One might at first suspect that the text of Avicenna used by Gundissalinus was a different translation from that in the Venice edition. Compare v.g. p. 47, lines 15–16 of this text: *nam omnis vis, ex hoc quod est vis, non est nisi quia ex ea provenit actio quam principaliter habet*, and Avic. f.27r, IB: *quod omnis virtus, ex eo quod est virtus, nihil est nisi ad quod ex ea provenit actio quam habet principaliter*. But in other long passages Gundissalinus follows the text of the Venice edition word for word except perhaps the change of a *vel* to an *aut*. He revised or changed or paraphrased the text in some places, but in my opinion there is not a case of two translations.

Most of the references to the sources of this treatise were provided for me by Professor Etienne Gilson.

<sup>4</sup> The additions of Avohaveth, chapters five and six of Part Four, are much the same in part at least as the *de Viribus Cordis* published with the *Canon Medicinæ* of Avicenna, Venice, 1608, Tome II, pp. 334–352. The similarity begins with the second chapter of the *de Viribus Cordis*; *de definitione et natura spiritus et eius virtute*: *Neque vita neque aliqua perfectio neque bonum*

*aliquod pervenit a prima veritate altissime et a manatione prima cum avaritia*. Compare this with Avic. *VI Nat.* IV, 5, f. 20v, col. 2: *nec vita nec ulla perfectionum aut bonitatum est retenta apud primum principium in prima genitura*. A study of this question is outside the scope of this article.

MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

In the references to sources the following titles are used: Avic. stands for Avicenna, *Liber sextus Nat. (de anima)*, Venice, 1608.

Fons Vitae refers to Avencebrolis (Ibn Gebirol), *Fons Vitae*. C. Baeumker, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* I, 2. 1892.

De Diff. Animae et Spir. refers to Costa-Ben-Luca, *De Differentia Animae et Spiritus Liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi*, Carl Sigmund Barach, Innsbruck, 1878, pp. 120–139.

De Motu Cordis refers to the same volume pp. 83–112: *Excerpta e Libro Alfredi Anglici, de Motu Cordis*.

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*LIBER<sup>a</sup> DOMINICI GUNDISALINI DE ANIMA EX  
DICTIS PLURIUM PHILOSOPHORUM COLLECTUS*

INCIPIT<sup>b</sup> PROLOGUS IN TRACTATU DE ANIMA

Cum<sup>5</sup> omnes homines aequae constant<sup>c</sup> ex anima et corpore, non tamen omnes sic<sup>d</sup> certi sunt de anima sicut de corpore; quippe cum hoc sensui subiaceat, ad animam vero non nisi solus intellectus attingat. Unde homines solis sensibus dediti aut animam nihil esse<sup>e</sup> credunt, aut, si<sup>f</sup> forte ex motu corporis<sup>g</sup> eam utcumque<sup>h</sup> esse<sup>i</sup> coniciunt, quid sit vel quomodo se habeat plerique fide tenent, sed paucissimi ratione convincunt.<sup>j</sup> Indignum siquidem est<sup>k</sup> ut illam sui partem qua<sup>l</sup> homo sciens est ipse nesciat, et<sup>m</sup> id per quod rationalis est<sup>n</sup> ipse ratione non comprehendat; unde nec Deum<sup>o</sup> nec se plene potest cognoscere qui id in quo Deo<sup>p</sup> similis est convincitur ignorare. Cum enim multis creaturis homo corpore<sup>q</sup> sit inferior, sola tamen anima rationali cunctis antecellit, in qua sui<sup>r</sup> creatoris simulacrum expressius quam cetera gerit. (15)

Quapropter quicquid de<sup>s</sup> anima apud philosophos rationabiliter dictum inveni, simul in unum colligere curavi. Opus siquidem latinis<sup>t</sup> hactenus incognitum utpote in archivis<sup>u</sup> graecae et arabicae<sup>v</sup> tantum linguae reconditum,<sup>w</sup> sed iam per<sup>x</sup> Dei gratiam quamvis non sine multo labore ad notitiam latinorum est deductum<sup>y</sup> ut fideles, qui pro anima<sup>z</sup> tam studiose laborant, quid de ipsa<sup>a</sup> sentire debeant, non iam<sup>b</sup> fide tantum, sed etiam ratione comprehendant. Ubi in primis quaeritur de anima an sit, postea quid sit, deinde an sit creata vel<sup>c</sup> increata; sed si creata, an una vel<sup>d</sup> multae; si multae, an simul creatae ab initio mundi, an non simul ab initio mundi, sed cotidie novae creentur; si autem cotidie novae<sup>e</sup> creantur,<sup>f</sup> tunc an de nihilo an de aliquo; si vero de aliquo, an ex traduce sicut corpus, an de alio. Deinde an sit mortalis vel<sup>g</sup> immortalis; sed si immortalis, tunc an omnes vires suas quas exercet dum est in corpore retineat etiam post mortem corporis, an non omnes; si autem non omnes, tunc<sup>h</sup> sciendum est quas retineat vel quas amittat<sup>i</sup> exuta a corpore, et<sup>j</sup> hic finitur liber. (20) (25)

<sup>a</sup> Liber . . . collectus] Tractatus de anima  
V] Liber de anima a dominico gundisalino ab  
arabico in latinum translatus continens decem  
capitula P] *om.* M.

<sup>b</sup> Incipit . . . anima *om.* CMP.

<sup>c</sup> constant P.

<sup>d</sup> *om.* CP.

<sup>e</sup> *add.* aliquid PV.

<sup>h</sup> utrumque C] utrumque M.

<sup>i</sup> *om.* C.

<sup>j</sup> coniciunt C] *corrupt* P.

<sup>k</sup> *om.* MV.

<sup>m</sup> *add.* per M.

<sup>o</sup> nec se nec Deum MV.

<sup>p</sup> est similis Deo CP.

<sup>q</sup> sit inferior corpore CP.

<sup>r</sup> sim. sui creatoris CP.

<sup>e</sup> *om.* M.

<sup>g</sup> *om.* CP.

<sup>l</sup> *add.* ipse CP.

<sup>n</sup> *om.* M.

<sup>s</sup> de anima . . . inveni] per philosophos de  
anima dictum inveni rationabiliter C.

<sup>t</sup> latinus M.

<sup>v</sup> hebraicae P.

<sup>x</sup> *add.* iam M.

<sup>z</sup> tam studiose pro anima C]

quodammodo studiose pro anima laborent P.

<sup>a</sup> *ea* CP.

<sup>b</sup> naturali C.

<sup>c</sup> *an* CP.

<sup>d</sup> *an* C] aut P.

<sup>e</sup> novae cotidie CP.

<sup>f</sup> creantur C.

<sup>g</sup> *an* CP.

<sup>h</sup> tunc sciendum] consciendum V.

<sup>i</sup> retineat C.

<sup>j</sup> et . . . liber *om.* M.

<sup>5</sup> Cum omnes . . . l. 11, gerit. The same as the first paragraph of the prologue to the translation of Avic. *Liber VI Naturalium* by Johannes Hispalensis. Quoted by A. Jourdain, *Recherches Critiques*, Paris. Joubert, 1843; specimen L, pp.

449–450. Both passages are given in parallel columns by Loewenthal, *op. cit.* p. 20. The prologue is found, amongst others, in MSS. Paris, B.N. Lat. 8802, f. 79r and Bruges 510. f. 1r. Cf. also Paris, B.N. Lat. 6443.

# CAPITULUM PRIMUM<sup>k</sup>

## AN SIT ANIMA

Merito quaeritur de anima an sit. Fuerunt enim plerique hominum<sup>1</sup> qui solis sensibus dediti nihil praeter haec sensibilia esse crederent. Unde in tantam dementiam delapsi<sup>m</sup> sunt ut etiam<sup>n</sup> Deum non esse dicerent; aut sicut illi qui in Iob dicunt: *Quid<sup>o</sup> est Deus, ut serviamus ei;*<sup>o</sup> aut sicut<sup>p</sup> illud<sup>q</sup> David: *Dixit<sup>r</sup> insipiens in corde suo: Non<sup>r</sup> est Deus.* Quapropter rationes<sup>s</sup> quibus philosophi animam esse deprehenderunt<sup>t</sup> apponere necessarium duxi. Dixerunt enim: Nos<sup>s</sup> videmus quaedam corpora moveri voluntate et sentire; hoc autem habent<sup>u</sup> vel ex hoc quod corpora sunt vel non. Si autem hoc<sup>v</sup> habent ex eo quod corpora sunt, tunc omnia corpora conveniunt in hoc, quoniam quibuscumque convenit aliqua forma et proprietates addicta<sup>w</sup> ipsi<sup>x</sup> formae. Unde si sentire et moveri voluntate<sup>y</sup> habent ex hoc quod corpora sunt, tunc sentire et moveri voluntate<sup>z</sup> comitantur ubique corporeitatem. Sed non comitantur ubique quoniam non omne corpus sentit vel movetur voluntate,<sup>a</sup> ut lapides. Ergo sentire et moveri voluntate<sup>a</sup> non habent animalia ex hoc quod corpora sunt. (5)

Item si ipsa corpora haberent sentire et moveri voluntate ex seipsis, tunc ipsa corpora essent causa sui motus et sensus. Sed si ipsa essent causa sibi<sup>b</sup> voluntarii motus et sensus, tunc numquam<sup>q</sup> quiescerent<sup>a</sup> a voluntario<sup>d</sup> motu et sensu dum essent corpora. Quamdiu enim est causa, secundum quod est causa, numquam cessat effectus; sed quandoque quiescunt corpora; igitur<sup>10</sup> non habent sentire<sup>e</sup> et moveri voluntate ex seipsis. Aliquid ergo aliud inest eis quod est causa voluntarii motus et sensus. (10)

Item nullum corpus<sup>11</sup> agit aliquid<sup>f</sup> ex hoc<sup>g</sup> quod est corpus, alioquin omne corpus ageret illud.<sup>h</sup> Sed nos videmus multas actiones corporis; nullam igitur earum agit corpus ex hoc quod est corpus; sed omnis actio eget agente. (25) Quia<sup>12</sup> enim omnis actio accidens est, nec est res per se existens, ideo necessario eget agente per quem sit essentia eius et esse. Igitur actiones corporis causam efficientem habent praeter corpus.

<sup>k</sup> ll. 8-9 capitulum . . . anima] Prima quaestio de anima an sit V] quaestio prima an sit anima C] om. M.

<sup>1</sup> homines CP.

<sup>m</sup> lapsi C.

<sup>n</sup> et CP.

<sup>o</sup> illi MPV.

<sup>p</sup> sicut illud om. M.

<sup>q</sup> om. CP.

<sup>r</sup> non est Deus] et cetera C.

<sup>s</sup> philosophorum rationes quibus C.

<sup>t</sup> deprehendant C.

<sup>u</sup> vel habent MV.

<sup>v</sup> hoc . . . quod] habent ex hoc quod V.

<sup>w</sup> adiecta (Cor. s.m.) C] addita P.

<sup>x</sup> ipsae V.

<sup>y</sup> om. C] voluptate P.

<sup>z</sup> om. CM] voluptate P.

<sup>a</sup> voluntarie C.

<sup>b</sup> sui CP.

<sup>c</sup> quiescent M.

<sup>d</sup> suo motu voluntario C.

<sup>e</sup> moveri et sentire CP.

<sup>f</sup> aliquid C.

<sup>g</sup> eo P.

<sup>h</sup> om. M.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Job XXI, 15.

<sup>7</sup> Ps. XIII, 1; cf. LII, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Nos . . . sentire, cf. Avic. I.1, f. 1r, 2A: Videmus quaedam . . . moventur voluntarie.

<sup>9</sup> Numquam . . . motu. Cf. Macrobius, Com. in S. S. 15, 9: Numquam . . . a motu cessant.

<sup>10</sup> igitur . . . sensus. Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 1r,

2A: Sed non habent . . . huius corporeitatem.

<sup>11</sup> Nullum corpus . . . agente. Cf. Fons Vitae III. 43-44; p. 176, ll. 6-7, 11-12.

<sup>12</sup> Quia enim . . . l. 27, praeter corpus. Cf. op. cit. p. 176, ll. 25 sqq.: Postquam actio . . . praeter corpus.

Item corpora<sup>13</sup> composita sunt et continuata ex partibus.<sup>i</sup> Coniunctio vero et continuatio non fit nisi per motum <sup>i</sup> partium compositi et per attractionem aliarum ab aliis et per retentionem uniuscuiusque illarum in loco. Non est autem partium per <sup>k</sup> se coniungi quarum natura est potius ire in diversas partes. Necesse est igitur ut sit ibi essentia praeter corpus quae partes corporis coniungat et retineat. (5)

Item omne <sup>14</sup> quod <sup>1</sup> movetur vel movetur ab alio vel a seipso. Si <sup>15</sup> autem a seipso, tunc idem est motum et movens; sed movere est in receptibili in potentia facere motum esse in actu, sicut calefacere est facere ut in calefactibili in potentia sit calor in actu, et sic in similibus. Uno autem et eodem motu movet et movetur quicquid movet se, sed motus quo movet in actu est, et movetur ad hoc ut motus quem habet <sup>m</sup> in potentia sit in actu. Si <sup>16</sup> ergo aliquid a se movetur, tunc simul est in eodem unus et idem motus in potentia et actu, quod est impossibile; nihil enim simul est in potentia et actu <sup>n</sup> secundum idem. Nihil ergo movetur ex seipso, sed omne quod movetur ab alio (15) movetur. Ergo aliquid aliud est per quod corpora sentiunt et voluntarie moventur.

Item videmus corpora animari et sensificari; omne <sup>17</sup> autem quod animatur ante possibile est animari quam animetur, alioquin impossibile esset <sup>o</sup> illud animari. Nullum autem possibile de potentia venit ad actum nisi per aliud (20) quod sit in actu; quod enim in actu non est, sibi vel alii dare esse non potest; omne ergo quod animatur ab alio animatur. Dicatur autem illud, si placet, anima vel quomodolibet aliter; non enim inquirimus quomodo vocetur, sed an sit illud quod sic vocatur. Sed quoniam aliqua <sup>18</sup> vis relationis est in hoc quod dicitur anima, — anima enim animati anima, et omne animatum (25) anima animatum est, — tunc rationabilius <sup>p</sup> videtur ut id quo corpora animantur anima vocetur. Hoc <sup>19</sup> enim nomen anima non est ei inditum a sua essentia, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora <sup>q</sup> et refertur ad <sup>r</sup> illa <sup>s</sup> anima ergo est quae corpora animat et sensificat et voluntario motu movet.<sup>t</sup>

### QUOMODO <sup>u</sup> ANIMA MOVET CORPUS

Nunc autem inquiramus quomodo anima moveat corpus. Omne <sup>20</sup> enim, <sup>v</sup> (30) quod movet aliud, aut quiescit dum movet, aut movetur dum movet. Si <sup>21</sup> autem anima <sup>w</sup> movetur dum movet, tunc aliquo sex <sup>x</sup> motuum movetur

<sup>i</sup> paratibus V.  
<sup>j</sup> motum partium comp.] mutuam partium compositionem C.  
<sup>k</sup> coniungi per se CP.  
<sup>l</sup> om. M. <sup>m</sup> habent M.  
<sup>n</sup> add. quod est impossibile C.  
<sup>o</sup> est C.

<sup>p</sup> rationabilis P. <sup>q</sup> corpus C.  
<sup>r</sup> ab M.  
<sup>s</sup> alia C] aliud P.  
<sup>t</sup> add. Capitulum Secundum P.  
<sup>u</sup> Quomodo . . . corpus om. VM.  
<sup>v</sup> om. M.  
<sup>w</sup> om. C. <sup>x</sup> sex all mss.

<sup>13</sup> Corpora composita . . . l. 6, retineat. Cf. *op. cit.* p. 177, ll. 4-14: Corpus est compositum . . . absolute et retinere.

<sup>14</sup> omne quod . . . a seipso. Cf. Aristotle, *de anima* I. 3, 406a. ll. 3-5.

<sup>15</sup> Si autem . . . l. 10, in actu. Cf. Themistius *Paraphrasis de Anima Aristotelis*, I. 3, vol. II, p. 27, ll. 7-14 (L. Spengel, *Themistii Paraphrases Aristotelis*, Lipsiae, 1866).

<sup>16</sup> si ergo . . . et actu. Cf. *ibid.*: *ei tò avro-klivtron . . . pòs tò avró.*

<sup>17</sup> omne autem . . . l. 21, sit in actu. Cf. *Fons Vitae* III. 10, p. 100, ll. 20-21: Quicquid

coepit esse . . . illud esse. and III. 4, p. 83, ll. 10-11.

<sup>18</sup> aliqua vis . . . dicitur anima. Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 2r, 2: appellatur haec res . . . relatione.

<sup>19</sup> Hoc enim nomen . . . ad illa. Cf. *op. cit.* f. Iv, 2M: Hoc enim nomen . . . ad illa.

<sup>20</sup> omne enim . . . dum movet. Cf. *de Diff. Animae et Spir.* p. 133: quod movet . . . et non movetur.

<sup>21</sup> Si . . . autem . . . secundum locum. Cf. Avic. I. 2, f. 2v, 2: Hic motus . . . secundum aliud.



quia <sup>r</sup> aut movetur secundum substantiam aut secundum quantitatem aut secundum qualitatem aut secundum locum. Sed secundum substantiam fit motus <sup>a</sup> duobus modis quia aut secundum generationem aut secundum corruptionem. Sed anima dum movet non movetur secundum generationem. Moveri enim secundum generationem nihil aliud est quam generari; generari vero est substantiam ingredi. Si ergo anima dum movet movetur secundum generationem, tunc <sup>a</sup> quotiens movet, totiens corrumpitur, et sic <sup>b</sup> desinit esse anima, et totiens generatur quia totiens substantiam <sup>c</sup> ingreditur et fit substantia alia ab ea quae prius erat. Et ita ad singulos motus quibus movet corpus ipsa fit alia <sup>d</sup> et alia substantia; et sic <sup>e</sup> fit cotidie infinitae <sup>f</sup> substantiae, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima <sup>g</sup> movetur secundum generationem dum corpus <sup>h</sup> movet. Sed neque <sup>i</sup> movetur secundum corruptionem a simili per contrarium. (5)

Sed neque secundum quantitatem. Motus enim secundum quantitatem fit duobus modis quia vel secundum augmentum vel secundum diminutionem. Secundum <sup>j</sup> augmentum vero <sup>k</sup> non movetur anima dum movet quia si dum movet secundum augmentum moveretur, tunc quae diutius moveret ipsa maior fieret, et ita maior <sup>l</sup> esset anima in senibus quam in iuvenibus <sup>m</sup> et maior <sup>n</sup> in iunioribus quam in pueris. Augmentum autem et diminutio solius corporis est. Augmentum <sup>22</sup> enim non fit nisi ex infusione alicuius corporis quod penetrat illud <sup>o</sup> et convertitur in eius <sup>p</sup> essentiam. Si ergo anima secundum augmentum moveretur, ipsa corpus esset; sed postea probabitur <sup>q</sup> ipsam non esse corpus. Ergo anima non movetur secundum augmentum. Sed neque secundum diminutionem a simili per contrarium. (15)

Sed neque secundum locum. Motus <sup>23</sup> enim secundum locum vel est naturalis vel violentus vel animalis. Motus autem naturalis semper est ad unam partem tantum quia vel est a medio, vel ad medium, <sup>r</sup> vel circa medium. <sup>s</sup> Si ergo anima secundum locum naturaliter moveretur, <sup>t</sup> tunc dum <sup>u</sup> moveret, moveretur ad unam partem tantum. Ipsa vero <sup>v</sup> movet corpus suum ad multa et diversa. Ergo simul ipsa moveretur ad unam partem tantum et moveret corpus aliquando ad partem oppositam illi, quod fieri non posset. Non ergo movetur anima naturaliter <sup>w</sup> secundum locum. Sed neque movetur secundum locum <sup>x</sup> violententer. Si <sup>24</sup> enim motus quo ipsa movetur esset violentus, tunc invita et coacta moveretur. Si autem invita et coacta moveretur ad movendum suum corpus, tunc motus animae non fieret voluntate. Motus ergo animalis non esset <sup>y</sup> voluntarius, quod est inconveniens. (25)

Item motus violentus aut est <sup>z</sup> ad unum tantum, ut motus caeli, aut est ad plura, ut hominis vel asini. Si ergo moveretur <sup>a</sup> anima motu violento sed ad unum tantum, sequeretur praedictum <sup>b</sup> inconveniens eo quod ipsa

<sup>r</sup> quod vel quia C.

<sup>a</sup> om. CP.

<sup>c</sup> substantia M.

<sup>e</sup> om. CP.

<sup>g</sup> om. V.

<sup>h</sup> movet corpus CM.

<sup>j</sup> secundo V.

<sup>l</sup> om. M.

<sup>n</sup> add. est C.

<sup>z</sup> motum C.

<sup>b</sup> om. CMP.

<sup>d</sup> fit animal V.

<sup>f</sup> add. sic CP.

<sup>i</sup> add. etiam C.

<sup>k</sup> autem C] om. P.

<sup>m</sup> iunioribus C.

<sup>o</sup> aliud CP.

<sup>p</sup> om. V.

<sup>r</sup> add. id est centrum C.

<sup>s</sup> add. id est circulariter VM.

<sup>t</sup> movetur CPV.

<sup>v</sup> autem C.

<sup>w</sup> sec. locum nat. MV.

<sup>x</sup> violententer movetur locum C.

<sup>y</sup> est V.

<sup>a</sup> movetur M.

<sup>q</sup> probatur PV.

<sup>u</sup> cum CP.

<sup>z</sup> esset CP.

<sup>b</sup> om. C.

<sup>22</sup> Augmentum . . . in eius essentiam. Cf. Avic. *loc. cit.*: Motum secundum quantitatem . . . in eius essentiam.

<sup>23</sup> Motus . . . l. 33, violententer. Cf. *loc. cit.*

Si fuerit localis . . . ad unam partem.

<sup>24</sup> Si enim motus . . . non fieret voluntate. Cf. *ibid.*: Si autem fuerit . . . intentio ex seipsa.

movet ad plura sed haec <sup>o</sup> tantum quae ex elementis constant. Si vero moveretur ad plura, cum ipsa moveat <sup>d</sup> suum corpus ad plura, tunc vel ad eadem plura movebitur ipsa vel ad alia. Si autem ad eadem, tunc anima et corpus simul moverentur <sup>e</sup> ad easdem actiones corporales comedendi scilicet et bibendi et similia, quod est inconveniens. Si vero moveretur <sup>f</sup> anima ad alia plura, tunc vel <sup>g</sup> ad similia vel ad dissimilia. Si autem ad similia, tunc idem inconveniens sequeretur <sup>h</sup> quod si ad eadem. Si vero ad diversa, erit tunc contrarietas inter motus quibus movetur et quibus movet, et impediuntur alii propter alios. Et sic cum ipsa movetur ad alia quam corpus suum moveatur, impediuntur movere corpus suum, quod nequaquam fieri potest. Sed neque motus quo ipsa movetur est animalis. Animalis enim motus est ille qui ab anima fit, <sup>i</sup> sicut naturalis qui a natura. Si ergo anima moveretur motu animali, tunc una anima moveretur ab alia anima, et <sup>j</sup> similiter de illa alia <sup>k</sup> quaereretur si moveretur ab alia anima, et sic <sup>l</sup> in infinitum.

Sed nec movetur <sup>m</sup> secundum alterationem de qua magis videtur. Alteratio enim est secundum qualitatem facta permutatio. Finis <sup>25</sup> vero alterationis est habere illam qualitatem ad quam permutatur, quae cum habita fuerit, cessabit alteratio. Si ergo anima cum movet alteratur, tunc singulis motibus quibus movet, ipsa anima <sup>n</sup> de qualitate ad qualitatem permutatur, et <sup>o</sup> numquam permanet <sup>p</sup> eadem dum movet, et sic dum movet, necesse est eam alterari et non alterari simul, quod est impossibile. Item omnis <sup>26</sup> qualitas aut est corporalis aut incorporealis. Corporalis qualitas dicitur quae <sup>q</sup> in solis corporibus invenitur, ut color et figura. Incorporealis vero est quae in eo est quod corpus non est <sup>r</sup> ut scientia, <sup>s</sup> virtus et similia. Si ergo movetur anima secundum alterationem dum movet corpus, tunc alteratur secundum qualitatem corporalem vel incorporealem. Sed secundum qualitatem corporalem non alteratur quoniam in <sup>t</sup> ipsa non est qualitas corporalis. Alteratur ergo secundum qualitatem incorporealem, sed qualitas incorporealis non est nisi <sup>u</sup> scientia vel virtus vel voluntas vel laetitia vel ira vel alia huiusmodi. Si ergo cum <sup>v</sup> anima movet corpus ipsa alteratur, tunc quotiens movet corpus ipsa movetur secundum aliquod istorum. Semper ergo mutat affectus vel profectus <sup>w</sup> in melius vel <sup>x</sup> peius. Numquam ergo eadem permanet. Sed videmus quod saepe movet et non discit nec fit melior nec peior nec gaudet nec tristatur. Ergo saepe movet et non alteratur secundum hoc. Non est ergo necesse moveri animam aliquo <sup>y</sup> sex motuum, dum ipsa movet corpus suum.

Quaeritur etiam si ideo movet quia movetur, scilicet ut non possit movere nisi ipsa <sup>z</sup> moveatur, quemadmodum in artificialibus apparet ut in molendino cuius mola non movetur nisi quia rota movetur per quam mola <sup>a</sup> movetur, an non, scilicet ut ad movendum corpus non sit <sup>b</sup> necesse semper ipsam moveri, sed quandoque moveat <sup>c</sup> corpus ipsa mota, quandoque quieta. <sup>d</sup> Si enim non moveret corpus nisi quia ipsa moveretur, tunc impossibile esset

<sup>o</sup> om. C.<sup>e</sup> moveretur C.<sup>g</sup> om. C.<sup>i</sup> sit M.<sup>j</sup> add. sic usque in infinitum C.<sup>k</sup> anima quaeritur C.<sup>m</sup> moveretur C.<sup>o</sup> om. MV.<sup>q</sup> quia C.<sup>d</sup> movet C.<sup>f</sup> movetur CM.<sup>h</sup> sequitur M.<sup>l</sup> add. usque CP.<sup>n</sup> om. MV.<sup>p</sup> manet CP.<sup>r</sup> non est corpus CP.<sup>t</sup> om. M.<sup>v</sup> anima cum C] anima dum P.<sup>w</sup> profectus C.<sup>y</sup> aliquibus C.<sup>a</sup> om. C.<sup>b</sup> fit V] scit M.<sup>c</sup> mov. cor. ipsa om. C.<sup>d</sup> add. moveat corpus C.<sup>a</sup> add. et MV.<sup>u</sup> om. M.<sup>x</sup> add. in CM.<sup>z</sup> om. C.

<sup>25</sup> Finis . . . cessabit alteratio. Cf. *loc. cit.* permutationis secundum accidentia . . . cessabit permutatio.

<sup>26</sup> omnis qualitas . . . color et figura. Cf. *Fons Vitae* IV. 7, p. 229, ll. 12-15: qualitas, id est, color et figura.

ipsam movere corpus nisi simul et <sup>o</sup> ipsa moveretur. Sed <sup>27</sup> probatum est ipsam non moveri aliquo sex motuum, et constat ipsam movere corpus. Movet ergo et non movetur. Et ita ad hoc ut moveat, non est necesse ipsam moveri, sed quia aliquando gaudet et <sup>f</sup> aliquando tristatur et de ignorantia ad scientias per studium cotidie permutatur,<sup>g</sup> utique secundum alterationem (5) saltem moveri videtur. Movetur enim affectibus eo quod nolle et velle eiusdem rei habeat in diversis temporibus. Videtur ergo moveri motu electionis, cum hoc potius eligit quam illud, et sic videtur alterari dum movet. Sed si hoc esset, nunquam in eadem voluntate <sup>h</sup> permanens propter eundem finem et ad idem propositum suum corpus aliquo tempore moveret, quod (10) esse <sup>i</sup> falsum quisquis <sup>j</sup> in se facile deprehendit. Sed etsi sic moveatur,<sup>k</sup> non est tamen <sup>l</sup> necesse eam moveri ad hoc ut moveat. Anima igitur quiescens movet.

Quicquid autem a re quiescente movetur, uno quinque modorum movetur, quoniam movetur <sup>m</sup> anima aut per desiderium eius quod appetit aut per (15) odium eius quod respuit aut per terrorem eius quod refugit aut per vim naturalem sursum vel deorsum tendit, ut lapis deorsum, ignis sursum, vel sicut ferrum movetur ab adamante, aut quia res movens rei motae causa principalis existit, sicut scientia movet artificem, ipsa <sup>n</sup> tamen <sup>o</sup> non movetur.<sup>p</sup> Hoc ergo quinto modo anima movet animalia, quia <sup>q</sup> est causa motus (20) animalium per desiderium et <sup>r</sup> per voluntatem et per opus atque mutationem; <sup>s</sup> ipsa tamen non movetur aliquo modo motionis corporum.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>o</sup> om. C.

<sup>f</sup> om. CP.

<sup>n</sup> om. C.

<sup>g</sup> commutatur CM.

<sup>h</sup> voluntatem V.

<sup>o</sup> tantum V.

<sup>i</sup> om. CP] falsum esse M.

<sup>p</sup> add. ipsa C.

<sup>j</sup> quisque CP.

<sup>q</sup> quae CP.

<sup>k</sup> movetur P.

<sup>r</sup> om. CP.

<sup>l</sup> tantum V.

<sup>s</sup> intentionem mutationem P] intentionem C.

<sup>m</sup> quando movetur quoniam V.] anima quoniam M.

<sup>t</sup> corporis CP.

<sup>27</sup> Sed probatum . . . l. 22, motionis corporum. Cf. *de Diff. Animae et Spir.* pp. 133-134.

CAPITULUM<sup>u</sup> SECUNDUMQUID<sup>v</sup> SIT ANIMA?

Nunc restat inquirere quid sit anima, et merito; magna enim quaestio fuit apud philosophos quid esset. Quidam enim dixerunt quod anima est substantia incorporea mobilis<sup>28</sup> ex se ipsa; alii quod ipsa est complexio<sup>29</sup> <sup>w</sup> corporis; alii quod anima est sanguis; Pythagoras dixit quod anima est numerus se ipsum movens, et multa alia in hunc modum. Quibus omnibus contemptis quasi frivolis et iam destructis, quid philosophorum principes, Plato scilicet et Aristoteles, dixerint <sup>x</sup> animam esse videamus. (5)

Plato<sup>30</sup> animam sic definit<sup>y</sup> dicens: anima est substantia incorporea corpus movens.<sup>z</sup> Quod<sup>31</sup> autem anima <sup>a</sup> sit substantia sic probatur; quicquid recipit contraria, cum sit unum et idem numero, substantia est. Sed anima, manens una et eadem numero, recipit contraria quae sunt virtutes et vitia,<sup>b</sup> gaudium et tristitia, scientia et ignorantia. Ergo anima substantia est. (10)

Item quicquid est, aut est substantia aut accidens. Sed anima non est accidens. Nihil enim quod adveniens constituit et recedens destruit<sup>c</sup> accidens est; sed<sup>d</sup> anima adveniens constituit animal et recedens destruit; (15) ergo anima non est accidens; est igitur substantia.

Quod autem anima<sup>e</sup> non sit corpus philosophi sic probant dicentes: ponamus aliquem hominem subito creatum<sup>f</sup> in aere et <sup>g</sup> perfectum, sed velato visu suo ne videat exteriora sua, et moveatur in aere, sic ut membra eius separata non contingant se nec aer tangat eum ita ut ipse sentire possit; (20) qui siquidem non affirmabit tunc vel<sup>h</sup> exteriora membrorum suorum vel interiora, nec se<sup>i</sup> animatum esse vel sensibilem esse<sup>j</sup> vel aliquid huiusmodi; nec tamen<sup>k</sup> dubitabit affirmare se esse, cuius tamen non affirmat longitudinem nec latitudinem nec spissitudinem. Si autem in illa hora et in illo statu posset imaginare manum vel aliquod aliorum membrorum,<sup>l</sup> non tamen (25) imaginaret illud esse partem sui nec necessarium suae essentiae. Verum est autem quia<sup>m</sup> id quod affirmatur aliud est ab eo quod<sup>n</sup> non affirmatur, et concessum aliud est<sup>o</sup> ab eo quod non conceditur, et quia essentia quam affirmat esse est propria illi eo quod illa est ipsemet, et est praeter corpus eius et praeter membra eius quae non affirmat esse, profecto datur<sup>p</sup> intelligi aperte (30) quod anima habeat aliud esse quam sit esse corporis et quod homo non eget corpore ad hoc ut sciat animam suam et percipiat<sup>q</sup> eam.

Item id<sup>32</sup> de quo nulla est dubitatio hoc est quod in homine est aliquid per

<sup>u</sup> Cap. Sec. om. CMV] Cap. Tertium P.

<sup>v</sup> om. M.

<sup>w</sup> complexi M.

<sup>x</sup> dixerunt CP.

<sup>y</sup> definiuit CP.

<sup>z</sup> movens corpus M.

<sup>a</sup> om. CP.

<sup>b</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>c</sup> destruat MV.

<sup>d</sup> sed . . . destruit] anima est huiusmodi C.

etiam P.

<sup>e</sup> om. P.

<sup>f</sup> add. esse CM.

<sup>g</sup> om. M.

<sup>h</sup> add. secundum C] scilicet P.

<sup>i</sup> animatum se MV.

<sup>j</sup> om. MV.

<sup>k</sup> om. C.

<sup>l</sup> om. MV.

<sup>m</sup> quod CP.

<sup>n</sup> add. non conceditur et C] non conc.

etiam P.

<sup>o</sup> om. C.

<sup>p</sup> aperte datur intelligi MV.

<sup>q</sup> recipiat M.

<sup>28</sup> mobilis ex seipsa. Avic. I. 2, f. 2v, 1A.

<sup>29</sup> complexio corporis . . . seipsum movens.

*ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Plato . . . movens. Cf. *de Diff. Anima et Spir.* p. 131.

<sup>31</sup> Quod autem . . . l. 32, percipiat eam.

Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 2r, 2X: Dicemus igitur . . . percipiat eam. See also f. 27r, 2C.

<sup>32</sup> Id de quo . . . l. 15, p. 38, per se proprium. Cf. Avic. V. 2, f. 22v, 2D: id de quo nulla . . . f. 23r, 1A, habere situm proprium.

quod ipse apprehendit intelligibilia. Id ergo quod est subiectum intelligibilium vel est corpus vel aliquid habens esse per corpus, vel <sup>r</sup> non. Si autem <sup>a</sup> subiectum intelligibilium est corpus vel aliquid habens esse per corpus, tunc intellecta <sup>t</sup> forma subsistit per se vel in aliquo eius divisibili vel in aliquo eius non divisibili. Illud autem corporis quod non dividitur punctus est; punctus enim est finis qui non separatur a linea in situ aliqua tali separatione per quam punctus sit aliquid in quo aliud <sup>u</sup> subsistat. Si ergo punctus per se separatus esset ut reciperet aliquam rerum et cognosceretur habere esse, tunc punctus esset <sup>v</sup> habens duas partes, unam versus lineam a qua separatus esset et aliam ab ea <sup>w</sup> diversam et oppositam ei. Cum autem punctus esset separatus per se a linea, <sup>x</sup> profecto linea a qua separaretur haberet alium finem versus punctum, et iste alius punctus esset finis lineae et non iste; sed de hoc et de illo puncto idem potest dici, et ex hoc provenirent <sup>y</sup> puncta ordinari <sup>z</sup> ad faciendum lineam, quod impossibile est; ex coniunctione enim punctorum nihil effici potest nec potest <sup>a</sup> habere punctus situm per se proprium. Ergo <sup>33</sup> subiectum intelligibilium non potest esse aliquid corporis indivisibile. (5)

Sed neque corpus neque aliquid corporis divisibile potest esse subiectum intelligibilium. Si enim <sup>34</sup> forma intellecta fuerit in aliquo quod dividitur <sup>b</sup> in partes, tunc accidit ei ut ipsa dividatur in partes quae vel erunt similes vel dissimiles. Si autem fuerint similes, tunc quomodo componetur ex eis aliquid quod non est illae? Nullum <sup>35</sup> enim totum ex hoc quod est totum est pars; nec ulla quaelibet partium <sup>c</sup> est suum totum, cum altera contineatur in toto, quae est praeter intentionem eius. Quapropter si fuerint similes, tunc <sup>36</sup> intellecta forma vel erit aliqua figura vel aliquis numerus, et forma intellecta erit imaginabilis non intelligibilis, quod constat esse falsum. Non est autem (20) omnis forma intellecta figura vel numerus; quapropter non possunt esse similes; sed nec possunt esse dissimiles. Forma enim intellecta partes dissimiles habere non potest nisi partes definitionis quae sunt genus et differentia. Si autem genus et differentiae essent in subiecto corporali, provenirent multa inconvenientia, quorum unum est quia omnis pars <sup>d</sup> corporis recipit etiam <sup>e</sup> divisionem in infinitum in potentia. Sequeretur ergo tunc genus et differentias infinitas <sup>f</sup> esse in potentia, quod est impossibile. Probatum est enim genera et differentias unius rei non esse infinita in potentia. (25)

Item <sup>37</sup> non omne intellectum potest dividi in <sup>g</sup> intelligibilia simpliciora. Inter <sup>h</sup> ea enim, <sup>i</sup> quae sunt, sunt intelligibilia quae sunt principia compositionis aliorum <sup>j</sup> intelligibilium quae non habent genus nec differentias nec sunt divisibilia <sup>k</sup> in quantitate nec in intellectu. Partes igitur intellectae formae non possunt esse similes, quarum unaquaeque contineatur in toto quod <sup>l</sup> non habeat <sup>m</sup> esse nisi ex <sup>n</sup> earum coniunctione; sed nec dissimiles. <sup>o</sup> Forma igitur intellecta non potest dividi; quapropter non potest consistere (35) (40)

<sup>r</sup> vel non *om.* C.

<sup>a</sup> autem . . . esse per *om.* C.

<sup>t</sup> forma intellecta CM.

<sup>u</sup> aliquid CP] alium M.

<sup>v</sup> *add.* separatus in duas partes vel per se esset C.

<sup>w</sup> eo MPV.

<sup>x</sup> *om.* CP.

<sup>y</sup> pervenient P.

<sup>z</sup> ordinarii V.

<sup>a</sup> punctus potest habere CMP.

<sup>b</sup> dividatur C.

<sup>c</sup> paratum V and *sic often.*

<sup>d</sup> paras V.

<sup>e</sup> infinita CP.

<sup>f</sup> in intell.] intelligibili M.

<sup>g</sup> item P.

<sup>h</sup> intell. aliorum CP.

<sup>i</sup> quae C.

<sup>j</sup> *om.* M.

<sup>k</sup> Sed . . . dissimiles *om.* here and put after dividi.

<sup>l</sup> enim ea CM.

<sup>m</sup> dissimilia C.

<sup>n</sup> habet CP.

<sup>33</sup> Ergo subiectum . . . indivisibile. *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Si enim . . . est ille. *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Nullum . . . eius. *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> tunc . . . imaginabilis. *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Item non omne . . . l. 5, p. 39, *existens* per corpus. Cf. Avic. V. 2, f. 23r, 2A: Item non omne . . . non corporalis.

in aliquo quod dividatur,<sup>p</sup> sed neque in aliquo quod est indivisibile; quare non potest esse in corpore nec in aliquo quod habeat <sup>q</sup> esse per corpus. Ipsa tamen eget receptibili; ergo subiectum intelligibilium nec est corpus nec aliquid corporis, divisibile vel indivisibile; sed forma intellecta non consistit nisi in anima; ergo anima non est corpus nec aliquid existens per corpus. (5)

Item <sup>38</sup> virtus intellectiva abstrahit intelligibilia a quantitate et loco et situ et ceteris omnibus. Sed haec abstractio vel est respectu rei quae abstrahit vel respectu rei quae abstrahitur, videlicet esse huius formae intellectae abstractae <sup>r</sup> a situ vel est ita in esse extrinseco vel est ita in esse formantis.<sup>s</sup> Impossibile est autem ut habeat esse sic in esse extrinseco. Restat ergo ut non sit separatum a situ et ubi nisi cum habet esse in intellectu quia, cum habet esse in intellectu, nec est habens situm nec potest innui <sup>t</sup> nec separatim ostendi nec dividitur nec habet aliquid eorum quae sunt huiusmodi; ergo impossibile est eam esse in corpore. Ergo subiectum intelligibilium non est corpus nec forma existens in corpore; sed anima est subiectum intelligibilium; igitur <sup>u</sup> anima non est corpus nec aliquid existens per corpus. (10)

Item <sup>39</sup> intelligibilia quae sigillatim <sup>v</sup> solet intelligere anima rationalis sunt infinita in potentia. Iam autem probatum est quia <sup>w</sup> id quod praevalet rebus infinitis in potentia nec est corpus nec <sup>x</sup> virtus corporis; anima igitur non <sup>y</sup> est corpus <sup>z</sup> nec virtus corporalis. Virtutes <sup>40</sup> enim corporales debilitari solent in fine aetatis iuvenilis <sup>a</sup> circa quadraginta annos; virtus vero apprehendens intelligibilia plerumque corroboratur <sup>b</sup> circa hanc aetatem; unde non est de virtutibus corporalibus. (15)

Item virtutes <sup>41</sup> corporales apprehendentes per instrumenta solent fatigari assiduitate suae actionis. Ea enim quae fortia <sup>c</sup> et difficilia sunt, cum apprehenduntur, plerumque debilitant instrumenta vel etiam destruunt, in tantum ut post illa non valeant apprehendere debiliora <sup>d</sup> ipsis eo quod nimis penetraverit <sup>e</sup> illa passio a difficili, sicut splendor visum et maximum tonitruum debilitat auditum, ita ut postquam sensus apprehenderit difficile nequeat apprehendere debile. Qui enim intuetur nimium splendorem, profecto nec cum illo nec statim <sup>f</sup> post illum videt debilem lucem; similiter et in aliis. In re autem intelligibili <sup>g</sup> contrario fit. Assiduitas enim suae actionis et formandi ea quae sunt difficilia acquirit ei virtutem facilius apprehendendi post illa id <sup>h</sup> quod est debilius illis; quamvis accadat ei plerumque defectus eo quod intellectus iuvatur imaginatione operante instrumento deficiente et tunc non deservit intellectui. Quod si non esset, profecto aut semper ita eveniret <sup>i</sup> aut saepius; quare anima non est virtus corporalis. (20)

Item <sup>42</sup> quod anima non sit corpus sic probatur. Omne corpus habet qualitates perceptibiles aliquo <sup>j</sup> sensu; sed qualitates animae non sunt perceptibiles aliquo <sup>k</sup> sensu; ergo anima non est corpus. (25)

<sup>p</sup> dividitur P div. . . . quod om. M.

<sup>q</sup> habet CP.

<sup>r</sup> abstractae and abstratio l. 3 V.

<sup>s</sup> informantis C] infortitatis P.

<sup>t</sup> minui CP. <sup>u</sup> ergo CP.

<sup>v</sup> om. here and put after intelligere C.

<sup>w</sup> quod CP. <sup>x</sup> add. est CP.

<sup>y</sup> nec C.

<sup>z</sup> iuvenalis V] om. P.

<sup>a</sup> fortia sunt et dif. C.

<sup>d</sup> debilitata C.

<sup>f</sup> statim post illum] sine illo CP.

<sup>g</sup> om. C.

<sup>i</sup> alio C.

<sup>s</sup> virtus corporis C.

<sup>b</sup> corroborantur PV.

<sup>e</sup> penetravit C.

<sup>h</sup> eveniet C.

<sup>38</sup> Item virtus . . . l. 14, esse in corpore. *Ibid*: Quod virtus intellectiva . . . esse in corpore.

<sup>39</sup> Item intelligibilia . . . virtus corporalis. *Cf. loc. cit. f. 23r, 2 ad finem*: Item probatum est . . . quae sit in corpore.

<sup>40</sup> Virtutes . . . l. 23, virtutibus corporalibus. *Cf. op. cit. V. 2, f. 23v, 2B*: Item omnium

partium . . . virtutibus corporalibus.

<sup>41</sup> Item virtutes . . . l. 37, virtus corporalis. *Cf. loc. cit. 1E-2A*: quod virtutibus . . . e contrario autem fit.

<sup>42</sup> Item quod anima . . . non est corpus. *Cf. de Diff. Animae et Spir. p. 131*: uniuscuiusque corporis . . . est incorporea.

Item <sup>43</sup> omne corpus subiacet omnibus sensibus vel aliquibus; sed anima nullis subiacet sensibus; ergo anima non est corpus.

Item <sup>44</sup> omne corpus aut est animatum aut inanimatum. Ergo si anima est corpus, aut est inanimata <sup>i</sup> aut animata. Si autem anima est animatum <sup>k</sup> corpus — sed omne animatum corpus aliqua anima est animatum — tunc anima est animata ab alia <sup>l</sup> anima; et similiter illa <sup>m</sup> eadem quaestio de illa alia <sup>n</sup> anima, et sic in infinitum. Anima ergo non est <sup>o</sup> animatum corpus; sed nec est corpus inanimatum quia quod non vivit aliud vivificare non potest; anima autem corpus vivificat; ergo anima nullo modo est corpus sed est substantia. Ergo est anima <sup>p</sup> substantia incorporea. Quod autem sit movens corpus iam superius demonstratum <sup>q</sup> est. Vera est igitur <sup>r</sup> definitio animae secundum Platonem, quod anima <sup>45</sup> est substantia incorporea corpus movens. (5) (10)

*Definitio <sup>s</sup> animae secundum Aristotelem*

Aristoteles autem sic <sup>t</sup> definivit <sup>u</sup> animam <sup>v</sup> dicens: *Anima* <sup>46</sup> est prima perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentalis, viventis potentialiter. Perfectio autem alia est <sup>w</sup> prima, alia secunda. Prima <sup>47</sup> perfectio est per quam species fit species <sup>x</sup> in effectu, ut figura ensi <sup>y</sup>; secunda perfectio est ut aliquid eorum quae consequuntur speciem rei aut ex actionibus eius aut ex passionibus eius, sicut est incidere ensi. Prima perfectio est scientia medicinae <sup>z</sup> in cognitione, secunda perfectio est medicina in operatione. Anima <sup>a</sup> ergo est perfectio prima quia statim cum unitur corpori fit in eo plena <sup>b</sup> potentia vivendi vel <sup>c</sup> sentiendi, et sic per animam perficitur species corporis animati quod ante animam erat in sola potentia. Quicquid autem in sola potentia est, adhuc imperfectum est; tunc autem perficitur cum de potentia ad effectum perducitur, et quia sola anima corpus vivit, ideo anima est perfectio corporis, quia id, ad quod aptum est potentia, non perficitur nisi per animam; et prima quia nulla praecedunt quae animant, <sup>d</sup> et <sup>e</sup> quae sequuntur <sup>f</sup> ad hoc non valent. Corpus <sup>48</sup> autem aliud naturale est ut arbor, aliud artificiale ut scamnum quod animatum esse non potest. Ut ergo removeatur artificiale, appositum naturale. Sed naturale aliud est <sup>g</sup> simplex, aliud compositum. Simplex autem aliud est quodlibet elementorum quatuor, aliud nec elementum nec elementatum ut quodlibet caeleste corpus. Sed nullum elementorum est animatum nec aliquod <sup>h</sup> caelestium corporum secundum Aristotelem, licet aliter videatur Platoni. Nullum ergo simplex corpus est animatum; sed nec omne compositum naturale ut lapis. Ideo appositum instrumentalis, id est habentis instrumenta quibus iuvatur ad vitam. Instrumentorum <sup>49</sup> autem alia sunt necessaria ad (15) (20) (25) (30) (35)

<sup>i</sup> anim. aut inan M. <sup>k</sup> corpus anim. M.  
<sup>l</sup> aliqua M. <sup>m</sup> om. MV.  
<sup>n</sup> eadem CP. <sup>o</sup> est non V.  
<sup>p</sup> om. C.] anima est M.  
<sup>q</sup> monstratum MV. <sup>r</sup> om. C.  
<sup>s</sup> Def . . . Arist. om. MV] opinio Aristotelis  
de anima C in margin.  
<sup>t</sup> se M.  
<sup>u</sup> definit sic M.  
<sup>v</sup> om. V.

<sup>w</sup> om. MV. <sup>x</sup> om. CP.  
<sup>y</sup> ensis M. <sup>z</sup> materiae C.  
<sup>a</sup> altera CP.  
<sup>b</sup> potentia plena M.  
<sup>c</sup> et CP. <sup>d</sup> animetur M.  
<sup>e</sup> om. C.  
<sup>f</sup> consequuntur C] consequuntur P.  
<sup>g</sup> om. MV.  
<sup>h</sup> aliquid P.

<sup>43</sup> Item omne corpus . . . non est corpus. Cf. *op. cit.*, l. 1, p. 132: omne corpus . . . non est corpus.

<sup>44</sup> Item omne corpus . . . l. 10, substantia incorporea. Cf. *loc. cit.*: Item omne corpus est animatum . . . l. 6, p. 133, substantia incorporea.

<sup>45</sup> quod . . . movens. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>46</sup> Anima . . . potentialiter. Cf. *de diff. Animae et Spir.* p. 134.

<sup>47</sup> Prima perfectio . . . incidere ensi. Cf. *Avic.* I, 1, f. Iv, 20.

<sup>48</sup> Corpus . . . quatuor. Cf. *de Diff. Animae et Spir.* p. 135: modi autem . . . aqua, terra.

<sup>49</sup> Instrumentorum . . . actiones eorum. *Op. cit. ibid.*

recipiendum nutrimentum, alia ad superflua eiciendum. Necessaria autem ad  
 recipiendum nutrimentum in vegetabilibus sunt truncus, radix et rami et alia  
 huiusmodi; in sensibilibus autem guttur <sup>i</sup> et venae et alia huiusmodi. Neces-  
 saria vero ad superflua expellendum in utrisque sunt <sup>j</sup> pori, sed in sensibilibus  
 etiam alia. Multipliciora enim sunt instrumenta sensibilibus quam vegetabi-  
 lium propter multipliciores actiones eorum. (5)

Ultima autem differentia idem videtur significare qua <sup>k</sup> dicitur viventis  
 potentialiter.<sup>1</sup> Quicquid enim est aut est potentialiter aut effectum; quicquid  
 autem potentialiter est imperfectum est donec de potentia transeat ad ef-  
 fectum per perfectionem. Perfectio autem rei est receptio suae speciei. (10)  
 Dicens <sup>50</sup> ergo viventis potentialiter tantum illud ostendit corpus per ani-  
 mam <sup>m</sup> perfici, quod ante animam habuit <sup>n</sup> potentiam vivificari, quod pene  
 idem sonat instrumentale, scilicet cui <sup>o</sup> possibile <sup>p</sup> est uti <sup>50</sup> actibus vitae.

Postquam <sup>51</sup> autem ea, in quibus videmus esse animam, sunt corpora, et  
 non perficitur esse eorum secundum quod sunt animalia nisi per existentiam (15)  
 animae in illis, tunc anima pars est constitutionis illorum.<sup>q</sup> Partes autem  
 constitutionis rei duae sunt. Una est id quo res est id quod est in actu, quae  
 est ei forma vel quasi forma; altera vero est id quo res est id quod est in po-  
 tentia, quae est ei materia vel quasi materia. Cum igitur anima sit <sup>r</sup> pars con-  
 stitutionis rei, profecto non est pars materialis cui ad constituendum aliquid (20)  
 forma adveniat; sed quia omne <sup>52</sup> esse ex forma est, ipsa utique est quasi  
 forma, non quae in subiecto subsistat,<sup>s</sup> sed quae adveniens corpori animal  
 perficiat. Nam <sup>53</sup> corpus proprium, in quo existit unaquaeque animarum,  
 scilicet tam vegetabilis quam sensibilis quam etiam rationalis, non <sup>t</sup> est id  
 quod est ex complexione propria sed ex anima. Anima enim est quae facit (25)  
 illud esse illius complexionis, nec permanet in complexione <sup>u</sup> propria in actu  
 nisi quamdiu fuerit anima in illo.<sup>v</sup> Anima enim sine dubio est causa per quam  
 vegetabile et animal sunt illius complexionis; ipsa enim anima est principium  
 generationis et vegetationis. Unde impossibile est <sup>w</sup> ut proprium subiectum  
 animae sit id quod est in actu nisi per animam. Non enim verum est ut pro- (30)  
 prium subiectum animae prius constituatur ab alio,<sup>x</sup> cui postea adveniat  
 anima quasi non habens partem in eius constitutione vel definitione,<sup>y</sup> sicut  
 accidentia quae consequuntur esse rei consecutione necessaria, non consti-  
 tuentia illud in actu. Immo ipsa anima constituit ipsum <sup>z</sup> proprium subiectum  
 et dat ei esse in actu. Cum vero anima separatur ab eo, succedit <sup>a</sup> necessario (35)  
 cum separatione eius alia forma quae est sicut opposita formae complexionali.  
 Haec enim forma et haec materia, quam <sup>b</sup> habebat dum aderat anima, non  
 remanet post animam in sua specie quoniam destruitur eius species et eius  
 substantia quae erat subiectum animae. Illud ergo corpus et naturale non

<sup>i</sup> add. ut C.

<sup>j</sup> om. MV.

<sup>k</sup> quae MP.

<sup>1</sup> Quicquid . . . potentialiter om. M.

<sup>m</sup> ipsam M.

<sup>n</sup> pot. hab. M.

<sup>o</sup> cum C.

<sup>p</sup> posse C.

<sup>q</sup> eorum CP.

<sup>r</sup> pars sit CMP.

<sup>s</sup> consistit CP.

<sup>t</sup> hoc C.

<sup>u</sup> complexionem V.

<sup>v</sup> illa Cj in illo corrupt M.

<sup>w</sup> om. M.

<sup>x</sup> illo CP.

<sup>y</sup> diffusionem M.

<sup>z</sup> suum CMP.

<sup>a</sup> succedat V.

<sup>b</sup> quoniam M.

<sup>50</sup> Dicens . . . actibus vitae. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 136. Dicens . . . actibus vitae.

<sup>51</sup> Postquam . . . l. 19, quasi materia. Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 1r, 2B: postquam haec . . . sicut subiectum.

<sup>52</sup> omne esse ex forma est. Boethius, *de Trinitate*, 2, 21. PL 64, 1250B.

<sup>53</sup> Nam corpus . . . l. 5, p. 42, esse in subiecto. Cf. Avic. I. 3, f. 3v, 1A-B: materia propria . . . in subiecto. *Partly paraphrase.*



erit <sup>o</sup> iam sicut erat, sed habebit aliam formam et alia accidentia, cuius <sup>d</sup> aliquando pereunt aliquae partes et dissolvitur substantia propter mutationem earum.<sup>e</sup> Unde non remanet essentia materiae post separationem animae, et quod erat subiectum animae fit subiectum alterius rei. Ergo animam <sup>f</sup> esse <sup>g</sup> in corpore non idem est quod accidens esse in subiecto. Anima ergo non est accidens; sed nec <sup>h</sup> corpus; est igitur substantia. (5)

Cum autem quatuor sint <sup>i</sup> quorum unumquodque substantia dicitur, scilicet materia et forma materiae et corpus et spiritus, quo istorum modorum anima substantia dicatur <sup>j</sup> videndum est.<sup>k</sup> Non enim est substantia quae sit materia quoniam tunc apta esset recipere omnem formam, itaque et formam asini, quod est impossibile. Nec est substantia quae sit <sup>l</sup> forma materiae quoniam forma materiae non <sup>m</sup> habet esse post separationem sui a materia; anima vero habet esse post separationem sui a corpore, sicut postea probabitur. Anima etiam non est substantia quae sit <sup>n</sup> corpus. Restat igitur ut sit substantia quae est spiritus rationalis. De quo si constiterit quod sit compositus ex materia et <sup>o</sup> forma, tunc non erunt nisi tres substantiae, scilicet materia et forma et compositum ex utroque, ut substantiae talis recte <sup>p</sup> fiat divisio. Substantia, <sup>q</sup> alia est <sup>r</sup> simplex, alia composita; simplex, alia materia, alia forma; sed composita, <sup>s</sup> alia est <sup>t</sup> corpus, alia est <sup>u</sup> spiritus. Cui <sup>v</sup> enim advenit forma corporeitatis et <sup>w</sup> fit substantia corporea, eidem procul dubio advenit forma spiritualitatis et rationalitatis et fit substantia rationalis <sup>x</sup> spiritualis. Sed de hoc in sequentibus <sup>y</sup> plenius disseremus. (10) (15) (20)

<sup>o</sup> est M.

<sup>e</sup> earum mut. CP.

<sup>g</sup> est M.

<sup>h</sup> sed nec] nec est CP.

<sup>i</sup> sunt CP.

<sup>j</sup> dicitur V.

<sup>k</sup> om. C. add. non enim substantia dicatur videndum est M.

<sup>l</sup> est C] fit P.

<sup>m</sup> non habet esse om. here and put after materia C.

<sup>d</sup> eius C.

<sup>f</sup> anima M.

<sup>n</sup> est C] fit P.

<sup>o</sup> om. M.

<sup>p</sup> res se M.

<sup>q</sup> substantiae CP.

<sup>r</sup> om. MV.

<sup>s</sup> compositi CP.

<sup>t</sup> om. MV.

<sup>u</sup> cum CP.

<sup>v</sup> om. C.

<sup>w</sup> spir. rat. M.

<sup>x</sup> consequentibus CP] sequenti M.

## CAPITULUM TERTIUM 7

## AN 2 ANIMA SIT CREATA VEL INCREATA

De anima quaeritur 2 an sit creata an 3 increata hoc modo. Omne quod est aut coepit esse aut non coepit esse; sed anima est; ergo anima 4 coepit esse aut non coepit esse. Si autem non coepit esse, tunc cum ipsa sit substantia, est utique substantia quae non coepit esse; sed substantia quae non coepit esse aeterna est; ergo anima, si non coepit esse, est aeterna substantia. Ergo (5) est 5 coaeterna Deo. Igitur Deus et quod non est Deus sunt coaeterna, quod omnino videtur falsum. Si enim omne 6 quod est 7 aut creator aut creatura aut proprietas creatoris est, tunc, cum anima non sit creator nec proprietas creatoris, profecto creatura est; igitur anima creata 8 est. Item omne quod (10) crescit imperfectum est; nihil enim crescit nisi ad hoc ut perficiatur. Sed anima crescit quia in sapientia et iustitia proficit; igitur imperfecta est.

Item omne imperfectum a perfecto descendit; sed anima est imperfecta; igitur a perfecto descendit. Omni 9 autem quod ab alio descendit illud 1 aliud sibi initium est unde coepit; 2 anima 3 igitur coepit esse. Sed nihil quod coepit esse increatum est; anima igitur increata non est; est igitur creata, (15) quia, omne quod est, creatum 4 vel increatum est. 5

7 om. all mss.

2 An . . . increata om. M] an anima sit creata vel non C in margin] utrum anima sit creata V.

4 om. here and put after increata CP.

5 vel M.

6 om. CM.

8 coest aeterna Deo M.

9 om. M.

8 creatura C.

9 omne CP.

1 istud C.

2 incoepit C.

3 an. ig. coepit om. C.

4 add. est CP.

5 om. CP.

7 add. esse M.

# CAPITULUM QUARTUM <sup>a</sup>

## AN <sup>54</sup> SIT CREATA UNA VEL MULTAE <sup>o</sup>

Fuerunt <sup>p</sup> <sup>55</sup> enim qui dicerent animam unam tantum esse quae secundum diversas <sup>a</sup> vires unius suae substantiae in plantis exercet <sup>r</sup> vegetationem, in animalibus sensibilitatem, in hominibus intellectum et rationem; quemadmodum unaquaeque rationalis anima dum est in suo corpore secundum vires <sup>s</sup> quas habet varias ipsa, cum sit una simplex substantia, in ossibus, <sup>t</sup> capillis, et unguibus exercet solam vegetationem, in aliis vero partibus corporis praeter hoc etiam sensum et motum, in cerebro <sup>u</sup> vero insuper intellectum et rationem. Et quemadmodum unus et idem radius solis simul diversa agit in diversis, quoniam lutum stringit et ceram dissolvit, sic unam tantum animam esse dixerunt, quae simul de universitate rerum alia tantum <sup>(10)</sup> animat, alia sensificat, alia rationabilia reddit, prout unumquodque corpus virium suarum receptibilius invenit. Et tamen cum in omnibus corporibus <sup>v</sup> una sit, <sup>w</sup> multas dici invenitur <sup>x</sup> propter diversitatem corporum et virium quibus tam diversa operatur.

Sed hunc errorem philosophi sic <sup>y</sup> destruunt dicentes: cum nos videamus vegetabilia habere animam quae nutrit et generat nec habere animam quae sentiat vel <sup>z</sup> cognoscat, profecto haec anima <sup>a</sup> aliud est ab illa. <sup>(15)</sup>

Item <sup>b</sup> cum videamus animalia habere animam quae sentiat nec habere animam quae intelligat, tunc haec <sup>c</sup> anima aliud est ab illa. Tres igitur principaliter sunt animae, prima vegetabilis qualis est in plantis, secunda sensibilis qualis est in brutis animalibus, tertia rationalis qualis est in hominibus; de quibus tamen omnibus vegetabilis anima praedicatur ut genus de suis speciebus. Anima enim vegetabilis est intellectus generalis cuius subiectum similiter est commune universale, videlicet <sup>d</sup> corpus vegetabile, augmentabile, <sup>e</sup> absolutum genus non specificatum, et in hoc omnes animae conveniunt; omnis enim anima nutrit, augmentat et generat. Anima ergo vegetabilis, secundum intellectum communem, sic est in vegetabili sicut in animali quia esse eius est sicut esse rei <sup>f</sup> universalis <sup>g</sup> in rebus; sed postea vegetabile et animal differunt specifica differentia constitutiva, non accidentem tantum. Anima vero vegetabilis secundum quod est specialiter faciens vegetationem in solis vegetabilibus est et non in sensibilibus; sed secundum quod est in animali non facit nisi corpus animale quia est animativa ex qua pendet virtus animationis quae est differentia ipsius ad id cum quo convenit in hoc quod est virtus nutriendi et augmentandi quoniam praeter <sup>56</sup> hoc <sup>h</sup> quod est nutritiva et augmentativa est etiam animalis et habet in sua natura ut sen- <sup>(35)</sup>

<sup>a</sup> om. all mss.

<sup>o</sup> An . . . multae om. CM] anima an una an multae P.

<sup>p</sup> Quaeerunt V.

<sup>q</sup> vires diversas V.

<sup>r</sup> exerceret corrected to exercet V] exercent M.

<sup>s</sup> varias vires quas habet CMP.

<sup>t</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>u</sup> crebro V.

<sup>v</sup> om. C.

<sup>w</sup> add. in corporibus C.

<sup>54</sup> An . . . multae. Avic. V. 1, f. 26v, 2.

<sup>55</sup> Fuerunt . . . exercet. Cf. Avic. I. 4, f. 4r, 2B: Immo una vis . . . diversas actiones. Also Fons Vitae III. 44, p. 178, l. 23 to p. 179, l. 14.

<sup>x</sup> om. V. dici inv.] dicit M.

<sup>y</sup> ita CP.

<sup>z</sup> et C.

<sup>a</sup> omnia M.

<sup>b</sup> Item . . . illa om. C.

<sup>c</sup> anima haec M.

<sup>d</sup> scilicet C.

<sup>e</sup> om. M.

<sup>f</sup> om. CP.

<sup>g</sup> universale CP.

<sup>h</sup> long passage inserted in V from tantum dicitur p. 54. l. 15 to sed actiones p. 55, l. 24 and marked va . . . cat.

<sup>56</sup> praeter hoc . . . l. 13, p. 45, est tantum vegetabilis. Cf. Avic. II. 1, f. 6v, 1C: praeter hoc . . . vegetabilis tantum.

sificet <sup>i</sup> et moveat, cum habuerit instrumenta, et <sup>j</sup> ipsa est conservans illam <sup>k</sup> compositionem et complexionem <sup>l</sup> sicut cum relata <sup>m</sup> fuerit ad habentia conjunctionem erit cogens. Non enim de natura elementorum et contrariorum corporum est coniungi per se quorum natura est ire in partes diversas quae <sup>n</sup> non coniungit nisi anima propria; verbi gratia, in palma est anima palmifica et in uva, anima uvifica <sup>o</sup> et omnino anima quae est forma ipsius materiae. Anima vero, cum sit palmifica supra hoc quod <sup>p</sup> est anima nutriendi et augmentandi, habet etiam <sup>q</sup> esse animam <sup>r</sup> palmificam. Unde palma non eget anima vegetabili et alia anima ad hoc ut fiat palma; si enim hoc esset, profecto non haberet actiones nisi tantum vegetabiles; sed eius anima vegetabilis habet etiam in sua vegetabilitate quod est palmifica. Similiter anima <sup>s</sup> vegetabilis quae est in animali post creationem animalis habet actiones praeter actiones quas agit sola secundum quod est tantum vegetabilis. Hae igitur animae in virtute <sup>t</sup> vegetandi tanquam in genere conveniunt sed specificis differentiis differunt. (5)

Quamvis autem omnis anima sit substantia et hae tres simul sint in unoquoque homine quoniam in homine est anima vegetabilis <sup>u</sup> et sensibilis et rationalis, non tamen <sup>v</sup> tres substantiae sunt in homine; humana enim anima, cum sit una <sup>w</sup> simplex substantia, habet vires animae vegetabilis et vires animae sensibilis et vires animae rationalis; similiter et anima sensibilis habet vires animae vegetabilis et quamvis hae vires <sup>57</sup> diversae <sup>x</sup> sint inter se ita ut <sup>y</sup> una earum non praedicetur de altera, quippe cum unaquaeque <sup>z</sup> earum sit species per se, tamen <sup>a</sup> nihil <sup>b</sup> prohibet <sup>c</sup> eas <sup>d</sup> simul haberi ab anima rationali; quemadmodum, quia invenimus humorem in aere non separatum a calore, non tamen idcirco necesse est ut humorem et calorem qui sunt in aere non habeat aliqua una forma vel aliqua una materia; sic et de viribus animalium. (10)

Quod autem corpus mundanum aliud est receptibile vitae, aliud non, et receptibile vitae aliud est receptibile animae vegetabilis tantum, aliud animae <sup>e</sup> sensibilis tantum, aliud animae rationalis tantum, ratio haec est; quoniam receptibile vitae facit temperantia, <sup>f</sup> non receptibile vero vitae facit contrarietas. Unde ultimas contrarietatis prohibuit corpora elementaria recipere vitam. Natura <sup>58</sup> enim cuiusque illorum habet contrariam, et ob hoc fuerunt remotissima a vita; corpora vero coelestia, quia non habent contrarium, <sup>59</sup> ideo fuerunt apta nobiliori modo vitae corporalis. Quapropter unumquodque corpus, quanto fuerit minoris contrarietatis et magis accesserit ad temperantiam, quae non habet contrarium, tanto magis incipiet assimilari coelestibus corporibus. In <sup>60</sup> compositis vero complexio <sup>h</sup> frangit (20)

<sup>i</sup> significat C.

<sup>j</sup> om. CP.

<sup>k</sup> ipsam P.

<sup>l</sup> compl. et compositionem CP.

<sup>m</sup> relicta C.

<sup>n</sup> qui C.

<sup>o</sup> vivifica M.

<sup>p</sup> om. M.

<sup>q</sup> et P.

<sup>r</sup> anima palmifica CP.

<sup>s</sup> autem V.

<sup>t</sup> nutritivae CP.

<sup>u</sup> om. CP.

<sup>v</sup> tantum V] tres tamen M.

<sup>w</sup> simplex una CP.

<sup>x</sup> sint diversae CP.

<sup>y</sup> et M] om. VP.

<sup>z</sup> unaquaque M.

<sup>a</sup> tantum M.

<sup>b</sup> nil V.

<sup>c</sup> om. C.

<sup>d</sup> ea V.

<sup>e</sup> om. MPV.

<sup>f</sup> temperatia V.

<sup>g</sup> contraria P.

<sup>h</sup> complexio C.

<sup>57</sup> hae vires . . . l. 26, una materia. Cf. *op. cit.* V. 7, f. 27v, 2: Virtus . . . una materia.

<sup>58</sup> Natura . . . l. 38, corporibus. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 5, f. 21r, 1: Deinde demonstratores . . .

remota a vita.

<sup>59</sup> In compositis . . . l. 14, p. 46, tenebrae sunt contrariae. Cf. *loc. cit.*: In compositis . . . est contraria.

et debilitat virtutem contrarietatis et operatur in eis formam complexionis; complexio vero medium est inter contraria. Medium vero non habet <sup>i</sup> contraria et ideo aptatur plus ad recipiendum vitam; unde complexio, quae remotior fuerit ab extremis contrariis et magis accesserit ad medium complexionatum, aptior fiet ad recipiendum augmentum perfectionis vitae. Cum (5) vero temperatissimum fuerit ita ut contraria <sup>j</sup> aequalia sint in eo et agant aequaliter, coaptabitur perfectioni vitae rationalis quae est similis vitae coelestis.<sup>k</sup> Haec autem aptitudo est in spiritu humano. Spiritus vero humanus omnino est quiddam quod generatur ex elementis et effigiat <sup>l</sup> vultus ad similitudinem coelestium corporum. Unde sapientes iudicant de eo dicentes: quod (10) sit substantia lucida et ideo spiritus visibilis vocatur radius et lux, et ob hoc anima gratulatur cum videt lucem et tristatur in tenebris. Ipsa enim lux comparata est <sup>m</sup> vehiculo et confortatur propter <sup>n</sup> eam vehiculum eius quod est spiritus cui <sup>o</sup> tenebrae sunt contrariae. Ex his <sup>p</sup> manifestum est quod cum nec <sup>60</sup> vita nec ulla perfectionum sive bonitatum retenta sit apud primum (15) principium in prima genitura, sicut Aristoteles dixit, tamen <sup>q</sup> non omne corpus est receptibile vitae quia caret aptitudine recipiendi eam. Quae autem sunt receptibilia vitae quanto maioris fuerint temperantiae, tanto fient receptibilia <sup>r</sup> vitae <sup>s</sup> nobilioris, et <sup>t</sup> inde est quod quaedam non recipiunt nisi animam vegetabilem tantum, quaedam vero amplius quia animale, (20) quaedam vero multo <sup>u</sup> amplius quia rationalem. Quemadmodum <sup>61</sup> si corpus <sup>v</sup> unum ponatur ad solem cuius situs talis esse potest ut non recipiat a sole nisi calorem tantum; si vero talis fuerit eius <sup>w</sup> situs ut recipiat ab eo calorem et illuminationem, tunc simul calefiet <sup>x</sup> et illuminabitur <sup>y</sup> et lux cadens in illud erit principium calefaciendi illud; sol enim non calefacit nisi radio. Deinde (25) si maior fuerit eius aptitudo ut etiam possit accendi, accendetur et fiet flamma, quae flamma erit <sup>z</sup> etiam causa calefaciendi et illuminandi simul ita ut quamvis sola esset, tamen perficeretur calefactio et illuminatio, et praeter hoc calefactio poterat inveniri per se sola, vel calefactio et illuminatio sola per se, quorum posterius non esset principium a quo emanaret <sup>a</sup> prius. Cum (30) autem omnia simul concurrunt, tunc id quod fuerat posterius fit principium etiam prioris et emanat ab eo id quod erat prius.

Sic ergo dispositionem virium animarum facile intelligere poteris, si per corpus calefieri intelligas illud <sup>b</sup> tantum vegetari, et per illuminari illud ab anima sensificari,<sup>c</sup> per accendi <sup>d</sup> vero animam rationalem sibi infundi. (35) Fortior enim est actio animae rationalis quam animalis et animalis fortior quam vegetabilis. Anima enim vegetabilis movet partes corporis sine mutatione totius de loco ad locum; animalis vero movet totum corpus de loco ad

<sup>i</sup> add. sanc C.

<sup>j</sup> add. aequaliter et CP.

<sup>k</sup> coelesti C.

<sup>l</sup> effugiat (gerat *superscript*) M.

<sup>m</sup> om. M.

<sup>n</sup> propter eam conf. CP.

<sup>o</sup> cuius M.

<sup>p</sup> add. ergo CP] igitur M.

<sup>q</sup> cum P] tantum M.

<sup>r</sup> receptibilia C.

<sup>s</sup> nob. vitae CMP.

<sup>t</sup> om. C.

<sup>v</sup> unum corpus CP.

<sup>x</sup> calefit CM] calefacit P.

<sup>y</sup> illuminatur CP.

<sup>z</sup> emaneret M.

<sup>a</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>d</sup> accendi M.

<sup>u</sup> om. M.

<sup>w</sup> situs eius CP.

<sup>etiam</sup> erit CP.

<sup>b</sup> istud C.

<sup>60</sup> nec vita . . . receptibile vitae. Cf. Avic. IV. 5, f. 20v ad finem: nec vita . . . est receptibile vitae. This passage is from the addition of Avohaveth which is found in the de Viribus Cordis of Avicenna. See the footnote on page 29 of my introduction. In Avic. de Anima, it is introduced by the words: Dixit Avohaveth: . . . Hae sunt distinctiones extra hunc librum . . . est quod

praecepit actor praecipuus. Did Gundissalinus interpret actor praecipuus as Aristotle? I do not find the sentence in Aristotle, neither does it sound Aristotelian.

<sup>61</sup> Quemadmodum . . . l. 33, intelligere poteris. Cf. Avic. V. 7, f. 27v, 2E: Dicemus . . . virtutum animalium.

locum totaliter et anima animalis coniungitur formis corporum convenientibus sibi in subtilitate cominus vel eminus, et abstrahit eas <sup>o</sup> a formis rerum corporalibus. Anima <sup>62</sup> vero <sup>f</sup> vegetabilis coniungitur essentiae corporum quia convenit cum eis in spissitudine, et hoc <sup>z</sup> proprie et continue tantum. Unde <sup>63</sup> anima sensibilis agit in vegetabilem et vegetabilis in naturam, sed rationalis agit in sensibilem sicut intelligentia <sup>h</sup> agit in rationalem. Oportet <sup>64</sup> enim <sup>i</sup> ut inferius sit quasi <sup>j</sup> materia superiori <sup>k</sup> eo quod superius agit in inferius; et ideo sapientes noluerunt <sup>l</sup> appellare aliquam substantiarum formam simpliciter, nisi intelligentiam <sup>m</sup> primam quae vocatur ab eis intelligentia agens. (5)

Non solum autem istas, sed etiam <sup>n</sup> humanas animas multas esse philosophi probant <sup>o</sup> dicentes: Si <sup>65</sup> anima humana una est in omnibus corporibus, sed est <sup>p</sup> multae propter relationem <sup>q</sup> quam <sup>r</sup> habet ad illa, <sup>s</sup> tunc aut est <sup>t</sup> sapiens in omnibus illis aut <sup>u</sup> insipiens in omnibus illis, et non latet unum quicquid est in anima alterius. Unum enim, quod ad multa refertur, possibile est differre secundum diversos respectus; non est autem verum illud posse <sup>v</sup> differre in eis per illa quae habent esse <sup>w</sup> in essentia illius. Cum enim unus fuerit multorum <sup>x</sup> filiorum pater, et ipse fuerit iuvenis, non est <sup>y</sup> iuvenis nisi secundum omnes illos; iuventutem enim habet in seipso et <sup>z</sup> continetur in unaquaque relatione. Similiter prudentia et stultitia et alia <sup>a</sup> his similia non sunt nisi in ipsa anima, et continentur cum ea <sup>b</sup> in unaquaque relatione. Unde si una esset anima in sapiente et stulto, tunc una anima simul esset sapiens et insipiens, quod est impossibile. Cum igitur alia sit sapiens et alia insipiens, tunc non est una anima in omnibus corporibus, sed sunt multae differentes numero non specie. Omnes <sup>66</sup> enim animae humanae unum sunt in specie et definitione; multas igitur species animarum <sup>c</sup> esse et uniuscuiusque speciei singularia <sup>d</sup> multa manifestum est, ex quibus omnibus solae tantum anima rationalis et vegetabilis, secundum quod tantum est vegetabilis, <sup>e</sup> specialissimae species sunt. Ex <sup>67</sup> differentia enim constitutiva non provenit ulla anima vegetabilium, sed ex differentiis quas habet unumquodque vegetabile per se tantum et non aliud; non est <sup>f</sup> enim nisi <sup>g</sup> principium tantum proprium actionis vegetabilis. Sed animae vegetabilis animalis differentia, divisiva et <sup>h</sup> constitutiva singularum <sup>i</sup> specierum quae sunt sub ipsa, est virtus animae animalis adiuncta illi, quae aptat illi corpus, et est differentia ad modum differentiarum quas habent simplicia, non quas <sup>j</sup> habent composita. (15) (20) (25) (30)

<sup>o</sup> eam V.

<sup>f</sup> igitur CP.

<sup>z</sup> haec V.

<sup>h</sup> intellectiva C.

<sup>i</sup> tamen V.

<sup>j</sup> quasi (sicut *superscript*) M.

<sup>k</sup> superioris CP, s. m. M.

<sup>l</sup> voluerunt MPV.

<sup>m</sup> intellectiva C.

<sup>n</sup> et M.

<sup>o</sup> add. esse C.

<sup>p</sup> etiam V.

<sup>q</sup> relationes CP.

<sup>r</sup> quas CP.

<sup>s</sup> alia C] ab illa M.

<sup>t</sup> sapiens est CP.

<sup>u</sup> ant . . . illis om. M.

<sup>v</sup> esse differre posse C] esse posse differre P.

<sup>w</sup> om. CP.

<sup>x</sup> pater fil. mult. CP. <sup>y</sup> om. M.

<sup>z</sup> etiam V. <sup>a</sup> add. et C.

<sup>b</sup> unaq. rel. in ea C.

<sup>c</sup> esse animarum CP.

<sup>d</sup> multa singularia CP.

<sup>e</sup> vegetabilium CP.

<sup>f</sup> om. M.

<sup>g</sup> sic all mss. om. in Avic.

<sup>h</sup> et om. CP.

<sup>i</sup> singulariter M.

<sup>j</sup> qualis M.

<sup>62</sup> anima . . . tantum. Cf. *Fons Vitae* III. 48, p. 186, ll. 19–23: anima . . . tantum.

<sup>63</sup> Unde . . . naturam. Cf. *op. cit.* 48, p. 185, ll. 27 sqq.

<sup>64</sup> oportet . . . I. 9, agens. *Op. cit.* V. 19, p. 294, ll. 14–17: Oportet . . . agens.

<sup>65</sup> Si autem . . . I. 24, non specie. Cf. Avic.

V. 3, f. 24v, 1: Nos scimus . . . una est.

<sup>66</sup> omnes . . . definitione. Cf. Avic. V. 3, f. 23v *ad finem*.

<sup>67</sup> Ex differentia . . . I. 34, composita. Cf. Avic. II. 1, f. 6v, 1A: Ex differentia . . . composita.

# CAPITULUM QUINTUM \*

## AN<sup>1</sup> FUERINT ANIMAE CREATAE AB INITIO MUNDI

Merito quaeritur, cum multae sint animae, an simul creatae<sup>m</sup> fuerint ab<sup>n</sup> initio mundi, an cotidie novae creentur.<sup>o</sup> Fuerunt enim qui dicerent omnes humanas animas simul a principio mundi<sup>p</sup> fuisse creatas, et in comparibus<sup>q</sup> stellis positas, tamdiu ibi permanere<sup>r</sup> unamquamque quoadusque corpus sibi coaptabile generetur cui ipsa statuto tempore<sup>s</sup> nutu creatoris infundatur. Rationes autem, quamvis debiles, quibus philosophi sententiam hanc destruere<sup>t</sup> conati sunt, apponere non recusam. (5)

Dixerunt enim: licet<sup>68</sup> ponamus animas<sup>u</sup> humanas prius extitisse et non incepisse cum corporibus, eas tamen ante corpora multas fuisse impossibile est. Multitudo enim rerum vel est ex essentia et forma, vel ex comparatione<sup>v</sup> ad materiam et originem multiplicatam locis circumscribentibus unamquamque materiam<sup>v</sup> secundum aliquid, vel ex temporibus propriis uniuscuiusque illarum quae accidunt illis accidentibus, vel ex causis dividendibus illam. Inter animas autem ante corpora non fuit alteritas in essentia vel forma.<sup>w</sup> Forma enim earum una est, quoniam omnes humanae animae unum sunt in specie et definitione; ergo non est inter<sup>x</sup> illas alteritas nisi secundum receptibile suae essentiae, cui debetur essentia eius proprie quod est corpus. Ergo si animae fuerunt ante corpora, profecto una non fuit alia numero ab alia, quia non fuit alteritas vel multitudo inter illas; itaque non fuerunt multae ante corpora. (10)

Item, si<sup>69</sup> possibile esset unamquamque<sup>y</sup> animam creari ante corpus in quo perficitur et operatur, profecto otiosum<sup>z</sup> esset eius esse; nihil autem otiosum vel superfluum est<sup>a</sup> in natura; ergo non fuerunt creatae ante corpora. Sed nec fuit creata una numero. Cum<sup>70</sup> enim generantur duo corpora, infunduntur eis duae<sup>b</sup> animae, quae duae animae vel sunt partes<sup>c</sup> illius unius animae, et sic aliquid quod non habet molem vel magnitudinem est divisibile in potentia, quod impossibile<sup>d</sup> est; vel illa anima una numero est in duobus corporibus, quod iam superius improbatum est. Igitur ante corpora animae<sup>e</sup> non fuerunt una nec multae. Quod autem non est unum vel<sup>f</sup> multa, non est; quicquid<sup>71</sup> enim est, unum<sup>g</sup> est vel multa; nullo modo<sup>h</sup> igitur fuerunt ante corpora. Quapropter consequitur ut cotidie creentur novae animae; (20)

\* Capit. Quint.] Caput P] *om.* CMV.

<sup>1</sup> An omnes animae fuerint simul creatae ab initio aut non C (*in margin*)] *om.* V] de creatione (*in margin*) M.

<sup>m</sup> fuerint creatae CP.

<sup>n</sup> a principio CM] in principio P.

<sup>o</sup> crehentur V.

<sup>p</sup> *om.* M.

<sup>q</sup> corporibus M.

<sup>r</sup> unamq. perm. CP.

<sup>s</sup> corpore C.

<sup>t</sup> con. sunt dist. CP.

<sup>u</sup> hum. animas CP.

<sup>v</sup> *om.* CP.

<sup>w</sup> in forma CMP.

<sup>x</sup> alt. inter illas CMP.

<sup>y</sup> animam creari unamquamque CP.

<sup>z</sup> otiosus M.

<sup>a</sup> *om.* C.

<sup>b</sup> *om.* M.

<sup>c</sup> illius unius animae partes CP.

<sup>d</sup> est impossibile CP.

<sup>e</sup> nec animae C] nec non P.

<sup>f</sup> nec CP.

<sup>g</sup> est unum vel C] vel est unum P.

<sup>h</sup> igitur modo CP.

<sup>68</sup> licet . . . l. 19, ab alia. Cf. Avic. V. 3, f. 24r, 1B: Si autem posuerimus . . . 2A, ab alia.

<sup>69</sup> Si possibile . . . in natura. Avic. V. 4, 24v, 2: Si possibile . . . in natura.

<sup>70</sup> Cum enim . . . in duobus corporibus. Cf. *op. cit.* 24r, 2B: Cum enim fuerit . . . in duobus corporibus.

<sup>71</sup> quicquid . . . multa. Cf. *Fons Vitae* II. 21, p. 62.

cum <sup>72</sup> enim creatur corpus quod sit dignum fieri instrumentum et regnum eius, tunc causae <sup>i</sup> intelligibiles quae solent dare unamquamque animam creant eam. Ergo ut anima creetur sine corpore ita ut ipsa creetur et non corpus, hoc est impossibile.

Licet autem cotidie creentur novae animae, non tamen creantur in tempore. Tempus enim secundum Aristotelem <sup>73</sup> est mensura spatii continentis prius et posterius, et secundum alios tempus est mora <sup>j</sup> cuius pars iam <sup>k</sup> praeteriit parsque <sup>l</sup> futura est. Nihil ergo fit in tempore nisi ex intellectu habendi prius et posterius. In tempore enim non creatur nisi cuius aliquid fit <sup>m</sup> prius et deinde aliud <sup>n</sup> eius <sup>o</sup> posterius, quasi in succedentibus sibi instantibus; non enim omnes partes simul fieri possunt, sed unaquaeque occupat spatium suum ordine secundum prius et posterius. Anima autem simplex est carens omni mole et quantitate. Quod autem quantitate caret non habet partes quarum unam <sup>p</sup> necesse sit prius creari et deinde aliam; in instanti igitur creatur anima. Instans vero non est tempus; non enim habet prius <sup>(5)</sup> et posterius; ergo creatio animae non fit in tempore, sed creatur simplex in simplici anima in instanti. Quod enim quantitate caret, quantitatem quae tempus <sup>q</sup> est occupare non potest, nec potest extendi creatio eius per prius et posterius, in quo nihil est prius vel posterius. Unde anima non est opus naturae quae <sup>r</sup> non operatur nisi in tempore. <sup>(10)</sup>

Probant autem philosophi animas non a Deo sed ab angelis creari hoc modo: si <sup>74</sup> factor primus est <sup>s</sup> factor animae per se, tunc anima semper fuit apud eum; sed anima <sup>t</sup> non semper fuit apud Deum <sup>u</sup> quoniam cotidie creantur novae; igitur anima non est facta a primo factore, nec primus factor est factor eius per se. Igitur necesse est ut aliquid sit medium inter deum et animam, quod sit factor animae. Illam autem propositionem qua <sup>v</sup> dicitur quod, si anima facta est a primo factore, <sup>w</sup> semper fuit apud eum, sic probant dicentes: cum aliquis fit agens qui fuit <sup>x</sup> non agens, necesse est hoc fieri <sup>y</sup> propter novitatem alicuius rei quae contingit, scilicet vel conditionis <sup>z</sup> vel naturae <sup>a</sup> vel voluntatis vel intentionis vel potentiae vel alicuius alterius dispositionis, quoniam si dispositiones agentis permanent ita ut erant, ita quidem ut agenti non fieret aliquid novum in se vel extra se, usque tunc, profecto agenti non esset potius actionem esse quam non esse. Immo non esse duraret semper; quia enim non esse duravit usque huc, eo quod non fuit elector <sup>b</sup> qui daret esse, profecto cum iam est esse, necesse est, ut eius causa sit, <sup>(25)</sup> electorem <sup>c</sup> esse. Si enim agens non fieret novus elector, nec <sup>d</sup> esset elector sicut <sup>e</sup> nec erat ante, procul dubio non esse <sup>f</sup> duraret necessario sicut erat ante. <sup>(30)</sup> Sed qui creat animam eligit melius esse eam <sup>g</sup> quam non esse. Aliquid ergo <sup>(35)</sup>

<sup>i</sup> add. animae C. causae] animae P.

<sup>j</sup> om. CP.

<sup>k</sup> om. CMP.

<sup>l</sup> pars M.

<sup>m</sup> sit CP.

<sup>n</sup> aliquid CP.

<sup>o</sup> om. M.

<sup>p</sup> una M.

<sup>q</sup> est tempus CP.

<sup>r</sup> quem M.

<sup>s</sup> esset C.

<sup>t</sup> iam M.

<sup>u</sup> eum CP.

<sup>v</sup> qui M.

<sup>w</sup> creatore C.

<sup>x</sup> non fuit agens CMP.

<sup>y</sup> propter nov. fieri CP.

<sup>z</sup> conditionis V.

<sup>a</sup> naturae vel vol.] necessitatis C] nat. vel necessitatis P.

<sup>b</sup> elector C.

<sup>c</sup> elector quam est C.

<sup>d</sup> non CM.

<sup>e</sup> nec sicut CP.

<sup>f</sup> etiam C.

<sup>g</sup> eam melius esse CP.

<sup>72</sup> Cum enim . . . est impossibile. Cf. Avic. V. 4, f. 24v, 2.

<sup>73</sup> Aristotle, *Physics* IV. 11, 220A.

<sup>74</sup> Si factor primus . . . factor animae. Adapted from *Fons Vitae* III. 2, p. 78, ll. 5-12: si inter factorem . . . inter illa.



sibi novi accidit, quia<sup>h</sup> tunc primum hoc<sup>i</sup> facere eligit<sup>j</sup> quod prius<sup>k</sup> similiter elegisse potuerit; <sup>l</sup> Deo autem nihil novi advenit;<sup>m</sup> tunc enim variabilis esset, quod est impossibile. Igitur ab ipso non creatur anima quoniam, si ab ipso crearetur, secundum praedictam ratiocinationem aliquid novi sibi accidisse videretur, quod est impossibile. Unde verum est illud quod, si primus factor eam creasset per se, semper fuisset apud eum, quia si Deus eam creasset, non noviter,<sup>n</sup> sed ab aeterno eam<sup>o</sup> creasset et ita semper apud eum fuisset. (5)

Item alia probatio: factoris<sup>75</sup> primi facere est facere<sup>p</sup> aliquid ex nihilo; sed<sup>q</sup> postea probabitur animam fieri ex materia; igitur non est factura primi factoris. (10)

Item creari<sup>76</sup> vel fieri est exire de potentia ad effectum. Nihil autem exit de potentia ad effectum nisi per aliud quod est in effectum; <sup>r</sup> primus vero factor nec est in potentia nec in effectum; igitur per illum non exit anima de potentia ad effectum. Ergo non creatur ab illo. (15)

Item creare<sup>77</sup> vel facere est trahere de potentia ad effectum; sed trahere de potentia ad effectum est movere; igitur quaecumque res creat animam movet eam. Sed quicquid creando movet eam, necesse est<sup>s</sup> ut sit mobile vel immobile. Si autem fuerit immobile in se, tunc non poterit<sup>t</sup> moveri; si autem non poterit moveri, tunc nec a se<sup>u</sup> poterit moveri nec ab alio. Quod autem se non potest<sup>v</sup> movere, multo minus et aliud; igitur quod movet animam<sup>w</sup> non est immobile in se; igitur est mobile. Sed Deus est immobilis; igitur non movet eam; et si non movet eam, utique nec<sup>x</sup> eam<sup>y</sup> creat. (20)

Item ad<sup>78</sup> recipiendum aliquid ab aliquo, nihil est dignius eo quod illud recipit nullo mediante. Si<sup>z</sup> igitur anima recipit<sup>a</sup> esse a primo factore nullo mediante, tunc nihil est dignius ea ad recipiendum illud ab illo; sed substantia intelligentiae dignior est ad hoc; ergo anima non recipit esse a primo factore<sup>b</sup> nullo mediante. (25)

Item quicquid<sup>79</sup> movet animam non<sup>c</sup> potest esse infinitum quoniam quicquid movet aliud aut movet per se aut per accidens. Si autem id quod infinitum est movet aliud per se, necesse est ut motus, qui ab eo fit, sit infinitus; sed motus animae finitus est; igitur non fit ab infinito. Si autem movet illud<sup>d</sup> per accidens, tunc essentia eius non est infinita, quod sic probatur: nulli quod infinitum est advenit<sup>e</sup> accidens; id<sup>f</sup> enim quod infinitum est non mutatur; sed omne cui accidens advenit mutatur; igitur infinito non accidit accidens. (35)

<sup>h</sup> quia tunc] qui tamen M.

<sup>i</sup> istud C.

<sup>j</sup> elegit M.

<sup>k</sup> prius om. and placed after potuit CP.

<sup>l</sup> potuit CP.

<sup>m</sup> accidit vel advenit CP.

<sup>n</sup> noverit M.

<sup>o</sup> om. MV.

<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> tamen C.

<sup>r</sup> effectum M.

<sup>s</sup> mob. vel immob. necesse est esse C.

<sup>t</sup> potuerit M.

<sup>u</sup> add. nec ab alio and om. after moveri CP.

<sup>v</sup> poterit CP.

<sup>w</sup> om. CP.

<sup>x</sup> non CMP.

<sup>y</sup> creat eam CM.

<sup>z</sup> tunc nihil est dignius ea. Si igitur anima recipit esse a primo factore ad recipiendum etc. C.

<sup>a</sup> recipit V.

<sup>b</sup> facto V.

<sup>c</sup> om. M.

<sup>d</sup> istud C.

<sup>e</sup> accidens advenit CP.

<sup>f</sup> id enim] illud est V.

<sup>75</sup> factoris . . . primi factoris. Adapted from *op. cit.*, p. 79, ll. 18–20: facere factoris . . . ex nihilo.

<sup>76</sup> creari . . . nec in effectum. Inspired by *op. cit.* III. 4, p. 83, ll. 15–20: Progressis . . . nec in effectum.

<sup>77</sup> creare vel facere . . . l. 23, nec eam

creat. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 7, p. 92, 11 to p. 93, 8.

<sup>78</sup> ad recipiendum . . . nullo mediante. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 6, p. 90, l. 27 to p. 91, l. 6: Omne quod recipit . . . nullo mediante.

<sup>79</sup> quicquid . . . est igitur finitum. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 6, p. 91, ll. 7–21: Quod movet . . . Ergo est finitum.

Igitur quod movet animam nullo mediante non potest esse infinitum; est igitur finitum.

Item quod <sup>80</sup> movet animam nullo mediante est finitum; sed primus \* factor non est finitus; igitur factor primus non movet animam nullo mediante.

Item si motor animae est infinitus, et motus animae est infinitus; sed (5)  
motus animae non potest esse infinitus quoniam substantia eius finita est; <sup>h</sup> igitur motor animae nullo mediante non potest esse infinitus; sed factor primus est infinitus; igitur factor primus non potest esse motor animae nullo mediante.

Hoc <sup>i</sup> autem quod philosophi probant, animas non a Deo sed ab angelis (10)  
creari, sane quidem <sup>j</sup> potest intelligi, scilicet <sup>k</sup> non Dei ministerio <sup>l</sup> sed angelorum. Et tamen <sup>m</sup> cum dicitur Deus creare <sup>n</sup> animas, intelligendum est auctoritate non ministerio, sicut cum dicitur de Christo: *hic est qui baptizat*, cum sacerdos baptizet. <sup>o</sup> Sed <sup>p</sup> Christus auctoritate non ministerio; sacerdos vero <sup>q</sup> ministerio tantum <sup>r</sup> non auctoritate; sic et angeli creant animas ministerio (15)  
tantum non auctoritate. Unde nec creatores animarum dicuntur quia in creando non auctoritate, sed ministerio funguntur. Qui enim in agendo aliquid non auctoritate sed ministerio utitur, in <sup>s</sup> ministrando utique superiori obsequitur. Et ideo anima creatura angeli non dicitur, sed Dei, cuius auctoritate creatur, sicut et magnalia quae aliquorum ministri operantur non (20)  
ipsis sed dominis suis quorum nutu faciunt imputantur. Sicut <sup>81</sup> ergo corpus humanum non recipit actionem aliquam <sup>t</sup> animae rationalis nisi mediante spiritu, sic et anima rationalis non recipit actionem factoris primi nisi mediante intelligentia, scilicet angelica creatura. Multiplex enim simplici, nec (25)  
spissum <sup>82</sup> subtili potest coniungi, nisi mediante aliquo <sup>u</sup> quod habeat convenientiam cum utroque extremorum.

\* factor primus M.

<sup>h</sup> om. C.

<sup>i</sup> haec V.

<sup>j</sup> om. CP] quid M.

<sup>k</sup> sed M.

<sup>l</sup> min. sed] *corrupt.* M.

<sup>m</sup> Item CP.

<sup>n</sup> creat CP.

<sup>o</sup> baptizat CP.

<sup>p</sup> si M.

<sup>q</sup> autem P] om. C.

<sup>r</sup> om. MV.

<sup>s</sup> om. CP.

<sup>t</sup> om. MPV.

<sup>u</sup> alio C.

<sup>80</sup> quod movet . . . l. 9, nullo mediante. *Op. cit.* III. 6, p. 91, ll. 19–29: quod movet . . . nullo mediante. *Interpreted.*

<sup>81</sup> Sicut ergo . . . angelica creatura. *Cf. op. cit.* III. 2, p. 75, l. 24 to p. 76, l. 5: Si non esset

spiritus . . . uno ictu oculi.

<sup>82</sup> Spissum . . . extremorum. *Cf. op. cit.* III. 51, p. 194, ll. 1–3: quod si spissum . . . nisi per medium.

# CAPITULUM SEXTUM ♀

(SI ♀ ANIMA CREETUR DE NIHILLO VEL DE ALIQUO)

(Merito de ♀ anima quaeritur si de nihilo vel de aliquo creetur.) Fuerunt enim qui dicerent ♀ animam esse ex traduce sicut et ♀ corpus; ut quemadmodum caro filii ex carne patris et matris generatur, ita anima filii ex animabus parentum decidatur. Quibus cum opponebatur quod, cum aliquid de substantia alterius sumitur, aut totum de toto aut pars de parte aut pars de toto (5) sumitur, illud <sup>a</sup> unde sumitur <sup>b</sup> minus remanet, sic animae parentum minores remanent post decisionem animae <sup>c</sup> filii ab illis, <sup>d</sup> respondebant hoc non sequi. Cum enim una candela ab alia accenditur, tota flamma eius <sup>e</sup> ab alia sine diminutione eius sumitur, sic et in animabus. Sed quia sola quantitas augetur vel minuitur, profecto <sup>f</sup> cum anima nullius quantitatis sit, eius es- (10) sentia nec augeri potest nec minui, quamvis una anima ♀ fluat <sup>h</sup> ab alia. Sic enim fluit una anima ab alia sine illius <sup>i</sup> diminutione, sicut <sup>83</sup> calor ignis non minuitur, cum ex <sup>j</sup> se generat calorem in aere. Nam calor qui est in aere non est ipsemet qui est in igne, eo quod, remoto igne, remanet calor in aere, et quia subiecta <sup>k</sup> eorum sunt duo diversa, unde calor qui fit in aere diversus est (15) a calore qui est <sup>l</sup> in igne in potentia. Similiter propter lumen solis quod diffunditur super terram non minuitur lumen solis, quod est in essentia eius, <sup>m</sup> quamvis hoc fluat ab illo, nec lumen quod est super terram est idem ipsum, sed diversum a lumine quod est in essentia eius. Omne <sup>84</sup> autem quod fluit ab aliquo <sup>n</sup> eiusdem <sup>o</sup> generis est cum eo ♀ a quo fluit, et est simile ei a quo fluit, (20) nec fluit ab aliquo nisi quod est illi simile, et ideo a substantia simplici non fluit nisi substantia simplex. Iam tamen omnes tenent animam non esse ex-  
traduce.

♀ Cap. Sex. om. all mss.

♂ Si . . . aliquo] an anima creatur ex nihilo vel non C (in margin)] utrum anima creata sit a nihilo P] om. M.

♀ quaeritur de anima M.

♀ dixerunt C.

♂ ex V.

<sup>a</sup> istud unum consumitur C.

<sup>b</sup> add. et C.

<sup>c</sup> om. CP.

<sup>d</sup> eis CMP.

<sup>e</sup> om. CP.

<sup>f</sup> perfectio P.

<sup>g</sup> om. CP.

<sup>h</sup> ab alia fluat CP.

<sup>i</sup> dim. illius CMP.

<sup>j</sup> gen. ex se CP.

<sup>k</sup> subiectum V.

<sup>l</sup> fit V.

<sup>m</sup> solis C.

<sup>n</sup> alio CP.

<sup>o</sup> est eiusdem CP.

♀ ipso CP.

<sup>83</sup> Sicut calor . . . l. 19, in essentia eius. *Op. cit.* III. 54, p. 200, ll. 2–11: sicut calor . . . in essentia eius.

<sup>84</sup> Omne . . . a quo fluit. *Op. cit.* III. 53, p. 197, ll. 17–18: quicquid fluit . . . fluit.

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM <sup>a</sup>

Sed <sup>r</sup> nec de nihilo creata esse videtur. Quamvis <sup>85</sup> enim anima sit simplex, videtur tamen constare ex materia et forma. Cui <sup>s</sup> enim <sup>t</sup> advenit forma corporeitatis ut fiat corporea substantia, eidem prorsus advenit forma spiritualitatis <sup>u</sup> ut fiat incorporea substantia. Unde <sup>86</sup> corporea et incorporea substantia in substantia quidem nullatenus differunt, sed potius substantialiter (5)  
conveniunt. Immo in substantia unum sunt cum nomen et ratio substantiae aequae omnibus <sup>v</sup> conveniat. Omnis <sup>87</sup> autem diversitas ex forma est, non <sup>w</sup> ex materia; materia enim in omnibus eadem <sup>x</sup> est, sed partes eius formae advenientes distribuunt, ac per hoc in materia non est differentia, sed in forma; unde corporea et incorporea substantia constare videntur ex materia et (10)  
forma.

Materia <sup>88</sup> autem tribus modis accipitur. Uno modo accipitur simpliciter et intelligibiliter tantum,<sup>y</sup> nuda ob omni forma, prout apta est recipere omnem formam corporalem <sup>z</sup> et incorporalem. Secundo modo accipitur composita <sup>a</sup> corporeitate, prout sic formata materia est tantum <sup>b</sup> corporum, vel (15)  
composita spiritualitate, prout sic formata est tantum materia omnium substantiarum intelligibilium. Tertio modo materia dicitur corpus elementum vel elementatum, prout sic tantum materia <sup>c</sup> est omnium generatorum. Quapropter cum substantiae sensibiles et <sup>d</sup> intelligibiles non ex eadem materia esse dicuntur, quantum ad secundum <sup>e</sup> et tertium modum hoc <sup>f</sup> intelligitur. Quantum vero ad primum modum dicendi, materia,<sup>g</sup> tam corporea quam incorporea, ex eadem materia constare perhibetur,<sup>h</sup> quoniam <sup>89</sup> in resolvendo omnia <sup>i</sup> ne in <sup>j</sup> infinitum eatur, ad unam materiam primam universalem et ad unam formam primam universalem pervenitur. Et sic omnia constant ex eadem materia et diversis; omnia quidem ex eadem materia <sup>k</sup> (20)  
universali prima, sed corporea et incorporea ex diversis secundariis iam formatis. Secundum hoc igitur materia alia simplex, alia composita; simplex <sup>l</sup> quae est universalis omnium; composita, quae <sup>m</sup> est specialis incorporeorum vel corporeorum. Et notandum quia <sup>n</sup> post primam universalem id <sup>90</sup> quod est materia posteriorum, forma est priorum et quod <sup>91</sup> est <sup>o</sup> manifestius, forma (30)

<sup>a</sup> Cap. Sept. *om. all mss.*<sup>r</sup> Sed nec] si vero C.<sup>s</sup> Cum C] qui P.<sup>t</sup> spiritualitati M.<sup>u</sup> in omnibus CP.<sup>v</sup> et non C.<sup>w</sup> est eadem CP.<sup>x</sup> tamen M.<sup>y</sup> add. scilicet M.<sup>z</sup> add. cum C.<sup>a</sup> add. omnium C.<sup>b</sup> est materia C. Sic est tantum materia omnium P.<sup>c</sup> et intell. *om. M.*<sup>85</sup> Quamvis . . . et forma. *Cf. op. cit. IV. 2, p. 213, ll. 14-15: Substantiae . . . et forma.*<sup>86</sup> Unde corporea . . . omnibus conveniat. *Perhaps op. cit. IV. 10, p. 233, ll. 8-11.*<sup>87</sup> Omnis autem . . . est eadem. *Perhaps op. cit. IV. 1, p. 212, l. 7; IV. 9, p. 231, ll. 13-30; p. 233, ll. 1-2.*<sup>88</sup> Materia autem . . . l. 18, omnium generatorum. *Cf. op. cit. IV. 8, p. 229, ll. 2-6:*<sup>e</sup> secundum et *om. C.*<sup>f</sup> hoc intell.] et primum intelligendum est C.<sup>g</sup> materiam CPV.<sup>h</sup> perhibentur MV] proibetur P.<sup>i</sup> *om. C.*<sup>j</sup> *om. MP.*<sup>k</sup> *om. CMP, prima universali M] prima universaliter P.*<sup>l</sup> simplex . . . comp. *om. M.*<sup>m</sup> quae . . . corporeorum] corporea spiritualis quae est corporearum vel incorporeorum C] spiritualis quae est corporearum vel incorporearum P.<sup>n</sup> quod CP.<sup>o</sup> man. est M.

Ponamus quod . . . alia est media.

<sup>89</sup> quoniam in resolvendo . . . pervenitur. *Cf. op. cit. p. 226, l. 20 to p. 227, l. 4: sed omnes . . . formas intelligibiles.*<sup>90</sup> id quod est . . . priorum. *Cf. op. cit. IV. 9, p. 231, ll. 4-5: quod est . . . superiori.*<sup>91</sup> quod est . . . l. 5, p. 54, infra eam. *Cf. op. cit. IV. 9, p. 230, ll. 7-13: quod manifestum . . . infra eam.*

est occulti,<sup>p</sup> quia materia quo propinquior est sensui est similior formae, et ideo fit manifestior propter evidentiam formae et occultationem <sup>q</sup> materiae, quamvis sit materia formae sensibilis. Sed quo <sup>r</sup> remotior fuerit a sensu, erit similior materiae propter occultationem, scilicet materiae, quamvis sit forma materiae primae simplici vel alicui aliarum materiarum quae sunt infra eam, ut quantitas, cum sit forma substantiae, materia <sup>s</sup> est coloris et figurae. Nam cum species forma sit generis et <sup>t</sup> omne genus post primum species sit, profecto omne genus post primum materia <sup>u</sup> est posteriorum et forma priorum. (5)

Unde <sup>92</sup> secundum Platonem forma similiter tribus modis accipitur: uno <sup>v</sup> in potentia tantum et nondum <sup>w</sup> coniuncta materiae; alio cum est in actu iam coniuncta materiae, per quam materia est in actu, sicut est unitas et substantialitas; tertio modo formae elementorum, scilicet quattuor primae qualitates. Est <sup>93</sup> etiam alius modus praeter hos quo forma dicitur, cum scilicet est in voluntate divina, sicut est illud: formae rerum fuerunt in mente divina ante quam prodirent in corpora, sed appellatione <sup>x</sup> tantum <sup>y</sup> dicitur. (10) Ibi enim forma est non <sup>z</sup> secundum veritatem, quoniam <sup>a</sup> non sustinetur in aliquo, et quia eius essentia est praeter essentiam formae existentis in materia. Unde oportet ut accipiat per se et innuatur <sup>b</sup> appellatione <sup>c</sup> formae. Quoniam forma intelligibilis quae est in essentia divinae voluntatis, impossibile est ut sit <sup>d</sup> talis ante fluxum suum ab essentia voluntatis, et <sup>e</sup> ante applicationem sui ad materiam, qualis est post defluxum <sup>f</sup> et coniunctionem sui cum materia. Sed <sup>94</sup> quia divina voluntas est prima causa agens, idcirco forma omnium est in eius essentia, ad modum quo forma omnis causati est in sua causa. Omne enim causatum <sup>g</sup> est in sua causa, et exemplatum <sup>h</sup> in suo exemplari, secundum formam quam habet, scilicet in causa rei <sup>i</sup> est, ut res sit huius modi vel huius <sup>j</sup> formae. Huic consonat divina auctoritas <sup>k</sup> quae dicit: (15) *Omne quod factum est* <sup>l</sup> *in ipso vita erat*. Nam quia omne exemplatum prout <sup>m</sup> in exemplari est, ab exemplari nullo modo diversum est, in Deo autem nihil est nisi quod ipse est, ipse autem vera vita est; <sup>n</sup> sed omne quod factum est eius exemplatum est; tunc omne quod factum est in ipso vita est. Sicut ergo (20) est <sup>o</sup> materia universalis, scilicet prima, quae est materia omnium creatorum, sic est et forma <sup>95</sup> universalis omnium creatorum, scilicet unitas et substantialitas. Et <sup>96</sup> sicut materia <sup>p</sup> est specialis omnium corporeorum <sup>q</sup> substantia corporea, sic est <sup>r</sup> etiam <sup>s</sup> materia specialis omnium spiritualium <sup>t</sup> sub-

<sup>p</sup> occultis C] *om.* P.

<sup>q</sup> occultatione M.

<sup>r</sup> quod M.

<sup>s</sup> materiae M.

<sup>t</sup> et . . . genus *om.* M. omne *erased* V.

<sup>u</sup> materia . . . secundum *om.* M.

<sup>v</sup> uno modo C. <sup>w</sup> nondum V.

<sup>x</sup> a plone (*stroke after l*) P.

<sup>y</sup> *add.* forma C.

<sup>z</sup> si C.

<sup>a</sup> qui C.

<sup>b</sup> innuitur P.

<sup>c</sup> amplicatione P.

<sup>d</sup> fiat C.

<sup>e</sup> *om.* C.

<sup>f</sup> fluxum CP.

<sup>g</sup> creatum CP.

<sup>h</sup> exemplum C.

<sup>i</sup> *add.* sui P.

<sup>j</sup> formae huius CP.

<sup>k</sup> *om.* P.

<sup>l</sup> *om.* CP.

<sup>m</sup> *om.* M.

<sup>n</sup> est materia CMP.

<sup>o</sup> corporum CMP.

<sup>p</sup> *om.* P.

<sup>q</sup> materia etiam M.

<sup>r</sup> specialium CP] *corrected to spiritualium* V.

<sup>k</sup> voluntas C.  
<sup>m</sup> proprium CP.

<sup>92</sup> Unde . . . primae qualitates. *Cf. op. cit.* IV. 20, p. 256, ll. 3-8: Unde ne . . . qualitates.

<sup>93</sup> Est etiam . . . I. 22, cum materia. *Cf. Fons Vitae* IV. 20, p. 255, ll. 15-24: Una earum . . . est materia.

<sup>94</sup> Sed quia divina . . . in sua causa. *Cf. op.*

*cit.* p. 256, ll. 11-13: Voluntas est . . . in sua causa.

<sup>95</sup> forma . . . unitas. *Cf. op. cit.* IV. 13, p. 239, ll. 18-20.

<sup>96</sup> Et sicut . . . incorporea. *Cf. op. cit.* IV. 8, p. 38, ll. 9-13: sicut prima forma . . . formae intelligentiae.

stantia incorporea. Et sicut est forma specialis illorum quantitas, sic istorum forma specialis <sup>u</sup> est spiritualitas <sup>v</sup> vel <sup>w</sup> rationalitas.

Rationes autem quibus probatur <sup>x</sup> anima constare <sup>y</sup> ex materia et forma hae sunt. Substantia <sup>97</sup> simplex aut habet formam sibi propriam aut non; si vero non habet formam sibi propriam, tunc non habet esse; omne enim esse <sup>z</sup> ex forma est.<sup>a</sup> Item si <sup>b</sup> substantia simplex <sup>c</sup> non habet formam sibi propriam, tunc non est species differens ab alia; nulla est enim differentia specierum nisi per formam; habet igitur formam. Sed forma non dat esse nisi cum est in materia; igitur substantiae simplices constant ex materia et forma. (5)

Item omnes substantiae, tam <sup>d</sup> simplices quam compositae, conveniunt <sup>e</sup> in hoc quod omnes substantiae sunt; sed propriis formis fiunt diversae substantiae; necesse est igitur ut sit haec <sup>f</sup> substantia communis in qua conveniant et quae det omnibus intellectum <sup>g</sup> substantialitatis aequaliter, quae non est eis forma, sed materia. Quod sic probatur: nulla conveniunt in quo differunt; sed omnia formis differunt; formis igitur non conveniunt sed conveniunt in substantia. Substantia <sup>h</sup> igitur non est <sup>i</sup> eis forma sed materia quae una est omnium substantiarum et qua <sup>j</sup> omnes participant. Nulla autem forma est qua omnes participant <sup>k</sup> nisi unitas; unitas vero non est substantia; igitur substantia materia est cui adveniunt formae corporeitatis et spiritualitatis <sup>l</sup> et fiunt substantia corporea et incorporea. (10)

Item <sup>98</sup> quaecumque sunt diversa, diversa sunt per formam; sed quaecumque diversa <sup>m</sup> sunt per formam, conveniunt in materia; igitur <sup>n</sup> corporea et incorporea conveniunt in materia. (20)

Item nulla res est agens nisi per formam; sed actiones <sup>99</sup> substantiarum simplicium <sup>o</sup> diversae sunt; unde <sup>p</sup> et formae earum diversae. Conveniunt <sup>100</sup> ergo omnes in materia eo quod omnes sunt substantiae simplices,<sup>q</sup> sed differunt formis propriis; conveniunt ergo <sup>r</sup> omnes in substantialitate sed differunt sapientiae perfectione eo quod una in sapientia vel iustitia perfectior est <sup>s</sup> alia. Item substantiae simplices aut sunt materiae tantum aut formae tantum aut nec materia nec forma aut materia et <sup>t</sup> forma simul. Si <sup>101</sup> substantiae spirituales materia <sup>u</sup> tantum essent, profecto in nullo differrent sed omnino unum essent quia materia rerum una est non diversa in se, nec aliquid agerent quoniam actus formae est non materiae quod intelligenti satis manifestum est.<sup>v</sup> Si enim ex hoc, quod materia sunt, aliquid agerent, tunc quicquid ex materia est illud ageret. (25)

<sup>u</sup> spiritualis P.

<sup>v</sup> specialitas C.

<sup>w</sup> et ut P.

<sup>x</sup> probant phylosophy animam V.

<sup>y</sup> bis V.

<sup>z</sup> om. C.

<sup>a</sup> om. V.

<sup>b</sup> om. C.

<sup>c</sup> add. si C.

<sup>d</sup> quam C.

<sup>e</sup> om. C.

<sup>f</sup> hic V] om. M and placed after communis.

<sup>g</sup> om. CP] intellectionis M.

<sup>h</sup> ergo substantia CP. <sup>i</sup> bis V.

<sup>97</sup> Substantiae . . . I. 8, nisi per formam. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 39, p. 168, l. 21 to p. 169, l. 2: Substantia . . . nisi per formam.

<sup>98</sup> Item . . . in materia. Cf. *Fons Vitae* IV, 10, p. 233, ll. 8–10: Postquam omnia . . . sit una.

<sup>99</sup> Sed actiones . . . in substantialitate. Cf.

<sup>j</sup> quae M.

<sup>k</sup> participant M.

<sup>l</sup> add. id est quae sunt corporeitas et spiritualitas CP.

<sup>m</sup> per formam sunt diversa C.

<sup>n</sup> ergo substantia CP.

<sup>o</sup> om. M.

<sup>p</sup> add. simplicium M.

<sup>q</sup> add. speciales C] spirituales P.

<sup>r</sup> enim CMP.

<sup>s</sup> sit V.

<sup>t</sup> aut V.

<sup>u</sup> tantum materiae CP.

<sup>v</sup> om. V.

*op. cit.* IV. 1, p. 212, ll. 2–8: Signum huius . . . in se formam.

<sup>100</sup> Convenient ergo omnes . . . perfectione. Cf. *loc. cit.* II. 15–17: Communitas . . . perfectione.

<sup>101</sup> Si substantiae . . . manifestum est. Cf. *ibid.* II. 20–23: haec substantiae . . . sensibilibus.

Item si substantiae spirituales materia tantum essent, tunc non haberent esse; materia <sup>102</sup> enim non habet esse nisi per formam.

Item substantiae spirituales non possunt esse formae tantum; formae <sup>w</sup> enim <sup>103</sup> non habent <sup>x</sup> esse nisi in materia; unde <sup>104</sup> si animae essent formae tantum, non <sup>y</sup> haberent esse. Nec sunt una forma tantum quia tunc non essent diversae; sed nec sunt diversae <sup>z</sup> seipsis quia tunc in nullo convenirent; sed constat eas convenire <sup>a</sup> et diversas esse; <sup>b</sup> non sunt ergo una forma tantum. Quod autem compositae <sup>c</sup> sunt <sup>d</sup> ex materia et forma evidenter indicat earum differentia a corporeis et earum a seipsis; non enim <sup>a</sup> <sup>e</sup> se differunt <sup>f</sup> nisi formas constituentes habent.

(10)

Item <sup>105</sup> omne quod est intelligibile dividitur in formam et formatum ut est spiritualitas <sup>g</sup> et spirituale, et <sup>h</sup> rationalitas et rationale. Intellectus vero, cuius est coniuncta dividere et divisa <sup>i</sup> coniungere, non comprehendit <sup>j</sup> primo nisi rem constantem ex materia et forma quae sunt finis rerum et deinde abstrahit. Cum enim intellectus <sup>k</sup> percipit rem, comprehendit eam; sed non comprehendit eam nisi quia res finita est. Res autem finita non est nisi per suam formam; unde res, quae non <sup>l</sup> habet formam <sup>m</sup> qua <sup>n</sup> fiat unum et differat ab alio, incomprehensibilis est quia infinita est ac per hoc essentia aeterna infinita est quia non habet formam.

(15)

Similiter et materia primordialis infinita est quia ex se nullam habet <sup>o</sup> formam. Omne vero creatum finitum est; <sup>p</sup> finitum autem esse non potest nisi sit habens formam; ergo omnis substantia intelligibilis est habens formam et materiam.

(20)

Item in anima est multiplicitas et diversitas, cui aliud est esse substantiam, aliud esse unam, <sup>q</sup> aliud esse animam, <sup>r</sup> aliud esse intelligentem. Unumquodque enim horum in aliis subiectis per se inveniri potest sine alio. Haec autem multiplicitas vel est diversarum materiarum tantum vel diversarum formarum tantum vel materiarum et formarum simul vel unius materiae <sup>s</sup> et diversarum <sup>t</sup> formarum vel unius formae et diversarum materiarum. Unam <sup>u</sup> autem tantum <sup>v</sup> materiam primam esse et non multas iam manifestum est; <sup>w</sup> multas etiam <sup>x</sup> formas sine materia subsistere impossibile est; restat igitur ut haec multiplicitas sit multarum formarum in una materia.

(25)

(30)

Item <sup>106</sup> necesse est ut anima sit una tantum <sup>x</sup> res simplex carens omni com-

<sup>w</sup> forma CP.

<sup>x</sup> habet CP.

<sup>y</sup> om. M.

<sup>z</sup> add. a CP.

<sup>a</sup> diversas esse et convenire CP.

<sup>b</sup> add. haec C.

<sup>c</sup> composita CP.

<sup>d</sup> sint MV.

<sup>e</sup> om. MV.

<sup>f</sup> different CP.

<sup>g</sup> specialitas et speciale C.

<sup>h</sup> om. CPM.

<sup>i</sup> diversa CP.

<sup>j</sup> apprehendit C.

<sup>k</sup> om. CP.

<sup>l</sup> om. V.

<sup>m</sup> forma M.

<sup>n</sup> quae MV.

<sup>o</sup> habeat M.

<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> materia M.

<sup>r</sup> anima M.

<sup>s</sup> formae C.

<sup>t</sup> diversarum materiarum vel unius materiae et diversarum formarum C.

<sup>u</sup> una V.

<sup>v</sup> prim. mat. tant. CP.

<sup>w</sup> esse M.

<sup>x</sup> res tantum CP.

<sup>102</sup> Materia . . . per formam. *Op. cit.* IV. 14, p. 241, ll. 10-11: cum non dicatur . . . propter formam.

<sup>103</sup> formae enim . . . in materia. *Cf. op. cit.* IV. 1, p. 212, ll. 24-26: Fortasse . . . sustinente.

<sup>104</sup> unde si animae . . . convenirent. *Ibid.* p.

213, ll. 2-6: Si hae substantiae . . . umquam.

<sup>105</sup> Item omne . . . l. 23, et materiam. *Cf. op. cit.* IV. 6, p. 223, l. 12: omne intelligibile . . . l. 10, p. 224, et materiam.

<sup>106</sup> Item necesse . . . forma simul. *Cf. op. cit.* IV. 2, p. 213, ll. 17-20: non est etiam . . . forma tantum.

positione vel non; non est autem simplex carens omni compositione; igitur vel est duae materiae vel duae formae vel materia et forma simul. Ex duabus autem materiis nihil potest esse sine forma; omne <sup>107</sup> enim esse ex forma est neque ex duabus formis sine materia. Necesse est enim ut aliqua <sup>r</sup> sit materia in qua coniungantur; est igitur anima materia et forma simul. (5)

Item nullam habet proprietatem materia per se nec forma per se, sed compositum ex utraque. Alioquin materia ex se non esset informis, et forma haberet formam, quod est impossibile. Omnis enim proprietas forma est; multae autem sunt proprietates animae; igitur <sup>108</sup> anima nec est materia tantum nec forma tantum sed composita ex utraque. (10)

Item omne esse vel <sup>z</sup> est sensibile vel intelligibile; sed omne esse ex forma est; igitur quicquid est sensibile vel intelligibile ex forma est; forma autem non habet esse nisi in materia.

Item factura a factore penitus diversa est; sed <sup>109</sup> factor est unus tantum simpliciter; nulla igitur factura est per se una <sup>a</sup> tantum simpliciter; anima igitur vel intelligentia <sup>b</sup> nec est una tantum materia nec una tantum forma, sed composita ex utraque. Si quis autem dicat <sup>c</sup> quod materia est una tantum per se et forma una <sup>d</sup> tantum per se, non est verum. Neque enim materia neque forma habet esse per se unum vel multa nisi cum sibi ad invicem coniunguntur. <sup>e</sup> Materia enim non habet esse per se nisi per formam, nec forma habet esse nisi in materia. (20)

Item <sup>110</sup> si universitas creaturarum ab extremo infimo usque ad extremum supremum continua est sine interruptione, tunc necesse est ut sicut corporeae substantiae compositae sunt ex materia et forma ita et spirituales; <sup>f</sup> alioquin corporea et incorporea substantia non essent sub eodem genere <sup>g</sup> coaequae species eo <sup>h</sup> quod simplex prior est <sup>i</sup> quam composita. <sup>j</sup> (25)

Item <sup>111</sup> universitas substantiarum vel resolvitur ad unam radicem vel ad <sup>k</sup> plures. Si autem <sup>l</sup> ad unam radicem resolvitur, tunc necesse est ut illa una radix vel sit materia tantum, vel forma tantum, vel nec materia nec forma. Sed materia tantum esse non potest quia res non haberent esse cum formae non essent, nec forma tantum quia forma non existit per se. Si autem nec forma nec materia, tunc vel <sup>m</sup> factor primus vel aliud (*esset*). <sup>n</sup> Sed factor primus esse non potest; omne enim quod ex ipso est nec creatum nec factum est nec est aliud quam ipse est. <sup>o</sup> Aliud autem quam ipse est <sup>p</sup> nihil est nisi vel materia vel forma vel compositum ex utraque. (30)

Si autem resolvitur ad plures, tunc vel <sup>q</sup> ad duas vel ad plures. Si vero fuerint duae, tunc vel duae materiae <sup>r</sup> vel duae formae, <sup>s</sup> vel altera materia et

<sup>r</sup> sit aliqua CP.

<sup>z</sup> est vel CP.

<sup>a</sup> tantum una CP.

<sup>b</sup> intellectiva C.

<sup>c</sup> om. V.

<sup>d</sup> tantum una CP.

<sup>e</sup> coniungitur V] consignantur P.

<sup>f</sup> speciales C.

<sup>g</sup> om. V.

<sup>h</sup> et M.

<sup>i</sup> esset CMP.

<sup>j</sup> compositum C.

<sup>k</sup> ad . . . autem om. M.

<sup>l</sup> om. V.

<sup>m</sup> om. CP.

<sup>n</sup> om. all mss.

<sup>o</sup> om. CP.

<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> om. CP.

<sup>r</sup> formae CP.

<sup>s</sup> materiae CP.

<sup>107</sup> omne enim . . . forma est. Boethius, *de Trinitate* 2, 21. PL 64, 1250B.

<sup>108</sup> igitur anima . . . ex utraque. Cf. *Fons Vitae* IV. 1, p. 212, ll. 11–17: non est possibile . . . perfectione.

<sup>109</sup> sed factor . . . ex utraque. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 2, p. 76, ll. 15–18: Factor primus . . .

quam ipsa.

<sup>110</sup> Item si . . . quam composita. Cf. *op. cit.* IV. 6, p. 226, ll. 2–7: et si totum . . . et forma.

<sup>111</sup> Item universitas . . . l. 9, p. 58, nec forma. Cf. *op. cit.* IV. 6, p. 224, l. 15 to p. 225, l. 21: omnia resolvuntur . . . nec forma.



altera forma, vel nec duae materiae <sup>t</sup> nec duae formae; sed non est possibile <sup>u</sup> ut sint duae materiae vel duae formae, vel nec duae materiae nec duae formae, propter praedicta inconvenientia; restat igitur ut altera earum sit materia et altera forma. Si autem fuerint plures quam duae, tunc illa multiplicitas vel resolvitur <sup>v</sup> ad duo vel non. Si autem multiplicitas resolvitur ad duo, tunc duo sunt radix, quorum unum est materia et alterum <sup>w</sup> forma. Si autem multitudo non resolvitur ad duo et natura multitudinis opposita <sup>x</sup> est duobus, tunc necesse est ut aliquid aliud, praeter factorem primum, sit <sup>y</sup> nec materia nec forma, quod impossibile <sup>z</sup> est. (5)

Item duo necessario sequuntur post unum; sed primus factor in se vere unus est; duo <sup>112</sup> igitur necessario sequuntur post eum, quae <sup>a</sup> sunt materia et forma ex quibus omnia constituuntur et ad quae omnia resolvuntur. (10)

Quamvis ergo humanae animae cotidie novae creari dicantur, non tamen de nihilo, <sup>b</sup> sed de materia prima creari videntur. Si enim omne esse ex forma est, profecto rationalis anima non habet esse nisi per formam; sed forma non habet esse nisi in materia; forma igitur qua anima rationalis est non est nisi in materia; ac per hoc anima <sup>c</sup> videtur constare ex materia et forma. (15)

Unde etiam constabit illud divinum: <sup>113</sup> *Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul*; quoniam qui nunc creat novas animas <sup>d</sup> quantum ad formas tunc etiam creavit animas quantum ad materiam, ut vere dicatur creasse omnia simul. Simul enim omnia creavit cum materiam <sup>e</sup> omnium semel creavit. Si autem humanae animae sive angelici spiritus de nihilo creantur, tunc non creavit omnia simul nisi sola corporea. Sed divina auctoritas irrefragabilis est; ut ergo omnia simul creasse dicatur necesse est ut unam materiam omnium, tam corporeorum quam spiritualium, semel creasse <sup>f</sup> concedatur. Si enim substantiae simplices ex prima materia non sunt, profecto quorum nec materia nec forma tunc aliquid <sup>g</sup> erat, cum aliis simul creata non sunt; non ergo *qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul*, quod falsum est. Summa autem praedictarum rationum quibus probantur substantiae simplices constare ex materia et forma haec est: creator <sup>114</sup> vere unus est; sed creatum a creatore omnino diversum <sup>h</sup> est; igitur necesse <sup>115</sup> est ut creatum sit duo. (20)

Item substantiae corporeae <sup>i</sup> et incorporeae nec sunt omnino diversae nec omnino convenientes. (25)

Item <sup>116</sup> omne quod intelligitur dividitur in formam <sup>j</sup> et formatum.

Item <sup>117</sup> omnia reducuntur ad duas radices per resolutionem. (35)

Item nulla resolvuntur nisi in ea ex quibus componuntur; sed omnia resolvuntur in duo.

Quamvis <sup>118</sup> autem substantiae simplices ex materia et forma constare <sup>k</sup>

<sup>t</sup> add. vel CP.

<sup>u</sup> potentia C.

<sup>v</sup> resolvatur C.

<sup>w</sup> altera CP.

<sup>x</sup> appositae MV.

<sup>y</sup> fit M.

<sup>z</sup> est impossibile CP.

<sup>a</sup> qui V.

<sup>b</sup> illo C.

<sup>c</sup> om. CP.

<sup>d</sup> om. MV.

<sup>e</sup> materia MV.

<sup>f</sup> om. C.

<sup>g</sup> erat aliquid CP.

<sup>h</sup> add. diversum V.

<sup>i</sup> corpore et in corpore M.

<sup>j</sup> forma V.

<sup>k</sup> constare dicantur om. CP.

<sup>112</sup> duo . . . post eum. Cf. *op. cit.* p. 222, l. 27: duo sunt post unum.

<sup>113</sup> Eccli. 18, 1.

<sup>114</sup> Creator . . . diversum est. Cf. *Fons Vitae* IV, 6, p. 222, ll. 25-28: creator . . . ab eo.

<sup>115</sup> necesse est . . . convenientes. Cf. *op. cit.* V, 12, p. 279, ll. 4-5: oportet . . . convenientes.

<sup>116</sup> Item . . . formatum. Cf. *op. cit.* IV, 6, p. 223, l. 12 omne intelligibile . . . formatum.

<sup>117</sup> Item omne . . . per resolutionem. Cf. *op. cit.* p. 225, l. 8 and l. 17.

<sup>118</sup> Quamvis . . . l. 5, p. 58, absolute dicitur. Cf. *op. cit.* IV, 4, p. 218, ll. 20-24: postquam non est . . . superius est eo.

dicantur, non tamen simplices esse negantur. Compositio enim <sup>1</sup> ex materia et forma tantum non tollit simplicitatem quae tantum ex alterius <sup>m</sup> comparatione dicitur. Hoc enim quod simplicitas de rebus creatis et <sup>n</sup> compositis cum magis et minus dicitur evidenter indicat quia <sup>o</sup> nulla earum simplex absolute dicitur; nullius enim incorporeae creaturae substantia vere simplex est <sup>p</sup> cui (5) hoc non potest esse quod nosse. <sup>q</sup> Non est <sup>r</sup> enim vera simplicitas ubi est compositio; sed omnino compositio est ubi est hoc et aliud. Omnis autem creatura est hoc et aliud; nihil est enim quod de ea vere dixeris quin de ea aliquid <sup>s</sup> aliud vere affirmare non possis, cum non sit ei <sup>t</sup> idem esse, vivere et intelligere. Si enim idem esset ei esse et <sup>u</sup> intelligere, profecto sicut una <sup>v</sup> est in (10) omnibus essentia non secundum magis et minus, ita et una esset intelligentia non secundum magis et minus. Si autem una esset intelligentia, una esset cognitio. Sed si una esset cognitio, una esset et dilectio; tantum enim quisque diligit quantum diligendum esse cognoscit; non autem aequae diligunt, <sup>w</sup> sicut nec aequae cognoscunt, quia *stella* <sup>119</sup> *a stella differt in claritate*. Non sunt (15) ergo aequales in <sup>x</sup> intelligentia, quae tamen <sup>y</sup> aequales sunt in essentia. Non ergo est eis idem esse et intelligere, sed aliud hoc et aliud illud. Ubicumque autem <sup>z</sup> est hoc et illud <sup>a</sup> procul dubio compositio est. Non sunt ergo simplices substantiae immunes ab omni compositione; ac per hoc non dicuntur simplices esse quod omni <sup>b</sup> compositione careant, sed quia respectu inferiorum (20) de compositione minus habent, <sup>c</sup> quoniam adhaerentes aeternitati et affixae <sup>d</sup> desiderio uni et eidem creatoris voluntati incommutabili, nulli permutationi subiacent, affectionem non variant, in eodem statu semper <sup>e</sup> permanent. Multo minus <sup>f</sup> ergo humanae animae simplices sunt, in quarum essentia tam multiplex virtus est animandi, sensificandi et ad <sup>g</sup> tam diversa corpus movendi (25) et multiplici de causa affectionem <sup>h</sup> commutandi. Quia enim gaudet, dolet, sperat et metuit, numquam pacata subsistit, et intelligentia eius semper variatur, dum incognitum studio addiscitur <sup>i</sup> et cognitum <sup>j</sup> per oblivionem subtrahitur; unde non est ei idem esse et intelligere. Sic <sup>k</sup> ergo nulla substantia incorporea absolute simplex est quae hoc et aliud est, quamvis una comparatione alterius simplicior dicatur quae tamen in se considerata <sup>l</sup> multiplex et composita iudicatur. (30)

In solo <sup>120</sup> autem Deo est vera et absoluta simplicitas ubi non est hoc et <sup>m</sup> hoc, qui id ipsum est quod habet ac per hoc non sic habet formam ut aliud illi sit scientia quam <sup>n</sup> scit et aliud essentia <sup>o</sup> qua <sup>p</sup> est, sed utrumque unum, (35) quamvis non utrumque dicendum est quod verissime simplex et unum est. Cum enim de Deo aliquid vere dixeris, nihil aliud restat quod de eo vere

<sup>1</sup> autem V.<sup>m</sup> comparatione alterius CP. dicitur alterius M.<sup>n</sup> vel V.<sup>o</sup> quod CP.<sup>p</sup> om. CP.<sup>q</sup> nosse V.<sup>r</sup> enim est C] est om. P.<sup>s</sup> om. CP.<sup>t</sup> om. CP.<sup>u</sup> in omnibus una est CP.<sup>v</sup> om. C.<sup>w</sup> diligit C.<sup>x</sup> om. M.<sup>y</sup> inde M.<sup>z</sup> om. V.<sup>a</sup> aliud MPV.<sup>b</sup> omnino C] omino P.<sup>c</sup> habeant MV.<sup>d</sup> affixi M.<sup>e</sup> om. CP.<sup>f</sup> ergo minus CP.<sup>g</sup> omnino CP.<sup>h</sup> affectionum CP.<sup>i</sup> addiscatur C] addicitur P.<sup>j</sup> recognitum MV.<sup>k</sup> si CP.<sup>l</sup> consideratur C.<sup>m</sup> om. M.<sup>n</sup> corrected to qua V. quia sit M.<sup>o</sup> scientia V.<sup>p</sup> quam C.<sup>119</sup> I Cor. XV. 41.<sup>120</sup> In solo . . . habet. Cf. Boethius, *de Trini-**tate*, 2. PL 64, 1250C: divina substantia . . . id quod est.

dicere <sup>a</sup> possis. Quaecumque enim de Deo secundum substantiam dicuntur multivoca <sup>r</sup> sunt. Unde cum dicis Deum iustum, hoc dicis esse quod est; cum vero bonum <sup>s</sup> vel fortem vel sapientem eum dicis, non aliud eum esse quam prius dicis, sed hoc idem aliis modis <sup>t</sup> repetis; non enim est ipse aliud et aliud. Solus ergo Deus absolute simplex est, et nulla creatura absolute simplex sed alterius comparatione dicitur. (5)

<sup>a</sup> *om.* CP. dic. poss. vere M.

<sup>r</sup> sunt multi C. multi vocati sunt M.

<sup>s</sup> fort. vel bonum CP.

<sup>t</sup> nominibus CMP.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM <sup>u</sup>AN <sup>v</sup> ANIMA SIT MORTALIS VEL IMMORTALIS

Merito quaeritur de anima an ipsa <sup>w</sup> sit immortalis. Fuerunt enim multi <sup>x</sup> qui dicerent <sup>y</sup> animam non remanere post corpus, dicentes animam spiritum esse qui <sup>z</sup> sicut carne regitur ita et <sup>a</sup> cum carne moritur; unde et isti negabant resurrectionem corporum. Quod autem in morte corporis ipsa non moriatur a philosophis sic probatur: quicquid <sup>121</sup> destruitur ad destructionem alterius pendet ex eo aliquo modo; sed quicquid pendet ex aliquo, necesse est ut vel <sup>b</sup> sit eo posterius vel sit eo prius essentia non tempore, vel habeat simul esse cum eo. Si autem anima sic pendet ex corpore sicut ex eo cum quo habet simul esse et hoc fuerit ei essentiale, <sup>c</sup> tunc essentia uniuscuiusque illorum <sup>d</sup> relativa est ad alterum <sup>e</sup> et sic nec corpus nec anima est substantia; sed utrumque est substantia; quare non est hoc <sup>f</sup> eis essentiale. Si autem hoc fuerit eis <sup>g</sup> accidentale, tunc destructo uno illorum destruitur relatio quae accidit alteri quod non destruitur ad destructionem alterius, quamvis sic pendeat <sup>h</sup> ex eo. (5)

Si autem anima sic pendet ex corpore veluti eo posterius, tunc corpus causa <sup>i</sup> est esse animae; causae autem quatuor sunt; corpus ergo vel erit <sup>j</sup> causa efficiens animae et dans ei esse vel erit causa receptibilis eius ad modum compositionis sicut elementa recipiunt corpora vel ad modum simplicitatis ut aes imaginis <sup>k</sup> vel erit causa formalis vel causa perfectiva <sup>l</sup> sive finalis. Impossibile est autem ut corpus sit causa animae efficiens. Corpus enim ex hoc <sup>m</sup> quod est corpus non agit aliquid. Non enim agit nisi per virtutem. <sup>n</sup> Si enim ageret per seipsum et non per virtutes suas, tunc omne corpus ageret illam actionem. Deinde omnes virtutes corporales aut sunt accidentia aut formae materiales. Impossibile est autem ut accidentia vel formae existentes in materiis dent esse substantiae existenti per se non in materia. Impossibile est etiam corpus esse causam recipientem quoniam anima non est impressa in corpore ullo modo ut forma in materia. Ergo corpus non est formatum forma animae rationalis nec ad modum compositionis nec ad modum simplicitatis ita ut aliqua pars corporis componatur vel complexionetur aliqua compositione vel complexione <sup>o</sup> aliqua in qua imprimatur <sup>p</sup> anima. Impossibile est etiam corpus esse finalem causam animae vel perfectivam. Melius est <sup>q</sup> autem hoc <sup>r</sup> e converso sentire. <sup>s</sup> Igitur anima non pendet ex corpore ut causatum a sua causa essentiali, <sup>t</sup> quamvis complexio et corpus causae sint <sup>u</sup> animae accidentales; cum enim creatur corpus aptum recipere animam et fit aptitudo instrumentorum, comitatur tunc creari a causis separatis illud quod est anima. (15)

Sed <sup>122</sup> quia creato uno creatur et aliud, non tamen idcirco oportet ut uno (25)

<sup>u</sup> *Cap. Oct. om. all mss.*  
<sup>v</sup> an . . . immort.] utrum anima sit immortalis CP] *om. M.* <sup>w</sup> anima C.  
<sup>x</sup> *om. C.* <sup>y</sup> credunt M.  
<sup>z</sup> quae V. <sup>a</sup> *om. CP.*  
<sup>b</sup> vel . . . prius] sit corp. vel eo sit posterius  
C] ut sit eo prius vel eo sit posterius P.  
<sup>c</sup> essentialiter M.  
<sup>d</sup> eorum C.  
<sup>e</sup> alteram CP.  
<sup>f</sup> ei hoc CP. hoc *om. V.* <sup>g</sup> ei C.

<sup>h</sup> ex eo pendeat CP.

<sup>i</sup> est causa CP.

<sup>j</sup> est V.

<sup>k</sup> imaginis M.

<sup>l</sup> perfectivae M.

<sup>m</sup> eo V.

<sup>n</sup> add. animae CP.

<sup>o</sup> aliqua comp. CM.

<sup>p</sup> imprimatur C.

<sup>q</sup> *om. C.*

<sup>r</sup> *om. CP.*

<sup>s</sup> essentialiter CP.

<sup>t</sup> consentire C.

<sup>u</sup> sunt M.

<sup>121</sup> quicquid destruitur . . . l. 34, quod est anima. Cf. Avic. V. 4, f. 24v, 1: quia quicquid destruitur . . . 2A, creant animam.

<sup>122</sup> Sed quia . . . l. 41, p. 63, quod monstrare volumus. Cf. Avic. V. 4, f. 24v, 2A: Sed quia creato . . . f. 25r, 1C, nutu divino.

destructo destruat et aliud. Non enim hoc <sup>v</sup> contingit nisi cum esse unius fuerit propter <sup>w</sup> esse alterius aut in altero. Saepe enim contingunt aliquae <sup>x</sup> propter <sup>y</sup> alia quibus destructis remanent illa quia esse illorum non habet esse ex illis, et praecipue, cum id <sup>z</sup> quod dat eis esse fuerit aliud ab illo ex quo utraque <sup>a</sup> habent simul esse. Attribuens igitur esse animae non est corpus nec virtus corporis, sed est sine dubio essentia existens nuda a materia et a mensura; et <sup>b</sup> quandoquidem anima habet esse ab illa et non habet ex corpore nisi <sup>c</sup> debitum horae qua debet esse tantum, tunc non pendet esse <sup>d</sup> eius ex corpore nec est corpus causa eius nisi accidentalis. Ergo non debet dici quod sic pendeat <sup>e</sup> anima ex corpore ut corpus debeat esse prius anima prioritate causalitatis.<sup>f</sup> (5)

Si autem anima pendet ex corpore sicut id quod est prius, sed si <sup>z</sup> haec prioritas fuerit temporalis, tunc impossibile est ut esse animae <sup>h</sup> pendeat ex corpore postquam prius est eo in tempore. Si vero prioritas eius fuerit in esse non in tempore, quemadmodum prioritas est ut, cum essentia prioris <sup>i</sup> fuerit, comitetur etiam esse id quod <sup>j</sup> est posterius, et tunc hoc prius non habet esse cum ponitur <sup>k</sup> destrui id quod est posterius, non ut, quia posterius posuimus <sup>l</sup> destructum, omnino oporteat destrui <sup>m</sup> id quod est prius, sed ob hoc quod <sup>n</sup> posterius non potest destrui nisi quia prius accidit priori aliquid in natura sua quod destruxit illud et tunc destruitur posterius. Unde ex positione destructionis posterioris non provenit destructio prioris, sed positio destructionis ipsius <sup>o</sup> prioris ponit posterius destrui postquam priori accidit destrui in se. Et quandoquidem ita est, oportebit tunc ut causa destructiva prius contingat in substantiam animae propter quam destruat corpus et ut corpus nullo modo destruat propter causam quae sit ipsius propria; sed corpus destruitur ex causis quae sunt eius propriae ex permutatione suae complexionis <sup>p</sup> et compositionis; igitur impossibile est ut anima pendeat ex corpore sicut prius natura cuius <sup>q</sup> causa postea <sup>r</sup> destruat corpus aliquo modo. Ergo non est inter illa hic modus pendendi; sed nec aliquis aliorum; restat igitur ut nullius eorum esse pendeat ex altero; esse enim animae pendet ex aliis <sup>s</sup> principiis quae non permutantur <sup>t</sup> neque destruuntur. Igitur anima non moritur in morte corporis. (10)

Dicimus insuper quod nulla causa destruit animam aliquo <sup>u</sup> modo, cuius probatio haec est. Quicquid solet destrui ex aliqua causa quae sit in eo, in illo est potentia destruendi in quo ante destructionem est effectus permanendi. Aptitudo autem eius ad destructionem non est ex suo effectu permanendi. Intentio etenim potentiae diversa est ab intentione effectus, et habitudo huius potentiae diversa est ab habitudine huius effectus, quoniam habitudo huius potentiae est ad destruendum, et habitudo huius effectus est ad permanendum; igitur ad duas res diversas inveniuntur in re una hae duae intentiones. Dicimus igitur quod quamvis in omnibus compositis et simplicibus existenti- (35)

<sup>v</sup> ex hoc M.

<sup>w</sup> per CP.

<sup>x</sup> alia CMP] corrected to aliquae V.

<sup>y</sup> per P.

<sup>z</sup> illud C.

<sup>a</sup> uterque habet M.

<sup>b</sup> quae M.

<sup>c</sup> tunc C] nec P.

<sup>d</sup> eius esse CMP.

<sup>e</sup> pendet CP.

<sup>f</sup> casualitatis V.

<sup>g</sup> om. MV.

<sup>h</sup> om. CP.

<sup>i</sup> fuerit prioris CP.

<sup>j</sup> quo CP.

<sup>k</sup> componitur M.

<sup>l</sup> possumus M.

<sup>m</sup> om. CP.

<sup>n</sup> quo CP.

<sup>o</sup> prioris ipsius CP.

<sup>p</sup> compos. et comp. CP.

<sup>q</sup> cum C.

<sup>r</sup> dest. postea CP.

<sup>s</sup> princip. aliis CMP.

<sup>t</sup> permutatur M.

<sup>u</sup> alio C.

bus in compositis possunt simul coniungi effectus permanendi et potentia destruendi, in rebus tamen simplicibus separatis per se impossibile est haec duo coniungi, et absolute dicimus quod impossibile est has duas intentiones simul esse in aliquo <sup>v</sup> unius essentiae.

Quicquid enim permanet et habet posse <sup>w</sup> destrui, permanendi habet (5) posse; sed permanentia eius non est omnino necessaria, et quia necessaria non est, est utique possibilis; possibilitas autem quae recipit duo extrema est natura potentiae; est igitur in substantia eius potentia permanendi et effectus permanendi. Iam autem ostensum est quod effectus permanentiae illius sine dubio non est potentia permanentiae illius. Effectus igitur permanentiae illius (10) est aliquid quod accidit rei cui inest potentia permanendi. Ipsa igitur potentia non est aliqua essentia animae in effectu, immo rei cuius essentiae accidit permanere in effectu, verumtamen est veritas essentiae ipsius. Sequitur ergo ex hoc ut eius essentia sit composita ex aliquo per quod essentia eius sit in effectu, quod est forma in unaquaque re, et ex aliquo cui advenit iste effectus, (15) in natura cuius <sup>x</sup> est potentia quae est materia eius. Ergo si anima est simplex absolute, profecto non dividitur in materiam et formam, sed si est composita.

Dimittamus nunc compositum et loquamur de substantia quae est eius <sup>v</sup> materia, dicentes quod ipsa materia vel dividitur sic, scilicet in formam et materiam, quod est impossibile, vel nullo modo destruitur; similiter et anima. (20) Non enim loquimur hic <sup>z</sup> de re composita ex materia et alio.<sup>a</sup> Manifestum est igitur quod in omni eo quod est simplex, non compositum <sup>b</sup> vel est materia compositi, non conveniunt effectus permanendi et potentia destruendi respectu suae essentiae. Si enim fuerit in eo potentia destruendi, non poterit esse in eo effectus permanendi, et e converso. Manifestum est igitur quod in substantia animae non est potentia corrumpendi sed generatorum corruptibilium; corrumpitur enim quod compositum et coniunctum est. Potentia vero (25) corrumpendi non est in composito secundum quod est unum, sed in materia quae in potentia receptibilis est utrorumque contrariorum. Ergo in destructo composito non est potentia permanendi vel destruendi, nec coniunguntur in (30) eo. Materia autem vel est permanens non per potentiam quae <sup>c</sup> praeparat eam ad permanendum, sicut quidam <sup>d</sup> putaverunt, vel est permanens per potentiam qua permanet quae non est potentia destruendi.

Potentia enim destructionis aliud est quod contingit in ea; potentia vero destructionis simplicium quae sunt in materia est in substantia materiae, non (35) in substantia eorum. Demonstratio autem quae necessarium facit hoc est quod omne generatum est corruptibile secundum quod finitur potentia permanendi, et ob hoc necesse est corrumpi quod est compositum ex materia et forma in cuius materia est potentia permanendi ipsam formam, et potentia corrumpendi simul. Ostensum est igitur humanam animam nullo modo cor- (40) rumpi; est igitur immortalis, et hoc est quod monstrare volumus.

<sup>v</sup> aliqua C.  
<sup>w</sup> om. CP.  
<sup>x</sup> om. C.  
<sup>y</sup> om. CP.

<sup>z</sup> om. M.  
<sup>b</sup> composita CP.  
<sup>c</sup> qua praeparant MV.  
<sup>d</sup> quiddam V.

<sup>a</sup> alia re CP.

# CAPITULUM NONUM<sup>o</sup>

## DE <sup>1</sup> VIRIBUS ANIMAE

Postquam autem anima rationalis convincitur esse immortalis, considerandae sunt utique omnes vires eius quas exercet dum est in corpore ut ex hoc aperte pateat quas retineat <sup>8</sup> exuta a corpore et quas deserat. Primo <sup>h</sup> autem <sup>123</sup> sciendum est quia vis ex hoc <sup>i</sup> quod est vis essentialiter et principaliter est vis ad aliquid. Nec potest esse principium alterius rei, nisi illius tantum quia ex hoc quod est vis ad illud, principium est illius. Si autem fuerit principium alterius rei, non tamen ex hoc quod est principium essentialiter illius primi; possibile est enim ut una vis <sup>j</sup> sit principium multarum actionum secundario quae oriuntur ex ea, quarum ipsa non est principium principaliter. Sicut visus,<sup>k</sup> cum principaliter <sup>l</sup> sit vis apprehendendi colorem, est tamen secundario vis apprehendendi numerum, figuram,<sup>m</sup> et situm et motum. Vires <sup>124</sup> ergo ex hoc quod sunt vires non sunt nisi principia actionum propriarum principaliter. Nam omnis vis, ex hoc quod est vis, non est nisi quia ex ea provenit actio quam principaliter habet. Omnis enim vis actionem habet propriam in qua non convenit cum aliis, quamvis unius virtutis aliquando diversae sint actiones secundum diversa receptibilia. Diversitas <sup>125</sup> enim <sup>n</sup> actionum provenit ex diversitate virium. Unde vis irascibilis <sup>o</sup> non <sup>p</sup> patitur ex deliciis, nec concupiscibilis ex nocumentis, nec visus ex aliquo illorum. Non est autem tanta diversitas inter vires quanta inter earum <sup>q</sup> actiones. Cum enim vires differant genere vel specie, actiones <sup>126</sup> tamen quaedam differunt genere ut apprehendere et movere, quaedam fortitudine et debilitate ut opinari et asserere, quaedam velocitate et tarditate ut subtilis et hebes in discendo, quaedam privatione et habitu, ut movere et quiescere, dubitatio et sententia,<sup>r</sup> quaedam differunt materia, ut sentire album et sentire nigrum, vel gustare dulce et gustare amarum. Quapropter unaquaeque actio non habet vim <sup>s</sup> sibi propriam ex qua proveniat. (5)

Actionum <sup>127</sup> enim quae <sup>t</sup> differunt fortitudine et debilitate principium una vis est, cuius actio aliquando est fortior, aliquando debilior. Si enim debilia propter debilitatem haberent aliam vim quam fortia, oporteret <sup>u</sup> tunc ut tantus esset numerus virium, quantus est numerus graduum diminutionis et augmenti qui paene infiniti sunt. Uni autem virtuti accidit facere suam actionem fortiorem vel debiliorem, quandoque secundum quod fuerit opera- (10)

<sup>o</sup> Capt. nonum. *om. all mss.*

<sup>1</sup> De viribus animae] anima exuta a corpore quas retineat vires et quas non, quod ut appareat de viribus animae est tractandum V (*s.m.*)] *om. M.*

<sup>8</sup> retinet MPV.

<sup>h</sup> primum CP.

<sup>i</sup> eo M.

<sup>j</sup> *om. M.*

<sup>k</sup> *add. est M.*

<sup>l</sup> *om. CP and put before colorem.*

<sup>m</sup> motum et situm CP.

<sup>n</sup> igitur CMP.

<sup>o</sup> irascibilium C.

<sup>p</sup> *om. C.*

<sup>q</sup> eorum CP.

<sup>r</sup> scientia CP.

<sup>s</sup> *corrupt V.*

<sup>t</sup> quaedam V.

<sup>u</sup> oportet V.

<sup>123</sup> Primo autem . . . l. 9, principaliter. *Cf. op. cit. I. 4, f. 4r, 2C: Dicemus igitur . . . earum principaliter.*

<sup>124</sup> Vires ergo . . . l. 17, ex nocumentis. *Cf. op. cit. V. 7, f. 27r, 1B: omnis virtus . . . ex nocumentis.*

<sup>125</sup> Diversitas . . . virium. *Cf. Avic. V. 7,*

*f. 27r, 1B.*

<sup>126</sup> actiones . . . l. 25, amarum. *Cf. Avic.*

*I. 4, f. 4r, 1A: Quaedam enim . . . amarum.*

<sup>127</sup> Actionum . . . l. 14, p. 65, et imaginatio. *Ibid.: Dicimus igitur . . . dispositione imaginationis.*

tio,<sup>v</sup> quandoque secundum aptitudinem instrumenti, quandoque secundum prohibentia <sup>w</sup> extrinsecus ne sit vel ne non sit, vel ut <sup>x</sup> augeatur vel minuatur actio. Sed principium actionum quae differunt genere, ut apprehendere et movere, vel apprehendere colorem vel apprehendere <sup>y</sup> saporem, dubitari solet an sit una vis, et an omnes vires apprehendentes sint una vis. Anima enim (5) habet apprehensiones per se ipsam quae sunt intelligibiles et alias apprehensiones per instrumenta quae diversae sunt secundum diversitatem <sup>z</sup> instrumentorum. Si autem intelligibiles et sensibiles actiones fuerint quasi ex duabus viribus, tunc iterum quaeritur an omnes sensibiles quae intus imaginantur et quae extrinsecus apprehenduntur sint <sup>a</sup> ex una vi. Si autem quae intus (10) fuerint fuerint ex una vi vel ex multis viribus, quaeritur tunc an exteriores sint ex una vi quae operatur actiones diversas in <sup>b</sup> instrumentis diversis; non enim prohibetur una vis apprehendere res diversas genere aut <sup>c</sup> specie, sicut intellectus et imaginatio. Sensata <sup>128</sup> etenim <sup>d</sup> communia, quae sunt magnitudo, numerus, motus et <sup>e</sup> quies et figura, quandoque sentiuntur uno sensum, quandoque <sup>f</sup> aliquibus eorum, quamvis hoc fiat mediante alio sensato. Deinde an vis movendi ipsa sit vis apprehendendi et an vis concupiscendi ipsa sit vis irascendi quia cum praesentatur <sup>g</sup> aliquid quod delectat, patitur uno modo, et cum praesentatur quod molestat, patitur alio modo? Una <sup>129</sup> enim et eadem vis operatur <sup>h</sup> contraria et una vis movet voluptatibus diversis, (20) immo <sup>i</sup> una vis operatur actiones diversas in diversis materiis. Quamvis ergo omnis actio proveniat ex aliqua vi, non tamen tot sunt vires quot <sup>j</sup> earum actiones.

Verissime <sup>130</sup> autem scimus quod omnium virium una <sup>k</sup> quandoque impedit alteram, et altera imperat alteri et retrahitur altera propter alteram a propria (25) actione; quod non fieret, nisi unum vinculum haberent in quo coniungerentur omnes, quod eis dominaretur, et quod propter alias impediretur regere alias. Nisi enim quaelibet vis haberet aliquid <sup>l</sup> in quo coniungeretur alii, hoc est, si instrumentum non esset commune nec subiectum commune nec aliquid aliud esset commune in quo coniungeretur,<sup>m</sup> una non retraheret aliam a sua (30) actione. Quomodo enim hoc esset cum nos videamus quod sensus aliquando augmentat cupiditatem et virtus concupiscibilis non patitur ex sensato secundum quod est sensatum? Si autem patitur <sup>n</sup> non ex hoc quod est sensatum, tunc ipsa passio non est ex concupiscentia illius sensati. Oportet ergo sine dubio ut concupiscibilis sit quae sentit. Impossibile est autem duas vires (35) esse unam. Manifestum est igitur quia aliquid unum <sup>o</sup> est habens duas vires. Unde verum est dicere, quia sensimus, concupivimus, et quia <sup>p</sup> vidimus hoc et hoc, irati sumus. Illud autem unum, in quo coniunguntur hae <sup>q</sup> vires, est id per quod cognoscit unusquisque quae sit sua sententia ita ut possit vere dicere,

<sup>v</sup> optio V.<sup>w</sup> prohibentiam V.<sup>x</sup> om. V.<sup>y</sup> om. CP. vel] et CMP.<sup>z</sup> diversitates CP.<sup>a</sup> sicut M.<sup>b</sup> om. CMP.<sup>c</sup> vel diversas CP. aut] vel M.<sup>d</sup> et omnia M.<sup>e</sup> om. CP.<sup>f</sup> quae neque C.<sup>g</sup> praesentitur C.<sup>h</sup> cont. oper. V.<sup>i</sup> imo (s.m.) V.<sup>j</sup> add. sunt CP.<sup>k</sup> una quandoque] unaquaque CP.<sup>l</sup> aliquid C.<sup>m</sup> coniungerentur CM.<sup>n</sup> patitur C.<sup>o</sup> om. CP.<sup>p</sup> quod CP.<sup>q</sup> vires hae CP.<sup>128</sup> Sensata etenim . . . l. 19, patitur uno modo. *Ibid.* 2B: Sensata . . . patitur alio modo.<sup>129</sup> Una . . . materiis. *Ibid.*<sup>130</sup> Verissime . . . l. 6, p. 66, subsistere in corpore. *Op. cit.* V. 7, f. 27r, 1B: Verissime . . . subsistentem in corpore.



quia sensi, concupivi. Hoc autem unum impossibile est esse corpus. Corpus enim ex hoc quod est corpus non potest esse id in quo coniunguntur hae vires, alioquin omne corpus haberet has <sup>r</sup> vires, sed ex alio propter quod fit <sup>a</sup> aptum ad hoc quod primo est coniungens et est perfectio corporis secundum quod est coniungens; ergo illud aliquid aliud <sup>t</sup> est a corpore; secundo quia manifestum est aliquas istarum virium nec esse corporeas nec subsistere in corpore, ut irascibilem <sup>u</sup> et concupiscibilem et intellectus et alias huiusmodi. Est igitur non corpus quoniam <sup>v</sup> in eo quod est non corpus possunt coniungi hae vires, quarum quaedam emanant ad instrumenta et quaedam sunt propriae ipsius.<sup>w</sup> Quae <sup>131</sup> autem exercentur instrumento coniunguntur in principio quod coniungit eas <sup>x</sup> instrumento; quod principium procedit ab anima in instrumento. Manifestum <sup>132</sup> est ergo quia <sup>y</sup> unum est in quo omnes hae <sup>a</sup> vires coniunguntur et cui omnes reddunt ea quae apprehendant,<sup>a</sup> et illud non est corpus. Restat ergo ut illud sit anima, quae quamvis sit una essentialiter, ab ea <sup>b</sup> tamen fluunt multa in membra diversa. Cuius cum infinitae sint vires, tamen dum est in corpore, tres principaliter vires habet: primam vegetandi qualis est in plantis, secundam sensificandi qualis est in brutis animalibus, tertiam ratiocinandi <sup>c</sup> qualis est in hominibus. (5)

Vegetare <sup>133</sup> autem est movere partes vegetati <sup>d</sup> a centro ad extrema. Sed <sup>134</sup> anima secundum quod est vegetabilis habet tres vires, scilicet virtutem nutritivam, augmentativam et generativam. Vis autem nutritiva est vis convertens corpus quod est nutrimentum a corporeitate in qua erat in similitudinem corporis in quo <sup>e</sup> est, et unit ei pro <sup>f</sup> restauratione eius quod resolutum est de illo.<sup>g</sup> Nutrimentum vero est corpus quod solet assimilari naturae corporis cuius dicitur esse nutrimentum et restaurat ei quantum resolutum est de illo vel <sup>h</sup> plus vel minus. Augmentativa vero est vis augens <sup>i</sup> corpus in quo est per corpus quod assimilatur illi augmento porportionali omnibus suis dimensionibus quae sunt longitudo, latitudo, spissitudo, ut perducat rem ad suam perfectionem. Generativa vero vis est accipiens de corpore in quo est partem illi similem in potentia et operatur in ea, per attractionem aliorum corporum quae illi assimilatur, generationem et complexionem et convertit eam in similitudinem ipsius in effectum. (20)

Anima <sup>135</sup> ergo per virtutem vegetandi tria operatur quia nutrit, augmen-  
tat et generat, sed ministrantibus sibi in hoc quatuor virtutibus naturalibus quae sunt attractiva, retentiva, digestiva, expulsiva,<sup>j</sup> cum suis quatuor qualitatibus, duabus activis, caliditate <sup>k</sup> scilicet et frigiditate, et duabus passivis, humiditate <sup>l</sup> et siccitate. Nam primo calor movet materias, deinde frigiditas (35)

<sup>r</sup> duas vires has C.

<sup>a</sup> sit CP.

<sup>t</sup> om. here and put after corpore M.

<sup>u</sup> irascibile et intellectum et concupiscibile CP.

<sup>v</sup> quod M.

<sup>w</sup> om. V.

<sup>x</sup> add. in CP.

<sup>y</sup> quod CP.

<sup>z</sup> om. M.

<sup>a</sup> apprehendunt CP.

<sup>b</sup> eo C.

<sup>c</sup> rationandi V.

<sup>d</sup> vegetatas C] vegetari P.

<sup>e</sup> qua C.

<sup>f</sup> per restaurationem CP.

<sup>g</sup> eo M.

<sup>h</sup> om. C.

<sup>i</sup> agens C.

<sup>j</sup> repulsiva V.

<sup>k</sup> scil. calid. CP.

<sup>l</sup> siccitate (sic) et humiditate V.

<sup>131</sup> Quae autem . . . in instrumento. *Ibid.* 27r, 2: Quae autem exercentur . . . in instrumentum.

<sup>132</sup> Manifestum . . . non est corpus. *Op. cit.* V. 7, f. 27v, 1CD: Manifestum . . . est non corpus.

<sup>133</sup> Vegetare . . . extrema. *Fons Vitae*, p.

184, l. 20.

<sup>134</sup> Sed anima . . . l. 32, in effectum. *Cf.* Avic. I. 5, f. 4v, 2B: Anima autem . . . in effectum.

<sup>135</sup> Anima ergo . . . l. 3, p. 67, retinendum eam. *Cf. op. cit.* I. 5 to II. 1, f. 6r, 1A; a *paraphrase*.

facit eas quiescere in suis perfectionibus creaturarum et consummat<sup>m</sup> eas, deinde sequitur humiditas quae est receptibilis figurae; postea sequitur siccitas quae conservat figuram et iuvat ad retinendum eam.

Notandum<sup>136</sup> autem quod ex omnibus viribus animae vegetabilis sola virtus nutritiva<sup>n</sup> est quae operatur omni tempore vitae singularis. Quae dum permanserit exercens suas<sup>o</sup> actiones, profecto vegetabile<sup>p</sup> et animal<sup>q</sup> erunt viva. Si<sup>r</sup> vero destructa fuerit, non remanent<sup>s</sup> viva. (5)

Augmentativa<sup>137</sup> vero a principio operatur quousque res perficiatur, et deinde cessat eius operatio<sup>t</sup> commendata nutritivae. Generativa<sup>138</sup> vero in principio operatur et statim eius operatio perficitur commendata regimini<sup>u</sup> virtutum nutritivae et augmentativae. Quae postea iterum excitatur ut creetur<sup>v</sup> res sui generis, cuius duae sunt actiones: una est creare corpus et figurare et lineamentare,<sup>w</sup> altera est attribuere partibus eius in operatione secunda formas rerum, scilicet virtutes et dimensiones et<sup>x</sup> numeros et figuras<sup>y</sup> et asperitatem et lenitatem et alia his adhaerentia; in quo<sup>z</sup> serviunt ei virtus<sup>a</sup> nutritiva et augmentativa, illa nutriendo, ista dilatando et elongando secundum<sup>b</sup> quod res meretur. Virtus ergo nutritiva servit augmentativae et ambae serviunt generativae. (15)

Sed virtus nutritiva appetit ut per eam substantia cuiuslibet singularis conservetur, et augmentativa appetit ut per eam substantia singularis perficiatur. Generativa vero appetit ut per eam permaneat species. Nutritiva enim restaurat quod resolvitur de singulari, et generativa restaurat quod resolvitur de specie. Augmentativa vero apponit quod rei deest de perfectione. Hae sunt vires animae vegetabilis. (20)

Multis autem videtur has actiones non esse animae sed naturae, sicut divinis<sup>c</sup> qui dicunt<sup>d</sup> arbusta vivere non per animam sed per viriditatem. Sed actiones naturae et animae in hoc differunt quod actiones naturae semper eodem modo, actiones vero animae diversis modis fiunt. Unde<sup>139</sup> motus naturae semper ad unam partem tantum, motus vero animales ad diversa. Unde si motus arboris motus naturae esset, non simul moveretur<sup>e</sup> unum et idem corpus oppositis motibus ut<sup>f</sup> in radicibus<sup>z</sup> deorsum ad centrum, et in ramis sursum a centro. Unde fortior est operatio animae quam naturae quia anima agit in naturam sed non e converso ut<sup>h</sup> apparet in plantis in quibus gravia feruntur sursum contra naturam. (30)

## DE<sup>i</sup> ANIMA SENSIBILI SECUNDUM QUOD EST SENSIBILIS

Secundum<sup>140</sup> autem quod anima est<sup>j</sup> sensibilis duo operatur, scilicet sensum et motum voluntarium. Unde secundum hoc duas<sup>k</sup> vires habet motivam (35)

<sup>m</sup> consumit P] consumat MV.

<sup>n</sup> nutritiva virtus CMP.

<sup>o</sup> actiones suas V.

<sup>p</sup> vegabile V.

<sup>q</sup> animalis M.

<sup>r</sup> si vero fuerint dest. V] si vero dest. sunt G.

<sup>s</sup> remanet P.

<sup>t</sup> add. et deinde C.

<sup>u</sup> virtutum regimini CP.

<sup>v</sup> creatur C] crearetur P.

<sup>w</sup> liniamentare MV.

<sup>x</sup> om. V.

<sup>y</sup> figuram V.

<sup>z</sup> virtutes M.

<sup>1</sup> divinus VP.

<sup>d</sup> dicit P.

<sup>e</sup> movetur M.

<sup>f</sup> quod CP.

<sup>g</sup> radices CP.

<sup>h</sup> quod M.

<sup>i</sup> De . . . sensibilis om. PV.

<sup>j</sup> om. M.

<sup>k</sup> vires duas habet C] duas habet vires P.

<sup>z</sup> quibus CP.

<sup>b</sup> quod secundum C.

<sup>136</sup> Notandum autem . . . l. 7, remanent viva. Cf. *ibid.* 1A: ergo virtus . . . erunt viva.

<sup>137</sup> Augmentativa . . . nutritivae. *Ibid.* 2A: Augmentativa . . . nutritivae.

<sup>138</sup> Generativa . . . l. 23, de specie. Cf. *ibid.* 2B: Sed generativa . . . de specie.

<sup>139</sup> Unde . . . tantum. *Op. cit.* I. 2, f. 2v. 2A: Si autem . . . tantum.

<sup>140</sup> Secundum autem . . . l. 6, p. 69, vis in essentia. Cf. *op. cit.* I. 5, f. 4v, 2B: Anima autem . . . una in essentia.

scilicet et apprehensivam. Sed motiva est duobus modis quia aut est movens eo quod imperat motui, aut est movens eo quod efficit <sup>1</sup> motum.

Sed vis motiva secundum quod est imperans motui est vis appetitiva vel desiderativa, quae, cum imaginatur aliquid quod appetitur vel respicitur,<sup>m</sup> imperat alii virtuti motivae ut moveat. Quae habet duas partes; unam quae dicitur vis concupiscibilis quae est vis imperans moveri ut appropinquetur ad id quod putatur necessarium vel utile appetitu delectamenti; aliam <sup>n</sup> quae vocatur irascibilis quae est vis imperans moveri ut fugiatur ab eo <sup>o</sup> quod putatur nocivum vel corrumpens appetitu <sup>p</sup> vincendi. (5)

Vis autem motiva secundum quod efficit motum est vis infusa nervis et musculis. Quae aliquando contrahit cordas et ligamenta coniuncta membris versus principium, in quo servit irascibili cum fugitur quod molestat. Aliquando vero <sup>q</sup> relaxat et extendit in longum convertens cordas et ligamenta e contrario contra principium, in quo servit concupiscibili cum appetitur quod delectat. (10)

Vis autem apprehensiva duplex est. Alia est <sup>r</sup> enim vis quae apprehendit a foris; alia est <sup>s</sup> quae apprehendit ab intus. Sed apprehendens a foris dividitur in quinque <sup>t</sup> vel in octo scilicet <sup>u</sup> visum, <sup>v</sup> auditum, odoratum, gustum et tactum. (15)

Visus autem est vis sita in nervo concavo ad apprehendendum formam eius quod formatur in humore cristallino ex similitudinibus corporum coloratorum venientibus per corpora radiosa in effectum ad superficies <sup>w</sup> corporum tersorum. (20)

Auditus est vis sita in nervo expanso in superficie nervi optici ad apprehendendum formam eius quod sibi advenit ex commotione <sup>x</sup> aeris, qui constringitur <sup>y</sup> inter percutiens et percussum resistens ei constrictione violenta, ex qua provenit sonus, et pervenit eius commotio ad aerem collectum <sup>z</sup> quietum in concavitate nervi optici movens illum <sup>a</sup> ad instar sui motus, et commotiones illius motus tangunt nervum. (25)

Odoratus est vis sita in duabus carunculis anterioris partis cerebri, similibus <sup>b</sup> mamillarum capitibus, ad apprehendendum id quod offert ei aer attractus <sup>c</sup> ex odore qui est in vapore permixto cum aere, aut ex odore impresso in illo ex permutatione quae fit ex corpore odorifero. (30)

Gustus est vis sita in nervo expanso super corpus linguae ad apprehendendum sapes resolutos de corporibus contingentibus ipsam <sup>d</sup> cum permiscetur humori unctuosum <sup>e</sup> linguae permixtione permutanti. (35)

Tactus est vis sita in nervis cutis totius corporis et eius carnibus ad apprehendendum id quod tangit illum,<sup>f</sup> et afficit contrarietatem <sup>g</sup> permutante complexionem <sup>h</sup> vel <sup>i</sup> permutante affectionem compositionis. Videtur autem quibusdam haec <sup>j</sup> vis non esse species specialissima sed genus quatuor virium aut etiam plurium diffusarum simul in toto corpore. Quarum una discernit (40)

<sup>1</sup> efficiat MV.

<sup>m</sup> respicitur C] recipitur P.

<sup>n</sup> add. autem C.

<sup>o</sup> ea P. eo bis M.

<sup>p</sup> impetu vincendi P] impetum nocendi C]  
appetitum vincendi. Avicenna.

<sup>q</sup> om. M.

<sup>r</sup> enim est CP.

<sup>s</sup> om. P.

<sup>t</sup> decem CP.

<sup>u</sup> id est C.

<sup>v</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>w</sup> superficiem CP.

<sup>x</sup> motione V.

<sup>y</sup> astringitur M.

<sup>z</sup> quietum collectum CP.

<sup>a</sup> illud CP.

<sup>b</sup> similis C.

<sup>c</sup> attractus V.

<sup>d</sup> illam CP.

<sup>e</sup> ventuosum humori CP.

<sup>f</sup> illud CP.

<sup>g</sup> contrarietate CM.

<sup>h</sup> complexionem M.

<sup>i</sup> vel perm. aff. om. CP.

<sup>j</sup> hoc M.

contrarietatem quae est inter calidum et frigidum; alia discernit contrarietatem quae est inter humidum et siccum; tertia discernit contrarietatem <sup>k</sup> quae est inter durum et molle; quarta discernit contrarietatem quae est inter asperum et lene, et propter has superius <sup>l</sup> dixit vel octo. Sed quia collectio harum virium tactibilibum est in uno instrumento, ideo computantur una esse vis <sup>m</sup> in essentia. Notandum autem quia <sup>n</sup> sicut ad tactum haec octo <sup>o</sup> vel decem pertinent, similiter ad unumquodque aliorum pertinent totidem. (5)

Ad <sup>141</sup> gustum enim pertinent octo saporibus qui sunt dulcedo et amaritudo, et <sup>p</sup> acetositas et <sup>p</sup> stipticitas, ponticitas et acuitas, unctuositas et insipiditas. Insipidum autem videtur quod non habet saporem et est <sup>q</sup> sicut id quod gustatur de aqua vel de albugine (*sic*) ovi. Ceteri vero multiplicati sunt per hoc quod sunt medii, et praeter hoc quod afficiunt gustum sunt etiam quidam eorum qui afficiunt tactum <sup>r</sup> quia ex natura saporiva et affectione tactiva componitur unum quid quod non discernitur sensu et fit illud unum quasi sapor purus discretus. Saporibus autem qui sunt medii inter extremos vel adiungitur solutio et calefactio <sup>s</sup> et haec compositio vocatur acuitas, vel adiungitur sapor et solutio sine calore et fit acredo, <sup>t</sup> vel cum sapore adiungitur et <sup>u</sup> siccare et spissare et fit ponticitas; similiter autem <sup>v</sup> et in <sup>w</sup> aliis. (10)

Ad <sup>142</sup> odoratum <sup>x</sup> quoque pertinent octo, de quibus apud nos non habentur nomina nisi duo, scilicet <sup>y</sup> fetor et odor. Ceteri vero designantur cum adiectione nominum saporum ut odor dulcis et odor acidus, quasi odores qui solent coniungi cum saporibus non <sup>z</sup> comparentur nisi illis nec cognoscantur sine illis. (15)

Ad <sup>143</sup> auditum quoque pertinent <sup>a</sup> octo sed carent nominibus; designantur tamen nominibus transumptis ut sonus, alius acutus, alius gravis, alius debilis, alius fortis, alius durus, alius mollis, alius asper, alius lenis. <sup>b</sup> Sed haec divisio soni est secundum accidentia; <sup>c</sup> primum enim sensibile est sonus sed ea <sup>d</sup> quae accidunt ei sunt haec. (20)

Ad visum etiam <sup>e</sup> pertinent octo quorum principales sunt duo, scilicet albedo et nigredo, sed <sup>144</sup> album paulatim fit nigrum (*tribus*) <sup>f</sup> viis; una est primum in subpallidum et haec est progressio pura. Cum enim fuerit progressio pura, prius pervenitur <sup>g</sup> ad subpallidum et deinde ad pallidum et tam diu sic <sup>h</sup> quousque fiat nigrum, quia hoc modo procedendo non cessat paulatim intendi nigredo sola quousque fiat pura nigredo. Alia autem via est prius ad subrubeum, deinde ad rubeum, postea ad nigredinem: tertia vero via est qua primum <sup>i</sup> itur ad viriditatem, deinde ad indicum, postea ad nigredinem, (25)

<sup>k</sup> inter asperitatem et lenitatem contrarietatem CP.

<sup>l</sup> dictum est superius CP.

<sup>m</sup> om. C. esse vis om. P.

<sup>n</sup> quod CP.

<sup>o</sup> decem vel octo CP.

<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> om. M.

<sup>r</sup> calidum M.

<sup>s</sup> calefactio V] calefacio C.

<sup>t</sup> acedo C] actio P.

<sup>u</sup> exsiccare CMP.

<sup>v</sup> autem et] etiam CMP.

<sup>w</sup> in aliis om. C.

<sup>x</sup> odorem CP.

<sup>y</sup> sed M.

<sup>z</sup> nec C.

<sup>a</sup> octo pert. M.

<sup>b</sup> levis MP.

<sup>c</sup> essentiam C] accidentiam M.

<sup>d</sup> om. M.

<sup>e</sup> autem C.

<sup>f</sup> all mss. duabus.

<sup>g</sup> pervenit CP.

<sup>h</sup> sit M.

<sup>i</sup> primo C.

<sup>141</sup> Ad gustum . . . I. 8, et in aliis. Cf. *op. cit.* II. 4, f. 8v, 1A: Sapoires autem . . . est in aliis.

<sup>142</sup> ad odoratum . . . sine illis. Cf. *ibid.* 2A: et ideo odores . . . sine illis.

<sup>143</sup> Ad auditum . . . sunt haec. Cf. *Avic.* II. 5, f. 9v, 2 and 10r, 1: Poterit autem . . . haec sunt.

<sup>144</sup> sed album . . . colores medii. Cf. *op. cit.* III. 4, f. 12r, 1B: quod album . . . medii.

et in istis modis non potest esse diversitas nisi secundum diversitatem eius <sup>j</sup> ex quo componuntur colores medii.

Notandum <sup>146</sup> autem quod inter omnes sensus quibus animal est animal, <sup>k</sup> tactus est principalior; <sup>l</sup> sicut enim omne quod habet terrenam animam habet virtutem nutritivam et potest non habere aliquam aliarum sed non convertitur. Sic omne quod habet animam sensibilem habet sensum tangendi et potest non habere aliquem aliorum sed non convertitur. Qualis est <sup>m</sup> ergo virtus nutritiva <sup>n</sup> comparatione aliarum virium ad animam terrenam sive vegetabilem, talis est tactus comparatione aliarum virium ad animam <sup>o</sup> sensibilem quod ideo fit quia prima compositio animalis fit ex qualitatibus tactibilibus. (10)

Gustus <sup>146</sup> autem quamvis inter gustata indicet <sup>p</sup> id <sup>q</sup> per quod vita permanet, tamen destructo gustu potest remanere <sup>r</sup> animal. Alii autem <sup>s</sup> sensus, licet cooperentur <sup>t</sup> ad inquirendum nutrimentum conveniens et ad fugiendum quod est nocens, non tamen iuvant <sup>u</sup> ad sciendum <sup>v</sup> si <sup>w</sup> aer est adurens vel congelans, et quod fames est desiderium sicci <sup>x</sup> et calidi et sitis est desiderium frigidi et humidi. Nutrimentum enim <sup>y</sup> huiusmodi <sup>z</sup> fit ex qualitatibus quas apprehendit tactus. <sup>a</sup> Tactus igitur est primus sensuum qui est necessarius omni <sup>b</sup> terreno animali. Unde cum ceterorum sensuum instrumenta sint membra aliqua, instrumentum <sup>147</sup> tactus est tota cutis circumdans corpus. (20) Quia enim sensus iste est conservans corpus ab accidentibus quae nocent, profecto si consisteret in aliquo membrorum, tunc cum accideret ei aliquid <sup>c</sup> noxium, oporteret ut totum corpus penetraretur sentiens per tactum. Quia vero alii sensus apprehendunt res non contingentes et de procul, sufficit ut eorum instrumentum sit unum membrum cui, cum sensatum sibi coniunctum fecerit nocumentum, caveat sibi anima ab eo et separet corpus a parte illa. Si autem instrumentum tangendi esset aliquod unum ex membris, tunc non perciperet anima de corrumpentibus nisi quantum contingeret illud <sup>d</sup> membrum tantum. Praeter hoc etiam tactus potest esse sine aliis sensibus. Alii vero sensus non possunt fieri <sup>e</sup> sine tactu quod manifeste apparet in gustu (30) et auditu. Hi autem sensus non ab omnibus animalibus habentur aequaliter; a quibusdam enim habentur fortius et a quibusdam debilius et a quibusdam habentur omnia et a quibusdam non omnia. Sensibilium ergo alia superant alia qualitate et numero horum quinque <sup>f</sup> sensuum, alia qualitate et non numero, alia numero et non qualitate, alia nec numero nec qualitate. (35)

<sup>j</sup> om. C.

<sup>k</sup> om. CP.

<sup>l</sup> principalis CP.

<sup>m</sup> ergo est CP.

<sup>n</sup> om. M.

<sup>o</sup> add. terrenam, talis est tactus comparatione aliarum virium ad animam C.

<sup>p</sup> iudicet CP.

<sup>q</sup> om. CP.

<sup>r</sup> permanere CP.

<sup>s</sup> etiam M.

<sup>t</sup> cooperantur MPV.

<sup>u</sup> iuvat V.

<sup>v</sup> add. quod continens MPV. quod aer continens . . . corpus. *Avicenna*.

<sup>w</sup> scilicet MPV.

<sup>x</sup> cal. et sicci CP.

<sup>y</sup> vero M.

<sup>z</sup> om. CP.

<sup>a</sup> om. C.

<sup>b</sup> cum CP.

<sup>c</sup> om. CP.

<sup>d</sup> il. tant. mem. C] tant. il. mem. P.

<sup>e</sup> esse CP. <sup>f</sup> quoque M.

<sup>146</sup> Notandum . . . ex qualitatibus tactilibus. *Cf. op. cit.* II. 3, f. 7v, 2A: Primus sensuum . . . ex qualitatibus tactilibus.

<sup>147</sup> Gustus autem . . . quas apprehendit

tactus. *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> instrumentum . . . l. 29, illud membrum tantum. *Cf. op. cit.* II. 3, f. 8r, 2D: Ex proprietatibus . . . contingeret illud.

## DE \* INTERIORIBUS VIRTUTIBUS ANIMALIUM

Virtus <sup>148</sup> vero apprehendens ab intus duplex est, quoniam alia apprehendit formas sensibilibum, alia intentiones sensibilibum; interest autem inter apprehendere formam <sup>h</sup> et apprehendere intentionem. Forma enim est id quod apprehendit sensus interior et exterior simul, sed sensus exterior prius, et deinde reddit <sup>i</sup> eam interiori. Formam igitur apprehendit ovis exteriore sensu cum videt figuram lupi et affectionem et colorem. Intentionem vero <sup>j</sup> apprehendit cum iudicat ut illum expavescat et ab eo fugiat, <sup>k</sup> quamvis hoc <sup>l</sup> non apprehenderit <sup>m</sup> sensus exterior aliquo modo. Idcirco <sup>n</sup> quod de lupo primum <sup>o</sup> apprehendit sensus exterior et postea interior vocatur hic proprie forma. Quod vero apprehendunt <sup>p</sup> vires interiores <sup>q</sup> absque sensu vocatur hoc loco intentio. (5) (10)

Virium <sup>149</sup> ergo apprehendentium ab intus prima est phantasia quae est sensus communis, et haec vis est <sup>r</sup> sita in principio primae <sup>s</sup> concavitatis cerebri recipiens per seipsam omnes formas quae imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. (15)

Post hanc est vis imaginativa <sup>t</sup> sive formativa quae est sita in extremo anterioris concavitatis cerebri retinens quod recipit sensus communis a quinque sensibus, et remanent in ea post remotionem illorum sensibilibum.

Post <sup>150</sup> hanc autem <sup>u</sup> sequitur vis quae vocatur imaginatio comparatione animae sensibilis, sed cogitatio comparatione animae humanae, quae est sita in principio mediae concavitatis cerebri ubi est nervus <sup>v</sup> qui, <sup>w</sup> secundum quod vult, solet coniungere et dividere inter se aliqua de his quae retinet formativa. (20)

Post hanc est virtus aestimativa, <sup>x</sup> quae est sita in summo mediae concavitatis cerebri, apprehendens intentiones non <sup>y</sup> sensatas quae sunt in singulis sensibilibus, sicut vis quae est in ove diiudicans quod ab hoc lupo est fugiendum et quod huius agni est miserendum. Videtur autem haec <sup>z</sup> vis operari in imaginatis compositionem <sup>a</sup> et divisionem. (25)

Ad ultimum autem est vis memorialis sive reminiscibilis, quae est sita in posteriore concavitate <sup>b</sup> cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit aestimatio de intentionibus non sensatis singulorum sensibilibum. Talis est <sup>c</sup> autem comparatio virtutis memorialis ad virtutem aestimationis qualis est comparatio virtutis <sup>d</sup> imaginativae ad sensum; et talis est comparatio virtutis imaginativae ad intentiones qualis est comparatio virtutis aestimativae ad formas sensatas. (30)

Quod autem has quinque vires anima habeat intrinsecus ratio deprehendit. (35)

\* De . . . Animalium *om.* CMPV.

<sup>h</sup> formas CP.

<sup>i</sup> int. eam reddit N.

<sup>j</sup> enim N. app. vero M.

<sup>k</sup> *add.* id C.

<sup>l</sup> *om.* C] id P.

<sup>m</sup> apprehendat CP.

<sup>n</sup> id ergo MN.

<sup>o</sup> primo C.

<sup>p</sup> apprehenderit N.

<sup>q</sup> exteriores MV.

<sup>r</sup> sita est CP.

\* *om.* CNP.

<sup>t</sup> forma sive imag. CP.

<sup>u</sup> *om.* N.

<sup>v</sup> vermis MPV.

<sup>w</sup> quae MV.

<sup>x</sup> extimativa V.

<sup>y</sup> in N.

<sup>z</sup> haec vis] ovis CN.

<sup>a</sup> divisione et compositione CM.

<sup>b</sup> concavitatis M.

<sup>c</sup> autem est CN.

<sup>d</sup> *om.* C.

<sup>148</sup> Virtus . . . hoc loco intentio. *Cf. op. cit.* I. 5, f. 5r, 1C: sed virium apprehendentium . . . nomine intentionis.

<sup>149</sup> Virium . . . l. 18, illorum sensibilibum.

*Cf. op. cit.* I. 5, f. 5r, 2D: Virium autem . . . illorum sensibilibum.

<sup>150</sup> Post hanc . . . l. 34, ad formas sensatas. *Cf. ibid.*

Et <sup>e</sup> primum de sensu communi qui <sup>f</sup> est phantasia. Nam <sup>151</sup> sensus communis est virtus cui redduntur omnia sensata; quae virtus si non esset quae apprehenderet coloratum et tactum, non possemus discernere inter illa nec dicere quia hoc non est illud. Sed haec distinctio non fit ab intellectu quamvis oporteat ut intellectus inveniatur ea simul quousque discernat ea inter se; secundum enim quod sensata <sup>g</sup> sunt et secundum <sup>h</sup> quod redduntur a sensatis non apprehendit ea <sup>i</sup> intellectus sed abstracta; nos autem discernimus inter illa. Oportet igitur ut coniuncta sint apud discernentem vel in essentia eius <sup>j</sup> vel extra; impossibile est autem hoc fieri in intellectu; restat ergo ut hoc fiat in alia virtute. Si enim non coniungerentur in <sup>k</sup> imaginatione animalium quae carent intellectu, cum inclinarentur proprio desiderio ad dulcedinem, scilicet quod res <sup>l</sup> quae est huiusmodi formae est dulcis, cum viderent eam non appeterent eam ad comedendum.<sup>m</sup> Praeter hoc etiam, si non esset apud nos virtus apprehendens quod hic homo albus <sup>n</sup> est iste mimus eo quod audivimus eum canentem, non probaretur nobis eius iocularitas ex sua albedine et e converso. (5)

Item si non esset in animalibus virtus in qua coniungerentur formae sensorum,<sup>o</sup> difficile esset eis vivere, scilicet si olfactus <sup>p</sup> non ostenderet <sup>q</sup> saporem et si sonus non ostenderet saporem et si forma baculi non rememoraret formam doloris ita ut fugiatur ab eo. Oportet igitur sine dubio ut formae istae habeant unum aliquid in quo coniungantur intrinsecus.<sup>r</sup> Ostendit etiam <sup>s</sup> nobis esse huius virtutis consideratio rerum quae ostendunt <sup>t</sup> se habere instrumentum praeter sensus exteriores, sicut videmus, quod ei, qui <sup>u</sup> in circuitu <sup>v</sup> volvitur, videtur quicquid <sup>w</sup> est in circuitu moveri, quod vel est accidens quod accidit visibilibus vel est accidens quod accidit instrumento quo <sup>x</sup> perficitur visus; sed hoc <sup>y</sup> in visibilibus non est quia non circumvolvuntur; igitur in alio est. Vertigo etenim <sup>z</sup> non fit nisi causa <sup>a</sup> motus vaporis qui est in cerebro et in spiritu qui ibi est cum <sup>b</sup> acciderit spiritui circumvolvi; ergo virtuti quae <sup>c</sup> ibi est accidit circumvolvi. (20)

Item <sup>152</sup> imagines quae videntur in somnis aut fiunt ex descriptione formae in thesauro retinente formas aut ex alia virtute. Si autem fierent ex descriptione formae in thesauro, tunc quicquid ibi custoditur esset praesens animae, non pars eius tantum, ut quasi illa sola pars tantum <sup>d</sup> sit visa vel audita in somnis; sed hoc non est. Si autem ex alia virtute, tunc ex virtute quae est sensus exterior vel sensus interior; sed sensus exterior non prodest in somnis quia <sup>e</sup> aliquando qui imaginatur <sup>f</sup> colores privatus <sup>g</sup> est oculis; restat ergo ut hoc fiat in <sup>h</sup> sensu interiore. Impossibile est autem hoc <sup>i</sup> fieri nisi in principio sensuum (30)

<sup>o</sup> om. M.

<sup>f</sup> quae C.

<sup>g</sup> sunt sensata CMNP.

<sup>h</sup> add. hoc MNP.

<sup>i</sup> eas M.

<sup>j</sup> om. CP.

<sup>k</sup> om. N.

<sup>l</sup> om. N.

<sup>m</sup> add. eam CP.

<sup>n</sup> est albus ille minus CP] est albus est N.

<sup>o</sup> sensatae C.

<sup>p</sup> olfactus MV.

<sup>q</sup> add. eis C.

<sup>r</sup> extrinsecus CNP.

<sup>s</sup> in M.

<sup>t</sup> ostenduntur MNPV.

<sup>u</sup> quae M.

<sup>v</sup> circuitum M.

<sup>w</sup> qui C.

<sup>x</sup> per quod CP.

<sup>y</sup> hic N.

<sup>z</sup> enim CN.

<sup>a</sup> cum C.

<sup>b</sup> quando accidit CP] quando acc. N.

<sup>c</sup> qui N.

<sup>d</sup> sit tantum CNP.

<sup>e</sup> add. qui N.

<sup>f</sup> imaginatur N.

<sup>h</sup> om. C.

<sup>g</sup> oc. pr. est CP.

<sup>i</sup> om. M.

<sup>151</sup> Nam . . . l. 29, accidit circumvolvi. Cf. *op. cit.* IV, 1, f. 17r, 2A: Nam sensus communis . . . f. 17v, 1A: quod iam expeditivimus.

<sup>152</sup> Item imagines . . . l. 8, p. 73, sive formativa. Cf. *ibid.* 1A: imagines quae sunt . . . vocatur formalis.

interiorum; quae cum imperat ei virtus aestimativa et vult propalare quod est in thesauro, ostendit,<sup>j</sup> licet fiat hoc <sup>k</sup> etiam in vigilante in quo, cum firmiter fuerint stabilita, sensata erunt quasi praesentia. Et haec virtus est illa quae vocatur phantasia sive sensus communis quia <sup>l</sup> est communis omnium sensuum a qua derivantur aliae et cui omnes reddunt sensus, et ipsa est vere quae sentit. Sed quia inutile est aliquid <sup>m</sup> recipere nisi contingat illud retinere, ideo sequitur alia virtus quae retinet id quod haec apprehendit, et haec <sup>n</sup> virtus vocatur imaginativa sive <sup>o</sup> formativa. (5)

Quae <sup>153</sup> et <sup>p</sup> sensus communis videntur <sup>q</sup> esse quasi una virtus eo quod unum habent <sup>r</sup> subiectum, scilicet primam concavitatem cerebri; sed tamen <sup>s</sup> in forma differunt quia aliud est id <sup>t</sup> quod recipit, aliud id <sup>u</sup> quod retinet; quod apparet in aqua quae siquidem potentiam habet recipiendi insculptiones <sup>v</sup> et limationes <sup>w</sup> sed non habet potentiam retinendi eas. Sic <sup>x</sup> et istae duae vires diversae sunt quia formam rei sensibilis retinet haec virtus quae vocatur formativa <sup>y</sup> vel imaginativa, sed non discernit illam ullo modo nisi hoc <sup>z</sup> tantum quia retinet eam. Sensus vero communis, sive phantasia, et sensus exteriores recipiunt et discernunt aliquo modo et diiudicant. Dicunt enim quia <sup>a</sup> hoc mobile nigrum est et hoc rubicundum acidum est; per hanc autem virtutem nihil discernitur de omni eo quod est in ea nisi hoc tantum quia hoc et illud continetur in illa.<sup>b</sup> (10)

Sed quia certissime scimus in natura nostra esse ut componamus et dividamus sensibilia inter se ad instar formarum quas vidimus <sup>c</sup> extra, quamvis non videamus eas <sup>d</sup> esse vel non esse, idcirco oportet ut in nobis sit virtus quae <sup>e</sup> hoc operetur <sup>f</sup> et haec est virtus quae cum intellectus sibi imperat vocatur cogitatio, sed cum virtus animalis sibi <sup>g</sup> imperat, vocatur imaginatio.<sup>h</sup> (20)

Deinde aliquando <sup>i</sup> diiudicamus de sensibilibus per intentiones quas non sentimus vel quia in natura sua non sunt sensibiles aliquo modo vel quia sunt <sup>j</sup> sensibiles sed nos <sup>k</sup> non sentimus eas in hora iudicii. Sed quae non sunt sensibiles ex natura sua sunt sicut inimicitiae et malitia et quae a se diffugiunt sicut hoc quod ovis apprehendit de lupo, et concordia quam habet cum socia <sup>l</sup> sua. Quae vero sunt sensibiles sunt sicut cum videmus aliquid <sup>m</sup> ceruleum, iudicamus esse mel et dulce; hoc <sup>n</sup> enim non reddit nobis sensus in ipsa hora cum ipsum sit de genere sensorum, et hae <sup>o</sup> sunt res quas apprehendit anima <sup>p</sup> sensibilis ita quod sensus non doceat eam aliquid de his; tunc virtus qua haec apprehenduntur est alia virtus et vocatur aestimativa. Aestimatio enim operatur in homine iudicia propria ex quibus est illud, cum anima perti-

<sup>j</sup> offendit M.<sup>k</sup> etiam hoc C] et hoc P.<sup>l</sup> quia est com. om. N.<sup>m</sup> aliquod C.<sup>n</sup> om. CP.<sup>o</sup> vel CP.<sup>p</sup> est M.<sup>q</sup> videtur CV.<sup>r</sup> habet CMP.<sup>s</sup> om. M.<sup>t</sup> om. M.<sup>u</sup> om. MNV.<sup>v</sup> impressiones CP.<sup>w</sup> lineationes CP] linationes M.<sup>x</sup> sed CN.<sup>y</sup> im. vel for. CP.<sup>z</sup> quia tant. ret. haec eam C.<sup>a</sup> quod CP.<sup>b</sup> ea NP.<sup>c</sup> vidi M.<sup>d</sup> esse eas C.<sup>e</sup> qua N.<sup>f</sup> operatur M.<sup>g</sup> om. C.<sup>h</sup> imaginativa N.<sup>i</sup> deind. aliq. CP.<sup>j</sup> sens. sunt CP.<sup>k</sup> om. CP add. cum habet N.<sup>l</sup> sua socia P.<sup>m</sup> aliquam C.<sup>n</sup> haec MV.<sup>o</sup> om. M.<sup>p</sup> animam M.<sup>153</sup> Quae et sensus . . . l. 13, p. 75, quae intelligitur hominis. Cf. *ibid.* IA: formae autemquae sunt . . . quae intelligitur hominis. (*End of chapter.*)



naciter negat esse res quae non imaginantur,<sup>a</sup> nec describuntur in ea et omnino non vult credere eas esse. Et haec virtus sine <sup>r</sup> dubio consistit in nobis quae est domina iudicans in animali iudicium non definitum,<sup>s</sup> sicut est iudicium intellectuale, immo iudicium imaginabile coniunctum cum singularitate et forma sensibili; et ex hac virtute emanant <sup>t</sup> quam plures actiones animalium. (5)

Usus <sup>u</sup> autem est ut id quod apprehendit <sup>v</sup> sensus vocetur forma et quod apprehendit aestimatio vocetur intentio. Sed unaquaeque istarum, scilicet <sup>w</sup> forma <sup>x</sup> et intentio, habet thesaurum suum. Thesaurus enim eius quod apprehendit aestimatio est <sup>y</sup> virtus imaginativa vel formativa cuius locus est anterior pars cerebri. Unde cum contingit <sup>z</sup> in ea infirmitas, corrumpitur hic modus formalis ita ut vel imagnet formas quae non sunt, vel vix retineat <sup>a</sup> quod est in illa. Thesaurus vero apprehendens intentionem <sup>b</sup> est virtus retentiva sive custoditiva cuius locus est posterior <sup>c</sup> pars cerebri; et ideo, cum contingit <sup>d</sup> ibi infirmitas, corrumpitur haec virtus, cuius proprium est custodire has intentiones, quae vocatur <sup>e</sup> etiam memorialis. Sed vocatur retentiva ob hoc quia <sup>f</sup> id quod est in ea firmiter haeret, et vocatur memorialis propter velocitatem suae aptitudinis ad recordandum per quod formatur cum rememorat post oblivionem; <sup>g</sup> quod fit cum aestimatio convertitur ad suam virtutem imaginativam <sup>h</sup> et repraesentat sibi <sup>i</sup> unamquamque formarum quae sunt in ea, ita <sup>j</sup> ut quasi modo videat quod ipsae sint <sup>k</sup> formae eius. Cum vero ostensa fuerit forma, <sup>l</sup> apprehendet <sup>m</sup> intentionem quae erat <sup>n</sup> deleta et apparebit ei intentio, sicut apparuerat prius, et stabiliet eam in se virtus memorialis, sicut stabilierat <sup>o</sup> prius, et fit <sup>p</sup> memoria. Aliquando vero de intentione pervenit <sup>q</sup> ad formam, et memoria tunc non habet comparisonem ad id quod est in thesauro retinendi, <sup>r</sup> sed <sup>s</sup> ad id quod est in thesauro imaginandi, et tunc erit eius conversio vel ad intentiones quae sunt in <sup>t</sup> retentiva ita ut intentio faciat <sup>u</sup> sibi formam apparere necessario; et tunc redit <sup>v</sup> iterum comparatio ad id quod est in imaginatione vel erit eius conversio ad sensum. Ad intentiones autem fit conversio veluti cum oblitus <sup>w</sup> fueris comparisonis tuae ad aliquam formam quam tu iam scieras, considerabis actionem quae appetebatur <sup>x</sup> per illam, et, cum inveneris eam, scies quem saporem vel quam figuram vel quem colorem debeat <sup>y</sup> habere et revocabitur comparatio tui ad formam quae est in imaginatione, et restitues oblitam comparisonem in memoriam. (30)

Thesaurus enim intellectus memoria est quae retinet intentionem. Si autem id hoc modo fuerit <sup>y</sup> impeditum ita ut non facile intelligatur, erit conversio ad sensum, et, si sensus reddiderit <sup>z</sup> tibi formam rei, <sup>a</sup> revocabitur <sup>b</sup> et (35)

<sup>a</sup> imaginatur M. <sup>r</sup> procul N.

<sup>s</sup> finitum V.

<sup>t</sup> emanent C.

<sup>u</sup> usus est autem M.

<sup>v</sup> apprehendat C.

<sup>w</sup> om. CP.

<sup>x</sup> formarum C.

<sup>y</sup> om. C. Est . . . imaginativa om. and inserted

after formativa N.

<sup>z</sup> contigit M.

<sup>a</sup> teneat CP.

<sup>b</sup> intentione M.

<sup>c</sup> pars posterior CM.

<sup>d</sup> vocatur V.

<sup>e</sup> quia id quod est finitum haeret in ea C]  
quod vel quod finitum haeret in ea P.

<sup>f</sup> oblivionem N.

<sup>g</sup> aestimativam. Avicenna.

<sup>h</sup> om. C] quod P.

<sup>i</sup> om. MP.

<sup>j</sup> for. eius sint N eius om. CP.

<sup>k</sup> for. fuerit CP.

<sup>l</sup> apprehendit CP.

<sup>m</sup> del. erat CN] delecta erat MP.

<sup>n</sup> add. eam CP.

<sup>o</sup> fiet CNP.

<sup>p</sup> perveniet C.

<sup>q</sup> retinendo C.

<sup>r</sup> hoc C.

<sup>s</sup> om. C.

<sup>t</sup> form. fac. sibi C.

<sup>u</sup> reddet C.

<sup>v</sup> fueris oblitus CP.

<sup>w</sup> apparebatur CP.

<sup>x</sup> debebat MV.

<sup>y</sup> impedimentum fuerit M] imp. fuerit CNP.

<sup>z</sup> rediderit V] tibi redderit N.

<sup>a</sup> om. CP.

<sup>b</sup> irrevocabitur CP.

residebit in imaginatione; et redibit comparatio tui ad illam et residebit in memoria. Et haec virtus quae componit <sup>o</sup> inter formam et formam, et inter formam et intentionem, et <sup>d</sup> inter intentionem et intentionem est quasi virtus aestimativa; et hoc propter locum, non propter hoc quod iudicat, immo quia <sup>e</sup> facit pervenire ad iudicium. Unde assignaverunt locum eius in medietate cerebri ut haberet communitatem cum intentione et cum forma. (5)

Videtur autem quod virtus aestimativa sit virtus cogitativa et imaginativa et memorialis, et quod ipsa est diiudicans. Sed per seipsam est diiudicans, per motus vero suos et actiones suas est imaginativa et memorialis. Sed est imaginativa per id quod operatur in formis, et est memorialis per id quod est eius <sup>t</sup> ultima actio; sed retentiva est virtus sui thesauri. Et videtur quod formalis et cogitativa huius sit memoria quae provenit ex intentione ipsa quae intelligitur hominis. (10)

Dicimus <sup>154</sup> ergo quia virtus formalis, quae est imaginatio, ipsa est ultima in <sup>s</sup> qua resident <sup>h</sup> formae sensibilibus, et facies eius quam habet ad sensibilia est sensus communis. Sensus autem communis quicquid reddit ei sensus exteriores reddit <sup>i</sup> virtuti formali quasi ad reponendum et ipsa reponit. Aliquando autem virtus formalis reponit quaedam quae non sunt apprehensa sensu. Virtus vero cogitativa convertitur <sup>j</sup> ad formas quae sunt in hac virtute formali ad componendum eas et dividendum quoniam sunt subiecta ipsius; et <sup>k</sup> cum ex eis composuerit formam <sup>l</sup> vel <sup>m</sup> diviserit, poterit reponere in illa. Illa enim non est thesaurus huius <sup>n</sup> formae secundum quod forma comparatur ad aliquid vel secundum quod est adveniens <sup>o</sup> ab intus vel de foris, sed est thesaurus eius <sup>p</sup> eo quod ipsa est <sup>q</sup> ipsa forma abstracta <sup>r</sup> hoc modo abstractionis. (15)

Si autem haec forma eo modo quod est compositionis vel divisionis adveniret de foris, profecto haec virtus retineret eam, vel etiam si appareret huic virtuti ex alia causa. Cum enim contingerit <sup>s</sup> ex alia causa, scilicet vel ex imaginatione vel ex cogitatione vel ex aliqua figurarum caelestium ut appareat in formali aliqua forma, et intellectus fuerit absens vel cessans ab inspiciendo, possibile est tunc describi aliquid in sensu communi ita ut audiat et videat sonos et colores quae non habent esse extra, nec aliquid de illis est extra. Et saepissime contingit hoc cum negligens est virtus intelligibilis, <sup>t</sup> quia cum anima rationalis occupatur circa alia et non <sup>u</sup> custodit aestimationem et imaginationem, profecto confortatur <sup>v</sup> imaginativa sive formativa in suis propriis actionibus ita ut formae etiam imagentur sive videantur ei quasi sensatae. (20)

Quod ideo fit quoniam omnes <sup>w</sup> hae virtutes sunt virtutes <sup>x</sup> unius animae deservientes <sup>y</sup> ei. Unde cum anima occupatur circa aliquam earum, ipsa retinet eam <sup>z</sup> ne adiuvet alias nec conservet eas ab errore ipsarum et revocet

<sup>o</sup> componitur N.

<sup>d</sup> om. CP.

<sup>e</sup> quod N.

<sup>f</sup> om. CP.

<sup>g</sup> etiam M.

<sup>h</sup> resideret N.

<sup>i</sup> redit V.

<sup>j</sup> convertit M. om. P.

<sup>k</sup> quoniam CP.

<sup>l</sup> om. CP.

<sup>m</sup> et CP.

<sup>n</sup> formae huius CP.

<sup>o</sup> conveniens CP.

<sup>p</sup> om. V.

<sup>q</sup> est ipsa forma] forma ipsa CP.

<sup>r</sup> om. CP.

<sup>s</sup> contingit CP] contigerit M.

<sup>t</sup> intelligibiles M.

<sup>u</sup> et non] inde N.

<sup>v</sup> imag. conf. CP.

<sup>w</sup> om. CP.

<sup>x</sup> virtutes om. N. virtutes sunt M.

<sup>y</sup> ei deservientes CP.

<sup>z</sup> eas CMV.

<sup>154</sup> Dicimus . . . l. 19, p. 76, de qua magis curat. Cf. *ibid.* 17v, 2A . . . 18r, 1B: Agemus

prius . . . de qua magis curat.

eas<sup>a</sup> ad viam rectitudinis. Anima etenim, cum occupata fuerit circa interiora, non solet curare de exterioribus quantum deberet; cum vero occupata fuerit circa exteriora, praetermittit gubernare virtutes interiores. Ipsa enim cum intente considerat sensibilia exterius, ea hora, qua de his tractat, debilitatur eius imaginatio et memoria. Cum vero obedit actionibus virtutis concupiscibilis, debilitantur actiones virtutis<sup>b</sup> irascibilis, et e converso; et omnino cum obiederit dispositioni actionum motivarum debilitantur actiones apprehensivae, et e converso. (5)

Cum vero non fuerit<sup>c</sup> occupata actionibus huius vel illius, sed fuerit tranquilla veluti separata, tunc fortiori et operosiori inter virtutes accidit ut operetur et superet. Cum vero occupata fuerit una virtute et ob hoc praetermiserit refrenare aliam quae non retrahitur a suis actionibus superfluis nisi per custodiam animae et aestimationis circa se, tunc confortatur illa virtus et discurrit per actiones suas naturales. (10)

Hoc autem quod contingit animam<sup>d</sup> aliquando non<sup>e</sup> occupari actione alicuius virtutis quandoque fit infirmitate vel debilitate quae impedit et retrahit a perfectione, sicut fit in languoribus et terroribus, quandoque in quiete, sicut in dormitione, et tunc id<sup>f</sup> de quo curiosior<sup>g</sup> est nihil aliud est nisi imperare virtuti de qua magis curat. (15)

Deinde<sup>155</sup> virtus imaginativa est virtus quam aliquando retrahit anima a sua propria actione duobus modis; uno<sup>h</sup> cum occupatur anima sensibus exterioribus et convertit virtutem formalem<sup>i</sup> ad operandum in suis<sup>j</sup> exterioribus et movet<sup>k</sup> eam per id quod reddit ei de illis ita ut non permittat imaginativam<sup>l</sup> cogitare quia retrahit eam a sua propria actione; et formalis etiam impeditur ne possit coniungi imaginativae; et hic est unus modus. Aliquando autem anima praevalet super eam in suis actionibus quae coniunguntur ei de cognitione<sup>m</sup> et cogitatione, et hoc duobus modis. Uno cum dominatur imaginativae et subicit eam sibi et sensum<sup>n</sup> communem cum ea ad componendum formas aliquas et disiungendum<sup>o</sup> secundum quod anima concupiscit. Unde tunc non licet<sup>p</sup> imaginativae agere quod debet agere naturaliter, sed trahitur ad partem illam ad quam trahit<sup>q</sup> eam anima rationalis. Alio<sup>r</sup> cum revocat eam ab imaginationibus quae non assimilantur rebus extrinsecis et retrahit eam ab his falsificando<sup>s</sup> eas. Unde non multum licet ei effigiare eas et praesentare. (20)

Cum autem imaginativa<sup>t</sup> impeditur utroque modo, debilitatur eius actio. Remoto vero utroque impedimento sicut fit in hora dormiendi<sup>u</sup> vel in languoribus qui debilitant corpus et impediunt animam ne habeat intellectum et cognitionem sicut fit in terrore<sup>v</sup> cum debilitatur anima et quasi dissolvitur propter<sup>w</sup> id quod timetur, et tunc retrahitur ab intellectu, vel quia debilis est, vel quia timet ne contingant res corporales, tunc imaginatio (25)

<sup>a</sup> eam N.

<sup>b</sup> virtutis . . . actiones om. V.

<sup>c</sup> fuerit V.

<sup>d</sup> aliquando animam V.

<sup>e</sup> si M.

<sup>f</sup> de quo] quod CP.

<sup>g</sup> est curiosior C.

<sup>h</sup> add. modo CP.

<sup>i</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>j</sup> add. actionibus P.

<sup>k</sup> vovet V] monet P.

<sup>l</sup> imaginationem CP] imaginativa M.

<sup>m</sup> agnitione C.

<sup>n</sup> sensu M.

<sup>o</sup> distinguendum C.

<sup>p</sup> add. et M.

<sup>q</sup> retrahit C] retrahitur P.

<sup>r</sup> add. modo C.

<sup>s</sup> similificando C.

<sup>t</sup> imaginatur CP.

<sup>u</sup> dormiendo N.

<sup>v</sup> timore C.

<sup>w</sup> per N.

<sup>155</sup> Deinde virtus . . . I. 28, p. 77, disserere praetermittimus. Cf. *op. cit.* IV. 2, f. 18r, 1B:

Deinde virtus . . . 2D: prophetiae quae declarabuntur.

potest niti et converti ad formalem et iniungere <sup>x</sup> sibi operari, et earum adu-  
natio simul <sup>y</sup> confortatur ita ut actio formalis fiat manifestior et formae quae  
erant in formali praesententur <sup>z</sup> in sensu communi et videantur quasi habe-  
ant esse extrinsecus. Operatio etenim apprehensi de eo quod venit ab exteri-  
oribus et de eo <sup>a</sup> quod venit ab interioribus est id quod praesentatur in formali, nec differunt nisi comparatione. Sed cum sensatum vere est id quod  
apparet in ea, tunc id quod apparet in ea tale <sup>b</sup> est intus quale est id quod appa-  
ret foris. Et ob hoc epilepticus, perterritus et dissolutus et soporatus <sup>c</sup> videt  
imaginationes et audit sonos tales quales vere videt <sup>d</sup> et audit <sup>e</sup> in tempore  
salutis. (5)

Si autem cognitio et intellectus succurrerint <sup>f</sup> ei in aliquo istorum et re-  
vocaverint ad se virtutem imaginativam excitando eam, delebuntur omnes  
illae formae et imaginationes. In quibusdam autem hominibus haec virtus  
imaginativa sic fortissima creata est et praevalens ut non <sup>g</sup> dominantur ei  
sensus, nec formalis resistat ei. Et anima eorum sic est fortissima ut, quamvis  
contempletur intellectum et id quod est supra intellectum, non tamen desinat  
conscendere ad sensus. Isti habent in vigiliis quod alii <sup>h</sup> in somnis; haec  
enim est dispositio dormientis dum apprehendit visiones et certificantur <sup>i</sup> ei,  
scilicet vel ita ut sunt vel per imagines quas habent. Istis quoque talia acci-  
dunt in vigiliis; saepe etenim inter utrumque istorum, scilicet dormitionis et  
vigiliae, contingit eos in ultimo absentari a sensibilibus et <sup>j</sup> accidit eis quasi  
dormitatio; <sup>k</sup> et multotiens non accidit, et multotiens rem vident sicut <sup>l</sup> est,  
et multotiens apparet eis <sup>m</sup> eius <sup>n</sup> imago; propter causam enim qua imagina-  
tur in dormiente imago rei quae videtur, multotiens apparet similitudo, et  
videtur eis quia id quod apprehendunt sit locutio illius imaginis, quasi verba  
audita quae tenent et legunt, et haec est propria prophetia virtutis imagina-  
tivae. Sunt autem hic <sup>o</sup> et <sup>p</sup> aliae prophetiae et <sup>q</sup> genera somniorum, quae quia  
longum est de eis <sup>r</sup> disserere praetermittimus. (10)

Restat autem dicere de virtute memoriali, et de eo quod interest inter  
ipsam et cogitativam in hora aestimandi. Dicimus <sup>156</sup> ergo quia <sup>s</sup> aestimatio  
excellenter iudex est <sup>t</sup> in animalibus quae iudicat ad modum adinventae  
imaginationis, cum non est <sup>u</sup> certa sicut cum putat homo mel sordidum quia <sup>v</sup>  
simile est stercore. Aestimatio enim iudicat ita <sup>w</sup> esse et anima sequitur ipsam  
aestimationem <sup>x</sup> quamvis intellectus improbet. Animalia autem et qui <sup>y</sup> as-  
similantur eis homines in suis actionibus non sequuntur nisi hoc <sup>z</sup> iudicium  
aestimationis, quod non habet discretionem rationalem, <sup>a</sup> sed est ad modum  
ad inventionis <sup>b</sup> prout est in animo eius tantum, quamvis virtutibus hominis <sup>c</sup>  
(20)

<sup>x</sup> coniungere P.

<sup>y</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>z</sup> praesentem M.

<sup>a</sup> hoc CP.

<sup>b</sup> est tale CP.

<sup>c</sup> add. et C.

<sup>d</sup> vidit CP.

<sup>e</sup> audivit CP.

<sup>f</sup> succurrerent CN] succurent P.

<sup>g</sup> om. CP.

<sup>h</sup> alteri CP.

<sup>i</sup> certificatur V.

<sup>j</sup> om. C.

<sup>k</sup> dormitio CP.

<sup>l</sup> sicuti V.

<sup>m</sup> om. MV.

<sup>n</sup> imaginatio eius C eius om. N.

<sup>o</sup> haec C.

<sup>p</sup> etiam N.

<sup>q</sup> om. C.

<sup>r</sup> disserere de eis N.

<sup>s</sup> quod CP.

<sup>t</sup> om. C.

<sup>u</sup> certa est CP.

<sup>v</sup> quod C.

<sup>w</sup> om. CNP; inserted before iudicat N.

<sup>x</sup> extimationem V.

<sup>y</sup> quae N.

<sup>z</sup> ad CP.

<sup>a</sup> om. C.

<sup>b</sup> inventionis CP.

<sup>c</sup> hominum C.

<sup>156</sup> Dicimus ergo . . . l. 23, p. 80, sunt  
iudicia aestimationis. Cf. *ibid.* f. 19r, 2A:

Dicimus ergo . . . 2D: sunt iudicia extima-  
tionis.

propter consortium rationis accadat aliquid per quod virtutes eius interiores differant a virtutibus animalium. Unde ex utilitatibus sonorum <sup>d</sup> compositorum et colorum et odorum et saporum compositorum <sup>e</sup> et spei et desiderii, habent quaedam quae non habent cetera animalia. Et eius virtus imaginativa interior eiusmodi <sup>f</sup> est quod valet ad scientias, praesertim cum virtus suae memoriae valeat multum <sup>g</sup> ad scientias eo quod confert nobis experimenta quae retinet memoria et considerationes singulorum et alia huiusmodi. (5)

Ad considerandum autem aestimationem iudicamus rationes in <sup>h</sup> quibus non communicat ei intellectus in hora aestimandi, scilicet qualiter apprehendat intentiones quae sunt in sensibilibus, statim ut sensus apprehenderit formas, ita ut aliquid de illis intentionibus non sentiat, <sup>i</sup> et ita ut plures ex illis nec prosint, nec obsint in ipsa hora. Dicimus ergo quod ipsa aestimatio fit <sup>j</sup> multis modis ex quibus unus <sup>k</sup> est cautela proveniens in omne quod est a <sup>l</sup> divina clementia, sicut est cautela infantis qui cum nascitur mox pendet ad ubera matris, et sicut cautela infantis qui cum elevatur ad standum et timet cadere, statim nititur adhaerere ad aliquid, vel ad custodiendum se per aliquid, et cum oculum eius volueris purgare a lippitudine, ipse statim claudit tamquam intelligat quid accadat ex hoc et quid debeat <sup>m</sup> fieri secundum <sup>n</sup> hoc, quasi hoc sit natura animae eius, cum <sup>o</sup> non habeat hoc <sup>p</sup> per electionem; praeter hoc etiam animalia habent cautelas naturales. Et ob hoc sunt comparationes inter has <sup>q</sup> animas et eorum principia quae sunt duces incessantes praeter comparationes quas contingit aliquando esse, et aliquando non esse, sicut considerare cum intellectu, et quod subito in mentem <sup>r</sup> venit. Omnia enim illic <sup>s</sup> veniunt <sup>t</sup> et per istas cautelas apprehendit aestimatio intentiones <sup>u</sup> quae sunt commixtae cum sensibilibus, ut de eo quod obest et prodest. Unde omnis ovis pavet lupum cum numquam viderit eum. <sup>v</sup> Et accipitres timent aliae aves, et conveniunt cum aliis absque discrezione, et hic est unus modus. Alius autem modus est qui fit per experientiam, scilicet cum animal <sup>w</sup> habet dolorem vel delicias, vel pervenit ad illud utilitas sensibilis, vel nocumentum sensibile adiunctum cum forma sensibili; <sup>x</sup> forma enim huius rei et forma eius quod <sup>y</sup> adiunctum est <sup>z</sup> illi <sup>a</sup> fiunt descripta in formali; et intentio <sup>b</sup> comparationis quae est inter illas et iudicium de illa fiunt descripta in memoria, scilicet quod memoria per se ipsam naturaliter apprehendat hoc et deinde forma ipsa apparet extra imaginativam, <sup>c</sup> tunc movetur per formam, et cum illa movetur id quod adiunctum fuerat illi de intentionibus utilibus, vel nocivis, <sup>d</sup> et omnino <sup>e</sup> procedit memoria ad modum motus inquisitionis, quae est in natura virtutis imaginativae. Sed aestimatio simul sentit hoc totum et videt intentionem per formam eius. Et hic est modus qui <sup>f</sup> contingit per experientiam. Qui est sicut cum <sup>g</sup> canis terretur lapidibus sive fustibus vel aliis huiusmodi. (40)

<sup>d</sup> suorum C.

<sup>e</sup> om. here and inserted after odorum V.

<sup>f</sup> est eiusmodi CNP.

<sup>g</sup> ad sci. mul. M.

<sup>h</sup> om. N.

<sup>i</sup> sentiantur M.

<sup>j</sup> sit N.

<sup>k</sup> est una M.

<sup>l</sup> om. C.

<sup>m</sup> fieri debeat N.

<sup>n</sup> ex CP.

<sup>o</sup> add. hoc. CP.

<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> animas has CP.

<sup>r</sup> mente CNP.

<sup>s</sup> illinc N.

<sup>t</sup> conveniunt M.

<sup>u</sup> intentione V.

<sup>v</sup> lupum C] illum MNP.

<sup>w</sup> om. CP.

<sup>x</sup> sensibile C.

<sup>y</sup> om. CP.

<sup>z</sup> cum. C.

<sup>a</sup> illis C.

<sup>b</sup> intratio N.

<sup>c</sup> imaginationem C.

<sup>d</sup> nocuis CMP.

<sup>e</sup> ideo C.

<sup>f</sup> quae M.

<sup>g</sup> om. CP.

Aliquando autem adveniunt alia <sup>h</sup> iudicia ab aestimatione ad modum similitudinis. Cum enim res habuerit aliquam formam coniunctam <sup>i</sup> cum intentione aestimationis in aliquo sensibilibus quae coniuncta est semper cum omnibus illis, profecto cum visa fuerit forma, videbitur eius intentio, aliquando autem animalia differunt in iudice qui eget in suis actionibus ut istae virtutes obediant. Id autem quo magis eget <sup>j</sup> est memoria et sensus. Sed forma opus est propter memoriam et recordationem, memoria autem est etiam <sup>k</sup> in aliis animalibus; sed recordatio, quae est ingenium revocandi quod oblitum est, non invenitur ut puto nisi in solo homine. Cognoscere etenim <sup>l</sup> aliquid ibi fuisse <sup>m</sup> quod deletum <sup>n</sup> est, non est nisi virtutis <sup>o</sup> rationalis. Si autem fuerit alterius praeter rationalem utique poterit esse aestimationis, sed quae decoratur rationalitate. Reliqua autem animalia si memorant, memorant tantum; si vero non memorant, memorare tamen nec desiderant, nec cogitant inde, <sup>p</sup> quia hoc desiderium et hic appetitus solius hominis est. Recordatio vero est respectus ad aliquid <sup>q</sup> quod habuit esse in anima in praeterito, et imitatur discere uno modo et non imitatur alio modo. Recordatio etenim est motus a rebus apprehensis exterioribus vel interioribus ad alias. Discere vero est motus a cognitis ad incognita ad hoc ut sciantur. <sup>r</sup> Recordatio vero est inquisitio ut habeatur in futuro quale habebatur in praeterito. Discere vero non est nisi ut habeatur aliquid <sup>s</sup> in futuro. (5)

Item in recordatione non itur ad id quod intenditur per aliqua quae sequatur acquisitio intentionis necessario, sed ad modum signorum. Cum enim iam habetur id quod est propinquius intentioni, movetur anima ad intentionem tali dispositione qualis ipsa erat. Si autem dispositio fuerit diversa, quamvis subeat <sup>t</sup> mentem forma propinqua, vel eius intentio, non tamen <sup>u</sup> propter <sup>v</sup> hoc oportebit moveri. Sicut ille cuius mentem subit liber aliquis per quem recordatur magistri qui <sup>w</sup> se docuerit eum. Non enim necesse est ut cum recordatur libri et intentionis eius recordetur etiam magistri sui omnis homo. Via autem quae ducit ad discere <sup>x</sup> necessario <sup>y</sup> est syllogismus et definitio. (10)

Sunt autem plerique hominum quibus facilius est discere quam recordari; quidam enim <sup>z</sup> naturaliter habet cognoscere necessario motus, alii vero fit e converso; quidam enim fortis est in memoriter retinendo, <sup>a</sup> sed debilis <sup>b</sup> in recordando eo quod est siccae complexionis quae retinet quod apprehendit; sed materia, cum <sup>c</sup> movetur anima, non est <sup>d</sup> obediens actionibus imaginationis <sup>e</sup> et representationibus eius. Alius vero est contrarius isti; qui enim citius recordantur sunt hii qui magis percipiunt nutus; nutus enim operatur <sup>f</sup> motus <sup>g</sup> sensibilibus <sup>h</sup> ad alias intentiones; unde qui fuerit perceptibilior nutuum erit citius recordans. Alius autem fortis est in discendo, sed debilis est <sup>i</sup> in memorando, quasi enim inter discere et memorare contrarietas est. Ad discendum etenim necesse <sup>j</sup> est ut materia formae interioris sit multum (15)

<sup>h</sup> illa N.  
<sup>i</sup> egent CNP.  
<sup>k</sup> om. PV.  
<sup>l</sup> enim CP.  
<sup>m</sup> fecisse C.  
<sup>n</sup> delectum M.  
<sup>o</sup> virtus CNP.  
<sup>p</sup> tantum C.  
<sup>q</sup> id CP.  
<sup>r</sup> sciatur M.  
<sup>s</sup> aliquod C.  
<sup>t</sup> prop. forma subeat mentem CP.  
<sup>u</sup> om. M.  
<sup>v</sup> oportebit propter hoc CMNP.

<sup>w</sup> qui sc] quae sic C.  
<sup>x</sup> adiscere MP.  
<sup>y</sup> om. N.  
<sup>z</sup> enim . . . habet] autem habet naturaliter C.  
<sup>a</sup> om. C.  
<sup>b</sup> debilius M.  
<sup>c</sup> cum movetur] commovetur MV] cum commovetur N.  
<sup>d</sup> om. M.  
<sup>e</sup> imaginationibus M.  
<sup>f</sup> operantur MN.  
<sup>g</sup> motum CNP om. M.  
<sup>h</sup> sensibilem CP.  
<sup>i</sup> om. MN.  
<sup>j</sup> est necesse C.

facilis ad imprimendum ei, ad quod non iuvat nisi humor; memoriae vero necessaria est materia in qua difficile deleatur quod impressum est in illa, et ad hoc <sup>k</sup> opus est sicca materia, et idcirco difficile est haberi <sup>l</sup> illa duo simul.

Illi vero sunt memoriores quorum animae non habent multos motus nec disperguntur cogitationes eorum; ille enim cuius anima habet multos motus et multiplices <sup>m</sup> cogitatus <sup>n</sup> non bene memorat. Unde memoria etiam <sup>o</sup> sicca materia eget ut anima sit velox studio ad formam et ad <sup>p</sup> materiam, et ut habens illam non occupetur circa aliam. Unde pueri, quamvis sint humidi, tamen firmiter retinent; animae enim eorum non occupantur circa quae occupantur animae maiorum, nec moventur ab eo in quo stant ad aliud. Iuvenes vero <sup>q</sup> propter calorem suum et propter motus suos agiles, quamvis complexio eorum <sup>r</sup> sit sicca, tamen memoria eorum non est sicut memoria puerorum. Senibus vero propter <sup>s</sup> humorem qui praevallet in eis accidit non memorare ea quae vident, sed aliquando ex dolore vel ira vel ceteris huiusmodi accidit cum memoria aliquid simile dispositioni rei qualiter acciderit <sup>t</sup>; causa vero doloris et irae et tristitiae non <sup>u</sup> est nisi quia forma eorum quae praeterierunt impressa est sensibus interioribus; quae cum reddit, <sup>v</sup> facit illud vel simile illius. Desiderium quoque et spes faciunt hoc idem; spes autem aliud est <sup>w</sup> quam desiderium quia spes est imaginatio alicuius rei cum affirmatione vel opinione quia erit; desiderium vero est imaginatio rei et concupiscentia eius, iudicans quod delectabit cum affuerit. Timor autem est oppositus spei ad modum contrarietatis; diffidentia vero vel desperatio est eius privatio, et haec omnia sunt iudicia aestimationis.

Post haec <sup>x</sup> autem repetimus adhuc <sup>y</sup> de virtutibus motivis, adicientes quod animal, <sup>157</sup> cum aliquid desiderat, percipit se <sup>z</sup> desiderare vel imaginat; si enim non perciperet, non intenderet moveri ad quaerendum <sup>a</sup> illud. Non autem habet <sup>b</sup> hoc desiderium ex aliqua virtutum apprehendentium; virtutes enim apprehendentes nihil aliud faciunt nisi iudicare et apprehendere. Cum autem iudicant vel apprehendunt sensu vel aestimatione, non ex hoc necesse est illud desiderare. Homines enim conveniunt in apprehendendo quod sentiunt <sup>c</sup> vel imaginant secundum hoc quod sentiunt illud et imaginant, sed differunt in desiderando illud quod sentiunt vel <sup>d</sup> imaginant; unus etiam et idem homo discrepat in hoc; imaginat enim cibum et desiderat illum in hora famis sed non desiderat illum in hora satietatis et qui bonorum morum <sup>e</sup> est quandoque imaginat <sup>f</sup> turpes concupiscentias <sup>g</sup> sed non desiderat illas; alius autem desiderat.

Et hae duae dispositiones non sunt <sup>h</sup> hominis tantum, sed etiam omnium animalium. Desiderium etiam aliquando est debile, aliquando est <sup>i</sup> forte; cum <sup>158</sup> autem confortatur desiderium, statim obediunt ei virtutes motivae

<sup>k</sup> haec V.

<sup>l</sup> habere CP.

<sup>m</sup> multos CP.

<sup>n</sup> add. vel multiplices CP.

<sup>o</sup> add. cum MNPV.

<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> om. CP.

<sup>r</sup> om. MNV.

<sup>s</sup> per C.

<sup>t</sup> accidit C.

<sup>u</sup> nichil C.

<sup>v</sup> reddit CP.

<sup>w</sup> est om. V.

<sup>y</sup> de virt. adhuc CP.

<sup>z</sup> om. C.

<sup>a</sup> illud quaerendum CP.

<sup>b</sup> om. M.

<sup>c</sup> quae CP.

<sup>d</sup> et MN.

<sup>e</sup> om. CP.

<sup>f</sup> ymaginatur CP.

<sup>g</sup> cum cupicentias V.

<sup>h</sup> om. N.

<sup>i</sup> om. CMP.

<sup>x</sup> hanc N.

<sup>157</sup> Animal cum aliquis . . . l. 38, omnium animalium. Cf. *op. cit.* IV. 4, f. 20r, 2A: animal cum vult . . . omnium animalium.

<sup>158</sup> cum autem . . . l. 19, p. 83, quae solet pati ex eis. Cf. *ibid.* 2A: cum autem firmatur . . . 20v, 2B: quae sunt in musculis.

quae non faciunt aliud nisi contrahere musculos et extendere. Non est autem hoc ipsum desiderium; non enim quisquis prohibetur a motu prohibetur a vehementia desiderii, nec tamen habet obedientiam aliarum virtutum quae tantum movere solent quae sunt in musculis. Huius autem virtutis, scilicet desiderii, rami sunt virtus irascibilis et virtus concupiscibilis. Illa autem quae desiderat delectabile et quod putatur utile ad acquirendum <sup>j</sup> est concupiscibilis; quae vero desiderat vincere et id quod putatur nocivum <sup>k</sup> repellere <sup>l</sup> est irascibilis. Aliquando autem invenitur in animalibus affectus non ad concupiscentias suas, sed sicut affectus matris circa filium suum et uxoris circa virum suum et sicut affectus eius qui desiderat exire <sup>m</sup> a carcere vel a compedibus.<sup>n</sup> Sed hic affectus, quamvis non sit cupiditas virtutis concupiscibilis, est tamen aliquis affectus concupiscentiae virtutis imaginativae; virtuti enim apprehendenti appropriatur proprium delectamentum in eo quod apprehendit, et in eo quod agitatur <sup>o</sup> de eis quae semper renovantur, vel de formis. Cum autem dolet quia amisit illud, cupit <sup>p</sup> illud naturaliter; desiderat autem virtus desiderativa <sup>q</sup> movere ad illud instrumenta,<sup>r</sup> sicut desiderat ex concupiscentia et ira ad id quod est pulchrum inter intelligibilia. Ex concupiscentia igitur habetur intensio <sup>s</sup> desiderii ad delectamentum, et ex virtute affectandi desiderium; et ex ira habetur intensio <sup>t</sup> desiderii ad victoriam, et ex virtute affectante desiderium.

Timor enim, dolor et tristitia sunt de accidentibus irascibilis propter communionem quam habent virtutes apprehendentes; cum enim moventur sequentes formationem intelligibilem vel imaginabilem, fit timor. Cum vero <sup>u</sup> non timet, confortatur; et accidit ei dolor unde venit ira, cum non potest repellere illud, vel cum <sup>v</sup> timet adventum eius. Gaudium autem, quod est <sup>w</sup> ex modo separationis, est finis huius virtutis. Sed pecuniam capere et cibos appetere et concupiscere coitum et alia his similia sunt ex virtute bestiali concupiscibili. Solatium vero et gaudium sunt de accidentibus virtutis apprehendentes. Virtus autem desiderativa sequitur has virtutes praedictas; enim intenditur eius vis, desiderat.

Hae autem omnes sequuntur virtutes aestimativas, non enim appetunt nisi postquam aestimaverint volitum. Aliquando vero est ibi aestimatio, sed non est ibi desiderium. Et contingit aliquando ex rebus corporalibus ut illos motus sequatur aestimatio ad quae repellenda movetur natura, et ut illae virtutes sint priores aestimatione in actione sua, sicut plerumque aestimatio ducit virtutes ad aestimationem. Aestimatio enim habet dominium inter virtutes apprehendentes in animalibus. Cupiditas vero et <sup>x</sup> ira habent dominium <sup>y</sup> inter virtutes moventes quas sequuntur virtutes desiderativae, et deinde virtutes motivae quae sunt in musculis.

Omnes autem istae actiones et ista accidentia sunt de accidentibus quae accidunt animae, sed dum est in corpore, quia non accidunt ei nisi propter <sup>z</sup> consortium corporis; et ideo trahunt <sup>a</sup> post se complexiones <sup>b</sup> corporum. Accidunt etiam ipsa cum accidunt complexiones in corporibus. Quasdam <sup>c</sup> enim

<sup>j</sup> inquirendum N.<sup>k</sup> nocuum CNP.<sup>l</sup> replere V.<sup>m</sup> om. C.<sup>n</sup> corporibus M.<sup>o</sup> cogitat CP.<sup>p</sup> incipit CP.<sup>q</sup> motiva CP.<sup>r</sup> instrumentum N] instrumento CP.<sup>s</sup> intentio CP.<sup>t</sup> intentio CP.<sup>u</sup> enim N.<sup>v</sup> cum timet om. M.<sup>w</sup> om. CP.<sup>x</sup> et ira om. M.<sup>y</sup> add. et ira M.<sup>z</sup> per P.<sup>a</sup> trahit MV.<sup>b</sup> complexionem C.<sup>c</sup> Quasdam N.



complexiones sequitur aptitudo irascendi et quasdam aptitudo concupiscendi et quasdam aptitudo formidandi et timendi. Unde facies quorundam hominum est facies irascibilis, qui ex hoc quod cito irascitur contestatur <sup>d</sup> faciei suae. Quidam etiam videtur timidus et formidolosus quia formidat et cito terretur.

(5)

Hae igitur omnes dispositiones non sunt nisi ex consortio corporis, sed diversis modis. Quasdam enim principaliter <sup>e</sup> habet corpus, sed ex hoc <sup>f</sup> quod est habens animam; et quasdam principaliter habet anima, sed ex hoc <sup>f</sup> quod est in corpore; quasdam <sup>g</sup> vero habet <sup>h</sup> aequaliter. Somnus enim et vigiliae, aegritudo <sup>i</sup> et sanitas sunt dispositiones corporis quorum principia in ipso <sup>j</sup> sunt. Sed non habet ea corpus nisi ex hoc quod est habens animam. Imaginatio vero <sup>k</sup> et concupiscentia et ira et alia huiusmodi sunt animae, sed ex hoc quod est habens corpus, et sunt corporis ex hoc quod principaliter sunt animae <sup>l</sup> ipsius corporis, quamvis sint <sup>m</sup> animae; sed ex hoc quod est habens corpus non dico ex corpore. Similiter sollicitudo, dolor, tristitia et <sup>n</sup> memoria — nullum horum est accidens corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, sed sunt <sup>o</sup> dispositiones rei coniunctae cum corpore, nec sunt nisi <sup>p</sup> cum est coniunctio cum corpore. Habet ergo ea corpus, sed propter animam, nam habet <sup>q</sup> anima ea principaliter, quamvis habeat illa <sup>r</sup> ex hoc quod est habens corpus; sed non dico quod habet <sup>s</sup> illa ex corpore. Dolorem autem habet propter verbera et propter permutationem complexionis, sed hoc accidens habet esse in corpore. Solutio vero continuitatis et complexio sunt dispositiones corporis ex hoc quod est corpus et hic dolor etiam <sup>t</sup> habet esse in sensu sentientis secundum quod est sentiens, sed corporis. Videtur autem <sup>u</sup> fames et cupiditas esse huius generis; sed ex imaginatione et timore <sup>v</sup> et dolore et ira principaliter accidit passio animae. Non enim ira vel dolor, secundum quod est ira vel dolor, est passio aliqua ex passionibus quae dolorem inferunt corpori, <sup>w</sup> quamvis sequatur eas passio corporalis dolorem inferens corpori, sicut accensio caloris vel extinctio <sup>x</sup> eius et cetera huiusmodi. Haec enim non est ipsa ira vel dolor, sed quiddam <sup>y</sup> quod consequitur <sup>z</sup> iram vel <sup>a</sup> dolorem.

(10)

(15)

(20)

(25)

(30)

Dicimus etiam melius esse ut anima <sup>b</sup> habeat aliquid ex hoc quod est in corpore quod postea sequantur <sup>c</sup> passionem in corpore quae sunt propriae corporis. Imaginatio etiam, ex hoc quod est apprehensio, non est de passionibus quas habet corpus principaliter, quamvis postea ex imaginatione accidat extendi aliquod membrum. Hoc enim non habet ex causa naturali per quam debeat complexio permutari, vel calor augeri, vel vapor generari qui diffunditur in membrum ita ut extendatur, sed quia forma habetur in aestimatione secuta est permutatio in complexione et calor et humiditas et spiritus, et nisi esset illa forma, non haberet natura <sup>d</sup> quid moveret eam.

(35)

Dicimus igitur ad summam, quod ex anima solet contingere in materia cor-

(40)

<sup>d</sup> contestatur V] testatur N.  
<sup>e</sup> habet corpus principaliter C] non habet corpus principaliter P.  
<sup>f</sup> eo CP.  
<sup>g</sup> quaedam CP.  
<sup>h</sup> habent CP.  
<sup>i</sup> san. et aeg. CP.  
<sup>j</sup> sunt in eo C.  
<sup>k</sup> enim C] om. P.  
<sup>l</sup> causae with animae *suprascript* s.m. N.  
<sup>m</sup> sunt N.  
<sup>n</sup> om. CMNP.  
<sup>o</sup> om. CP.  
<sup>p</sup> om. CP.

<sup>q</sup> anima habet CMNP.  
<sup>r</sup> ea CN.  
<sup>s</sup> habeat N.  
<sup>t</sup> om. C.  
<sup>u</sup> om. CP.  
<sup>v</sup> dolore et amore C] amore et dolore P.  
<sup>w</sup> corporibus CP.  
<sup>x</sup> extinctio V] extincto P.  
<sup>y</sup> quiddam M.  
<sup>z</sup> sequitur CP.  
<sup>a</sup> et MNV.  
<sup>b</sup> om. CP.  
<sup>c</sup> sequatur V.  
<sup>d</sup> naturam quae M.

porali permutatio complexionis quae acquiritur sine actione et passione corporali, ita quod calor accidat non ex calido et frigiditas non ex frigido. Cum enim <sup>o</sup> imaginat anima <sup>f</sup> aliquid et firmatur in eo, statim materia <sup>s</sup> corporalis recipit formam habentem comparisonem ad illam, vel qualitatem; et forma quae est in anima principium est eius quod contingit in materia, sicut forma sanitatis quae est in anima medici principium est sanitatis quae advenit, et sicut forma scamni in anima carpentarii. Sed haec non adducunt ad hoc quod provenit ex illis nisi per instrumenta et <sup>h</sup> media. Cum autem infirmus credit se convalescere vel sanus aegrotare, multotiens contingit ex hoc ut forma in <sup>i</sup> tantum confirmetur in anima eius ut eius materia patiat ex ea et proveniat inde sanitas vel infirmitas, et haec actio efficacior est quam id quod agit medicus <sup>j</sup> instrumentis suis et mediis. Propter hoc etiam est quod homo potest ambulare super trabem quae est in media via, sed non audet ambulare super eam si fuerit posita pons super aquam profundam eo quod imaginatur in anima eius forma cadendi <sup>k</sup> nimis inpressa. Cui obedit natura eius et virtus membrorum eius, nec obediunt eius contrario, scilicet <sup>l</sup> ad erigendum et <sup>m</sup> ad ambulandum. Sic igitur <sup>n</sup> cum formae imprimuntur in anima et constiterit animae ita esse, saepe <sup>o</sup> contingit materiam <sup>p</sup> pati ex eis quae solet pati ex eis.<sup>q</sup> Hae sunt vires animae secundum quod est sensibilis.

Sciendum autem quod nullam virium vegetabilium, nullam sensibilibum retinet anima exuta a corpore. Nihil enim est quod vegetando nutriat vel animando sensifcet vel moveat. Has enim actiones non exercet anima nisi dum est in corpore. Unde, sicut ex coniunctione corporis et animae fiunt, sic ex divisione utriusque pereunt, et vires earum non remanent in corpore vel <sup>r</sup> anima nisi in <sup>s</sup> sola potentia. Quod philosophi sic probant dicentes: manifestum est omnes vires <sup>159</sup> vegetabiles et sensibiles non habere actionem nisi per corpus, et <sup>t</sup> esse earum <sup>u</sup> est <sup>v</sup> eas sic esse ut operentur; ipsae autem vires non sunt sic ut operentur nisi dum sunt <sup>w</sup> corporales; igitur esse earum est esse corporales. Ergo non remanent post corpus.

<sup>o</sup> om. N.<sup>f</sup> aliquid anima CP.<sup>s</sup> corp. mat. M.<sup>h</sup> om. M.<sup>i</sup> om. N.<sup>j</sup> add. in NV.<sup>k</sup> nimis cadendi N.<sup>l</sup> sed CP.<sup>m</sup> et ad] etiam ad C] et P.<sup>n</sup> ergo N.<sup>o</sup> fere C.<sup>p</sup> materia M.<sup>q</sup> illis CP.<sup>r</sup> aut M.<sup>s</sup> add. in MN.<sup>t</sup> om. N.<sup>u</sup> om. M.<sup>v</sup> add. esse C.<sup>w</sup> fuerunt C.<sup>159</sup> omnes vires . . . post corpus. Cf. *op. cit.* IV. 5, f. 20v, 2D: omnes vires . . . post corpus.

*CAPITULUM DECIMUM\**

DE  $\gamma$  VIRIBUS ANIMAE RATIONALIS

Sciendum autem quod omnes praedictae vires et actiones communes sunt homini cum omnibus animalibus. Sed quae sequuntur propriae sunt hominis, scilicet agere actiones electione deliberationis et adinvenire artes meditando et comprehendere universalia. Homo <sup>160</sup> enim habet agere de rebus singularibus et de rebus universalibus. Universalia autem non sunt nisi conceptiones tantum, quamvis sint de actione. Qui enim tenet communem conceptionem qualiter debeat aedificari domus, ex hac tantum conceptione non provenit aliquam domum esse <sup>a</sup> in actu singulariter. Actiones enim egent rebus singularibus et proveniunt ex intentionibus singularibus. Homo igitur habet virtutem quae est propria conceptionum universalium et aliam <sup>a</sup> quae propria <sup>b</sup> est (10) ad cogitandum de rebus singularibus, de eo scilicet quod debet fieri et dimitti et quod prodest et obest et quod est honestum et <sup>c</sup> inhonestum et quod est bonum et malum; et hoc fit ad modum syllogismi vel <sup>d</sup> considerationis verae vel <sup>e</sup> falsae cuius finis est dare sententiam <sup>f</sup> de re <sup>g</sup> singulari futura ex rebus possibilibus. De necessariis etenim <sup>h</sup> et impossibilibus non cogitat an habeant <sup>i</sup> (15) esse an non; de praeterito etiam non cogitat an habeat esse quia <sup>j</sup> est praeteritum. Ad huius autem virtutis iudicium sequitur motus virtutum desideratarum et ex virtute iudicante de universalibus, haec virtus transumit maximas propositiones ad id quod cogitat et concludit de <sup>k</sup> singularibus.

Quapropter <sup>161</sup> animae rationalis duae sunt vires: <sup>m</sup> una est virtus intelligendi et alia est virtus agendi, sive una est virtus contemplativa et alia est virtus <sup>n</sup> activa; et utraque vocatur intellectus aequivoce. (20)

Sed virtus activa sive intellectus activus est <sup>o</sup> principium movens corpus hominis ad singulas actiones quas praecipue sibi eligit secundum quod intendit. Sed hoc facit aliquando per virtutem animalem appetitivam sive (25) desiderativam, aliquando per imaginativam sive <sup>p</sup> aestimativam, aliquando per se ipsam. Per appetitivam siquidem agit quotiens accidunt ei affectiones hominis propriae quibus cito afficitur, sive sint actiones sive passiones sicut confusio et verecundia et <sup>q</sup> risus et similia. Per aestimativam vero sive imaginativam agit cum contendit adinvenire scientias rerum faciendarum et non (30) faciendarum et artes. Per se ipsam autem humana <sup>r</sup> anima agit cum contendit generare in se intellectum contemplantem quae sententiae <sup>s</sup> pendunt ex usu et divulgantur famose apud homines, sicut hoc <sup>t</sup> quod mentiri turpe est et consimiles propositiones <sup>u</sup> tantummodo probabiles.

\* *om. all mss.*

$\gamma$  De Viribus Propriis Animae Rationalis  
C] De Propriis Viribus Hominis P] *om. M*  
De virtutibus quae propriae sunt hominis N.

<sup>a</sup> in actu esse N.

<sup>b</sup> alia MNV.

<sup>c</sup> est propria CP.

<sup>d</sup> *add.* quod CP.

<sup>e</sup> et V.

<sup>f</sup> et V.

<sup>g</sup> scientiam CP.

<sup>h</sup> *om.* CP.

<sup>i</sup> enim CP.

<sup>j</sup> habeat MNV.

<sup>k</sup> quod CP.

<sup>l</sup> *add.* rebus CP.

<sup>m</sup> virtutes C.

<sup>n</sup> *om.* N.

<sup>o</sup> *om.* C.

<sup>p</sup> *add.* per C.

<sup>q</sup> *om.* N.

<sup>r</sup> anima humana N.

<sup>s</sup> scientiae P.

<sup>t</sup> est V.

<sup>u</sup> praepositiones M.

<sup>160</sup> Homo . . . l. 19, de singularibus. Cf. *op. cit.* V. 1, f. 22v, 1C: dicemus autem . . . de particularibus.

<sup>161</sup> Quapropter . . . l. 33, mentiri turpe est. Cf. *op. cit.* I. 5, f. 5r, 2E: Sed animae rationalis . . . mentiri turpe est. 5v, 1A.

Virtus <sup>162</sup> autem contemplativa sive intellectus contemplativus est qui solet informari a forma universali nudata a materia. Et si fuerit  $\nabla$  nuda in se, apprehendere formam eius in se facilius erit; si vero non fuerit nuda, fiet tamen nuda, quoniam ipse denudabit eam, ita ut de omnibus affectionibus eius  $\nabla$  cum  $\times$  materia nihil remaneat  $\nabla$  in ea. Intellectus <sup>163</sup> vero  $\times$  contemplativus est iudex veri et falsi de universalibus; sed activus est iudex de malo et bono in singularibus. Ille est  $\alpha$  iudex de necessario et possibili et impossibili; hic  $\beta$  de honesto et inhonesto, licito et illicito. Unusquisque <sup>164</sup> autem horum intellectuum habet dubitationem sive opinionem; habet et sententiam.<sup>c</sup> Cum enim intellectus non quiescit in eo quod comprehendit sed adhuc haesitat ignorans quid potius tenere debeat, ille intellectus vocatur dubitatio sive opinio. Dubitatio enim est privatio comprehensionis  $\delta$  alterius contradictoriarum. Opinio vero est conceptio ad quam acceditur cum formidine alterius partis. Non enim omnis qui putat iam concipit, sicut  $\epsilon$  non omnis qui sensit  $\zeta$  iam intellexit,<sup>g</sup> aut qui imaginat iam  $\eta$  putavit, vel concepit  $\iota$  vel consensit. (5)

Cum autem in eo quod comprehendit, consentit, et quiescit et  $\jmath$  quod utique fit,<sup>k</sup> cum per inventionem medii termini altera contradictoriarum certissima fit, tunc sententia  $\lambda$  vocatur. Sententia  $\mu$  enim <sup>165</sup> est conceptio  $\alpha$  certissime definita, sive sententia  $\mu$  est certa comprehensio unius  $\circ$  contradictoriarum. Certa autem non fit nisi necessaria  $\nu$  ratione vel divina revelatione. Principia vero contemplativi sunt ex propositionibus per se notis; sed principia activi sunt ex probabilibus et ex auctoritatibus  $\varrho$  et ex  $\tau$  famosis et  $\theta$  experimentis. Ergo <sup>166</sup> in homine est virtus iudicans sensibilis et iudicans imaginativa et iudicans aestimativa et  $\sigma$  iudicans contemplativa et iudicans activa. Principia vero quae imperant virtuti desiderativae ad movendum membra sunt aestimatio imaginativa, et aestimatio activa et cupiditas et ira. Quapropter<sup>167</sup> intellectus activus eget corpore et virtutibus corporalibus ad omnes actiones suas. Contemplativus vero eget corpore et virtutibus eius, sed non semper, nec omni modo. Sufficit enim ipse  $\tau$  sibi per seipsum. (20)

Sciendum autem quia  $\upsilon$  nulla harum virtutum est anima; immo anima est id quod habet  $\nabla$  has virtutes, habens scilicet aptitudinem ad actiones quarum quaedam  $\nabla$  sunt quae non perficiuntur nisi per instrumenta et per usum  $\times$  eorum; quaedam vero sunt quibus non  $\nabla$  sunt necessaria instrumenta. Sub-

$\nabla$  nudata fuerit C.

$\nabla$  eiusdem N.

$\times$  de CP.

$\nabla$  remanet P] maneat C.

$\alpha$  igitur CMP] ergo N.

$\epsilon$  autem CP] autem est N.

$\beta$  hoc C. om. P.

$\circ$  scientiam CMP.

$\delta$  alt. comp. C.

$\epsilon$  sed M.

$\zeta$  sentit CP.

$\eta$  intelligit CP.

$\iota$  vel C.

$\jmath$  concipit CP.

$\lambda$  om. CNP.

$\kappa$  sit C.

$\lambda$  scientia CP.

$\mu$  scientia C] sent. (vel scientia *superscript* N).

$\alpha$  om. M.

$\circ$  cont. unius CP.

$\nu$  div. rev. et nec. rat. CP.

$\varrho$  auctoritatibus M.

$\tau$  om. N.

$\theta$  om. CMP.

$\iota$  om. CP.

$\jmath$  quod CNP.

$\kappa$  has habet N.

$\lambda$  quadam N.

$\mu$  visum N.

$\nabla$  nec. non. sunt CP.

<sup>162</sup> Virtus autem . . . remaneat in ea. Cf. *ibid.*: sed virtus . . . remaneat in ea.

<sup>163</sup> Intellectus . . . et illicito. Cf. *op. cit.* V. 1, f. 22v, 1D: intellectus contemplativus . . . et illicito.

<sup>164</sup> Unusquisque . . . consensit. Cf. *op. cit.* V. 1, f. 22v, 2C: Unaquaeque autem . . . 2D: aut consensit.

<sup>165</sup> Sententia . . . definita. *Ibid.*

<sup>166</sup> Ergo in homine . . . l. 27, et ira. Cf. *Avic. loc. cit.* ergo est in homine . . . cupiditas et ira.

<sup>167</sup> Quapropter intellectus . . . l. 33, non sunt necessaria instrumenta. Cf. *loc. cit.*: Intellectus vero activus . . . non sunt necessaria instrumenta.

stantia <sup>168</sup> igitur animae humanae <sup>z</sup> duas habet actiones: unam propter corpus quae vocatur practica, et aliam propter <sup>a</sup> se et propter principia sua <sup>b</sup> quae est apprehensio per <sup>c</sup> intellectum et utraeque sunt inter se dissidentes <sup>d</sup> et impediens se. Nam cum anima occupatur circa unam, retrahitur ab alia quia cum anima intenta fuerit sensibilibus, retrahitur ab intelligibilibus, et cum cogitaverit de intellectu, postponet haec omnia <sup>e</sup> nisi forte fuerint haec praevaletia super animam et subegerint eam et traxerint <sup>f</sup> eam ad partem suam. (5)

Quapropter <sup>169</sup> virtus activa debet imperare ceteris virtutibus corporis <sup>z</sup> sicut oportet secundum iudicium virtutis contemplativae ita ut haec non patiat <sup>b</sup> ab illis ullo modo; immo ipsae patiantur ab ea, et sint ei omnino subiectae, ne forte contingant in ea affectiones trahentes eam post se provenientes ex rebus naturalibus quae vocantur perversi mores. Oportet ergo ut ipsa <sup>i</sup> non sit passibilis ullo modo vel vincibilis, sed imperans, et tunc habet mores optimos. Possibile est autem ut mores comparentur etiam <sup>j</sup> viribus corporalibus. Cum enim illa fuerit dominans habebit affectionem agentem, et ex intellectu habebit affectionem patientem. Nominamus autem omnem affectionem morem; erit ergo unum propter quod contingunt <sup>k</sup> mores in hoc, et mores in illo; quoniam, si ipsa fuerit victa, habebit affectionem passibilem et similiter affectionem activam non extraneam, quae erunt duae actiones et duo mores. At <sup>l</sup> mos quidem erit unus sed habebit duas comparationes. Anima ergo <sup>m</sup> rationalis cum sit <sup>n</sup> una substantia habet comparationem ad duo, quorum unum est supra <sup>o</sup> eam et alterum <sup>p</sup> infra eam. Sed habet in se virtutes quibus coaptatur ad utrumque illorum, <sup>q</sup> nam virtutem activam habet propter id quod debet ei <sup>r</sup> quod est infra se, et virtutem contemplativam habet propter <sup>s</sup> id quod est supra <sup>t</sup> se videlicet ut patiat <sup>u</sup> ab eo et perficiatur per <sup>v</sup> illud et recipiat ab illo. Quae duae vires sive duo intellectus sunt animae <sup>v</sup> rationali quasi duae facies; una quae <sup>w</sup> respiciat deorsum ad regendum suum inferius quod est corpus quam nullo modo oportet recipere aliquam affectionem generis debiti naturae <sup>x</sup> corporis; et aliam qua respiciat sursum ad contemplandum suum superius quod <sup>y</sup> est Deus, quam oportet semper recipere <sup>z</sup> aliquid ab illo quod est illic <sup>a</sup> et affici ab illo. Sed ex eo quod est infra eam scilicet <sup>b</sup> intellectu activo generantur <sup>c</sup> mores et scientiae, et ex eo quod est supra eam, scilicet <sup>d</sup> intellectu contemplativo acquiruntur (30)

<sup>z</sup> om. CP.

<sup>a</sup> per N. propter princ. et prop. CP.

<sup>b</sup> om. CP.

<sup>c</sup> propter CP.

<sup>d</sup> dividentes V. diss. inter se CP.

<sup>e</sup> anima CP.

<sup>f</sup> extraxerint V.

<sup>g</sup> om. C.

<sup>h</sup> patiantur N.

<sup>i</sup> anima M.

<sup>j</sup> om. CP.

<sup>k</sup> contingit M.

<sup>l</sup> om. C.

<sup>m</sup> igitur CP bis N.

<sup>n</sup> fit V.

<sup>o</sup> super C.

<sup>p</sup> add. est CP.

<sup>q</sup> eorum C.

<sup>r</sup> om. V.

<sup>s</sup> id propter quod P.

<sup>t</sup> super CP.

<sup>u</sup> om. M.

<sup>v</sup> in natura C] anima M.

<sup>w</sup> om. C] qua MN.

<sup>x</sup> natura C.

<sup>y</sup> quod est Deus *not in Avicenna*.

<sup>z</sup> aspicere C] respicere P.

<sup>a</sup> illac C.

<sup>b</sup> add. in V.

<sup>c</sup> generatur V.

<sup>d</sup> add. in V.

<sup>168</sup> Substantia . . . l. 8, ad partem suam. Cf. *op. cit.* f. 23v, 2 *ad finem*: Dicemus ergo . . . ad partem suam.

<sup>169</sup> Quapropter virtus activa . . . l. 1, p. 87,

acquiruntur sapientiae. Cf. *Avic.* I. 5, f. 5v, 1: Oportet autem ut haec virtus . . . generantur sapientiae.

sapientiae. Sed ad acquirenda \* haec unusquisque horum † duorum intellectuum habet aptitudinem et perfectionem. Id enim quod solet aliquid recipere aliquando est receptibile eius in potentia, aliquando in effectu.

Potentia <sup>170</sup> autem tribus modis dicitur secundum prius et posterius. Dicitur s enim <sup>h</sup> potentia sola aptitudo a qua nondum exivit aliquid ad <sup>i</sup> effectum, nec habetur aliquid per quod exeat, sicut est potentia infantis ad scribendum. Dicitur etiam <sup>j</sup> potentia haec aptitudo, cum iam habetur id per quod possit pervenire ad effectum sine medio, sicut est potentia adulti hominis ad scribendum cum cognoverit <sup>k</sup> incaustum <sup>l</sup> et <sup>m</sup> calamum et simplicia elementa. Dicitur etiam potentia haec aptitudo cum perfecte habentur instrumenta et ex instrumentis accedit <sup>n</sup> perfectio aptitudinis ita ut possit facere quando libuerit et non sit ei necesse addiscere, sed sufficiat ei <sup>o</sup> tantum velle sicut est potentia scriptoris perfecti in arte sua cum non scribit. (5)

Sed potentia prima vocatur pura <sup>p</sup> et materialis, secunda vocatur <sup>q</sup> potentia possibilis sive facilis, tertia est perfectio. Intellectus igitur activus sive contemplativus cum est in sola potentia, scilicet cum <sup>r</sup> potentia animae nondum recipit aliquid de eo quod est eius perfectio, vocatur intellectus materialis, dictus autem materialis ad similitudinem aptitudinis materiae <sup>s</sup> primae quae ex se nullam habet formam sed est receptibilis omnium formarum. Cum vero uterque intellectus <sup>t</sup> est in potentia facili, scilicet cum accedit unicuique illorum habere iam principia quibus perficiuntur eorum actiones, sed activo <sup>u</sup> propositiones probabiles et aliae <sup>v</sup> affectiones, contemplativo vero per se nota prima ut: omne totum maius <sup>w</sup> est sua parte, et: quae <sup>x</sup> eidem <sup>y</sup> aequalia inter se sunt aequalia, et alia huiusmodi intelligibilia prima ex <sup>z</sup> quibus et cum quibus pervenitur ad intelligibilia secunda, vocatur uterque intellectus in habitu et potest dici intellectus in effectu respectu primi. Potentia enim prima non potest intelligere aliquid in effectu. Haec vero potest aliquid intelligere in effectu, sed cum inquisierit; deinde cum acquiritur <sup>a</sup> unicuique istorum <sup>b</sup> intellectuum perfectio dicitur intellectus in effectu. (10)

Intellectus enim contemplativus tunc est similis potentiae perfectivae, cum incipiunt in anima existere formae intelligibiles adeptae post <sup>c</sup> per se nota. Et quamvis non convertitur ad eas <sup>d</sup> ut consideret illas in effectu, sunt tamen quasi repositae apud eam ut cum voluerit <sup>e</sup> consideret eas in effectu, et intelligat eas et intelligat se intelligere eas. (20)

Est <sup>f</sup> enim hic intellectus qui intelligit quotiens vult intelligere sine labore inquirendi. <sup>g</sup> Quamvis autem hic intellectus vocetur intellectus in effectu, potest tamen vocari intellectus in potentia respectu eius qui sequitur post <sup>h</sup> eum. Cum enim intellectus contemplativus est in effectu absoluto, scilicet cum (35)

\* acquirendum M impotentia N.

† horum intell. duor. C] intell. duor. P]  
duor. hor. intell. V.

<sup>s</sup> dicitur CP.

<sup>h</sup> om. V.

<sup>i</sup> in effectu C.

<sup>j</sup> et N.

<sup>k</sup> cognoveris V.

<sup>l</sup> incaustum N.

<sup>m</sup> om. C.

<sup>n</sup> om. C.

<sup>o</sup> om. CP.

<sup>p</sup> prima CP.

<sup>q</sup> bis N.

<sup>r</sup> in CP.

<sup>s</sup> primae materiae N.

<sup>t</sup> om. V.

<sup>u</sup> activae N.

<sup>v</sup> add. vero simplices CP.

<sup>w</sup> magis V.

<sup>x</sup> uni et C.

<sup>y</sup> add. sunt CP.

<sup>z</sup> cum quibus et ex quibus CP.

<sup>a</sup> acquiruntur N.

<sup>b</sup> om. C.

<sup>c</sup> prius C.

<sup>d</sup> add. et N.

<sup>e</sup> velit CP.

<sup>f</sup> et M.

<sup>g</sup> acquirendi CNP.

<sup>h</sup> prius C.

<sup>170</sup> Potentia autem . . . l. 11, p. 88, ab extrinsecus. *Ibid.* 1F: Potentia . . . ab extrinsecus.

forma intellecta est sibi praesens et considerat eam in effectu et intelligit in effectu et intelligit se intelligere in effectu, quod tunc est in ea, vocatur intellectus adeptus ab alio.<sup>1</sup> Qui ideo vocatur intellectus adeptus ab alio quoniam intellectus in potentia non exit ad effectum nisi per intellectum qui semper est in effectu. Aliquid igitur est per quod animae nostrae in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad <sup>i</sup> effectum. Id autem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum. (5)

Unde cum intellectus qui est in potentia coniungitur cum illo intellectu qui est in actu aliquo modo coniunctionis, imprimitur <sup>k</sup> in eo aliqua species formarum quae est adepta ab extrinsecus.<sup>1</sup> (10)

Ipsae enim est qui dat formam intelligibilem, cuius comparatio <sup>171</sup> ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros. Sicut enim sine luce exteriori non fit visio, sic sine luce intelligentiae agentis in nos, nulla fit veritatis rei comprehensio; hoc <sup>172</sup> enim <sup>m</sup> est menti ratio quod est aspectus oculo. Ratio enim est mentis aspectus; huius autem aspectus per ea quae conspicienda sunt motio dicitur consideratio vel cogitatio. Cogitationes <sup>173</sup> etenim et <sup>n</sup> considerationes motus sunt animae, et <sup>174</sup> ita menti opus est ratione ad videndum et consideratione <sup>o</sup> ad inquirendum, sed sicut saepe aspectus dirigitur et tamen quia lux deest nihil videtur, quod patet in tenebris, ita cum ratio movetur ad aliquid comprehendendum si lux intelligentiae deest, nihil comprehendit et vocatur ignorantia, si vero adest, comprehendit <sup>p</sup> et vocatur scientia. Sicut ergo fit visio concurrentibus tribus, scilicet visu et viso et luce, sic et scientia. Ad hoc enim ut fiat visio prius necesse est ut visus in oppositum corpus offendant, <sup>q</sup> et adminiculo exterioris lucis a viso corpore formam similem ei quae in <sup>r</sup> illo est, sed alterius generis quam sit illa, recipiat. Sic <sup>175</sup> et virtus rationalis cum considerat singula <sup>s</sup> quae sunt in imaginatione mediante luce intelligentiae fiunt nuda a materia et ab appendiciis materiae et imprimuntur in anima rationali; et ea <sup>t</sup> sibi imprimi hoc est ea intelligi, non quod ipsa mutantur <sup>u</sup> de imaginatione ad intellectum nostrum, nec quod ipsa forma cum in se sit nuda considerata per se faciat similem sibi, sed quia, cum <sup>176</sup> datur animae contemplari huiusmodi formam nudam, mediante luce intelligentiae agentis, ex <sup>v</sup> forma illa contingit in anima quiddam quod secundum aliquid est sui generis, et secundum aliquid non est sui generis, sicut cum lux cadit super colorata, ex illa fit in visu comparatio quae non est similis ei ex omni parte. Imaginabilia enim sunt intelligibilia in potentia et fiunt intelligibilia in effectu, non ipsa eadem, sed quae extrahuntur <sup>w</sup> ex illis. Immo sicut comparatio, quae apparet ex formis sensibilibus mediante luce, non est ipsae <sup>x</sup> formae sed quiddam aliud quod (35)

<sup>1</sup> illa C.

<sup>k</sup> imprimatur N.

<sup>m</sup> haec est enim C.

<sup>o</sup> cogitatione C.

<sup>p</sup> comprehenditque C.

<sup>i</sup> in C.

<sup>1</sup> extrinsecus N.

<sup>n</sup> om. V.

<sup>q</sup> ostendat N.

<sup>s</sup> singularia N.

<sup>u</sup> mutetur N.

<sup>w</sup> abstrahuntur ab CN]

<sup>x</sup> formae ipsae CP.

<sup>r</sup> om. M.

<sup>t</sup> eas N.

<sup>v</sup> om. C.

<sup>v</sup> abstrahuntur ex M.

<sup>171</sup> cuius comparatio . . . visus nostros. *Op. cit.* V. 5, f. 25r, 2B: cuius comparatio . . . visus nostros.

<sup>172</sup> hoc enim . . . oculo. *Cf.* St. Augustine *Solil.* I. 6. 12. PL 32, 875.

<sup>173</sup> cogitationes . . . animae. *Cf.* Avic. V. 5, f. 25r, 2B.

<sup>174</sup> et ita menti . . . vocatur scientia. *Much like* St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, 27,

53. PL 32, 1065: Ut ratio sit . . . ignorantia dicitur.

<sup>175</sup> Sic et virtus . . . l. 32, sed quia. *Cf.* Avic. V. 5, f. 25r, 2B: Virtus enim rationalis . . . sed quia.

<sup>176</sup> cum datur . . . l. 4, p. 89, ab omni permixtione. *Op. cit.* f. 25r, 2B: cum autem accidit. . . 25v. 1A, . . . ab omni permixtione.

habet comparationem ad illas, quod fit, mediante luce, in receptibili recte opposito,<sup>v</sup> sic anima rationalis cum coniungitur <sup>z</sup> formis aliquo modo coniunctionis ex luce intelligentiae agentis, aptatur ad hoc ut subsistant in ea ipsae formae nudaе ab omni permixtione, decorantes<sup>177</sup> et nobilitantes eam, quarum quasi locus est ipsa, mediante intellectu <sup>a</sup> materiali, et tunc<sup>178</sup> anima intelligit eo quod apprehendit in se ipsam formam intellectuum nudorum a materia; <sup>b</sup> hoc autem <sup>c</sup> quod forma est nuda vel ideo est nuda quia intellectus eam denudat ut <sup>d</sup> est humanitas, vel quia ipsa <sup>e</sup> forma in se nuda est a materia ut <sup>f</sup> angelica essentia, unde non est ei opus nudare <sup>g</sup> eam. (5)

Anima autem intelligit se ipsam et alia quae non sunt <sup>h</sup> ipsa; hoc autem quod se ipsam intelligit facit eam intelligere se esse intelligentem et intellectam <sup>i</sup> et intellectum. Cum vero intelligit ceteras formas, non ita est; ipsae enim formae per se sunt in corpore semper et in potentia sunt in intellectu, quamvis <sup>j</sup> in aliquibus rebus de potentia exeant <sup>k</sup> ad effectum. Cum igitur intelligit alia <sup>l</sup> a se, tunc<sup>179</sup> intelligens et intellectus et intellectum non sunt unum in nostris <sup>m</sup> animabus. Nam<sup>180</sup> ipsa anima est intelligens, intellectus vero vel dicitur virtus eius qua intelligit, vel dicitur ipsa sua forma intellectuum, quae, quia est in anima, sunt intellecta. Forma enim intellecta, cum subsistit in substantia intelligente, facit intelligi illud cuius haec forma est propria forma. Cum enim forma rei sicut est ab intellectu qui est actus animae comprehenditur, illa media veritatis rei conceptio quae ab intellectu agente in <sup>n</sup> rem intellectam et ab anima <sup>o</sup> patiente ab ea generatur, dicitur intellectus passive <sup>p</sup> medius <sup>q</sup> inter intellectum quo intelligimus, qui est actus animae, et intellectum scilicet rem <sup>r</sup> quam intelligimus, hoc <sup>s</sup> est, cuius formae similitudinem in mente retinemus. Unde quia hic intellectus non est nisi similitudo formae rei quae in mente concipitur, a philosophis similitudo vocatur. (10)

Primum autem<sup>181</sup> quod percipit de formis humanus <sup>t</sup> intellectus est id quod de eis est essentiale vel accidentale et id propter <sup>u</sup> quod <sup>v</sup> imaginationes <sup>w</sup> illae conveniunt et differunt. Sed intentiones quibus non differunt ipsae formae fiunt una intentio in essentia intellectus propter similitudinem, sed propter id in quo differunt fiunt multae. Intellectus igitur habet potestatem multiplicandi intentiones quae sunt una et adunandi eas quae sunt multae. Sed adunatio multorum fit duobus modis; uno cum intentiones, quae sunt multae et differentes dimensionibus in imaginationibus, sunt una intentio cum non differunt <sup>x</sup> in definitione; alio cum de intentionibus generum et differentiarum componitur una intentio in definitione. (15)

<sup>v</sup> composito CP.      <sup>z</sup> coniungetur N.

<sup>a</sup> materiali intellectu CP.

<sup>b</sup> modo C.

<sup>c</sup> add. est C.

<sup>d</sup> ut est humanitas *not in Avicenna*.

<sup>e</sup> om. M.

<sup>f</sup> ut angelica ess. *not in Avicenna*.

<sup>g</sup> denudare C.

<sup>h</sup> est C.

<sup>i</sup> intellectum C.

<sup>j</sup> add. exeant C.

<sup>k</sup> om. C.

<sup>l</sup> aliud C] *om.* P.

<sup>m</sup> an. nos N.

<sup>n</sup> inter V.

<sup>o</sup> ipsa MV.

<sup>p</sup> *sic mss. perhaps for passivus or patiens sive.*

<sup>q</sup> melius M.

<sup>r</sup> quam rem V.

<sup>s</sup> hic N.

<sup>t</sup> humanis CMNP.

<sup>u</sup> per M.

<sup>v</sup> *om.* C.

<sup>w</sup> add. quod C.

<sup>x</sup> differant C.

<sup>177</sup> decorantes . . . materiali. *Loc. cit.* f. 25v, 2B: decorantes . . . materiali.

<sup>178</sup> tunc anima . . . l. 14, ad effectum. *Ibid.* Anima intelligit . . . ad effectum. *Before the preceding by several lines.*

<sup>179</sup> tunc intelligens . . . nostris animabus. *Loc. cit.* 2C: ergo intellectus . . . nostris ani-

mabus.

<sup>180</sup> Nam ipsa . . . forma intellectuum. *Loc. cit.* 2X: anima enim . . . intellectuum suorum.

<sup>181</sup> Primum autem . . . l. 18, p. 90, Socratis. *Cf. op. cit.* f. 25v, 1A: Primum autem . . . Platonis et Socratis.



Modi autem multiplicandi fiunt e converso istorum; isti autem modi sunt de proprietatibus humani intellectus quos non habet alia virtus. Aliae enim vires apprehendunt quod est multum multum sicut est, et quod est unum apprehendunt unum sicut est. Cum autem apprehendunt unum quod est commune sed compositum ex aliquibus et ex eorum accidentibus, non tamen possunt separare accidentalialia eorum ab essentialibus eorum. Cum vero aliquam formam sensus <sup>v</sup> representat imaginationi et imaginatio intellectui et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem,<sup>s</sup> si postea representaverit ei aliam formam eiusdem <sup>a</sup> speciei quae non est alia nisi numero, intellectus tunc nullo modo excipiet <sup>b</sup> ex ea formam aliam praeter quam prius acceperat, nisi secundum accidens, quod est illius proprium ex hoc quod est illud accidens, ita ut aliquando accipiat illam nudam, aliquando cum illo accidente, et ob hoc dicitur quod Socrates et Plato sunt una intentio in humanitate, non quod humanitas quae est coniuncta proprietatibus Socratis ipsa eadem sit coniuncta proprietatibus Platonis quasi ambo haberent unam essentiam, sicut fit in amicitia et in aliis relationibus, sed quia humanitas multiplicata est <sup>c</sup> in esse. Humanitas enim non est una in qua conveniunt secundum esse extrinsecum, ita ut ipsa eadem sit humanitas Platonis et Socratis. Quamvis <sup>182</sup> enim humanitas sit natura sine <sup>d</sup> dubio in qua conveniunt omnia singularia speciei aequaliter quorum una est definitio, tamen quia accidit ei existere in hoc singulari et in illo, ideo multiplicata est; hoc <sup>e</sup> autem non habet ex natura sua. Si enim ex natura humana esset unde deberet multiplicari, profecto non predicaretur homo de aliquo uno numero. Si vero humanitas esset ex hoc quod est humanitas Petri, tunc humanitas non esset alterius. Ergo unum de accidentibus quae accidunt humanitati ex materia est haec species multiplicationis et divisionis. Accidunt etiam ei et <sup>f</sup> alia accidentia praeter haec, scilicet quia cum fuerit in materia acquireretur ei aliquis modus quanti et qualis et <sup>g</sup> ubi et situs quae omnia extranea sunt a natura ipsius. Si enim ex hoc quod est humanitas esset huius tantum termini, quanti et qualis et <sup>g</sup> ubi et situs, tunc ex hoc quod est humanitas oporteret <sup>h</sup> unumquemque hominem convenire <sup>i</sup> cum alio in his <sup>j</sup> accidentibus. Si vero ex hoc quod est humanitas esset alicuius alterius termini, quanti et qualis et <sup>k</sup> ubi et situs, oporteret similiter ut omnes <sup>l</sup> homines convenirent in illo alio <sup>m</sup> termino. Ergo forma humana ex sua essentia non habet haec accidentia quae solent ei accidere sed propter materiam habetur <sup>n</sup> cum illis.

Unde prima forma <sup>183</sup> humana quae praecedit,<sup>o</sup> ipsa tantum prodest ad cognoscendum formam humanam, secunda vero nil prodest. Intentio enim impressa animae una est, quae non est nisi imaginatio prima et ideo imaginatio secunda nil operatur; potuit tamen unaquaeque <sup>p</sup> praecedere et operari illud idem in anima, non sicut hic <sup>q</sup> homo singularis vel hic equus. Intellectus <sup>r</sup> au-

<sup>v</sup> sensui C.

<sup>s</sup> intentione M.

<sup>a</sup> eius V.

<sup>b</sup> excipiat M.

<sup>c</sup> om. M.

<sup>d</sup> in qua sine dubio CP.

<sup>e</sup> haec V.

<sup>f</sup> om. CNP.

<sup>g</sup> om. MV.

<sup>h</sup> oportet C.

<sup>i</sup> cum alio convenire CP.

<sup>j</sup> accidentibus his V.

<sup>k</sup> om. MV.

<sup>l</sup> homines omnes CP.

<sup>m</sup> om. C.

<sup>n</sup> om. M.

<sup>o</sup> procedit CP.

<sup>p</sup> unamquamque CN.

<sup>q</sup> om. M.

<sup>r</sup> intelligens C.

<sup>182</sup> Quamvis enim . . . l. 35, cum illis. Cf. *op. cit.* II, 2, f. 6v, 2A: forma etenim humana . . . habetur cum illis.

<sup>183</sup> forma humana . . . l. 13, p. 91, delectabilior. Cf. *op. cit.* V, 5, f. 25v, 1: forma humana . . . delectabilior.

tem, cum apprehendit <sup>s</sup> aliqua inter quae est prius et posterius, solet cum illis intelligere tempus necessario, nec in tempore sed in momento. Intellectus enim intelligit tempus in conclusione et in terminis, et <sup>t</sup> hoc subito.

Quod autem intellectus non potest formare ea quae sunt in ultimo intelligibilitatis <sup>u</sup> et abstractionis a materia, hoc non habet <sup>v</sup> ex aliquo quod sit in essentia illarum rerum, nec ex aliquo quod sit in natura intellectus, sed ex hoc quod anima impedita est in corpore et ex corpore et quod in multis eget corpore. Sed corpus elongat eam a dignioribus suis perfectionibus. Hoc enim quod oculus non potest intueri solem non est ex aliquo quod sit <sup>w</sup> in sole, nec ex hoc quod sol non <sup>x</sup> appareat sed ex infirmitate oculi. Cum autem remota fuerit a nostra anima <sup>y</sup> ipsa aggravatio et impedimentum, tunc intelligentia animae de his omnibus erit melior quam habet anima et quae est purior et delectabilior. Sed quia rerum aliae sunt subtilissimae, aliae, sunt nimi debilis esse, ideo <sup>184</sup> formatio <sup>z</sup> intellectus variatur secundum esse rerum. Res enim subtilissimas non valet apprehendere <sup>a</sup> quia excedunt <sup>b</sup> eum. Motum vero et tempus et materiam <sup>c</sup> vix potest intelligere eo quod sunt debilis esse; privationes quoque <sup>d</sup> non apprehendit intellectus absolute sed per hoc quod non <sup>e</sup> apprehendit habitum eius. Intellectus autem apprehendit privationem ex hoc quod ipse fuit habens privationem.<sup>f</sup>

Tribus <sup>185</sup> autem modis intelligibilia <sup>z</sup> formantur in nobis; quorum unus est cum in anima formatur aliquid in effectu ordinate,<sup>h</sup> sed haec ordinatio non est necessaria sed commutabilis, sicut cum ordinaveris in anima intentiones verborum significantium hoc quod omnis homo est animal, invenies intellectum uniuscuiusque horum universalem, qui non formatur nisi in substantia non corporea.

Ad hoc <sup>i</sup> autem ut <sup>j</sup> formentur in ea, necesse est ibi <sup>k</sup> prius et posterius. Si vero commutaveris hoc et ordinaveris aliter intentiones formatas, videlicet ut dicas quod animal predicatur de omni homine, non dubitabis hunc ordinem secundum quod est ordo intentionum universalium non esse ordinatum, nisi in substantia non corporea. Sed alius est hic ordo quam primus scilicet quantum ad auditum, non quantum ad intellectum; quasi enim <sup>l</sup> duo ordines sunt diversi, sed intellectus eorum purus idem est.

Secundus modus est cum intellectus rei iam acquisitus est, sed anima avertitur ab eo nec respicit ad id quod iam intellexit, sed est mutata ab illo intellecto ad aliud. Non enim est in potentia animae nostrae omnia simul subito intelligere.

Tertius est cum aliquid a te quaeritur de his quae iam scisti,<sup>m</sup> vel scire potes, sed tu dubitas respondere in ipsa hora; certus tamen quia potes <sup>n</sup> respondere postea quamvis nondum sit ordinata <sup>o</sup> apud te responsio. Nec

<sup>s</sup> add. inter M.

<sup>t</sup> et hoc om. CP.

<sup>u</sup> intelligibilitas N.

<sup>v</sup> habent N.

<sup>w</sup> fit V.

<sup>x</sup> om. V.

<sup>y</sup> ipsa anima CP.

<sup>z</sup> conformatio V.

<sup>a</sup> add. sed C.

<sup>b</sup> expediunt eam C.

<sup>c</sup> naturam P] materia M.

<sup>d</sup> vero CIN.

<sup>e</sup> sic all mss. Avic. omits non.

<sup>f</sup> habitum CP.

<sup>g</sup> form. intell. CP.

<sup>h</sup> ordine C] ordinate with sinuous stroke after a N.

<sup>i</sup> haec V.

<sup>j</sup> quod C.

<sup>k</sup> om. CP.

<sup>l</sup> non C.

<sup>m</sup> scivisti N.

<sup>n</sup> postea respondere potes CP.

<sup>o</sup> apud te ordinata CP.

<sup>184</sup> formatio intellectus . . . privationem. Cf. *ibid.* 2A: formatio . . . privationem.

<sup>185</sup> Tribus autem modis . . . l. 15, p. 96,

inter virtutes humanas. Cf. *op. cit.* V. 6, f. 26r, 1A: dicemus quod formari . . . f. 26v, 2: in virtutes humanas. *End of chapter.*

tamen incipis ordinare in animo tuo nisi dum respondes, quod provenit <sup>p</sup> ex certitudine sciendi illud, quam habet ante ordinationem. Differentia autem inter primam et secundam formationem <sup>q</sup> haec est, quod prima est sicut id quod de thesauro extrahis et agis aliquid de illo; secunda est sicut id quod habes in thesauro et <sup>r</sup> non agis aliquid de illo; tertia vero differt a prima in hoc quod nondum est aliquid ordinatum in cogitatione, sed est sicut inchoatio ordinis cum adiectione certitudinis, et differt a secunda per hoc quod respicitur aliquo modo a considerante illud in actu, qui habet se <sup>s</sup> ad illud sicut ad id quod est quasi repositum.<sup>†</sup> (5)

Si quis autem dixerit quod hoc <sup>u</sup> est scientia in potentia <sup>v</sup> sed potentia propinqua effectui,<sup>w</sup> dicimus falsum esse. Habens enim hoc habet certitudinem in effectu iam acquisitam quam non est necesse acquirere nec per potentiam remotam nec per propinquam. Ipsa enim certitudo certitudo est quia habet hoc apud se et ut cum voluerit scire illud sciet <sup>x</sup> et sic certitudo eius <sup>y</sup> in effectu est, quod hoc <sup>z</sup> iam acquisitum est, quae vocatur in effectu. Acquisitio enim alicuius acquisitio est; hoc <sup>a</sup> igitur quod inuimus <sup>b</sup> est acquisitum <sup>c</sup> in effectu. Impossibile est autem certum <sup>d</sup> fieri, ut id quod nescit sit ei cognitum in effectu et repositum <sup>e</sup> apud se. Quomodo enim certificabitur quis de aliqua re nisi quia secundum <sup>f</sup> hoc quod fit certum est ei cognitum? Id ergo quod inuimus duo continet in se, scilicet cognitum in effectu et certitudinem in effectu quia penes se habet hoc repositum. Sed illud simpliciter est cognitum apud eum; hoc vero, quod vult facere cognitum, aliter.<sup>g</sup> Mirum est autem quia hic respondendo ordinat id quod subito venit in eius animam,<sup>h</sup> qui dum docet alium incipit ipse discere doctrinam, quae est secundi modi in quo ordinatur ipsa forma secundum ordinem quo ordinatur apud illum qui ab eo recipit. Unus autem istorum modorum est scientia cogitabilis cuius ultima perfectio non completur nisi cum ordo eius componitur. Alius <sup>i</sup> vero est scientia simplex,<sup>j</sup> in qua non solet generari forma <sup>k</sup> una post aliam, sed est una ex <sup>l</sup> qua proveniunt <sup>m</sup> formae in receptibili earum. Et haec est scientia efficiens id quod vocamus scientiam cogitabilem et est principium eius et ipsa est virtus animae intellectiva <sup>n</sup> absoluta quae est similis intelligentiis agentibus. Ordinare enim non habet anima nisi ex hoc quod est anima, quod si non haberet, non <sup>o</sup> haberet utique scientiam animalem. (10) (15) (20) (25) (30)

In nostro autem puro intellectu non est multitudo <sup>p</sup> aliqua nec ordo formarum. Ipse enim est principium omnis formae fluentis ab <sup>q</sup> eo in animam <sup>r</sup>. Similiter est dispositio separatorum pure in hoc quod intelligunt aliqua. Intellectus enim noster est intellectus efficiens formas et creans illas.<sup>s</sup> Non est eius <sup>t</sup> formare <sup>u</sup> vel qui est in forma <sup>v</sup> animae; formare vero animae sapi- (35)

<sup>p</sup> proveniet N] praevenit C.

<sup>q</sup> affirmationem V.

<sup>r</sup> et non aliquid ex illo agis C, et non] nec N.

<sup>s</sup> esse CP.

<sup>t</sup> repositura N.

<sup>u</sup> est haec V] haec est C.

<sup>v</sup> in potentia] impotentia N.

<sup>w</sup> effectu N.

<sup>x</sup> scit M.

<sup>y</sup> add. est C.

<sup>z</sup> hic C.

<sup>a</sup> igitur hoc V.

<sup>b</sup> invenimus CP.

<sup>c</sup> om. C.

<sup>d</sup> hoc fieri certum C] fieri certum P.

<sup>e</sup> apud se repositum CP.

<sup>f</sup> hoc secundum. *Avic.*

<sup>g</sup> alteri. *Avic.*

<sup>h</sup> animum CP.

<sup>i</sup> alia C.

<sup>j</sup> simpliciter N.

<sup>k</sup> una forma N] forma alia M.

<sup>l</sup> in CN.

<sup>m</sup> proveniuntur N.

<sup>n</sup> intellecta C.

<sup>o</sup> nec V.

<sup>p</sup> similitudo V.

<sup>q</sup> ab eo *om.* CP.

<sup>r</sup> anima N.

<sup>s</sup> eas N.

<sup>t</sup> enim M.

<sup>u</sup> add. vel creare P.

<sup>v</sup> animae forma CP.

entis hominis secundum quod est anima non est nisi formare ordinatim et distincte. Unde ipsa non est simplex omnino.

Omnis autem apprehensio intelligibilis aliqua similitudo est ad formam separatam a materia et ab <sup>w</sup> accidentibus eius materialibus. Sed anima habet hoc ex hoc quod est substantia recipiens impressa ab eo. Intelligentia vero <sup>x</sup> (5) habet hoc ex hoc quod est substantia <sup>y</sup> principium agens et creans. Quod autem proprium est eius ex sua principalitate ad animam est eius intelligibilitas in effectu. Quod vero proprium est <sup>z</sup> animae ex eo quod informatur ab ea et recipit ab <sup>a</sup> ea est eius intellectibilitas <sup>b</sup> in effectu.

De dispositione autem formarum quae sunt in anima hoc sciendum est (10) quod imaginata <sup>c</sup> et quaecumque adhaerent eis, cum anima avertitur <sup>d</sup> ab eis, sunt reposita in virtutibus conservativis eorum, quae revera non sunt apprehendentes. Si enim hoc esset, tunc essent apprehendentes et conservantes simul, quod non est. Immo sunt thesaurus ad quem, cum <sup>e</sup> convertitur <sup>f</sup> se virtus apprehendens iudicans, scilicet aestimatio vel anima vel intellectus, (15) inveniet ea iam haberi ibi. Si autem non invenerit ea, erit <sup>g</sup> ei necesse redire <sup>h</sup> ad perquirendum et <sup>i</sup> reminiscendum. Quod si non fieret, necesse esset nobis dubitare cum anima vacuatur ab aliqua forma, an ipsa forma habeat <sup>j</sup> esse, an non habeat esse nisi in potentia, et dubitaremus quomodo <sup>k</sup> memoraretur <sup>l</sup> vel cum non fuit <sup>m</sup> apud animam in quo fuit et anima cui adhaesit (20) quousque revocata est haec forma. Animalis enim animae <sup>n</sup> discretæ sunt virtutes et unicuique virtuti per se separatim attributa sunt instrumenta, et formis assignatus est thesaurus, quas aliquando non contemplatur aestimatio; et <sup>o</sup> intentionibus assignatus est thesaurus, quas aliquando non considerat aestimatio. Non est enim aestimatio locus in quo stabiliantur ista, sed est (25) iudicans, et propter hoc dicimus quod aestimatio aliquando respicit formas et intentiones repositas in his duabus virtutibus et aliquando avertitur ab eis.

Dicemus ergo nunc de humanis animabus an ipsa <sup>p</sup> intelligibilia quae apprehendunt et deinde convertuntur ab eis ad alia non sunt in illis perfecte in effectu; et ideo ipsae non intelligunt ea perfecte in effectu; an habeant the- (30) saurum in quo reponunt. Sed hic thesaurus vel est <sup>q</sup> essentia earum vel corpus earum vel aliquid corporale ipsarum. Iam autem diximus quod nec corpus nec aliquid pendens ex corpore est dignum ut sit subiectum intelligibile. Non enim dignum est ut <sup>r</sup> formae intellectae sint habentes situm, sed coniunctio earum cum corpore facit eas habere situm. Si autem (35) essent <sup>s</sup> in corpore habentes situm, non essent intelligibiles. Vel dicemus quod ipsae formae intelligibiles sunt res per se existentes, quarum unaquaeque est species et res per se existens. Sed intellectus aliquando conspicit illas et aliquando avertitur ab illis et postea convertitur ad illas. Et anima est quasi speculum, ipsae vero <sup>t</sup> quasi res extrinsecae quae quandoque apparent in ea (40) quandoque non apparent, et hoc fiat secundum comparationes quae sunt in-

<sup>w</sup> om. N.

<sup>x</sup> om. CP.

<sup>y</sup> substantiae C.

<sup>z</sup> om. M.

<sup>a</sup> om. C.

<sup>b</sup> intelligibilitas CNP.

<sup>c</sup> imaginativa VP.

<sup>d</sup> advertitur V] divertitur C] advertitur M.

<sup>e</sup> om. N.

<sup>f</sup> convertit CNP] consistit M.

<sup>g</sup> om. M.

<sup>h</sup> om. V.

<sup>i</sup> add. ad C.

<sup>j</sup> esse habeat CP.

<sup>k</sup> quantum C.

<sup>l</sup> moraretur CP.

<sup>m</sup> fuerit CP.

<sup>n</sup> anima N.

<sup>o</sup> om. CP.

<sup>p</sup> add. in N.

<sup>q</sup> om. M.

<sup>r</sup> om. C.

<sup>s</sup> om. M.

<sup>t</sup> add. est M.

ter eas et animam; vel ex principio agente fluant <sup>u</sup> in animam formae una post aliam iuxta petitionem animae. Deinde cum anima <sup>v</sup> avertitur <sup>w</sup> ab hoc principio cessat fluxus formarum in animam; <sup>x</sup> quod si ita esset profecto necesse esset addiscere omnibus horis sicut primitus.

Nos autem dicimus ultimam partem huius divisionis esse veram. Non <sup>y</sup> enim possumus dicere hanc formam esse in anima <sup>z</sup> perfecte in effectu et non intelligi ab ea perfecte in effectu. Sensus enim de hoc quod eam intelligit non est nisi quia forma existit in ea; unde corpus non potest esse thesaurus eius, nec etiam essentia animae potest esse thesaurus eius; <sup>a</sup> animam <sup>b</sup> enim esse <sup>c</sup> thesaurum eius nihil aliud est nisi quia forma intellecta existit <sup>d</sup> in ea. (10) Non est autem sic apprehensio formae; apprehendere etenim formam non est thesauri sed tantum retinere; alterius ergo virtutis est apprehendere. Formas etenim memoratas et formatas esse in aliquo, non est ipsas apprehendere, sicut formas sensibiles esse in aliquo, non est sentire. Unde <sup>e</sup> corpora in quibus sunt formae sensibilibus non sunt apprehendentia. Apprehensionem vero secundum quod est virtutis <sup>f</sup> apprehendentis necesse est <sup>g</sup> fieri ab eo in quo solet imprimi ipsa <sup>h</sup> forma aliquo modo impressionis. In memoriali autem et formali non imprimuntur formae nisi secundum <sup>i</sup> quod sunt instrumenta et habent corpus retinens ipsas formas, propinquum gerenti <sup>j</sup> virtutem apprehendentem quae est aestimatio <sup>k</sup> et imaginatio, ita ut consideret eas cum vult, sicut retinent <sup>l</sup> formam sensatam circa sensum ad hoc ut acquirat eam sensus cum voluerit; hoc autem potest intelligi in memoriali et formali, non in anima; formam enim intellectam <sup>m</sup> esse in anima hoc est <sup>n</sup> quod apprehendi <sup>o</sup> eam. Item adhuc <sup>p</sup> postea declarabimus in sapientia prima quod haec forma non est per <sup>q</sup> se existens. (25)

Restat ergo ut ultima pars sit vera et ut discere non sit nisi perquirere <sup>r</sup> perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se intelligentiae agentis, quousque fiat ex ea <sup>s</sup> intellectus qui est simplex a quo emanat <sup>t</sup> formae ordinatae in <sup>u</sup> anima, mediante cogitatione. Aptitudo autem quae praecedit discere est imperfecta, postquam vero discitur <sup>v</sup> fit <sup>w</sup> integra. Cum enim transit in mentem eius qui discit id quod cohaeret cum intellectu acquisito <sup>x</sup> et convertit <sup>y</sup> se anima ad inspiciendum, ipsa inspectio est <sup>z</sup> conversio animae ad principium dans intellectum. <sup>a</sup> Cum enim anima coniungitur intelligentiae, emanat ab ea virtus intellectus <sup>b</sup> simplicis quem <sup>c</sup> sequitur emanatio ordinandi. Si vero avertitur a primo fiunt ipsae formae in potentia sed potentia proxima; ergo (35) primum discere est sicut curatio oculi, qui factus sanus cum vult aspiciat aliquid unde sumat aliquam formam. Cum vero avertitur ab illo, fit illud sibi in potentia proxima effectui.

<sup>u</sup> fluunt C.  
<sup>w</sup> avertitur M.

<sup>y</sup> nos CP.

<sup>a</sup> essentialis C.

<sup>b</sup> anima M.

<sup>c</sup> om. M.

<sup>d</sup> in ea existit CP.

<sup>e</sup> add. in N.

<sup>f</sup> virtus V.

<sup>g</sup> om. C.

<sup>h</sup> forma ipsa CP.

<sup>i</sup> om. CP.

<sup>j</sup> gerentem V.

<sup>k</sup> imag. et aestim. CMNP.

<sup>l</sup> formam ret. CP.

<sup>m</sup> intellectum N. Esse intell. C.

<sup>n</sup> add. idem N.

<sup>v</sup> om. CP.

<sup>x</sup> anima M.

<sup>z</sup> animam N.

<sup>o</sup> apprehendit CP corr. to apprehendi V]  
apprehendendi M.

<sup>p</sup> ad hoc CMN.

<sup>q</sup> per se] perfecte N.

<sup>r</sup> inquirere V. perfectam perquirere C] per  
formam perfectam perquirere P.

<sup>s</sup> eo CMVP.

<sup>t</sup> emanant CP.

<sup>u</sup> anima mediante in cog. Avic.

<sup>v</sup> disceretur C.

<sup>w</sup> add. perfecta et CP.

<sup>x</sup> inquisito CN.

<sup>y</sup> convertat N] converta M.

<sup>z</sup> add. quasi CP.

<sup>a</sup> intellectui C.

<sup>b</sup> intelligentiae C] intellectivae P.

<sup>c</sup> quam CP.

Dum autem anima <sup>d</sup> humana generaliter est in corpore, non potest recipere intelligentiam agentem subito. Sed eius dispositio est <sup>e</sup> sicut dicimus. Cum enim dicitur: Plato est <sup>f</sup> sciens intelligibilia, hic sensus est ut cum <sup>g</sup> voluerit, revocet formas ad mentem suam. Cuius etiam sensus est, ut cum voluerit possit <sup>h</sup> coniungi intelligentiae agenti, ita ut ab ea in ipsum formetur ipsum intellectum. Non quod intellectum sit praesens suae menti et formatum in suo intellectu in effectu semper, nec sicut erat priusquam disceret; hic autem modus intelligendi in potentia est virtus quae acquirit animae intelligere cum voluerit, quia cum voluerit coniungetur intelligentiae a qua emanat in eam forma <sup>i</sup> intellecta. Quae <sup>j</sup> forma est intellectus adeptus <sup>k</sup> verissime et haec virtus est intellectus in effectu secundum quod est perfectio. (5) (10)

Formatio vero imaginabilium <sup>l</sup> est respectio animae ad thesauros sensibilibium. Sed primum est inspicere quod est superius; hoc autem est inspicere quod est inferius. Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit coniungi <sup>m</sup> intelligentiae agenti et tunc inveniet in ea pulcritudinem <sup>n</sup> intelligibilem et delectationem perennem sicut dicemus suo loco.<sup>o</sup> (15)

Debes autem scire quod sapientia <sup>p</sup> sive <sup>p</sup> habeatur ex doctrina sive non, non <sup>q</sup> aequaliter habetur. Sunt etenim quidam discentium qui <sup>r</sup> sunt aptiores ad intelligendum, quorum aptitudo, quae est prior ea aptitudine quam praediximus, est fortior, cum vero homo habet hoc in seipso <sup>s</sup> non aliunde, vocatur haec aptitudo subtilitas, quae aptitudo <sup>t</sup> aliquando in aliquibus hominibus <sup>u</sup> ita praevalet, quod ad coniungendum se intelligentiae non indiget multis nec exercitio, nec disciplina, quia est in eo aptitudo secunda; immo quia quicquid est per se scit. Qui gradus est altior omnibus gradibus aptitudinis; <sup>v</sup> haec autem dispositio intellectus materialis debet vocari intellectus sanctus, qui est illius generis cuius est intellectus in habitu, sed hic est supremus in quo non omnes homines conveniunt. Non est autem longe ut ab his actionibus comparatis ad intellectum sanctum, potestate earum et virtute emanet aliquid in <sup>w</sup> imaginativam, quod <sup>x</sup> imaginativa representet <sup>y</sup> etiam secundum exempla visa vel audita verba eo modo quo praediximus. (20) (25) (30)

Per quod autem hoc fit certius, hoc est, quoniam manifestum est quod intelligibilia quae studet homo acquirere non acquirit nisi cum habuerit terminum <sup>z</sup> medium in syllogismo. Hic autem medius terminus invenitur duobus modis. Aliquando <sup>a</sup> invenitur proprio <sup>b</sup> ingenio; ingenium autem est actus rationis cuius propria vi <sup>c</sup> invenitur medius terminus. Subtilitas vero est supra <sup>d</sup> ingenium; aliquando habetur <sup>e</sup> ex doctrina; principium autem doctrinae est ingenium. Res vero terminantur sine dubio apud ingenia, quas adinvenerunt <sup>f</sup> homines ingeniosi, deinde tradiderunt eas discipulis. Possibile est ergo ut homo in <sup>g</sup> seipso habeat ingenium et ex ratione sua sine doctrina faciat (35) (40)

<sup>d</sup> om. M.<sup>e</sup> bis. V.<sup>t</sup> habitudo N.<sup>f</sup> esse N.<sup>g</sup> om. C.<sup>u</sup> om. N.<sup>h</sup> add. etiam N.<sup>v</sup> altitudinis N.<sup>i</sup> formam V.<sup>w</sup> om. PV.<sup>j</sup> quod V.<sup>x</sup> et C.<sup>k</sup> om. M.<sup>y</sup> representat N.<sup>l</sup> om. C.<sup>z</sup> medium terminum CNP.<sup>m</sup> om. C.<sup>a</sup> add. autem CNP.<sup>n</sup> pulcritudine V.<sup>b</sup> ingenio proprio CP.<sup>o</sup> in loco suo N] loco suo P.<sup>c</sup> om. M.<sup>p</sup> om. CP.<sup>d</sup> ultra C.<sup>q</sup> om. CM.<sup>e</sup> habentur M.<sup>r</sup> quae M.<sup>f</sup> invenerunt M.<sup>s</sup> semetipso N] *passage corrupt in C and M.*<sup>g</sup> ex CP.

syllogismum. Sed differunt homines in hoc quantitate et qualitate. In quantitate, eo quod aliqui hominum habent ingenia adinveniendi <sup>h</sup> medios terminos plures numero. In qualitate, eo quod aliquis hominum est velocioris ingenii. Et quia haec inaequalitas non potest terminari, sed semper recipit magis et minus, tunc debet finiri in ultimo defectus penes eum qui nullius est <sup>i</sup> ingenii, vel in ultimo augmenti penes eum qui habet ingenium omnium quaestionum, aut plurium ex his, aut qui habet velocius ingenium. Possibile est ergo ut alicuius <sup>j</sup> hominis anima eo <sup>k</sup> quod est clara et cohaerens principiis intellectibilibus <sup>l</sup> ita sit inspirata, ut accendatur ingenio ad recipiendum omnes quaestiones ab intelligentia agente vel subito vel paene subito firmiter impressas, non probabiliter sed cum ordine qui comprehendit medios terminos. Probata autem, quae sciuntur ex suis <sup>m</sup> causis, non sunt intelligibilia et hic est unus modus prophetiae, qui omnibus virtutibus prophetiae altior est. Unde congrue vocatur virtus sancta, quia est altior gradus inter omnes virtutes humanas.

Repetentes igitur a capite omnes praedictas vires rationalis animae ordinem earum inter se brevit assignemus, scilicet quomodo <sup>186</sup> aliae imperant aliis et aliae deserviunt <sup>n</sup> aliis. Duae enim passivae qualitates, quae sunt siccitas et humiditas, serviunt <sup>o</sup> duabus qualitatibus activis quae sunt calor et frigiditas. Sed calori servit <sup>p</sup> frigiditas vel praeparando ei materiam, vel conservando eius essentiam. Frigiditas autem non habet ordinem in virtutibus quae conveniunt appetitibus <sup>q</sup> naturalibus nisi quasi <sup>r</sup> servitium utilis <sup>s</sup> obsequentis. Hae vero quatuor qualitates serviunt quatuor virtutibus naturalibus quae sunt attractiva, retentiva digestiva, expulsiva. Sed digestivae serviunt retentiva ex una parte, et attractiva ex alia. <sup>t</sup> Expulsiva vero servit unicuique istarum. Sed hae quatuor virtutes naturales serviunt <sup>o</sup> tribus virtutibus vegetabilibus quae sunt nutritiva, augmentativa, generativa. Sed generativae servit augmentativa; et augmentativae servit nutritiva et hae virtutes vegetabiles serviunt virtutibus animalibus quae sunt motiva et apprehensiva. Sed motiva quae est in lacertis servit aliis motivis quae sunt concupiscibilis et irascibilis; concupiscibilis vero et irascibilis serviunt appetitivae. Et hae motivae serviunt apprehensivis exterioribus, quae sunt quinque sensus sed hi serviunt interioribus quae sunt phantasia et <sup>u</sup> formativa, imaginativa sive cogitativa, aestimativa, <sup>v</sup> memorialis. Nam quinque sensus serviunt phantasiae; phantasia vero servit formativae et formativa servit imaginativae; virtuti enim imaginativae deserviunt duae virtutes diversarum actionum. Nam virtus appetitiva <sup>w</sup> deservit ei cum obedientia eo quod imperat ei movere <sup>x</sup> aliquo modo praeceptionis. <sup>y</sup> Et virtus formativa deservit ei <sup>z</sup> per hoc quod ostendit ei formas retentas in se quae sunt aptae ad recipiendum compositionem et divisionem, et hae duae virtutes dominantur aliis. Aestimativae <sup>a</sup> vero deserviunt <sup>b</sup> similiter <sup>c</sup> duae virtutes, quarum una est <sup>d</sup> posterior ea <sup>e</sup> et alia <sup>f</sup>

<sup>h</sup> adinveniendum N.

<sup>i</sup> om. M.

<sup>j</sup> anima alic. hom. CP.

<sup>k</sup> om. M.

<sup>l</sup> intellectualibus CMP] intellectibus ita ut N.

<sup>m</sup> om. CP.

<sup>n</sup> deserviant N. <sup>o</sup> deserviunt CP.

<sup>p</sup> deservit CP. calor sive frig. M.

<sup>q</sup> nat. appet. CP.

<sup>r</sup> quia M.

<sup>t</sup> add. parte N.

<sup>v</sup> add. et CP.

<sup>x</sup> moveri CP.

<sup>z</sup> add. eo quod M.

<sup>b</sup> sim. des. CP.

<sup>d</sup> om. CP.

<sup>f</sup> altera N.

<sup>s</sup> om. CP.

<sup>u</sup> om. CNP.

<sup>w</sup> appetiva V.

<sup>y</sup> perceptionis V.

<sup>a</sup> add. virtutes C.

<sup>c</sup> add. et C.

<sup>e</sup> om. CP.

<sup>186</sup> Quomodo aliae imperant . . . l. 11; p. 97, eius quod est. Cf. Avic. I. 5, f. 5v, 2B: qualiter aliae imperant . . . utilis obsequen-

tis; and f. 5v, 2A, last sentence. Gundisalvus changes the order of sentences in this passage.

prior ea. Virtus autem posterior ea est virtus retentiva, quae scilicet retinet quod imaginativa reddit memoriali. Virtus vero prior ea est super omnes virtutes animales; aestimatio <sup>s</sup> vero servit intellectui activo et <sup>h</sup> activus deservit contemplativo. Colligatio enim animae cum <sup>i</sup> corpore ad hoc est ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et mundetur et sanctificetur; huius vero colligationis animae in <sup>j</sup> corpore rector <sup>k</sup> est intellectus activus. Intellectus autem materialis cum <sup>l</sup> aptitudine sua deservit intellectui in effectu; et intellectus in effectu deservit intellectui in habitu, et intellectus in habitu deservit intellectui adepto qui est ultimus finis in quo finitur genus sensibile <sup>m</sup> et humana species eius. Et in hoc virtus humana conformatur <sup>n</sup> primis principiis omnis eius quod est. (5) (10)

Ex his autem omnibus viribus animae rationalis, nulla virtus vegetabilis, nulla sensibilis, nullus etiam intellectus activus, nec scientia ulla quae activo intellectui <sup>o</sup> comparatur in anima exuta a corpore remanere cognoscitur. Scientia enim est <sup>p</sup> comprehensio formae rei ab anima, intellectu vel imaginatione. Sed cum intellectu comprehenditur dicitur scientia intelligibilis; cum vero imaginatione dicitur scientia sensibilis; scientia <sup>187</sup> enim intelligibilis est unio <sup>q</sup> formae intellectae cum intelligente et per hoc fit intellectus, cum intelligens apprehendit formam rei, non <sup>r</sup> intellectus quidem, <sup>s</sup> qui est vis animae qua forma rei concipitur, sed intellectus scilicet ipsa media conceptio quae ab intelligente et re intellecta in anima generatur. Scientia vero sensibilis est unio <sup>t</sup> formae sensatae cum sentiente et ob hoc dicimus nos scire <sup>u</sup> nivem esse albam et frigidam et mel dulce. Scientiam enim horum habere dicimur quia formas istorum sensibiles per experientiam sensuum in imaginatione impressas retinemus. Quod ideo fit <sup>v</sup> quia anima rationalis habet in se vim intelligendi et vim sentiendi. Sed quia ipsa in se, intelligibilis est <sup>w</sup> non sensibilis; ideo intelligibilia per <sup>x</sup> se apprehendit sine <sup>y</sup> medio, sensibilia vero non apprehendit per se nisi mediante <sup>z</sup> aliquo. Nihil enim apprehenditur <sup>a</sup> nisi per suum simile, sed anima rationalis nullo modo est similis <sup>b</sup> istis sensibilibus. <sup>c</sup> Igitur anima rationalis non apprehendit sensibilia per se. (15) (20) (25) (30)

Apprehensio <sup>188</sup> enim animae non fit nisi coniunctione suae formae cum forma intellecta et unitione eius cum ea. <sup>d</sup> Sed quia substantia animae est subtilis, sensibilia vero spissa, simplex <sup>e</sup> autem non potest coniungi spisso sine medio quod habet similitudinem cum extremis, ideo anima non apprehendit sensibilia per se nisi mediante *spiritu*, <sup>f</sup> qui est substantia sentiens consimilis <sup>g</sup> utrisque extremis. Et est media inter corporeitatem sensibilibus <sup>h</sup> et spiritualitatem <sup>i</sup> rationalis animae ac per hoc sensibilia <sup>i</sup> prout sunt sensi- (35)

<sup>s</sup> aestimativa MN. Exstimatio V.

<sup>h</sup> om. CP.

<sup>i</sup> in C. cum om. M.

<sup>j</sup> cum CNP. om. M.

<sup>k</sup> rector CP.

<sup>l</sup> con V.

<sup>m</sup> sensibilem N.

<sup>n</sup> confirmatur C.

<sup>o</sup> intellectu N] intellectum P.

<sup>p</sup> om. M.

<sup>q</sup> imitatio C] mutatio P.

<sup>r</sup> add. autem C.

<sup>s</sup> om. C] autem P.

<sup>t</sup> mutatio CP.

<sup>u</sup> om. CP.

<sup>v</sup> sit N.

<sup>w</sup> add. et N.

<sup>x</sup> app. per se CP.

<sup>y</sup> ante C.

<sup>z</sup> aliquo med. CP.

<sup>a</sup> apprehenderunt M.

<sup>b</sup> sensibilibus CP.

<sup>c</sup> similis CP.

<sup>d</sup> ipsa V.

<sup>e</sup> simpliciter N.

<sup>f</sup> all mss. spiritu.

<sup>g</sup> similis C.

<sup>h</sup> om. C.

<sup>i</sup> add. sensib. et spirit. C.

<sup>187</sup> scientia . . . l. 22, cum sentiente. Cf. *Fons Vitae* V. 19, p. 292, ll. 21, 22: Ratio scientiae . . . cum intelligentia.

<sup>188</sup> Apprehensio . . . l. 37, rationalis ani-

mae. Cf. *op. cit.* p. 284, l. 24: apprehensio intelligentiae . . . p. 285, l. 7, spiritualitatem intelligentiae.



bilis corporalia habentia materiam non sunt intelligibilia, sed abstracta a materia et a consequentibus materiam. Intellectus enim non apprehendit nisi cum intelligens apprehendit formam rei. Unde scientia intelligibilis non habetur nisi per intellectum. Igitur scientia intelligibilis est coniunctio formae intelligentis cum forma intellecta.

(5)

Cognitio<sup>189</sup> enim rei non habetur nisi per unionem duarum formarum cognoscentis et cogniti sine medio; quae unio<sup>j</sup> non fit nisi secundum<sup>k</sup> similitudinem et propinquitatem. Ac per hoc,<sup>l</sup> anima rationalis, quia<sup>m</sup> divisibilis<sup>n</sup> est a sensibus,<sup>o</sup> ideo non potest eis<sup>p</sup> coniungi nisi mediante aliquo quod sit simile duobus extremis. Medium autem inter animam intelligentem et corpus est anima sensibilis et natura. Sed et<sup>q</sup> anima sensibilis non apprehendit formas sensibiles nisi mediantibus instrumentis et aere propter similitudinem quam habent instrumenta et aer ad duo extrema, scilicet substantiam<sup>r</sup> sentientem et formas sensibiles.

(10)

Unde quaecumque scientia quae<sup>s</sup> aliquo<sup>t</sup> mediante acquiritur, anima exuta carne,<sup>u</sup> destruitur. Sed quia intellectus contemplativus animam subiectum suum inseparabiliter comitatur, ideo et sapientia quae per illum degustatur ab anima etiam separata a corpore non separatur. Sapientia<sup>190</sup> enim est comprehensio veritatis<sup>v</sup> earum rerum quae vere sunt et quae sui immutabilem<sup>w</sup> sortiuntur substantiam. Veritas<sup>191</sup> autem cuiusque rei est id<sup>x</sup> quod ipsa est, et in hoc conveniunt scientia et sapientia quod unaquaeque comprehendit id<sup>y</sup> quod ipsa res est. Unaquaeque igitur comprehendit veritatem rei. Alioquin nec vera scientia nec vera sapientia diceretur, si veritas<sup>z</sup> rei non comprehenderetur<sup>a</sup> sed quia<sup>192</sup> veritas rei alia est variabilis, alia<sup>b</sup> incommutabilis est.<sup>c</sup> Id enim quod unaquaeque res est aut variabiliter est et non semper manet idem aut incommutabilis<sup>d</sup> est quia semper idem<sup>e</sup> est; sed quia scientia est de sensibilibus quae motui et permutationi subiacta, ideo scientia est comprehensio veritatis rerum quae non<sup>f</sup> vere sunt, quia id quod sunt variabiliter sunt. Vere autem esse dicuntur quaecumque praeter motum et materiam vel omnino sunt vel intelliguntur quorum primum Deus est et deinde rationalis substantia intelligibilis et ad ultimum omnia quorum veritas incommutabiliter permanet. Sed quia horum omnium sapientia cognitio est, ideo sapientia<sup>193</sup> est comprehensio<sup>g</sup> veritatis earum rerum quae

(15)

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<sup>j</sup> unio C.

<sup>k</sup> per CP.

<sup>l</sup> add. quia CN] quod P.

<sup>m</sup> om. CNP.

<sup>n</sup> dissimilis CNP.

<sup>o</sup> sensibilibus N.

<sup>p</sup> ei NPV.

<sup>q</sup> om. CP.

<sup>r</sup> add. et N.

<sup>s</sup> om. CMNP.

<sup>t</sup> add. aliq. med. after acquiritur CP.

<sup>u</sup> corpore C.

<sup>v</sup> om. CP.

<sup>w</sup> immutabile C.

<sup>x</sup> idem N.

<sup>y</sup> id . . . comprehendit om. V.

<sup>z</sup> rei veritas CP.

<sup>a</sup> apprehenderetur C.

<sup>b</sup> add. est M.

<sup>c</sup> om. CMN.

<sup>d</sup> incommutabiliter MNP.

<sup>e</sup> est idem CP.

<sup>f</sup> nec M.

<sup>g</sup> cognitio CP.

<sup>189</sup> Cognitio . . . l. 14, formas sensibiles. Cf. *op. cit.* p. 285, ll. 7–23. quia cognitio . . . formas sensibiles.

<sup>190</sup> Sapientiam . . . sortiuntur substantiam. Cf. Isaac Israeli, *Liber de Definitionibus*. *Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du M.A.* 12–13 (1937–38), p. 307: Sapientia est veritas scientiae rerum primarum sempiternarum perpetuarum.

<sup>191</sup> Veritas . . . ipsa est. Cf. *op. cit.* l. 24, p. 307: Definitio veritatis est quod est. Cf. pp. 322–3.

Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est. St. Augustine, *Solit.* II. 5, 8. PL 32. 889. Nihil ergo crit falsum quia quidquid est, verum est. *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> veritas . . . l. 26, incommutabilis permanet. Cf. an analogous text: Boethius, *De Arith.* I, 1. PL 63, 1080D–1081A: Quae ipsa quidem . . . esse dicuntur.

<sup>193</sup> sapientia est . . . sortiuntur substantiam. Cf. *op. cit.* 1079–80: est enim sapientia . . . comprehensio veritatis.

sunt <sup>h</sup> vere et quae sui immutabilem sortiuntur substantiam. Sicut autem per intellectum scientia sic sapientia per intelligentiam acquiritur, quae <sup>i</sup> secundum Boethium <sup>194</sup> paucorum <sup>j</sup> admodum hominum est et solius Dei. Intelligentia <sup>195</sup> enim est altior oculus animae quo se vel Deum et aeterna contemplando speculatur.

(5)

Sed quia dum intelligendis sensibilibus subtilitate scientiae anima rationalis intendit, nec <sup>k</sup> se nec Deum intelligit, haec enim sensibilia quibus occupatur sub ipsa sunt, ideo ut se et Eum <sup>l</sup> a quo est intelligat, necesse est ut cuncta sensibilia et eorum formas, ipsum etiam intellectum et omnem scientiam et rerum memoriam transcendat ut a carnalibus sensibus pura uni soli et simplici cogitationi cui debet esse <sup>m</sup> tantum intenta in <sup>n</sup> considerationem <sup>o</sup> eius a quo est simpliciter sese suspendat; quatenus superiorem faciem sursum <sup>p</sup> elevans ascendat cum Paulo ad tertium coelum, <sup>196</sup> scilicet mundum illum intelligibilem in quo iam <sup>q</sup> non sensus vel intellectus sive scientia valet sed sola intelligentia. Si enim scientia non est nisi de his quae sensus vel intellectus percipit, intellectus autem et sensus proprie non est nisi de compositis, non enim intellectus percipit nisi coniuncta dividendo et divisa coniungendo, profecto cum altior mentis oculus scilicet intelligentia in solam <sup>r</sup> cognitionem verae simplicitatis intenditur, necesse est ut inde <sup>s</sup> intellectus et scientia quae diversorum sunt omnino expellantur. Sola est ergo ibi necessaria intelligentia ut sapientia percipiatur. <sup>t</sup>

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Cum enim hic oculus animae qui est intelligentia <sup>u</sup> in contemplationem <sup>v</sup> creatoris intendit, quoniam Deus lux est, ipsa intelligentia tanta claritate divini <sup>w</sup> luminis perfunditur ut <sup>x</sup> in ipsa intelligentia sic irradiata lux inaccessibilis tamquam forma in speculo resultare videatur. Ipsa enim intelligentia creaturae rationalis quasi speculum est aeterni luminis de qua Apostolus: <sup>197</sup> *Videmus nunc <sup>y</sup> per speculum <sup>z</sup> quae quanto amplius ab omni alia <sup>a</sup> cogitatione detersa fuerit, tanto verius in ea divinae lucis imago resultabit. Ex qua intelligentia sic irradiata et ex luce irradiante, illa mentis illuminatio divinitatis cognitio, veritatisque <sup>b</sup> perfectio <sup>c</sup> nascitur, quae est vera sapientia. De qua propheta <sup>198</sup> dicit: Domine in <sup>d</sup> lumine tuo videbimus lumen.*

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Sicut <sup>199</sup> enim hunc solem visibilem non nisi adminiculo suae lucis videmus <sup>e</sup>

<sup>h</sup> vere sunt CMNP.

<sup>i</sup> quod N.

<sup>j</sup> adm. pauc. C admodum om. P.

<sup>k</sup> ne V.

<sup>l</sup> Deum CP. Ideo . . . eum] ita ut eum se et

M.

<sup>m</sup> om. MNV.

<sup>n</sup> et V.

<sup>o</sup> consideratione CNP.

<sup>p</sup> om. C.

<sup>q</sup> non iam CMNP.

<sup>r</sup> sola cognitione N.

<sup>s</sup> idem N] om. M.

<sup>t</sup> perficiatur C] percipiant P.

<sup>u</sup> intelligentiae N.

<sup>v</sup> contemplatione N.

<sup>w</sup> aeterni V.

<sup>x</sup> om. N.

<sup>y</sup> om. M.

<sup>z</sup> add. in enigmate C] et cetera P.

<sup>a</sup> om. CP.

<sup>b</sup> ver. quod N.

<sup>c</sup> conceptio N] perceptio CMP.

<sup>d</sup> in lum.] illumine N.

<sup>e</sup> videbimus M.

<sup>194</sup> I do not find this in Boethius. The text cited by Father De Vaux: Ratio vero humani tantum generis est, sicuti intelligentia sola divini. *Consol.* V, Pr. 5. PL 63, 854B is not the same. We find it repeated in *Liber de Spiritu et Anima*, 37. PL 40, col. 808: Boethius tamen dicit intelligentiam solius Deiesse et admodum paucorum hominum. Originally it is an adaptation of Plato, *Timaeus* 51c: μετέχειν φαιέντων τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. Translated by Chalcidius: intellectus vero Dei proprius, et paucorum admodum lectorum hominum. *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, Mullachius, Paris, 1867. Vol.

2, p. 179.

<sup>195</sup> Intelligentia . . . animae. Cf. Boethius, *Consol.* V, Pr. 4. PL 63, 849A: Intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit. (In the critical edition, CSEL 67, p. 117, ll. 25–26, the text is the same but intelligentia is given as a variant.)

<sup>196</sup> Cf. II Cor. XII, 2.

<sup>197</sup> I Cor. XIII, 12.

<sup>198</sup> Ps. XXXV, 10.

<sup>199</sup> Sicut enim . . . l. 4, p. 100, proxime accedit. Much the same thought is found in Isaac de Stella, *Epist. de anima*, PL 194, 1888A.

sic <sup>f</sup> ipsum solem iustitiae Patrem <sup>200</sup> luminum non nisi sua claritate prius irradiati per intelligentiam contuemur; nam cum ad contemplandum Deum anima rationalis per intelligentiam ascendit ad ipsum lumen inaccessible proxime accedit. Inter quam et Deum quoniam iam tunc nihil inter est, ex vicinitate aeterni luminis ipsa quoque intelligentia quae in ipsum lumen offendit procul dubio luminosior fit ut se et Deum cognoscat, iuxta illud: <sup>201</sup> *Accedite ⁂ ad Deum et illuminamini*. Et in hoc tantum intelligentiae accessu sapientia degustatur. Si <sup>202</sup> enim sapientia a sapore dicta est, sapor autem rei non sentitur nisi cum res <sup>h</sup> ipsa degustatur, <sup>i</sup> gustatur autem cum ad horam <sup>j</sup> gustu tangitur, profecto sola intelligentia sapientia <sup>k</sup> percipitur, <sup>l</sup> quia ea sola <sup>m</sup> sed <sup>n</sup> rara <sup>203</sup> hora et parva mora Deus utcumque sentitur. Unde propheta: <sup>204</sup> *Gustate et videte quoniam ⁂ suavis est dominus*. Et merito per intelligentiam gustari potius quam videri <sup>o</sup> vel audiri vel odorari Dominus <sup>p</sup> dicitur quia cum omnes alii sensus praeter tactum qui communis est omnibus remota a se sentiant, gustus ex omnibus praeter tactum hoc habet proprium ut sentire non possit <sup>q</sup> nisi quod se nullo mediante tetigerit. (5)

Ideo sola intelligentia Deus gustari dicitur quia ex omnibus viribus animae ea sola in praesenti et in futuro nullo <sup>q</sup> mediante quasi tangitur; hic tamen proprie gustamus ubi <sup>r</sup> ad horam intelligendo raptim <sup>s</sup> <sup>205</sup> de Deo aliquid sentimus. Ibi vero satiabimur, ubi eo sine fine perfruemur iuxta illud <sup>206</sup>: *satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua*. Sola est ergo <sup>t</sup> intelligentia quae ex omnibus viribus suis in <sup>u</sup> purgata anima post mortem remanet, si forte in ea se <sup>v</sup> ante mortem iugiter exercet. Nam si in corpore posita intellectum contemplativum non habuit, <sup>w</sup> profecto, quia in morte intellectum activum deserit, cum neutro recedens in tenebris tabescit. Quod autem intellectus activus in morte deseratur, Apostolus <sup>207</sup> testatur dicens: *prophetia cessabit et scientia evacuabitur* sed quia sapientia permanet in aeternum, intelligentia utique qua <sup>x</sup> apprehenditur, semper permanere non dubitatur. Et ideo anima fit immortalis per intelligentiam aeternitatis. <sup>y</sup> Cum enim rationalis <sup>z</sup> anima sed beata <sup>a</sup> ab hac mortalitate transit, intellectus ab intelligentia, scientia a sapientia, temporalitas ab aeternitate absorbetur et in illa claritate aeterni luminis Deus et in Deo quicquid non est Deus simpliciter <sup>b</sup> videtur. Unde Apostolus: <sup>208</sup> *Tunc enim cognoscemus sicut et cogniti sumus*. Non enim erit <sup>c</sup> ibi necesse sicut hic ad multa cognoscenda oculum mentis circumflectere, et nunc hoc, nunc illud vicissim attendere, sed cuncta simul generaliter immo specialiter <sup>d</sup> cognosce- (10)

<sup>f</sup> sicut M.

<sup>g</sup> ascendite N.

<sup>h</sup> ipsa res CP.

<sup>i</sup> gustatur CP.

<sup>j</sup> hora M.

<sup>k</sup> om. C.

<sup>l</sup> perficitur CP.

<sup>m</sup> et CP.

<sup>n</sup> quia V] quam N.

<sup>o</sup> odor. vel aud. CP.

<sup>p</sup> Deus N.

<sup>q</sup> quasi nullo med. CP. om. N (torn ms.).

<sup>r</sup> nisi P.

<sup>t</sup> igitur CP.

<sup>u</sup> impurgata VP.

<sup>v</sup> add. tantum CP.

<sup>w</sup> habuerit N.

<sup>x</sup> quam N] qui C] que P.

<sup>y</sup> om. M.

<sup>z</sup> an. rat. C.

<sup>a</sup> liberata P.

<sup>b</sup> add. non est M.

<sup>c</sup> ibi erit CP.

<sup>d</sup> simpliciter CMNP.

<sup>s</sup> raptum N.

<sup>200</sup> St. James I, 17.

<sup>201</sup> Ps. XXXIII, 6.

<sup>202</sup> Si enim sapientia a sapore dicta est. Cf. St. Bernard, *In Cant. Canticorum*, Sermo 85, 8. PL 183, 1191D: et forte sapientia a sapore denominatur.

<sup>203</sup> rara hora et parva mora. *Op. cit.* Sermo 23, 15. PL 183, 892B: *The phrase parva mora*

*occurs several times in Ovid, v.g. Met. 8. 671.*

<sup>204</sup> Ps. XXXIII, 9.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. St. Bernard, *De dilig. Deo*, X. PL 182, 990C.

<sup>206</sup> Ps. XVI, 15.

<sup>207</sup> II Cor. XIII, 8.

<sup>208</sup> I Cor. XIII, 12.

mus quando <sup>o</sup> ipsum librum <sup>209</sup> vitae in quo sunt omnes <sup>210</sup> thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei coram nobis apertum in tanta claritate legentes intellexerimus.<sup>†</sup> Si enim nunc <sup>§</sup> in carne quis positus, quamdiu per intelligentiam sublevatur, sic <sup>h</sup> in ipso intuitu aeterni luminis indeclinabiliter tenetur ut ad nulla alia cogitanda unquam vel ad <sup>i</sup> modicum permutetur, tunc utique quanto immobilis <sup>j</sup> uni soli intentioni adhaerebit, quando quod impediatur nil habebitur,<sup>k</sup> quando secundum Apostolum: <sup>211</sup> *A claritate in claritatem transierit*; a claritate praesentis contemplationis ad claritatem perfectae visionis, a claritate speculi <sup>212</sup> et aenigmatis ad claritatem plenam et continuam cognoscendae veritatis. Rationalis ergo anima in tantum vere est in quantum se et Deum intelligit. Sed in <sup>l</sup> tantum a vero esse deficit et quasi moritur, in quantum a contemplatione veritatis avertitur. Et tamen non sic moritur ut esse desinat, sed sic moritur ut sine beata vita semper infelicitur vivat.

Ad beatam ergo vitam,<sup>213</sup> cognitionem <sup>m</sup> scilicet divinitatis, acquirendam, tam hic quam in futuro, quae est vera sapientia, nihil praestantius <sup>n</sup> videtur quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus, extra carnem mundumque <sup>o</sup> effectum quempiam, alienumque a mortalium <sup>p</sup> curis, in secreto cordis sibi soli loqui et Deo, ut altior cunctis visibilibus factus, mentem suam repleat divinis sensibus et coelestibus formis absque ulla commixtione terrena, vere speculum immaculatum effectus imaginis Dei; et ex ipsius lumine semper lumen accipiens instar quoddam futurae beatitudinis iam in semetipso praeferat; et id operis quod postmodum aeternaliter acturus est iam in praesenti quasi quodam praeludio contemplationis exerceat. Ad eum enim qui vere simplex est cognoscendum rationalis anima pervenire non potest nisi omnia sensibilia, se suamque multiplicitatem cogitationum, desideriorum transcendens, in <sup>q</sup> tantam simplicitatem se extenuaverit <sup>r</sup> ut haec sola intentio in eo permaneat <sup>s</sup> ceterisque omnibus clausis hunc solum intelligentiae simplicis oculum in Creatoris contemplatione defigat. Ad hoc autem quando sufficiat, quando suam ipsius simplicitatem simpliciter sine ulla <sup>t</sup> cogitatione vix <sup>u</sup> unquam <sup>v</sup> considerat? Nunc enim rationalis <sup>w</sup> anima plene se sicut est videre non valet quia <sup>x</sup> de terrena inhabitatione tenebras sustinet, et tamen in tantum se conspicit in quantum has tenebras per lumen intelligentiae vincit. Cum enim ad contemplandum Deum per intelligentiam ascendit, quoniam tunc ad lumen accedit,<sup>y</sup> ex qua parte magis illuminatur,<sup>z</sup> ex ea sibi magis innotescit; ex <sup>a</sup> ea vero parte se non videt, ex qua per consortium carnis tenebras sustinet

<sup>o</sup> quoniam C.<sup>†</sup> intelleximus C.<sup>q</sup> multiplicitatem in tantam (simplicitatem s.m.) V.<sup>§</sup> om. M. in carne nunc C.<sup>h</sup> sicut N.<sup>r</sup> add. vel P.<sup>i</sup> om. CP.<sup>s</sup> maneat CMN] remaneat P.<sup>j</sup> immutabilis C.<sup>t</sup> add. consideratione vel CP.<sup>k</sup> habebit CMP.<sup>u</sup> in quantum vix consideret P.<sup>l</sup> om. CP.<sup>v</sup> numquam MN.<sup>m</sup> cognitionis CP.<sup>w</sup> an. rat. CP.<sup>n</sup> primitius C.<sup>x</sup> quia de] qui ad V.<sup>o</sup> mundumque effectum CMV] mundum quia effectum P.] mundique? effectum N.<sup>y</sup> add. et N.<sup>p</sup> mortalibus C.<sup>z</sup> add. et N.<sup>a</sup> et M.<sup>209</sup> Apoc. XIII, 8.<sup>210</sup> Col. II, 3.<sup>211</sup> II Cor. III, 12.<sup>212</sup> I Cor. XIII, 12.<sup>213</sup> Repeated in *Liber de Spiritu et Anima*, 40. PL 40, 791: Nihil enim ad beatam vitam praestantius videtur, quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus extra carnem mundumqueeffectum quempiam intra semetipsum converti, alienumque effectum a mortalium cupiditatibus sibi soli et Deo loqui. *The passage from nihil praestantius to contemplationis exerceat is taken from St. Gregory Naz. Oratio II, 7. PG 35, 413BC. Cf. CSEL, XXXXVI, I, p. 11.*

quia corpus <sup>214</sup> quod corrumpitur aggravat animam. Unde mens <sup>b</sup> hominis a mene <sup>215</sup> graeco merito dicitur quod latine luna interpretatur. Luna enim, ut aiunt astrologi, non habet lumen a se sed a sole. Ex ea enim parte illuminatur qua solem respicit, sed ex ea semper tenebrosa manet quam <sup>c</sup> ad terram deprimit.<sup>d</sup> Sic <sup>e</sup> mens humana cum per <sup>f</sup> superiorem faciem virtutem <sup>g</sup> scilicet intelligentiae ad contemplandum Deum convertitur, ex ea parte illuminatur et sibi clara videtur quia se vel Deum nulla phantasia intervolante sed <sup>h</sup> revelata facie contuetur. Cum vero per inferiorem virtutem, scilicet scientiam, ad haec sensibilia <sup>i</sup> intelligenda et <sup>j</sup> disponenda se deprimit,<sup>k</sup> ex ea tenebrescit <sup>l</sup> et se non videt quia sibi et aliis, terrenis et aeternis, simul intendere non valet; cum enim istis intendit, ab illis discedit,<sup>m</sup> et <sup>n</sup> quo in his est amplior, in illis est angustior. Et <sup>o</sup> quo plus habet terrenae solitudinis in infimis, minus habet luminis ex supernis. Et ideo rationalis anima cum sit media inter intellectum et intelligentiam tanto per intellectum et scientiam haec inferiora subtilius intelligit,<sup>p</sup> laudabilius ordinat, quanto per intelligentiam plus cognitionis <sup>q</sup> superius degustat; quia <sup>r</sup> quanto plus <sup>s</sup> luminis a superiore percipit, tanto plus ad inferiorem transmittit ut in eo quasi ad lucernae lumen videat quo in nocte huius saeculi gressum operis ponat.

Cum autem inter solem et lunam terra interponitur, luna per eclipsim obscuratur, quia cum mens rationalis ad haec terrena cogitanda et amanda se deprimit, terrena cura interposita, veri solis sibi <sup>t</sup> radios abscondit quia contemplationis lucem subtrahit. Cum igitur <sup>u</sup> terra interponitur, luna eclipsim patitur, quia, cum mens terrena cura premitur, divinae contemplationis luce privatur.

Notandum autem quia <sup>v</sup> luna multotiens tota <sup>w</sup> obscuratur, sed numquam tota illuminatur; tota enim luna obscuratur cum humanam mentem terrenae solitudinis sic undique nebula obscurat, quod eam divinae considerationis radius ex nulla parte illustret.<sup>x</sup> Sed cum illuminatur, numquam tota illuminatur, quia mens rationalis numquam perfecte se videt, quamdiu temporalis mutabilitati subiacet. Sed eo magis et magis se conspicit quo magis et magis ad lumen verum per contemplationem accedit, quod *est* <sup>216</sup> lux vera quae <sup>y</sup> illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Non scilicet hunc primum <sup>z</sup> sensibilem, caliginosum, neque hunc <sup>a</sup> secundum intellectibilem <sup>b</sup> formarum multiplicitate <sup>c</sup> plenum, sed hunc tertium,<sup>d</sup> intelligibilem simplicem, qui est tertium caelum ad quod raptus Paulus per contemplationem audit arcana verba quae non <sup>217</sup> licet homini loqui, in quo sola simplicia et aeterna simpliciter <sup>e</sup> videntur quorum tantum cognitio sapientia est. In primo enim

<sup>b</sup> omnes homines C.

<sup>c</sup> qua CP.

<sup>d</sup> deprimitur C.

<sup>e</sup> add. est M.

<sup>f</sup> om. M.

<sup>g</sup> virtutis solis CP.

<sup>h</sup> scilicet M.

<sup>i</sup> in sensibilia C. ad hoc sensibilibium M.

<sup>j</sup> et disp. om. C.

<sup>k</sup> deprimitur C.

<sup>l</sup> tenebrascit C.

<sup>m</sup> descendit N.

<sup>n</sup> in N] et M.

<sup>o</sup> ex N.

<sup>p</sup> add. et N.

<sup>q</sup> cogitationis V.

<sup>r</sup> om. M.

<sup>u</sup> enim C.

<sup>v</sup> quod C.

<sup>w</sup> obscuratur tota P.

<sup>x</sup> illustrat MNV.

<sup>y</sup> quae ill.] illuminans N.

<sup>z</sup> scil. hunc primum cal. sens. N] scil. hunc mundum sens. cal. V] scil. hunc mundum primum cal. P] enim hunc primum cal. C

<sup>a</sup> om. CP.

<sup>b</sup> intelligibilem V.

<sup>c</sup> multiplicata CPV.

<sup>d</sup> terrenum N.

<sup>e</sup> simplicia CP.

<sup>r</sup> et N.

<sup>t</sup> radios sibi C.

<sup>214</sup> Wisdom IX, 15.

<sup>215</sup> Cassiodorus *De An.* 1. 7. PL 70, 1282B.

<sup>216</sup> St. John I, 9.

<sup>217</sup> II Cor. XII, 4.

mundo sive caelo cum bestiis terrae par experientiam sensuum <sup>f</sup> reptamus; ad secundum autem cum sapientibus huius saeculi per <sup>g</sup> intellectum sublevamur; ad tertium vero cum Paulo per intelligentiam <sup>h</sup> supra nos rapimur;<sup>i</sup> ut dicere possimus: <sup>j</sup> *Nostra* <sup>218</sup> *conversatio in caelis est.* In primo igitur solis sensibus degimus <sup>k</sup> in secundo scientiam apprehendimus, in tertio sapientiam degustamus. In primo caelo quasi caeci in tenebris homines palpitant de quibus dicitur: <sup>219</sup> *nescierunt neque intellexerunt quoniam in tenebris ambulant.* In secundo luna lucet <sup>l</sup> quia *nox nocti indicat scientiam.* In tertio sol refulget quia *dies* <sup>220</sup> *diei eructat verbum.* (5)

Postquam autem auxiliante Deo, iam sufficienter assignavimus quod rationalis anima omnes vires suas in corpore manens quantum in se est exerceat. Et deinde quod exuta a corpore de vegetabilibus nullam, de sensibilibus vero unam scilicet memoriam, de intelligibilibus <sup>m</sup> quoque unum scilicet contemplativum retineat, restabat ut ex omnibus viribus suis quas sit habitura recepto corpore monstraremus. Sed quia de hoc apud philosophos paene nihil invenimus, nos quasi ex nobis aliquid apponere non presumimus.<sup>n</sup> Tres enim status habet anima; in corpore, deposito corpore, recepto corpore; primus est vivorum, secundus mortuorum, tertius resuscitatorum. In primo itaque ut praedictum <sup>o</sup> est omnes vires suas exercere cognoscitur nisi forte alicuius sui instrumenti vitio praepediatur.<sup>p</sup> In secundo de vegetabilibus nullam, de sensibilibus vero unam scilicet memoriam retinet. Si enim dives damnatus apud inferos fratrum suorum memoriam non amisit dicens: <sup>221</sup> *habeo quinque fratres, quanto magis beatorum spiritus exuti* <sup>q</sup> *a carne memoriam nostri non deserunt quos dum viverent in Christo dilexerunt, cum iam* <sup>r</sup> *et angeli* <sup>222</sup> *gaudeant pro conversione* <sup>s</sup> *nostra.* De intellectibus etiam unum scilicet contemplativum quo uno oculo beata anima videt Deum suum. Recepto vero corpore quod de vegetabilibus nullam sit habitura certi sumus. Sed de sensibilibus et intelligibilibus viribus quas sit habitura et quas non, nondum plene instructi sumus. (10)

Finitus est liber.<sup>t</sup>

*Lege* <sup>u</sup> *Tractatum et fuge errores.*<sup>v</sup>

<sup>f</sup> sensivum M.

<sup>g</sup> per int. om. C.

<sup>h</sup> experientiam V.

<sup>i</sup> rapiamur MN.

<sup>j</sup> possumus N.

<sup>k</sup> digimus N.

<sup>l</sup> luceret C.

<sup>m</sup> intellectibus MNV.

<sup>n</sup> praesumpsimus CMN] praesumsimus P.

<sup>218</sup> Phill. III, 20.

<sup>219</sup> Ps. LXXXI, 5.

<sup>220</sup> Ps. XVIII, 3.

<sup>o</sup> dictum CP.

<sup>p</sup> impediatur CP.

<sup>q</sup> a carne exuti CMNP.

<sup>r</sup> etiam CMN.

<sup>s</sup> conversatione N.

<sup>t</sup> Finitus est liber. *add.* de anima M] *Explicit commentum de anima P]* om. CN.

<sup>u</sup> *Lege . . . errores om.* CMNP. s. m. V.

<sup>v</sup> *followed by three words I cannot read.*

<sup>221</sup> St. Luke XVI, 27.

<sup>222</sup> Cf. St. Luke XV, 10.

# Ralph Niger

## *An Introduction to His Life and Works*

G. B. FLAHIFF, C.S.B.

THE figure of Ralph Niger, like that of so many English scholars of the latter half of the twelfth century, is an obscure and elusive one. All who have attempted to sketch his life have had to conclude with the half apologetic acknowledgment that we know indeed but little of him.<sup>1</sup> What writings of his contemporaries have been preserved to us contain extremely few references to him. If additional contemporary works were known to the older bibliographers, they certainly do not seem to have provided them with any additional information about Niger.<sup>2</sup> Ordinarily, one might resign himself to passing over such a writer, as we do so many of that period, with little more than the mention of his name; but in Ralph's case, the very bulk of the writings he has left behind stands as a constant challenge and arouses our curiosity about their little-known author.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the already familiar material does afford, on closer examination, more information than has hitherto been gathered from it, while the works themselves of Niger provide other elements toward a more complete biography. The present article pretends in no way to be definitive. Its purpose is chiefly to restate and evaluate the known facts about Niger's life, to add those which have been derived from a study already begun of his works, and to show at the same time that such a study and even an edition of his works may be justified. It will deal in a first part with Niger's life, and in a second part with the list of his authentic works.<sup>4</sup>

### I

The year of Ralph Niger's birth cannot be fixed with certainty. Around 1140 would seem to be an approximate date, since he is a student in the schools of Paris in the 1160's and is referred to as *Magister (magister artium)* by 1168 at the latest. As to the place, several writers have stated that Niger was born at Bury St. Edmunds

<sup>1</sup> R. Anstruther, *Radulphi Nigri Chronica, the Chronicles of Ralph Niger* (Publ. of Caxton Soc., London, 1851) contains a few introductory remarks on Ralph's life (pp. vii-viii). R. Pauli has added nothing, save the suggestion that Ralph may have been a Cistercian, in his article, 'Die Chroniken des Radulphus Niger,' *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (1880), pp. 569-589, especially 569-571 on Ralph's life; cf. Pauli's introduction to the extracts of Ralph's chronicles, which he has edited in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, XXVII, 327-344. The fullest single account we have of Ralph is that by C. L. Kingsford in the *Dictionary of National Biography* under the name *Niger*; it is the fullest only because it gathers together most of what various others had previously said.

<sup>2</sup> John Bale, *Index Britanniae Scriptorum*, ed. Poole-Bateson (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Oxford, 1902), pp. 331-332; John Pits, *De Illustribus Angliae Scriptoribus* (1619), p. 291; C. Oudin,

*Commentarius de Scriptoribus Ecclesiae Antiquis* (Leipzig, 1722), III, 94-95; Thomas Tanner, *Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica* (London, 1748), p. 548. Tanner has used the earlier bibliographers, and seems to be himself the basis of later accounts. Most of the bibliographical works on English writers have at least mentioned Niger and his writings.

<sup>3</sup> His Scripture commentaries, preserved in the Library of the Dean and Chapter of Lincoln Cathedral (*Mss.* 23, 24, 25, 26, 27), fill some 700 folios, recto and verso, the equivalent, that is, of 1400 pages, each page containing 2 columns of 60 lines each. These manuscripts will be referred to as *Linc. Ms.* 23, etc.

<sup>4</sup> The only excuse for writing the article at this stage is the suggestion from others working in the twelfth century that anything added to our present knowledge of Niger would prove useful. I hope to be able to furnish further material, as my work on his writings proceeds.

in Suffolk, but none of them give any authority whatsoever for their affirmation. Some have been prudent enough to explain that 'it has been said' he was a native of that place;<sup>5</sup> others have stated it absolutely.<sup>6</sup> I find no evidence to confirm such a statement, unless it be the presence of Ralph's works in the mediaeval monastic library at Bury. This, after all, is rather weak evidence, and I see no reason why the statement should be maintained. The birthplace of Niger, like the date of his birth, is still unknown. Nor do we know aught of his youth: our first information concerning him comes from his student days. For a long time, John of Salisbury's letter of the year 1166 provided the earliest known reference to Ralph Niger. If the chronology proposed by the editor of a document recently come to light, however, be correct, our first information about him dates from one year earlier, 1165.

The document in question is a letter written by Ralph himself, probably in the year 1182, wherein he seeks to enlist the aid of Conrad of Wittelsbach Cardinal-Bishop of Sabina, in his effort to win ecclesiastical approval for his theological writings.<sup>7</sup> He reminds the Cardinal how he, Ralph, had formerly been instrumental in bringing Conrad, to the latter's great profit, into relation with Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Martin Preiss, who has published the document, shows that this meeting must have taken place in the summer of 1165 at Sens. As will appear presently, Niger was already at this time a student at Paris. His presence at Sens at a given moment is easily explained in view of his associations with the Archbishop of Canterbury and his fellow exiles. Of this latter fact we shall see more. Meanwhile, the document's particular interest consists in revealing to us Ralph's intimacy, even as a young man, not only with the great archbishop of Canterbury, but likewise with Conrad of Wittelsbach, Cardinal, Archbishop of Mainz, and a leading figure in the Empire.

The letter of John of Salisbury, written to Ralph Niger in the following summer, 1166,<sup>8</sup> is fortunately richer in information. It is the answer to one just received from Ralph. After a first allusion to his own recent failure to be reconciled with Henry II (for John has been forced into exile in the wake of Archbishop Becket and is at that moment the guest of his old friend Peter de la Celle, abbot of St. Remi at Rheims), he goes on to comment on the news given him by Niger, especially as to the English bishops' appeal against the excommunication which Becket had pronounced against them on Whitsunday of the year 1166. Finally, John comes to

<sup>5</sup> Bale (*Index*, p. 331) seems to be the first to state it; he does so cautiously: 'Fuit iste Sudovolas (ut fertur) Buriensis . . .' Later writers have undoubtedly followed Bale, although they do not give their authority. The author of the article in *DNB* appears to associate Bury as Niger's birthplace with the fact that manuscripts of his works were formerly preserved there.

<sup>6</sup> M. R. James, in speaking of the works of Niger which John Boston found at Bury, adds to Niger's name: 'a native of Bury' ('Two Essays on the Abbey of St. Edmund at Bury,' *Cambridge Antiquarian Soc. Publications*, XXVIII, 1895, p. 39). Tanner had already stated it without qualification (*Bibl.*, p. 548); also Anstruther, after Tanner (p. vii). Hardy, in his *Descriptive Catalogue of Mss. relating to History of Great Britain . . .*, II (London, 1865), 288, cites Pits who had very certainly used Bale.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Preiss, *Die politische Tätigkeit und Stellung der Cisterzienser im Schisma von 1159-1177* (Eberings Historische Studien 248, Berlin, 1934), Anhang II, pp. 260-265. The letter itself is published on p. 261. See below (n. 43) for a fuller consideration of Ralph's constant preoccupation about ecclesiastical approval for his works.

<sup>8</sup> Ep. 180 (Migne *PL*, 199, col. 177-179; also in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, XVI, 535-537; and Robertson, *Materials for the History of Thomas Becket*, VI, London, 1882, pp. 1-5; references in this article are given to the Migne edition, as the most convenient). The date of the letter may be ascertained from the fact that John is answering a letter received from Ralph, in which the latter informed him of the appeal of the English bishops against the excommunication pronounced by Becket at Vézelay on June 12, 1166. This appeal was decided upon at a meeting of bishops at Northampton on July 6 of the same year (A. Morey, *Bartholomew of Exeter*, London, 1937, pp. 23-24). Allowing time for the news to reach Niger and for his letter to reach John, John's letter could hardly be earlier than the end of July.



what seems to have been the main point of the letter he had received.<sup>9</sup> Niger had besought him to use his influence with the archbishop of Canterbury on behalf of Ralph's good friend, the archdeacon of Poitiers (Richard of Ilchester),<sup>10</sup> one of the victims of the excommunication; he had likewise asked John's counsel concerning a proposed visit to Richard. John is in a quandary as to what to reply: although he does not completely discourage such intimacy with the excommunicate, he sees it, nevertheless, to be dangerous and he urges Niger to seek the advice of others. Apparently Niger was not satisfied with this non-committal answer. John's next letter<sup>11</sup> shows that he has heard again from Ralph to the effect that, while he has thus far declined all invitations and inducements to go to Richard, the appeals of the latter become more and more insistent. By now, John's mind is clearer on the attitude to be taken: he makes the necessary distinctions as to various ways of communicating with excommunicates and goes on to find scriptural support for encouraging Niger to visit their mutual friend, the archdeacon, in the hope of winning him to repentance. These two letters are so closely connected, both in subject-matter and in time, that they may well be considered together in drawing from them information about Niger.

Ralph must have been at that moment of the year 1166 a student in the schools, since John, speaking in the present tense, congratulates him on his studies and on his choice of schools, where virtue and not merely idle argumentation is cultivated.<sup>12</sup> The schools in question can hardly be other than those of Paris, as indeed is generally accepted, although the vague reference to their being *in urbe garrula et ventosa* has been interpreted otherwise.<sup>13</sup> A considerable number of learned Englishmen were then in or near Paris, as a result of having been driven into exile with Becket.<sup>14</sup> This, however, is certainly not the case for Ralph, as may be inferred from facts which show that he is not in the king's disfavour at the time of this letter:

<sup>9</sup> *PL*, 199, col. 178C.

<sup>10</sup> On Richard of Ilchester, see the article under this name in *DNB* (Kate Norgate).

<sup>11</sup> Ep. 181 (*PL*, 199, col. 179-181; *Materials*, VI, 5-8); this letter is not published in the *Recueil*, but is referred to in a note on the preceding letter (XVI, 535, n.e.).

<sup>12</sup> Ep. 181 (col. 179D): 'Unde et studiis tuis congratulor quem agnosco ex signis perspicuis in urbe garrula et ventosa, ut pace scholarium dictum sit, non tam inutilium argumentationum locos inquirere quam virtutum.' Du Boulay, in his *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis* (Paris, 1665), II, 769, cites this passage when he speaks of Niger as a teacher of rhetoric and dialectics at Paris; but it surely suggests a student rather than a master. It is not impossible, however, that he was already a master in some discipline. The address prefixed to the letter as published proves nothing, since it is not that of the original letter; but in another letter of John's to Gerard Pucelle, dating from the same year (cf. n. 18 below), reference is made to a 'Master' Ralph (Ep. 185, *PL*, 199, col. 192: 'ministerium magistri Radulphi') who is almost certainly Niger, since this latter actually does figure in still another letter of John to the same Gerard with the added name of Niger (Ep. 238, *PL*, 199, col. 270), and the nature of the rôle played by the 'Master Ralph' in the two cases is very similar.

<sup>13</sup> The editor of the *Recueil* has attempted to prove that the reference is to Poitiers (XVI,

535, n.e). DuBoulay had interpreted it as meaning Paris (*loc. cit.*), and this interpretation seems highly probable, to say the least. The expression, 'garrulous and windy city,' rings like the slang of students with whom John himself would be familiar; indeed, just shortly before this time, he had been in Paris, enjoying to the full his renewed contact with the scenes of his own studies (cf. *Chartularium Univ. Paris.*, ed. Denifle-Chatelain, I, Paris, 1889, p. 24). Moreover, the allusion to a considerable choice among the schools ('multiplices locos et sedes') fits Paris better. Finally, we know that Ralph was certainly a student at Paris at some time, since, in the Prologue to one of his commentaries, he speaks of Gerard Pucelle as his master (Anstruther, *Radulphi Nigri Chronica*, p. vii; the passage referred to occurs in *Linc. Ms. 26*, fol. 1: 'Hujus vero audacie mee incoctores habui venerabilem Johannem Carnotensem episcopum et magistrum meum Gerardum Puellam dictum'). On Gerard, see *Hist. litt. de la France*, XIV, 301-304, for the little that is known of him; also A. Budinsky, *Die Universität Paris und die Fremden an derselben* (Berlin, 1872), pp. 82-83. Miss Eleanor Rathbone is preparing a work on English Cathedral Chapters as centres of learning in the twelfth century; it contains much new material on Gerard.

<sup>14</sup> Herbert of Bosham has left us a list of the *eruditi* who followed Becket into exile (*Materials*, III, 523 ff.).

he is intimate with Richard of Ilchester, clerk to Henry and his favourite ambassador, and he is, moreover, contemplating at the very moment a visit to the king's court (*ad curiam*), where he expects to meet the excommunicated archdeacon.<sup>15</sup> His subsequent bitterness toward Henry II and its cause, expulsion by the king, according to the testimony of the anonymous continuator of Niger's shorter chronicle,<sup>16</sup> must therefore date from a later period of his life. This, in turn, permits us to conclude that he was in Paris in 1166 for the specific purpose of studies, and not just to escape his monarch's wrath.

How long had Ralph then been in Paris? It is not sure, but, since he himself speaks elsewhere of Gerard Pucelle as his master,<sup>17</sup> and since Gerard left Paris for Cologne in 1165,<sup>18</sup> Niger must have been in Paris for some time previous to that date. Moreover, in a letter of the year 1168, John of Salisbury gives Ralph the explicit title of *Magister*; <sup>19</sup> this would certainly imply that Ralph had already spent several years in the schools. He may very well have come to Paris then about 1160 or shortly afterwards.

This letter of the year 1168 is addressed to Gerard Pucelle but makes reference to Niger. There is no evidence of any change in the latter's position at the time. He is still most intimate with John and Becket's followers. He may even have been present when John prepared for the archbishop a letter to Pope Alexander III interceding for Gerard Pucelle, who is still at Cologne and in disfavour with the Roman pontiff because of his association with the schismatics of that city.<sup>20</sup> John has asked Niger to write to Gerard and give him fuller details of the progress of their efforts, but the letter, if Niger ever did write it, has not come down to us. There is nothing further about Ralph in John's own letter; hence, it is of no assistance in determining whether his relations with the king's party had become any less friendly. That they did eventually, is clear from the well-known passage of Niger's shorter chronicle, where he bursts into a furious attack on Henry II's character as well as his policies.<sup>21</sup> Even in his theological works, he finds occasion to display his marked hostility to the king, although the tone he assumes is there somewhat less bitter.<sup>22</sup>

Our sole source of information on the subject of Niger's expulsion is the anonymous continuation of this shorter Chronicle. The author, before adding his own

<sup>15</sup> There can be no doubt that a visit to Henry II's court is meant, for on July 13 and 14 of that very year Richard was at Fougères with the king, where he witnessed royal acts issued there (L. DeLisle, *Recueil des actes de Henri II*, Paris, 1916, I, 402-403).

<sup>16</sup> Ed. Anstruther, p. 169.

<sup>17</sup> See above, n. 13.

<sup>18</sup> C. C. J. Webb (*John of Salisbury*, London, 1932, p. 148) gives 1166 as the date; Pauli is probably more correct in giving 1165 (*MGH*, SS, XXVII, 327, n. 1), since Gerard is already at Cologne when John of Salisbury writes to him early in 1166, at a date later than Becket's legatine appointment (April 24), but earlier, it would appear, than the excommunications of June 12 (Ep. 185, *PL*, 199, col. 192-195).

<sup>19</sup> Ep. 238 (*PL*, 199, col. 270); as has been seen above, he may have been *Magister* two years earlier; cf. n. 12.

<sup>20</sup> *PL*, 199, col. 270A: 'Misit ergo dominus Cantuariensis iterato ad Ecclesiam Romanam, injungens nuntiis, me praesente, ut revocationem vestram a domino papa satagerent

impetrare. Ego ipse ex conscientia magistri Radulphi Nigri composui litteras. Ego rogavi ipsum, ut rei hujus seriem ex ordine scriberet vobis.' Becket's letter had the desired effect, for, on May 20, Alexander III wrote pardoning Gerard, if Becket himself should deem his repentance sincere (*PL*, 200, col. 485-486; Jaffe-Loewenfeld, *Regesta*, no. 11400). Others besides Becket were seeking clemency for Gerard; cf. Preiss, *Die politische Tätigkeit . . .*, p. 102.

<sup>21</sup> Ed. Anstruther, pp. 167-169. This passage has likewise been transcribed in part by Wright, *Bibliographia Britannica Literaria*, Anglo-Norman Period (London, 1846), p. 423.

<sup>22</sup> Except in his chronicles, Niger invariably characterizes Henry II as 'rex sub quo passus est beatus Thomas martyr Anglorum' (e.g. *Moralia Regum*, Linc. Ms. 25, fol. 29v, 159v; Ms. 26, fol. 108, 109, 157; *De Re Militari*, Linc. Ms. 75, fol. 25, 28, 29v, etc.). Each of these references is occasioned, moreover, by the desire to point out some abuse of Henry's reign.

brief annals, feels called upon to offer some sort of apology for so 'unseemly' an attack on so great a monarch:

Hucusque protraxit hanc chronicam magister Radulfus Niger, qui, accusatus apud praedictum principem et in exilium pulsus, ob expulsiōis injuriā atrociora quam decuit de tanto ac tam serenissimo rege mordaci stilo scripsit.<sup>23</sup>

The grounds of the accusation against Niger are not stated. Oudin and Tanner use a very general term to characterize it as treason, without, however, giving any authority for their statement.<sup>24</sup> Very probably Ralph's continued sympathy for the archbishop's cause led to an accusation against him and to his expulsion some time before Becket's death in 1170.<sup>25</sup> There is, nevertheless, a further possibility, namely that he was involved in the rebellion of the sons of Henry II against their father in 1173, or even later, and on that account denied access to England. The latter hypothesis gains strength from an isolated reference in the writings of Gervase of Tilbury, where he states that he had been associated with Ralph Niger at the court of the young King Henry, eldest son of Henry II.<sup>26</sup> Whatever may have been the truth concerning the exile, this mention of Niger by Gervase of Tilbury is the next certain bit of information that we have about him.

How early Ralph came to be attached to the young king's court, we do not know. His acquaintance with Gervase there could hardly be earlier than 1177-1178, since Gervase, who had passed many years of his life in Italy, was still there in 1177, having assisted on July 24 of that year at the meeting between Alexander III and Frederick Barbarossa at Venice.<sup>27</sup> Ralph's connection with the court may, of course, have begun before that of Gervase. At any rate, since the young king died on July 11, 1183, we can affirm that at some period between 1177 and 1183, Ralph was in the service of Young Henry.<sup>28</sup> It is doubtful if the service was a very active one; the prince was more probably Ralph's patron, for, as will be seen in the course of this article, Niger was by this time already busy with his works on the Old Testament.

Of Ralph's later life nothing is known, says the writer in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. All his biographers have stopped here. Indeed, until quite recently, the letters of John of Salisbury and the passing mention of Gervase of Tilbury were the only known contemporary witnesses to even so much as the existence of our Master Ralph Niger. A short time ago, however, Professor W. Holtzmann, in his collection of papal letters relating to England, published two new documents, found on the flyleaf of one of the Niger manuscripts at Lincoln.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Ed. Anstruther, p. 169; also published in Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue*, II, 287-288 note; and in Wright, *loc. cit.* The continuator does not accuse Niger of falsehood, but blames him for keeping back Henry's many good points and for offering no excuses for his bad deeds, many of which could be palliated.

<sup>24</sup> Oudin, *Commentarius* . . . , III, 95: 'perduellionis reus'; Tanner, *Bibl. Br.-Hib.*, p. 548.

<sup>25</sup> Wright (p. 422), Anstruther (p. vii-viii), Hardy (II, 288), Pauli (*MGH, SS, XXVII*, 327) and the *DNB* all see his loyalty to Becket as the reason for the expulsion; but they seem to assume that he was driven into exile along with the archbishop; Hardy and Pauli state it expressly. Against this view, see above, pp. 106-107.

<sup>26</sup> *De Otii Imperialibus* (*MGH, SS, XXVII*, 370): 'Unde literatus ille nostri temporis vir magister Radulfus Niger, domini mei regis junioris concurialis, cum Topica Aristotilis et

Elencos versibus glosaret, ait:

"Sunt loca, sunt gentes, quibus est mactare parentes,

Cum mors aut pietas aut longa supervenit etas . . ."

<sup>27</sup> Cf. article on Gervase of Tilbury in *DNB* (W. H. Hunt).

<sup>28</sup> Ralph was not present at the death of Henry, for he speaks of having heard from others of his pious death: '. . . vitam finiens in Martello, castro Limoviae, sub testimonio sanctorum virorum, in sancta devotione' (Anstruther, p. 93). The most complete work on Young Henry is that of C. E. Hodgson, *Jung Heinrich* (Jena, 1906); it contains nothing, however, on Ralph's presence at the court.

<sup>29</sup> W. Holtzmann, *Papsturkunden in England*. 2 Band. *Die kirchlichen Archive und Bibliotheken* (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-Hist. Klasse, ser. 3, no. 14, 15), pp. 453-455.

They, in conjunction with Niger's own works, throw some light on the hitherto unknown portion of his life.

The first of the documents is a letter of Clement III, dated February 7, 1191, commissioning Guy of Noyers, archbishop of Sens, to have examined by men of his ecclesiastical province learned in the Scriptures and in Canon Law the writings of Master Ralph Niger; which writings, it is said, should prove of great profit to the Church. Any necessary corrections are to be made, and Guy is to report back to the Pope in order that he in turn may approve the works as thoroughly orthodox.<sup>30</sup> Pope Clement died in the following month, and one of the very early letters of his successor, Celestine III, is a word for word renewal of this same commission to Guy of Noyers.<sup>31</sup> The other document is yet more interesting. It consists of two parts: a notice recording how the volumes of Niger's works had been distributed among various persons for purposes of examination, and a copy of the report made by Guy to Celestine III to the effect that, after long and careful scrutiny by prudent and learned men, the works of Ralph have been found to contain nothing contrary to holy faith or dangerous to Christian teaching.<sup>32</sup> The date is missing on Guy's letter, but it is almost certainly of the year 1192 some time after Easter.<sup>33</sup> The details furnished as to the exact distribution made by Guy of the different works and the length of time they were kept permit us to conclude that the notice, along with the first transcript of the letters, was written at Sens.

Guy of Noyers was not the only one, however, who had the responsibility of censoring Niger's works. The notice, before giving the names of those to whom the archbishop of Sens entrusted certain works, states that the volumes had been first divided between Guy and the archbishop of Rheims<sup>34</sup> (William of Champagne, or of the White Hands, 1176-1202). Guy therefore distributed only those which fell to his lot. Moreover, since the Pope's letter to Guy states explicitly that he should have recourse to learned men *of his province*, it is not improbable that a similar commission, which has not come down to us, was sent to the archbishop of Rheims empowering him too to act as censor. The works for which Archbishop William was responsible would be those theological and canonical works of Niger written before 1191 which are not mentioned in the notice about Guy's distribution.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>30</sup> This is Holtzmann's no. 258 (pp. 453-454).

<sup>31</sup> Mentioned by Holtzmann under no. 259 (p. 454).

<sup>32</sup> Holtzmann, no. 259 (pp. 454-455).

<sup>33</sup> The notice prefixed to the letter states that the persons to whom Guy had distributed certain works of Niger kept them from the feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) until the following Easter. Since Pope Celestine's letter was dated April 24, 1191, it is quite probable that Guy set about his task within a few weeks, so that the feast of St. John the Baptist would be that of the year 1191 and the Easter, referred to, that of 1192, which fell on April 5. (As Guy died in December, 1193, the Easter could not in any case be later than that of 1193, March 28).

<sup>34</sup> *Diuisis uoluminibus inter dominum Guidonem Senonensem archiepiscopum et dominum Remensem archiepiscopum, idem dominus Senonensis assumpsit sibi ipsi secundam partem moralium Regum ad inspiciendum et examinandum, priorem uero partem moralium Regum tradidit magistro Petro Anglico cano-*

*nico et aliis canonicis . . . ?* (Holtzmann, p. 454). I have been unable to identify this Petrus Anglicus.

<sup>35</sup> Guy's lot included five works:

*Moralia Regum (prior pars, as in Linc. Ms. 25).*

*Moralia Regum (secunda pars, as in Linc. Ms. 26).*

*Epithome Veteris Testamenti* (which is not contained in part in Linc. Ms. 24, as stated by Holtzmann, p. 454, n. 5, but is identical with the *In Paralipomenon* as contained in Linc. Ms. 27; this is evident from the *Incipit* of the latter Ms., fol. 1: 'Epithome veteris testamenti liber iste inscribitur grece Paralypomenon, hebraice Debreiamin, latine . . .'). *Remediarius in Esdras* (cf. Linc. Ms. 27, where it is incomplete).

*Digestum Numeri* (cf. Linc. Ms. 23).

It may therefore be inferred that the archbishop of Rheims had some five others: the commentaries or *digesta* on *Leuiticus* and *Deuteronomy* (as represented by Linc. Ms. 24) also

The choice of the archbishops of Sens and Rheims as censors points to the conclusion that within their ecclesiastical provinces lay the scene of Niger's life and literary activity during the years since he had left the service of young King Henry. That his works were there so easily available, strengthens this hypothesis. Finally, the role played by William of the White Hands, as friend and host to Becket and his supporters in the different dioceses of central France over which he had ruled, would easily explain Ralph's preference for this region. As bishop of Chartres (1165-1168) and then as archbishop of Sens (1168-1176) while still retaining the see of Chartres,<sup>36</sup> he had been most active in the exiled archbishop's cause and that of his friends. Nor did he show himself less generous after Becket's death and his own transfer to Rheims: his intimacy with several learned men who were natives of the British Isles and friends of Becket's is quite well known.<sup>37</sup> The prologue to Niger's *De Re Militari*, as yet unpublished,<sup>38</sup> throws further light on these years of his own life. It confirms the hypothesis of his relations with the archbishop of Rheims, but it indicates also that a part, perhaps the greater part, of this time had been spent close to the scene of Ralph's earlier studies at Paris, which lay, it may be noted, within the limits of William's former ecclesiastical province of Sens.

Maurice of Sully, bishop of Paris from 1163 to 1196, was second only to William of the White Hands in his warm support of Becket and his friends. Less of a patron of letters than was William, he was, nevertheless, more of a scholar, a former master in the schools and a preacher of high repute, who continued, as bishop, his interest in the schools of his episcopal city and in the development of studies there.<sup>39</sup> Niger himself testifies, in the Prologue just mentioned, to his intimacy with the bishop of Paris, in the period prior to the composition of the *De Re Militari* (1188-1190). His testimony gives considerable probability to the theory that he was actually at Paris in the 1180's. Was he teaching during this period? He does not say so, but such may very well have been the case; writings of the character of his were, for the most part, the work of men who were or had been masters in the schools. It must in any case have been an interesting period in Paris amid teachers and students like Peter the Chanter, Peter of Poitiers, Alexander Neckam, Stephen of Tournai, Stephen Langton, the future pope Innocent III, Gerald of Wales, etc.<sup>40</sup>

the commentaries on the other two books of the Pentateuch, *Genesis* and *Exodus*, which works seem now to be lost but which are both mentioned by Niger himself in other commentaries (*In Num.*, Linc. Ms. 23, fol. 12 for *Genesis*; and *In Lev.*, Linc. Ms. 24, fol. 25v for *Exodus*); and finally the *De Re Militari et Triplici Via Peregrinationis Ierosolymitanæ* (cf. Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5-32), which Niger himself considers to be a theological and canonical work (*ibid.*, fol. 5v, Prologue).

It is extremely doubtful if the *De IV Festivitatibus Beatae Mariae Virginis* and the *De Interpretationibus Nominum Hebraeorum* (= *Philippicus*) were written by this time. As to the commentaries on *Josue* and *Judges*, which appear to be included in the list which Niger gives of his own works in his longer chronicle (ed. Anstruther, p. 97) under the comprehensive title of *Septem Digesta super Eptaticum*, no known manuscripts of them are preserved and I have seen no references to them in Niger's works; cf. below, p. 117.

<sup>36</sup> Could the *Radulfus Niger* who witnesses an act of donation in favour of the abbey of St. Père de Chartres, at an undetermined date between 1151 and 1171, be our Ralph? He is

not given the title of *Magister*; cf. Guérard, *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de S. Père de Chartres* (Documents Inédits, Paris, 1840), p. 395.

<sup>37</sup> On William, see the interesting and suggestive article of J. R. Williams, 'William of the White Hands and Men of Letters,' *Anniversary Essays . . . by the Students of C. H. Haskins* (Boston, 1929), pp. 365-387. Williams gives references to the chief biographies of and studies on the archbishop. The latter's acquaintance with English men of letters is treated on pp. 370-371.

<sup>38</sup> Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5-5v; also in Cambridge, Pembroke College Library Ms. 27, fol. 119r-120r. The latter manuscript was formerly at Bury St. Edmunds.

<sup>39</sup> The best, if not the only, individual work on Maurice is that of V. Mortet, 'Maurice de Sully Evêque de Paris,' *Mémoires de la Soc. de l'Hist. de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France*, XVI (1889-1890) 105-326; and published apart, Paris, 1890. On his studies, pp. 116-119; teaching and preaching, pp. 123-136; relations as bishop with the schools, pp. 150-161.

<sup>40</sup> Professor F. M. Powicke has devoted two chapters to Paris and its studies in this period: *Stephen Langton* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 23-74.

This important prologue to the first book of the *De Re Militari* begins with lengthy introductory remarks on the nature of the subject to be treated, on the three mystical journeys to Jerusalem, on contemporary pilgrimages and crusades, on the great need of proper interior and spiritual dispositions in such undertakings; then <sup>41</sup> the writer addresses himself directly to someone whom he calls *Reverende Pater*, to whom he is offering the work. The rest of the prologue makes it clear that it is the archbishop of Rheims, William of the White Hands.<sup>42</sup> Niger beseeches him to have this and others of his works (*hec et alia que super libros Moysi digessi*) examined lest they contain any error. After urging upon William how apt he is to assume such a task, he explains that formerly Maurice, bishop of Paris, had been accustomed to correct his works for him. Now, however, Maurice is growing old; besides, he is deficient in knowledge of law (*quia tamen canones et leges non didicerit*). Ralph has already asked the archbishop of Sens (Guy of Noyers, 1176–1193) and others (*alios quoque auditores legum et canonum*) to undertake the work of correction, but they have all for one reason or another declined. And so he has recourse 'like a beggar' to William, asking him to have prudent men and men skilled in law examine, emend and improve these his works on Scripture.<sup>43</sup>

It is Niger's allusion to the fact that Maurice 'was accustomed' to attend to the correction of his works (*aliis prioribus operibus meis favorem emendationis prestare consuevit*) that has led me to suggest that Ralph was in Paris during the 1180's and on quite intimate terms with the bishop. Probably he is still there when he writes to William in this prologue (1190?), since his reason for not turning on this occasion also to Maurice is only the latter's advancing years and his insufficient knowledge of law.

The prologue provides further information which permits us to link the facts it sets forth with those contained in the later documents, already considered, published by Holtzmann. There appears to have been a sequence of events like the following: Ralph Niger, after composing several commentaries or digests on the first books of the Old Testament and a work entitled *De Re Militari*, wishes to have the stamp of orthodoxy placed upon them. Maurice of Sully, who has censored earlier writings of Ralph, possibly even some of these same, cannot undertake the task this time. Guy of Noyers and others decline it. The author of the works then seeks help from the archbishop of Rheims, noted as a patron of letters and probably already well known to Ralph. Archbishop William, convinced of the value of the works, or interested at least, praises them to the Pope himself, Clement III, and urges him to have them all examined. Whereupon, the Pope commissions the archbishop of Rheims and the archbishop of Sens to conduct the scrutiny of the books and report to him. Someone at Sens has copied down, fortunately for us, the Pope's letter

<sup>41</sup> The general part of the Prologue ends in Linc. Ms. 15 on fol. 5v. The more personal part follows on; it has seemed to me important enough to publish as an appendix to this article.

<sup>42</sup> Further on, Niger addresses the one to whom he is writing: 'Sullimitas (*sic*) illustratus vestri et prerogativa potestatis apostolice auctoritatis et regie dignitatis fulta presidio . . .' William had been papal legate as early as 1169. Uncle of the king Philip Augustus, he had been likewise co-regent at the beginning of that king's reign, and he fills the same office a second time when Philip arranges for the governing of his kingdom during his absence on the Third Crusade in 1190. It would not be easy to find another whom Niger's form of address would fit so perfectly. Still further on,

reference is made to the addressee's having acquired knowledge in the 'consistory' (*de consistorio proprio*); William was raised to the dignity of cardinal-priest of Sancta Sabina at the Lateran Council of 1179.

<sup>43</sup> This is not the only place where Niger is preoccupied about ecclesiastical approval for his works. In a prologue to Book IV of his longer chronicle (see n. 101 below), in the prologue to *De IV Fest. B.M.V.* (see n. 60 below) and in that to his commentary on *Kings* (M. Preiss, *Die politische Tätigkeit und Stellung der Cisterzienser* . . . , Berlin, 1934, p. 261), he speaks in similar terms. These texts and those published by Holtzmann are important additions to our knowledge of censorship in the latter part of the twelfth century.

and that of his successor, Celestine III, along with the answer of the archbishop Guy commending the books, and has added a short notice concerning those who had assisted Guy in his work of censorship. No trace remains to us of the results of the enquiry instituted by William on the books which fell to his lot.<sup>44</sup>

What did the stamp of ecclesiastical approval on his works avail Ralph Niger? The question has to remain unanswered. At least it may be said, however, that it did not suffice to prevent his falling into all but complete oblivion. Save for the tribute of Gervase of Tilbury who speaks of him as *litteratus ille nostri temporis vir*,<sup>45</sup> the contemporaries of his later years make no reference even to the man, much less to his writings or his scholarship; nor do the men of following generations. His theological works were never popular enough to be copied to any great extent, if we are to judge by the known manuscripts. To our knowledge, only two sets existed even in the Middle Ages, neither of them quite complete: one in the Library of the Dean and Chapter at Lincoln,<sup>46</sup> the other at St. Edmund's Abbey, Bury.<sup>47</sup> Of these the former remains intact, but of the second set only the *De Re Militari* is still extant, having found its way in the sixteenth century to Pembroke College at Cambridge.

The remainder of Niger's life is obscure. There are serious reasons for believing, nevertheless, that he returned during the reign of Richard I to his native England. The Chronicles are evidently Ralph's latest works. That the longer chronicle, published as Chronicle I, comes after the theological writings is clear from the fact that it includes a list of all these. Moreover, since it does not list among Ralph's works the shorter chronicle, we may assume that this one was not yet written. Now,

<sup>44</sup> The books mentioned in the prologue to *De Re Militari* are probably the very ones which the archbishop of Rheims kept. Ralph speaks explicitly of 'hec (i.e. *De Re Mil.*) et alia que super libros Moysi digessi,' and these are just the ones of Niger's known theological works which are missing from the list of books examined by Guy, with the single exception of the *Digestum Numeri*. This latter is the only one of the Mosaic books which came into the hands of Guy. In the enquiry ordered by the Pope into Niger's works in general, he took rather the commentaries on the later books, *Kings*, *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras*. The reason for the exception in the case of *Numbers* seems to be that this commentary was written later than those on the other Mosaic books and so was grouped with *Kings*, *Paral.* and *Esdras* to which it was closer in time; see p. 117 below.

<sup>45</sup> See n. 26 above.

<sup>46</sup> Lincoln possessed eight volumes of Niger's works as early as the thirteenth century; they are listed in the manuscript catalogue known as Hamo's Catalogue. The latter is earlier than the year 1200, but the entry which mentions Niger's works is added in the margin by a somewhat later hand along with the titles of other books received or written since Hamo's time. The Niger entry is as follows: 'Septem volumina magistri Radulphi Nigri. Octavum est apud Abbatem de Toren . . .' The catalogue is printed in *The Works of Giraldus Cambrensis*, VII, ed. J. F. Dinnoek and A. E. Freeman (Rolls Series, London, 1877); the mention of Ralph's works occurs on p. 170. Wooley has likewise published it in the introduction to his catalogue for the Cathedral Library at Lincoln.

There are still seven volumes in the library,

if we consider as two the commentaries on *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras*, bound together to-day as *Linc. Ms. 27*. The eighth was perhaps never returned; it may have contained Niger's missing commentaries on the first two books of the Pentateuch, *Genesis* and *Exodus*. 'Toren . . .' (read by Wooley as 'Teren . . .') is probably for 'Torentona', i.e. Thornton, an abbey of Austin Canons in northern Lincolnshire.

<sup>47</sup> John Boston, himself a monk at Bury, drew up early in the fifteenth century a catalogue of ecclesiastical writers, indicating, in so far as he could, where their works were to be found in English ecclesiastical libraries. (I understand that R. A. B. Mynors, W. Pantin and R. W. Hunt are soon to publish this catalogue; meanwhile, we have that part of the work which Tanner published omitting the notices on non-English writers: *Bibliotheca Brit.-Hib.*, Preface, pp. xvii-xliii). Under Ralph Niger's name, Boston has reproduced the list of works given by Ralph himself in his longer chronicle (ed. Anstruther, p. 97), a copy of which was in the Bury library at the time and is likewise mentioned by Boston. He does not, however, indicate that all the works in the list were to be found at Bury, but only the commentary on *Kings*, seven books on the Heptateuch and the *De Re Militari*, along with the longer chronicle (Tanner, *Bibl.*, p. xxxvi; in the original catalogue, Cambridge Univ. Library, *Additional Ms. 3470*, fol. 124). Hence Bury had not the commentaries on *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras*, the *De IV Festivitatibus B.M.V.*, nor the *De Interpr. Nom. Hebr.* On the Bury library, as known to John Boston, see the article of M. R. James cited in n. 6 above; Niger's works are mentioned on pp. 39-40.



both chronicles, while not dealing expressly with England alone, are, nevertheless, distinctly English, especially toward the close. The sources used for the twelfth century, which Pauli has been able to identify, are the chronicles of earlier English writers, William of Malmesbury, Roger of Wendover, Geoffrey of Monmouth. A list of the kings of England occurs in the longer chronicle; the shorter one contains a list of the kingdoms and bishoprics of the Anglo-Saxons and one of the archbishops of Canterbury.<sup>48</sup> No other single country receives such special attention. It is this noticeably English touch to his last works that leads to the conclusion that Niger returned to England and composed them there. Henry II being now dead, there would be no particular obstacle to his doing so.

There is, moreover, corroboratory evidence of his presence there: three documents, at least, of an official nature, make mention of a *Magister Radulphus Niger* in England in the years 1194 and 1199. It may be, of course, that there were others of the same name. But, in spite of the frequent use of the name Ralph in England and Normandy at this time, the combination *Ralph Niger* is not common. It is known that the father of Roger Niger (bishop of London 1229–1241) was called Ralph;<sup>49</sup> and the name Ralph Niger occurs more than once in the Pipe Rolls of the last quarter of the twelfth century;<sup>50</sup> but none of these is given the title of *Magister*. It is therefore quite possible, and even probable, that the three known references to a *Magister Radulphus Niger* in English documents, at the very moment when our Ralph seems to have returned to England, apply to none other than himself. It would be a coincidence indeed if a second person of the same name and title happened to be at hand in just those same years.

Two entries in the Plea Rolls of 1194 mention the name. In one, two men are charged with robbing the servant of Master Ralph Niger.<sup>51</sup> In the other, Master Ralph himself is plaintiff against the king in connection with a certain prebend which is said to be in the king's gift;<sup>52</sup> the case is remanded and has unfortunately left no further trace in what rolls are preserved. The last mention is in one of King John's early charters, dated August 31, 1199, wherein he confirms to Roger Crispus the grant of a house in London under the same conditions as he had formerly, as Count of Mortain, granted it to Master Ralph Niger.<sup>53</sup>

When and where Niger died is unknown. Pauli has argued that he was still living

<sup>48</sup> Pauli, 'Die Chron. des R. N.' *Nachr.* . . . *Göttingen* (1880), pp. 583–584, 589, on English characteristics. The lists mentioned occur in Anstruther's edition on pp. 99–100, 136–137 and 166.

<sup>49</sup> The article on Roger Niger in the *DNB* records this fact, which is attested likewise by a fourteenth century document in the archives of St. Paul's Cathedral (*Hist. Mss. Comm. 9th Report*, part I, London, 1883, p. 3, col. 2).

<sup>50</sup> Ralph Niger of Straton' appears twice between 1175 and 1177: 'Pipe Roll 22 Henry II,' *Publ. of Pipe Roll Soc.*, XXV (1904) 96, and 'Pipe Roll 23 Henry II,' *P. of P. R. S.*, XXVI (1905) 60; both entries are for Notts and Derbyshire. Three entries for the same counties in the years 1195–1197 bear the name Ralph Niger, who may be the same as the Ralph Niger of Straton: 'Pipe Roll 7 Richard I,' *P. of P. R. S.*, new series, VI (1929) 19; 'Pipe Roll 8 Rich. I,' *P. of P. R. S.*, n.s., VII (1930) 268; 'Pipe Roll 9 Rich. I,' *P. of P. R. S.*, n.s., VIII (1931) 147. In 1199, a Ralph Niger occurs in a Lincolnshire entry and in one for Herefordshire: 'Pipe Roll 1 John,' *P. of P. R. S.*, n.s.,

X (1933) 149, 218.

<sup>51</sup> 'Three Rolls of the King's Court . . . (1194–1195),' *Publ. of Pipe Roll Soc.*, XIV, 88. Maitland, who edited this volume, found the name illegible in part, but he has supplied the missing letters, apparently from the *Placitorum Abbreviatio* (London, 1811), p. 14, where the name 'Magistri Radulphi Nigri' is found in full. Probably it could still be read on the roll when this work was edited.

<sup>52</sup> *Rotuli Curiae Regis*, I (London, 1835), 87. The session is that of Dec. 4, 1194, and the case is for Lincolnshire. The name of the prebend has not been read by the editor, except for the last three letters: '. . . nes'; this ending is not common in Lincolnshire; sixteenth century lists contain a Skegnes in the archdeaconry of Lincoln (deanery of Candelshoe). If Niger did hold a prebend at Lincoln, this would help to explain the interest taken by the cathedral library in his works.

<sup>53</sup> *Rotuli Chartarum* (London, 1837), p. 22. At his accession, Richard had granted the county of Mortain in Normandy to his younger brother John.



when Hubert Walter died in 1205, since he refers to Hubert in the longer chronicle as though he were already dead: *Parum tamen literatus fuit et nimis acer in operibus justicie*.<sup>54</sup> With this single exception, there is nothing in either chronicle that relates to a date later than 1199, the very year in which King John disposed of the house which Ralph had held in London. Such a coincidence suggests that Ralph may have died in that year and that the reference to Hubert Walter has been added or its tense altered. However, we shall have to be content, for the present, to place the date of Ralph's death in the last year of the twelfth century or in the very early years of the thirteenth.

Before passing from the man to his works the question as to whether Ralph was a monk or not should be raised. It was supposed at one time that he was a religious at St. Edmund's Abbey, Bury, but there are no apparent grounds for such a supposition other than the presence of his works in that house.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, unless his attitude toward the Black Monks changed considerably after his return to England, one would hardly expect to find Niger, who had severely criticized their abuses and excesses in his *De Re Militari*,<sup>56</sup> entering a house of the older branch of the Benedictine family but a few years later. The theory that he may have been a Cistercian is much more plausible, but I believe this too can be disproven. Pauli favoured this theory, adducing as evidence to support his view the many very precise statements in the Chronicles about the order of Cîteaux, the universal interests displayed by the author, his imperfect Latin,<sup>57</sup> his devotion to the Blessed Virgin, etc.<sup>58</sup> All of these facts are quite true, whether they warrant the conclusion drawn from them or not. Indeed, there are more passages in other works than the Chronicles which voice high praise of the Cistercians. In the *De Re Militari*, for instance, Niger's condemnation of the excesses of the Black Monks is followed by a most favourable picture of the continent, regular life of the Cistercians.<sup>59</sup> This need not, however, indicate any more than a decided preference for the younger order. And that this was Ralph's position, namely, that he was not himself a Cistercian but was a great admirer of the order, becomes almost certain in light of the Prologue to his work on the four feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary, still unpublished. The work is dedicated to the members of an unnamed religious order; references to their outstanding devotion to the Blessed Virgin, to the integrity of their lives, to their flight to the wilderness and to the unprecedented rapidity of their growth, make it evident that Ralph has the Cistercians in mind. But the terms in which the work is offered to them as a gift and the general tone of the whole Prologue seem to ex-

<sup>54</sup> *MGH, SS, XXVII*, 327, n. 5; cf. *art. cit.* in *Nachr. . . . Göttingen* (1880), p. 570. It might be noted that Pauli, like Anstruther, read 'minus acer' instead of 'nimis acer'; it is certainly the latter reading in the manuscripts (Brit. Mus., Cotton Ms. Cleopatra C. 10, fol. 53v; also in Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 57v).

<sup>55</sup> Pauli considers the supposition to have arisen in the sixteenth century (*art. cit.*, p. 571).

<sup>56</sup> Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 27-27v: 'Quippe grandes possessiones, quas pietas contulit religioni, dissipant, et edes nobilissimas in rudera decidere permittunt. De incontinentia eorum et excessibus finis non est, que, quia in propatulo sunt, scripto mandari non indigent. Et hec ut de pluribus et ut in pluribus vera sunt, in eis maxime qui nigrum habent habitum.'

<sup>57</sup> There is frequent awkwardness, striving for effect, use of unusual expressions, etc. In justice to Ralph, it should be noted once and for all that all the manuscripts which we have of his works are copies; some of the faults and

shortcomings may be put down to scribes.

<sup>58</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 570, 573; cf. *MGH, SS, XXVII*, 327. Pauli goes no further than to say that he must have been a Cistercian or very devoted to the Cistercians: 'Cisterciensis ordinis seu monachus seu congregationi valde addictus' (*MGH, loc. cit.*). A more recent writer, who seems to use Pauli as his authority, speaks without any reservation of Ralph as an English Cistercian: Karl Wenck, 'Die Römischen Päpste zwischen Alexander III und Innocenz III . . .', *Papsttum und Kaisertum* (=Festschrift Kehr), Munich, 1926, p. 417.

<sup>59</sup> Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 17v: 'In monachis vero Cisterciensis ordinis omnia claustra sancta conversatione minantur, nisi apud paucos in quorum porta valve consistunt cupiditas pariter et avaricia. Ab omnibus tamen inquinamenti immunes esse crediderim claustrales simplices quorum sola cura est ordinis sanctitas et silentium contemplationis . . .'

clude the possibility of his having been actually a member of the order.<sup>60</sup> The case is far from rare among the late twelfth century scholars, where a man, without being himself a Cistercian, displays keen interest in their life and institutions, nay more, gives enthusiastic voice to his admiration and affection for the order.<sup>61</sup> As long as proof to the contrary is lacking, it is more reasonable then, to conclude that Ralph Niger was not a monk but remained a secular clerk.

## II

The greater part of Ralph's works are scriptural and theological in character, typical of the age in which he lived, when theological studies were based largely on the Scriptures and the commentaries of the Fathers, and not yet marked with the dialectical character which was to predominate in thirteenth century Theology. The nature of Ralph's works was determined by his own education. To be sure, he had been first trained in the liberal arts and, like his friend John of Salisbury and other humanists of the late twelfth century, he came to bewail the decline of these studies, as the more utilitarian disciplines of law and medicine encroached upon them. But the liberal arts were to him only a means to an end. His true interests were more theological than humanistic; it is the inroads of law and medicine on the study of the Scriptures that cause him the greatest concern.<sup>62</sup> Ralph acknowledges Gerard Pucelle as his master; all too little is known of Gerard, beyond that he was learned in law, both civil and canon, and in the Scriptures.<sup>63</sup> His interests are

<sup>60</sup> It is the following beautiful passage in praise of the order which is particularly pertinent (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 33): 'Quia vero viri singulares et egregii servi beate virginis et matris Dei vos esse probaveritis, id modicum devotionis quod in ejus obsequium conquisi vestro examini presento et in donativum concedo. Neque enim ab alio rege vel regina labori meo premium quero nisi quod vestro interventu mihi contulerit sue matris gratia virginis filius. Suscipite igitur munus hoc, serenissimi patres, et quod vos spiritus docuerit de eo iudicate et facite. Vos enim Dei filii singulari favore et speciali munere in ecclesia sue matri ministros assignasse creditur, argumento profectus vestri bonorum operum temporalium et spiritualium. Neque enim a tempore Samuelis prophete usque in presens ullus ordo devotorum ad eum numerum multiplicari meruit ea celeritate qua vos ad numerum semper augendum Dei gratia multiplicavit. Sed neque aliquibus filiis prophetarum a diebus Helysei ulla silvarum incisione sue possessionis habitaculum ampliavit ea velocitate et gratia qua vestre habitationis angustias dilatavit per orbem terrarum. Presertim integritas ordinis vestri illibata religione institutionis primitive nondum unquam elanguit ut Sareptane vidue filius egrotari, sed status integer apud Deum et inter homines gratiam uberem vobis conciliavit. Quippe hospitali fugalitate (*sic*) foris et domi celibi parsimonia, preter ea qui (*sic*) intrinsecus latent, omnes alios transcenditis. Quod autem in occulto agit contemplatio non estimatur, quia frui Deo quantumlibet modico nullo pretio compensatur. Suscipite igitur, sanctissimi patres, hoc tantillum delibationis ad mensam vestram ut de micis vestris refici merear et saciari cum apparuerit gloria domini. Si quid ergo dissonaverit vel quoquo modo im-

mutandum fuerit, vestro committitur arbitrio ut insufficientia mea sapientia vestra que ex Deo est corrigatur et suppleatur.'

<sup>61</sup> J. de Ghellinck comments on the lofty reputation enjoyed at this time by the Cistercians and on the interest displayed by scholars in Cistercian usages: 'Les Notes marginales du Liber Sententiarum,' *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, XIV (1913) 533. Miss Beryl Smalley informs me that she has met in the works of Stephen Langton passages not unlike those of Niger, where Langton too, who was certainly not a Cistercian, expresses his praise and admiration for the order. Similar sentiments may be found likewise in Peter the Chanter's works.

<sup>62</sup> Chronicle I (ed. Anstruther, p. 96): 'Liberalium etiam studiorum exercitia evanuerunt occasione ambitiosi quaestus, ob quem curritur ad leges saeculi et decreta et fisicam, divina quoque pagina neglecta.' On complaints of the humanists, see *Rashdall's Universities*, ed. Powicke and Emden (Oxford, 1936), I, 71. Daniel Morley has left a brief but unfavourable picture of the 'lawyers' whom he found in possession at Paris in the 1170's; it is published in an extract from his works in the Oxford Historical Society's *Collectanea*, II (Oxford, 1890), 171; cf. Richard Hunt, 'English Learning in the Late Twelfth Century,' *Trans. of Roy. Hist. Soc.*, 4th series, XIX (1936) 23-24.

<sup>63</sup> See notes 13 and 12 above. A recent work suggests Gerard as author of a gloss on the *Decretum* of Gratian: S. Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik, 1140-1234* (Studi e Testi, 71, Rome, 1937), pp. 11, 26, 64 n. 2, 197 n. 3. Miss Eleanor Rathbone will deal with Gerard's legal work in her book on English Cathedral Chapters as centres of learning in the twelfth century; he was certainly in *utroque jure peritus*.

reflected in those of his pupil. Niger tells us that he has studied not only the expositions of the Fathers but also the *canones* and *leges* in the schools,<sup>64</sup> while his allusions to Roman civil law show some acquaintance with this subject as well.<sup>65</sup> To Ralph, however, all law is based primarily on the Scriptures; there one must seek it as at its source;<sup>66</sup> hence, his works appear to be predominantly scriptural. In reality, Ralph is, and his works are, a product of that period of the twelfth century when Canon Law and Theology had so much in common, both as to sources and method, that they constantly interpenetrated each other.<sup>67</sup>

It is not the purpose here, however, to go into a detailed study, or even to give a thorough analysis, of Niger's writings; this will be reserved for a future work. It is merely a question of listing Ralph's known authentic works with a brief explanation of their nature. The task of drawing up the list is greatly facilitated by the list which the author himself has left us in his longer chronicle. He has just been speaking of certain writers of the late twelfth century—Joachim of Flora and Geoffrey of Auxerre are mentioned by name—when he goes on:

Radulfus Niger scripsit Septem Digesta super Eptaticum. Scripsit et Moralia Regum, et Epithome Veteris Testamenti in Paralipomion, et Remediarium in Esdram. Scripsit etiam Librum de Re Militari et Tribus Viis Peregrinationis Jerosolymitane, et Librum de Quatuor Festivitatibus Beate Marie Virginis, et Librum de Interpretationibus Hebreorum Nominum. Scripsit et hec Cronica.<sup>68</sup>

If we add to these works the shorter chronicle, published as Chronicle II, we have, I believe, the complete list of the authentic works of Ralph Niger, with the exception possibly of a gloss in verse on certain works of Aristotle, of which the only trace is one isolated contemporary reference.<sup>69</sup> We seem to have them, moreover, in the approximate order in which they were written: Ralph might be expected to put them down in chronological order, and this does prove to be the case, where verification is possible, in every instance, save one.<sup>70</sup> We shall consider each work

<sup>64</sup> *Moralia Regum*, Linc. Ms. 25, fol. 6v: 'Sacras expositiones sanctorum patrum dumtaxat quas in scholis audivimus nostris inquisitionibus superponimus . . .' *De Re Mil.*, Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5v: 'Quecumque enim de canonibus ininitentia justicie et fidei in scholis didici de fontibus legis mosaice scaturire adverti.' Several times in the prologue to *De Re Mil.*, Ralph speaks of 'canones et leges' (cf. Appendix to this article), while in his commentary on *Deuteronomy* he frequently stops to remark that the 'leges et canones' agree with the explanations which he gives (Linc. Ms. 24, fol. 98v, 99 99v, 100, etc.).

<sup>65</sup> In *Moralia Regum*, he speaks of Pepo and Irenius and the renaissance of Roman Law in Italy (Linc. Ms. 25, fol. 160); elsewhere, there are allusions to certain details of the civil law; I have noted these particularly in the commentary on *Leviticus* (Linc. Ms. 24, fol. 57v, 59, 61v, 64; the first two of these mention specifically the *Lex Aquilia* and the *Lex Cornelia*). The late Professor H. U. Kantorowicz and Miss Beryl Smalley were preparing an article on Niger's knowledge of Roman Law; it should appear in the first volume of the new English publication, *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, announced for the summer of 1940. I am grateful to Miss Smalley for first calling my attention to the reference to Pepo.

<sup>66</sup> See second text in n. 64. In the previous

sentence, Niger had said: 'Ego estimaverim omne jus tam divinum quam humanum in terris lege mosaica contineri' (*ibid.*). Ralph is here anticipating by a hundred years the remark of Roger Bacon that Canon Law has as its sole basis the texts of the Scriptures and the Fathers: 'Caeterum jus canonicum totaliter fundatur super auctoritate scripturae et expositionum ejus. . . . Et ideo hoc jus non est nisi explicatio voluntatis Dei in Scriptura' (*Opus Majus*, ed. J. H. Bridges, III, London, 1900, p. 38).

<sup>67</sup> The close relationship between these two disciplines in the twelfth century is treated by Fournier-LeBras, *Histoire des collections canoniques*, II (Paris, 1932), 314–351, up to the time of Gratian, and by J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1914), pp. 277–346 throughout the whole century.

<sup>68</sup> Ed. Anstruther, p. 97; also in *MGH*, SS, XXVII, 338. The spelling of the original has seemed to me preferable to that adopted by Anstruther.

<sup>69</sup> Cited in n. 26 above; cf. below p. 123.

<sup>70</sup> The prologue to *De Re Militari* alludes to 'alia que super libros Moysi digessi' (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5v); the digests were therefore earlier than it. Moreover, the *De Re Mil.*, as will soon be seen, was occasioned by the fall of Jerusalem and the launching of the Third Crusade; it could not then have been begun before the

individually and then attempt to dispose of other writings which have been falsely assigned to Niger.

(1). *Digesta Septem in Heptaticum.*

There is no reason to doubt that Ralph did write commentaries on the first seven books of the Old Testament, since we have his own word for it and since his word is confirmed in five cases out of the seven by concrete corroboratory evidence. Nevertheless, no trace of manuscript or mention of the commentaries on *Josue* and *Judges* has been found, other than that implied in the title from Ralph's list: *Septem Digesta in Eptaticum*. John Boston of Bury gives this same title, having taken it directly from Ralph's own list, which Boston reproduces.<sup>71</sup> He indicates, moreover, that the commentaries or digests were to be found in the library at Bury. However, when we consult Boston's other list of *Nomina doctorum qui scribunt super Bibliam*, wherein after the name of each book of the Bible are given the names of those who have written on that book, we find Ralph's name occurring in the lists which follow *Genesis*, *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, *Numbers* and *Deuteronomy*, but missing after *Josue* and *Judges*.<sup>72</sup> From this we may conclude that, although Boston had indicated the Bury library after the comprehensive title of *Digesta super Eptaticum*, that library contained but the first five of the books.

The only extant manuscripts of the digests are those at Lincoln (Library of the Dean and Chapter, *Mss.* 23, 24). Even there the digests on *Genesis* and *Exodus* are missing. Proof positive that these did exist, however, is had in the references to passages in them which Niger himself makes in his commentaries on *Numbers* and *Leviticus*.<sup>73</sup>

The date of these writings cannot be fixed exactly. With the exception of *Numbers*, they are earlier than the *Moralia Regum* which was written before the end of Henry II's reign, in fact several years perhaps before the end of the reign.<sup>74</sup> If we are to judge by the quantity of work involved, Niger must have been engaged upon the digests already in the 1170's, or in the very early 1180's, at the latest. Exception has to be made, however, for the commentary on the Book of *Numbers*, which, for some reason, is later than the others, having been written after the *Moralia Regum* and the commentary on *Paralipomenon*, to both of which specific reference is made in the work on *Numbers*.<sup>75</sup> Possibly it is later than the commentary on *Esdras* also. In any case, it is prior to the year 1191, since it is mentioned among the writings of Niger, which were examined by Guy of Noyers at the command of the Pope.<sup>76</sup> The middle or later 1180's would seem to be the date of composition.

The question of Ralph's method in commenting on the Scriptures must be left for a more detailed study of his works. In spite of the variety of names he gives to his commentaries on the books of the Old Testament, his method does not vary

end of 1187. And, since the *Moralia Regum*, from internal evidence, was written in the reign of Henry II (d. July 6, 1189), it too must have been written before the *De Re Mil.*, for this latter would certainly occupy the author during the last year of Henry's life, and more. Probably all the commentaries on the Old Testament were composed before it; it has already been noted that *Numbers* was the last of the commentaries (cf. n. 44).

That the *De IV Festivitatibus* and the *De Interpr. Nom. Hebr.* came likewise after the Scripture commentaries is certain, because reference is made in the prologue of each to the author's previous works on the Bible (Linc.

*Ms.* 15, fol. 33 and 80).

<sup>71</sup> Catalogue in Tanner, *Bibl.*, Preface, p. xxxvi.

<sup>72</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. xli.

<sup>73</sup> See n. 35 above. It has been suggested in n. 46 that these two may have been in the volume which had been loaned to the abbot of Thornton when the entry concerning Niger's writings was made in Hamo's catalogue.

<sup>74</sup> See below on the date of the commentary on *Kings*. I hope that internal evidence may help to date these works more exactly.

<sup>75</sup> Linc. *Ms.* 23, fol. 50v and 57; cf. n. 44 above.

<sup>76</sup> See n. 35 above.

essentially. Nor is there anything original about his method as such: he goes through each book, giving first a section of the scriptural text, followed by commentaries drawn in large part from the Fathers of the Church and other early commentators, and often adding a certain number of personal notes. It is the method common to many older writers and still popular in the twelfth century. The *Glossa Ordinaria* is the classic example of this type of commentary.<sup>77</sup> What does add interest to Ralph's work, especially from the historian's point of view, is the number of allusions to historical events, some of them contemporary. This is true, however, of the later books, especially *Kings*, rather than of the digests on the Pentateuch.

(2). *Moralia Regum*.

The commentary on *Kings* has always occurred in lists of Niger's writings. It is preserved to-day in two volumes among the Lincoln manuscripts of his works (Library of the Dean and Chapter, *Mss.* 25, 26). In his Prologue to the second of these volumes (fol. 1), the author explains that the division into two volumes does not mean that he is following the old division of two books of *Samuel* and two books of *Malachim*; this old division ought not to be made, because the story of the kings of Juda and Israel runs on throughout and ought to be treated as a single whole. If Ralph has made two volumes of the work, it is for an eminently practical reason: a single volume would be too big and heavy to carry about with any ease. The internal division is not into four books, as eventually becomes the case with *Kings*, but into twenty-four, the second volume beginning with the thirteenth book. Ralph has likewise multiplied the number of chapter-headings; John of Salisbury and Gerard Pucelle are his authority for this.<sup>78</sup>

As has been noted above, Henry II was still reigning when the *Moralia Regum* was written, for within a few folios of the end of the second volume reference is made to him as still alive.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, since the *De Re Militari* was offered to the Archbishop of Rheims not later than 1190 so that before that date and yet after the composition of the *Moralia Regum* would come the writing of the commentaries on *Paralipomenon*, *Esdras* and *Numbers* and of the *De Re Militari* itself, the date of composition of the *Moralia* ought surely to be put back to the early 1180's. On the other hand, it cannot have been completed before 1179, since a decision of the

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle* (Ottawa, 1933), pp. 245-247, on this kind of 'lecture glosée.' On the *Glossa Ordinaria*, of which Niger himself makes use, see the article of Miss Beryl Smalley, 'La Glossa Ordinaria,' *Rech. théol. anc. méd.*, IX (1937) 366-400.

<sup>78</sup> Linc. *Ms.* 26, fol. 1: 'Prologus de libri divisione. . . et Malachim Hebrei dividunt nominibus et titulis et voluminibus. Ecclesia vero propter hystorie continuationem et successionem regum Israel et Juda usque ad Sezechiam (*sic*) ultimum totam seriem successionis regiminum appellat una nuncupatione libri regum. Unde et ego sub unius nominis et tituli (*sic*) nuncupatione totius hystorie seriem deputavi. Veruntamen expositionis ejus volumen dividi licere estimavi quatinus, licet unus sit liber, divisus tamen in partes facilius bajuletur; tali enim divisione licentia non admittitur ei qui voluerit tanquam unius hystorie et uno volumine unam expositionem contexere quominus divisa conjungat vel etiam pluralius

dividat, dum tamen hystorie continentiam non scindat. Capitula quoque numerosius supposui quam ea beatus Jeronimus dispertierit propter expositionis latitudinem et distinctionum utilitatem. Hujus vero audacie mee incentores habui venerabilem Johannem Carnotensem episcopum et magistrum meum Gerardum Puellam dictum, qui hoc mihi non minus licere quam expedire persuaserunt.' Ralph, John and Gerard may therefore have had something to do with the older division of the Scriptures into chapters. On this older division, see the article of A. Landgraf, 'Die Schriftzitate . . .,' *Biblia*, XVIII (1937) 74-84.

<sup>79</sup> Niger has been referring to the troubles of the English Church under Henry II. After speaking of Becker's death, he goes on: 'Princeps, licet postea in pena et confusione multa mala passus fuerit, a vexatione ecclesie, cum hec scribentur (*sic*), non quievit, quoniam Azazel Geth suam expugnauerat . . . (Linc. *Ms.* 26, fol. 157).

third Lateran Council (March, 1179) is cited toward the end.<sup>80</sup> The sentence in the Prologue to the second volume, which mentions John of Salisbury and Gerard Pucelle, inclines me to suggest the year 1180 as the date of the work's completion. In the first place, while John is called the venerable bishop of Chartres, Gerard, who became bishop of Coventry in 1183, is simply *magistrum meum Gerardum Puellam dictum*; which seems therefore to require an earlier date than 1183. Again, if John were already dead (d. Oct. 25, 1180), one might well expect from so good a friend as Ralph, so soon after the loss, some expression like *bonae memoriae*. But it is dangerous to argue from silence; let us take *about* 1180 as a round date.<sup>81</sup> This would, of course, put the digests on the Pentateuch back into the 1170's, as proposed above.

(3). *Epithome Veteris Testamenti in Paralipomenon.*

(4). *Remediarius in Esdram.*

These two works, the last of Niger's scriptural commentaries, are preserved in the library at Lincoln Cathedral (*Ms. 27*), bound together in one volume. From what has gone before, they would seem to have been composed in the middle 1180's.

(5). *De Re Militari et Tribus Viis Jerosolymitanae Peregrinationis.*

The title is given thus in Niger's chronicle, but in both the manuscripts extant (*Linc. Ms. 15*, fol. 5–32; Cambridge Pembroke Coll. Libr. *Ms. 27*, fol. 119–156v), it takes a slightly different form: *De Re Militari et Triplici Via Peregrinationis Jerosolimitane*. In spite of the order in which the two parts of the title occur, it is the second which indicates more truly the nature of the work, as is clear from the opening words of the Prologue:

Peregrinatio est tota vita hominis in hac valle lacrimarum in qua manentem civitatem non habemus sed futuram inquirimus; peregrinari enim est ab eo in quo manserit homo proficisci alio ad profectum suum.<sup>82</sup>

Jerusalem has always had the mystical meaning of Heaven, hence the 'pilgrimage to Jerusalem.' What has occasioned the writing of the work, however, is the recent fall of the earthly city of Jerusalem in Palestine<sup>83</sup> (occupied by Saladin on Oct. 2, 1187). This event has led many to take up the cross to go to Jerusalem on a new crusade. Niger's purpose is to warn them that a corporal crusade will profit nothing unless it be accompanied by a spiritual one,<sup>84</sup> that is, unless men give heed to the journey they are also making to the heavenly Jerusalem. This gives him an opportunity to enlarge on warfare, arms, armour, siege-machines, etc. (hence the *De Re Militari* of the title),<sup>85</sup> all of which are treated symbolically in connection

<sup>80</sup> *Linc. Ms. 25*, fol. 188v: 'Alexander Papa tertius de censura discipline communis in concilio decrevit ut careat sepultura Christiani regiminis laicus qui noluerit ecclesie decimis renuntiare.' The reference is to canon 14 of the Council (cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *Hist. des conciles*, V, Paris, 1913, p. 1099).

<sup>81</sup> Preiss argues convincingly that the dedication, with its part addressed to Conrad of Wittelsbach, could only have been written in the early summer of 1182 (*Die politische Tätigkeit . . . der Cisterzienser*, Berlin, 1934, p. 265). The work would then have to be prior to this date.

<sup>82</sup> *Linc. Ms. 15*, fol. 5.

<sup>83</sup> Prologue to Bk. I (*Linc. Ms. 15*, fol. 5); also in the course of Bk. III (fol. 24).

<sup>84</sup> Bk. I, Prologue: 'Quia vero labor peregrinationis corporalis parum facit nisi eam peregrinatio spiritualis purificat.'

<sup>85</sup> This part of the title was undoubtedly taken from Vegetius' treatise of the same name, a fourth century work which was very common in mediaeval libraries. Some of the headings on arms, instruments of war and campaigns seem to have been suggested by those of Vegetius. Otherwise, there is little resemblance.

with the spiritual warfare we must wage. Ralph even goes so far as to dissuade his readers from going on the crusade to Palestine; at least, he urges the king, to whom he addresses himself in the Prologues to Books II and III, to be in no great hurry.<sup>86</sup> If calamities have befallen Palestine, they are but a visitation from God upon the sins of its inhabitants;<sup>87</sup> hence one should be slow about interfering. Besides, there are enemies enough of Christ to be encountered at home in the guise of heretics, as diverse as they are numerous, without going off to the Holy Land to fight the infidel.<sup>88</sup> Man's true pilgrimage and crusade being a spiritual one, it should be assured before any other is attempted. This general thesis leads Ralph to a consideration of the evils of his own time, with the result that he has left us many passages of contemporary interest.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, the work merits to be published first among those of Niger's works which are still known only in manuscript. An edition will appear in the near future.

(6). *De Quatuor Festivitatibus Beatae Mariae Virginis.*

The Prologue informs us that, having served the Son of the Virgin in his expositions on Scripture, the author wishes now to honour the Mother. This work must, therefore, be later than the commentaries, and very probably after Niger's return to England. It is offered to the members of some religious house, almost certainly Cistercians, noted for their devotion to Mary,<sup>90</sup> and consists of the proper of the Divine Office for the four major feasts of the Blessed Virgin: her Nativity (Sept. 8), the Annunciation (March 25), the Assumption (Aug. 15) and the Purification (Feb. 2). Niger himself has composed the offices, drawing largely on scriptural sources. Antiphons and responsories are accompanied by musical notation which he claims to be new:

Novum enim cantum antiphonis et responsoriis conquesivi ut et concentus redimeret scripture ruditatem (fol. 33).

The work is extant in one manuscript only: Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 33-43.

(7). *De Interpretationibus Hebraeorum Nominum.*

In the one manuscript (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 59v-86), this work bears a different title: *Philippicus*, which has evidently nothing to do with the nature of the contents. Niger himself gave it this title and he tells us in his Prologue why he has done so: a certain Jew converted to Christianity and named Philip has been his guide in the

<sup>86</sup> Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 26v: 'Inde est, serenissime domine, quod prudentiam vestram et patientiam liberius audeam commendare quia nec inconsulte necessitate peregrinationis vos illigastis.' The prologues referred to are on fol. 12v and 18v. The king in question is certainly Philip Augustus, for Niger was in France when he wrote this work; moreover, his high praise of Philip throughout is in sharp contrast with his severe judgments against Henry II of England.

<sup>87</sup> 'Exigentibus peccatis hominum . . .' (fol. 5); 'Peccatis enim Palestine exigentibus . . .' (fol. 24); and a whole chapter in Bk. III, *De justa pena Palestine* (fol. 25v; cf. fol. 24).

<sup>88</sup> Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 26v: 'Hec itaque, serenissime regem, de militia christiana et de tribus viis peregrinationis Jerosolimitane et de pestilentis heresum que fines occiduos invasit (sic) vobis scribere curavi ut contagiones here-

ticorum ab ingressu terrarum vestrarum arceatis et de peregrinatione assumenda non festinetis et modum milicie religiose agnoscatis.' Several times Niger manifests great concern about the heresies of the late twelfth century (especially on fol. 24 and 25v). On these heresies, consult J. Guiraud, *Histoire de l'Inquisition. I. Origines* . . . (Paris, 1935), ch. I: *L'Hérésie au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (pp. 1-33). Ralph's preoccupation with heresy is another reason for supposing that he was at one time associated with the Archbishop William of Rheims; the latter was particularly active against the sect of *publicani* or *paterins* (cf. Williams, *art. cit.*, in *Anniv. Essays* . . . Haskins, p. 371, n. 44).

<sup>89</sup> The general character of some of these is not unlike that of certain passages in Walter Map's *De Nugis Curialium*.

<sup>90</sup> See above p. 114.



use of Hebrew dictionaries for the interpretation of many names; hence Ralph calls the work *Philippicus* to acknowledge his great debt to Philip.<sup>91</sup>

Much of the matter is based on a similar work of St. Jerome,<sup>92</sup> as Niger further explains in the Prologue. He feels obliged in fact to justify his seeming presumption in attempting to add to or alter what St. Jerome has already done. Like the latter's work, this of Niger proceeds through the books of the Old and New Testament listing in alphabetical order for each book all the proper names with their interpretation. It is not a slavish following of St. Jerome, however: the order of books varies somewhat and even that of names at times. More often than not Ralph's interpretation agrees with that of the great Doctor, but there are frequent cases where he differs; he is usually careful to indicate, nevertheless, what St. Jerome's interpretation is.<sup>93</sup> Finally, many of Niger's lists are fuller, while he gives lists for *Ruth*, *Judiith*, *Machabees*, *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras*, which are altogether lacking in St. Jerome's work.

The very nature of the work and the observations of the writer raise the interesting problem of Ralph's knowledge of Hebrew. That he should undertake this particular work at all is evidence that he had some interest in Hebrew. Moreover, his remarks in the Prologue on Hebrew words and writing prove some acquaintance with the language. Nevertheless, his other works bear but scant witness to a knowledge of Hebrew, while he himself in another part of this very work admits that even with the aid of dictionaries and the help of Jewish interpreters he sees the meaning of many names *non omnino clare . . . sed tanquam per speculum in enigmate*.<sup>94</sup> Elsewhere, after mentioning how some words are written with a simple aspiration, others with double and still others with none at all, he adds: *Unde et variatur interpretatio; verum ignorantibus Hebreum determinatio talium magis est laboriosa quam fructuosa*.<sup>95</sup>

If we may accept his own testimony for it, Ralph has been painstaking, nevertheless, in seeking out the meaning of the Hebrew names. He has declined to take

<sup>91</sup> Linc. Ms. 75, fol. 59v: 'Unde et hoc opus non nomine meo sed Philippi interpretis mei Philippicum intitulavi quoniam maxime fidem ejus in eo secutus sum, eo quod de Judeo factus Christianus in lectionem Machuere et Aruch magister et interpres meus fuit.' This is one more case to add to the already known number of ecclesiastical writers who thus made use of a Jewish interpreter; see Miss Smalley's article, 'Andrew of St. Victor, Abbot of Wigmore: a Twelfth Century Hebraist,' *Rech. théol. anc. méd.*, X (1938) 362.

<sup>92</sup> Published in Migne *PL*, 23, col. 815-904. Niger's work must not be confused with another treatise on the interpretation of Hebrew names, which occurs frequently in manuscripts of the Vulgate, and which used to be printed with the works of Bede (e.g. *Opera Venerabilis Bedae*, Basle, 1563, col. 498-647), but which is actually of a considerably later date; Professor F. M. Powicke says there is good authority for attributing it to Stephen Langton (*The Mediaeval Books of Merton College*, Oxford, 1931, p. 131, n°. 347 note). It too is based on St. Jerome's work; in fact, it seems to be little more than a rearrangement of it: instead of giving the names for each book of the Scriptures in succession, as does St. Jerome, this work groups all the Hebrew names beginning in *A*, then those in *B*, etc., making but one

alphabetical list. It appears to add little that is new. Niger's treatise, on the other hand, while following the order of St. Jerome, displays much more originality in the way of additions and differences, especially in the first books of the Old Testament upon which Niger himself had written commentaries.

<sup>93</sup> The following, chosen at random from fol. 60v, are typical: '*Cahath*: adunatus vel azedo. J. molares dentes vel paciencia' (cf. St. Jerome's treatise in *PL*, 23, col. 820). '*Emim*: dubius. Jer. horribilis' (cf. *PL*, 23, col. 823). Sometimes disagreement with St. Jerome is on a more fundamental point; thus, Niger prefaces the following observation to the names in *P*: 'Apud Hebreos, ut dicit Jeronimus, *P* littera non est. Moderni Hebrei dicunt habere *Pe* et *Phe* pro nostro *P*; ponit autem *F* forte ubique pro *P*. Ego vero tempora nostra sequor quia *P* habere (*sic*) semper in principio, *Phe* autem in fine; *Pe* autem pro *Phe* etiam plerumque ponitur principio' (fol. 61v; cf. *PL*, 23, col. 889). In his commentary on *Numbers*, Ralph invokes the testimony of St. Jerome along with that of Jewish usage to show that our letter *S* has to stand for three different Hebrew letters (Linc. Ms. 23, fol. 75v-76; cf. *PL*, 23, col. 827-828).

<sup>94</sup> Fol. 80, in a minor prologue to the names that occur in *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras*.

<sup>95</sup> Fol. 60v, at word *Chabor*.



the word of his interpreter Philip, unless the dictionaries *Machbereth* and *Aruch*<sup>96</sup> support it, and unless these in turn are in accord with the interpretation of Jews of Ralph's own time. Finally he has refused to trust even the combined weight of all three of these, unless their interpretation is confirmed by the Old Testament itself or at least by Gamaliel.<sup>97</sup> It is undoubtedly as a result of these efforts that Ralph acquired his smattering of Hebrew.

This work closes the list of Niger's scriptural writings; there remain his two chronicles and the gloss he is said to have composed on Aristotle.

(8). *Chronicle I.*

Anstruther gives the name of *Chronicle I* to the longer of Niger's two chronicles, extending from the creation to the end of the twelfth century. For his edition<sup>98</sup> he used one manuscript only: British Museum *Cotton Ms. Cleopatra C. 10*. Pauli has described this particular manuscript,<sup>99</sup> and in the parts of it which he has republished in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*<sup>100</sup> he has included certain marginal notes that Anstruther omitted. Pauli, like Anstruther, seems, however, to have been ignorant of the Lincoln manuscript of the same chronicle (*Ms. 15*, fol. 44-58). The latter incorporates the marginal notes just mentioned and contains as well a few interesting variants which will have to be taken into account in a re-edition. Pauli has carefully analyzed the contents of the chronicle and its sources up to the point where it becomes almost contemporary.<sup>101</sup> There still remains the task of determining more exactly, if possible, Niger's sources for the twelfth century. Meanwhile it must suffice to refer to Pauli's article and to the notice in T. Duffus Hardy's *Descriptive Catalogue*, vol. II, pp. 496-497.

(9). *Chronicle II.*

Less interesting for its own sake, apart from the attack it contains on Henry II, this chronicle acquires a certain importance from its association in all the manuscripts with the Chronicle of Ralph, abbot of the Cistercian house of Coggeshale, a valuable source for the reigns of Richard I and John.

<sup>96</sup> These are well known mediaeval dictionaries, *Machbereth* for biblical language, *Aruch* for the Talmudic. Menahem Ben Saruk composed a dictionary, *Machbereth*, in Spain in the tenth century. The first *Aruch*, by the Gaon Zemach, is of the late ninth century; but the best known one is that of Nathan of Rome, incorporating much of the earlier one and dating from the end of the eleventh century. About the middle of the twelfth century, Solomon Ibn Parchon, disciple of the Spanish scholar Abraham Ibn Ezra but himself writing at Salerno, composed a *Machbereth ha-Aruch* (name borrowed from the two). Niger may have had this latter, since he always uses the two names in conjunction whenever he refers to the use of a dictionary. Facts about the dictionaries are drawn from M. Waxman, *A History of Jewish Literature* (New York, 1930), I, 172, 254, 279-280, 178-179.

<sup>97</sup> 'Neque enim converso meo interpreti credere volui nisi Machuere vel Aruch astipularentur interpretationi. Sed neque his fidem adhibebam nisi Judei consentirent. Sed neque his tribus assentiebam nisi de veteri testamento vel saltem de Gamalielo suo talis in-

terpretationis significationem ostenderent' (fol. 59v).

<sup>98</sup> Pp. 1-104 (edition cited above in n. 1).

<sup>99</sup> *Art. cit.* in *Nachr. der Ges. der Wissensch. zu Göttingen* (1880), p. 572.

<sup>100</sup> *SS*, XXVII, 331-341.

<sup>101</sup> *Art. cit.*, pp. 573-581; also pp. 581-584 for the twelfth century part. Pauli recognized that from the year 1110, Niger is much less dependent on other sources. The Lincoln manuscript actually contains a prologue at this point, which is missing in the British Museum manuscript used by Pauli, and which states the very fact which he observed:

PROLOGUS: Priora de hystoriis etronicis aliorum excepimus et pleraque sequentium. Verum ea que prope tempora nostra acciderunt vel etiam diebus meis accidunt lacius expandi secundum ea que prius audivi aut vidi et a veridicis latoribus accepi. Ego tamen et de prioribus et de sequentibus non erubesco corrigi meis in quibus deliqui; et ideo hec cronica sicut et alia scripta mea omnia ad emendandum prudentiorum virorum committo iudicio (*Linc. Ms. 15*, fol. 55v).

Anstruther published this chronicle as *Chronicle II*,<sup>102</sup> using one manuscript almost exclusively: British Museum *Cotton Ms. Vespasian D. 10* with some notes from another: *Royal Ms. 13. A. 12*. Pauli re-edited extracts from the same two manuscripts.<sup>103</sup> Elsewhere he has described the manuscripts fully, analyzed the contents of the chronicle, and given a list of other known manuscripts:<sup>104</sup> London, Heralds' College *Ms. 11*; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale *Ms. Lat. 15076*; Dublin, Trinity College *Ms. E. 4. 24*. He omits the manuscript of Cambridge, Corpus Christi College *Ms. 343* (fol. 1v–18v for Niger's chronicle).

The success of this chronicle in comparison with Niger's other works, as evidenced by the number of manuscripts, is undoubtedly due to its having been used by Ralph of Coggeshale as his starting point. The relationship of the two Ralphs and of the annals and additions, which separate the parts that belong admittedly to these two, still awaits a more thorough examination.

Ralph Niger continued his part to about the year 1180; the death and burial of Louis VII of France are mentioned.<sup>105</sup> He seems to have been writing, however, some twenty years after this date, for in his list of the archbishops of Canterbury, he ends with *Hubertus qui regem Johannem inunxit*.<sup>106</sup>

All the manuscripts, most of which are of the thirteenth century, attribute this chronicle to Ralph Niger. The first continuator states explicitly that what has gone before is the work of Ralph, while the Prologue too is definitely assigned to him. Molinier, without giving any reasons or authority, seems to consider that the attribution to Ralph is by no means sure.<sup>107</sup> In the present state of the question, however, there is no solid reason for denying his authorship.

As in the case of the first chronicle, we refer the reader, for the time being, to Pauli's article and to T. Duffus Hardy's notices: *Descriptive Catalogue*, II, 287–289 on Ralph's part of the chronicle; II, 415 and III, 22, 30 on the continuations.

#### (10). Gloss on Aristotle's *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi* (?)

According to Gervase of Tilbury, Niger was the author also of a gloss in verse on these two parts of Aristotle's logic. There is no other reference to it than that of Gervase, not even in Ralph's own list of his works, and we have only the two lines of the gloss which Gervase cites.<sup>108</sup> The latter was in a position to know what Ralph had written in his earlier years, having been his fellow courtier in the Young King's service. Moreover, Ralph would certainly have studied the logic of Aristotle and perhaps even taught this very portion of it, the dialectical part, at Paris, as DuBoulay suggests.<sup>109</sup> The gloss may therefore be placed with some degree of probability among the authentic works of Niger. It would date from the early years of his literary activity, before his Scripture commentaries.

<sup>102</sup> Pp. 105–169; Ralph's chronicle ends at p. 169, but Anstruther goes on to publish the first additions also.

<sup>103</sup> *MGH, SS, XXVII*, 341–344.

<sup>104</sup> *Art. cit.*, pp. 585–589.

<sup>105</sup> 'Obiit Parisius sepultusque est apud Barbeaus super Sequanam quam ipse fundavit' (ed. Anstruther, p. 167).

<sup>106</sup> Pauli (*art. cit.*) says that the list ends with Baldwin (1184–1190); Anstruther too ends the list in his edition with Baldwin. Yet, the manuscript which they both used (*Vespasian D. 10*, fol. 34) bears the mention of Hubert Walter. I am dependent, for the moment, on photographs; there is evidence of the words 'Hu-

bertus qui Johannem inunxit' having been scratched somewhat; perhaps it is clear in the manuscript itself that they have been deleted. Nevertheless, they were certainly written by the person who copied the manuscript, for they are in the same hand and on a normal line, not interlined or added in the margin. And, since the manuscript is a copy, I do not see on what grounds Pauli and Anstruther have concluded that the words were not in the original.

<sup>107</sup> *Les Sources de l'histoire de France*, III (Paris, 1903), 19.

<sup>108</sup> The passage is cited above in n. 25; cf. editor's note in *MGH, SS, XXVII*, 370, n. 6.

<sup>109</sup> *Hist. Univ. Paris.*, II, 769.

*Works falsely attributed to Ralph Niger.*

The confusion between our Ralph and Ralph of Flaix, monk at St. Germer in the diocese of Beauvais, has long since been noted.<sup>110</sup> The confusion of persons led to a corresponding confusion of works. As a result, Ralph of Flaix's commentary on *Leviticus* has often been ascribed to Ralph Niger. Tanner made this error; the manuscripts in the Royal collection (now at the British Museum), which he lists as Niger's *Digestum in Leviticum*<sup>111</sup> are all copies of Ralph of Flaix's much better known work on this same book of the Old Testament. Conversely, Niger's historical works have sometimes gone under the name of Ralph of Flaix.<sup>112</sup>

No explanation has been offered of this confusion. It is not impossible, however, that Alberic of Trois-Fontaines was the unwitting cause thereof when he wrote of Ralph of Flaix: *Radulfus ille niger monachus Flaicensis in territorio Belvacensi fecit opus super Leviticum*.<sup>113</sup> The juxtaposition of the words *Radulfus* and *niger* could easily lead to the confusion of this member of the Black Monks at St. Germer with our Ralph Niger, since both wrote treatises on *Leviticus*.

Tanner likewise ascribed to Niger a work entitled *Pantheologicon*.<sup>114</sup> Bale was undoubtedly his source for this statement. The editors of Bale's *Index* have, however, called attention to this false ascription: the *Pantheologicon* is in reality the work of Peter, canon and prior of the Augustinian house of Holy Trinity, London.<sup>115</sup> The latter dedicated the second and third parts of his treatise to Ralph, archdeacon of Colchester,<sup>116</sup> and the presence of this name at the head of the volume seems to explain the false attribution to the other Ralph, Ralph Niger. I believe it explains another error about Niger, namely, that which makes him to have been archdeacon of Gloucester.<sup>117</sup> This error has its root apparently in a misreading of the archdeacon of Colchester's title; Tanner has put *Radulfus archidiaconus Glocestriae*, instead of *Colcestrie* as occurs in Bale.<sup>118</sup> Once the work was wrongly ascribed to Niger because of the name Ralph at the beginning, the further error, that Niger was archdeacon of Gloucester, would follow naturally.

Finally, Ralph has been sometimes credited with historical works other than his two chronicles. Bale, Pits and Tanner mention some three: *De Regibus Angliae a Guilielmo Primo, De Rebus Gestis Regis Johannis*, and *Initia Regis Henrici Tertii*.<sup>119</sup> The attribution to Niger is so lacking in solid foundation, however, that later bibliographers do not include them at all; even Bale and Tanner seem to have had their doubts about the authenticity of the works. They are nothing but excerpts from other chronicles which have, for some unknown reason, had Niger's name attached to them. It is hardly necessary to discuss them here. Anstruther treats the matter in the introduction to his edition of Niger's chronicles (p. ix), as does also the article in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Hardy too touches on it in his *Descriptive Catalogue*, III, 78.

<sup>110</sup> *Hist. litt. de la France*, XII, 484; also article on Niger in *DNB*.

<sup>111</sup> *Bibl. Brit.-Hib.*, p. 548; cf. article in *DNB*.

<sup>112</sup> *Hist. litt. de la France*, XII, 484; cf. art. in *DNB*.

<sup>113</sup> *Chronica Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium*, publ. in *MGH, SS*, XXIII, 844.

<sup>114</sup> *Loc. cit.* Pits too attributed it to him (*De Illustribus Angl. Script.*, p. 291).

<sup>115</sup> Ed. Poole and Bateson, p. 331, n. 11. On Peter's *Pantheologus*, see R. W. Hunt's article, 'English Learning in the Late XIIth Century,' *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.* (1936), 33-34; the prologue to the first part of the work is published as an appendix to the same article, pp. 38-42.

<sup>116</sup> This is Ralph of Haute Rive, who died at the siege of Acre in 1191 (R. W. Hunt, *art. cit.*, p. 33).

<sup>117</sup> Both the author of the article in *DNB* and Pauli (*art. cit.*) questioned this fact, but without offering any solid objection other than the non-appearance of Niger's name in the list of archdeacons of Gloucester found in LeNeve's *Fasti*.

<sup>118</sup> The editors have noted this misreading by Tanner: *Index*, p. 331, n. 12. Pits too had read Gloucester (*loc. cit.*).

<sup>119</sup> Bale, *Index*, pp. 331-332 Tanner, *Bibl.*, p. 548; Pits, *De Ill. Angl. Script.*, p. 291.

Many points about Ralph Niger's life still remain obscure. The further study of his works should add to our knowledge of the man. Certainly, it will make us more familiar with him, and this promises to be intriguing, for he reveals himself already as one with a strong personality and many peculiarities. This article has attempted little more than to show what can be stated with certainty, what is probable, and what is demonstrably false, among those things which have been previously said about him. If it has added anything new of particular interest, it is, first of all, in showing the scope of Niger's personal interests as manifested in his works; and secondly in bringing forth evidence for Ralph's prolonged residence in Paris or nearby and his close association with theologians and patrons of letters of the rank of the Bishop of Paris, Maurice of Sully, and the Archbishop of Rheims, William of the White Hands. He must have been in contact with many of the chief scholars and teachers at Paris during years which represent an important formative period in the realm of theological studies. All of which leads to the conclusion that Ralph's works may throw valuable light on the developments of those years, the 1170's and 1180's, at Paris.

### Appendix

Prologue to Book I of *De Re Militari* (cf. n. 41 above). (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5v, col. 1, line 18 to col. 2, line 5).

Hec vobis, reverende pater, de verbo Domini munus modicum in exenias porrigo quatinus Dei amore et sacre scripture intuitu et presentium gratia et hec et alia que super libros Moysi digessi a prudentioribus viris faciatis examinari priusquam a me vel ab alio in publicum educantur. Neque enim de me certus sum quod viam pollutam deserti hujus inpolluto pede transierim, ut in tanto sacre scripture pelago sine ullo periculo erroris enataverim. Hoc itaque munus magnificentie vestre congruum et officio vestro debitum omni desiderio et necessarie a vobis efflagito. Sullimitas (*sic*) enim illustratus vestri et prerogativa potestatis apostolice auctoritatis et regie dignitatis fulta presidio et potest et debet ydoneos viros ad hujus emendationis scrutinium eligere et quasi munus puplicum (*sic*) indicere. Quod enim apex apostolicus hodie pro debito sui officii facere non sufficit, quoniam egregios viros qui ad hoc facerent mortalitatis fatum ei subduxerit, vos qui singulariter in partem apostolice sollicitudinis accitus fueritis defectum ejus, maxime cum possitis, supplere tenemini. Venerabilis quoque M. episcopus Parisiensis, qui aliis prioribus operibus meis favorem emendationis prestare consuevit, jam consenuit ut amodo tali studio intendere non possit. Sed et si etas et voluntas pariter ei suffragarentur, quia tamen canones et leges non didicerit, ad emendandum expositiones juris non facit. Ego enim estimaverim omne jus tam divinum quam humanum in terris lege mosaica contineri. Quaecumque <sup>120</sup> enim de canonibus innitentia justicie et fidei in scolis didici, de fontibus legis mosaice scaturi[r]e adverti; et ideo secundum jura et sensum meum et stilum expositioni pro posse meo adaptavi. Inde est quod dominum Senonensem archiepiscopum quia canones et leges audierit ad scrutinium invitavi, et non tunc exaudivit me. Alios quoque auditores legum et canonum rogavi, qui aut metu laboris aut alia diffidentia pauperis auctoris inventa invisere noluerunt. Necessarie igitur tanquam pauper ad emendationem eorum quibus sufficere me non presumo a vobis auxilium postulo, quoniam de consistorio proprio didiceritis qui pre aliis noverit leges et canones. Etenim soli juris periti faciunt ad examen digestorum legis Moysi, quoniam juris ignari in examinando jure parum idonei sunt. Quicquid igitur falsum invenerint seu contra fidem secure condampnent, me tamen simul emendato. Si

<sup>120</sup> The reading looks more like *Quicumque* in the manuscript.

vero minus composite dictum invenerint quod ipsi elegantius scribere norint; <sup>121</sup> nolo enim <sup>122</sup> quod incompositum meum abradant cui tamen veri aut fidei substantia astipuletur.

<sup>121</sup> The conclusion of this conditional sentence is lacking; the following emendation is suggested: '. . . norint, [nolo quod condampnent;] nolo enim quod . . .'

<sup>122</sup> Corrected from Cambridge, Pembroke College *Ms.* 27, fol. 120: Lincoln *Ms.* reads: *tamen.*

# Origin and Significance of the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy<sup>1</sup>

GERHART B. LADNER

THE Byzantine iconoclastic controversy, the great struggle against religious images in the Eastern Roman empire which began between 724 and 726<sup>2</sup> with measures of the emperor Leo III against the images and ended finally with the institution of the Feast of Orthodoxy in 843, was one of the greatest political and cultural crises of Byzantium, the greatest one between the monophysite trouble and the Latin invasion of Constantinople in 1204. The question arises very naturally how this controversy about the religious images could assume such an outstanding importance and lead to such serious convulsions; for iconoclasm was then not only a secondary trouble as in the 16th century Reformation, but the matter of a great conflict. This question has not yet found a satisfactory answer. The reason is that it has been discussed either by historians in its supposed historical relations such as the rise of Islam, equally hostile to images, or by art historians who were only interested in the consequences for Byzantine art. With the exception of a few ingenious remarks of W. Solowjew in his book on Russia and the universal Church,<sup>3</sup> the first attempt at a more synthetical investigation has been made by the Russian A. Grabar in his excellent book on the emperor in Byzantine art.<sup>4</sup> I wish to emphasize that my effort to approach the solution of the problem of the political role of Byzantine iconoclasm in the first part of this article is largely based upon the results of Grabar who has not yet drawn the final consequences of his findings.

The emperors who initiated and chiefly encouraged iconoclasm were Leo III (717–741) and his son Constantine V (741–775), and then, after the iconophile intermezzo of Irene's reign (780–802) and the temporary rehabilitation of the holy images by the second council of Nicaea in 787, again Leo V (813–820), Michael II (820–829) and Theophilus (829–842). These emperors were in military and administrative matters the most able and successful rulers of Byzantium in the 300 years of transition between the death of the great Justinian and the coming of Basil I, the true father of the Middle Byzantine empire. These iconoclastic em-

<sup>1</sup> This article is on the whole identical with a public lecture, delivered at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and at Notre Dame University, Indiana, in February 1939. Some new points and documentary evidence have however been added. For more complete bibliographical reference cf. the excellent survey given by L. Bréhier, in: *Histoire de l'Église*, published by A. Fliche and V. Martin, V (Paris 1938) 431 ff.; an older study by L. Bréhier: *La querelle des images* (Paris 1904). The topics dealt with in the second part of the article, namely the doctrine of the sacred images as developed by their defenders in the Byzantine empire, its influence upon the matter and form of the images themselves and the relation of the Byzantine iconophile and iconoclastic views to the mediaeval theory of art in the west, have been treated by me at

some length in two earlier studies: "Der Bilderstreit und die Kunstlehren der Byzantinischen und abendländischen Theologie," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ser. III, Vol. I (1931) 1 ff., and: "Die italienische Malerei im 11. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien*, New Series, Vol. V (1931) 33 ff. The word "Byzantine" will be used in this article to designate the Church and her art in the whole territory of the Byzantine or Eastern Roman empire. Only on some occasions we shall have to distinguish between its diverse regions.

<sup>2</sup> For the date cf. note 45.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. notes 42 and 43.

<sup>4</sup> A. Grabar, *L'empereur dans l'art byzantin. Recherches sur l'art officiel de l'empire d'orient*. (Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg. Fasc. LXXV. Paris 1936).

perors stopped the early fierce assaults of the most dangerous enemies, Islam in the east, and the still pagan Bulgarians in the north, and they achieved the reforms of the army and of the political, juridical and financial administration, which made this possible. Like a few others of the greater Byzantine emperors Leo III as well as later Leo V and Michael II came from the eastern parts of the empire and were soldiers without a higher education.<sup>5</sup>

It is unfortunate for the historian that most of the iconoclastic sources have been lost or destroyed after the victory of orthodoxy—in so far as they are not recorded by the acts of the subsequent orthodox councils and the orthodox authors. The voluntary destruction of iconoclastic sources is the principal reason for our being so inadequately and often unreliably informed about Byzantine iconoclasm. But I think one should not go too far in criticizing the iconophile reports, partial as they were bound to be. The concrete statements which are made by these sources, concerning the reasons for the first iconoclastic measures of Leo III, infer that he took them under the influence of a few bishops of Asia Minor, who had again been inspired by Islamic and Jewish hostility against the supposedly idolatrous use of images.

The oldest and indeed contemporary source is a passage in the letter of the patriarch Germanus of Constantinople to Thomas of Claudiopolis, one of the iconoclastic Asiatic bishops, written about 724, shortly before the start of the iconoclastic activity of Leo III and preserved in the acts of the second council of Nicaea of 787. After having blamed the removal by Thomas of the images of Christ and the Saints from his episcopal town, calling it an inconsiderate innovation, Germanus continues in this way:<sup>6</sup> "For the rest," he says, "we" (that is to say the Christians), "ought to achieve the overthrow of the words and deeds gathered together by the infidels in order to injure the Church of Christ, and we should demonstrate her venerable and divine imperturbability. One thing therefore is to be understood first of all, namely, that not only just now but often the Jews too reproached us for such things," (namely, for idolatry in form of the use of images), "and that they, though being true worshippers of idols,<sup>7</sup> but attempt to abuse our pure and divine faith and are eager to prevent us from our devotion for things made by human hands" (namely the images; cf. the prohibition of *χειροποιήματα* in *Levit. XXVI*, 1, cf. also *Exod. XX*, 4 and *Deut. V*, 8). Further on in the same letter,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> It is probable that Leo III, who is generally called the Isaurian and founder of the so-called Isaurian dynasty, was not born in Isauria (Southern Asia Minor), but in Syria near the borders of Cilicia; (cf. the sources as quoted by L. Bréhier op. cit. 433 f., note 1; also K. Schenk, in: *Byz. Zeitschrift* V [1896] 296 ff.; H. v. Schubert, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Frühmittelalter* [Tübingen 1921] 330, and A. A. Vasiliev, *Histoire de l'empire byzantin* I [Paris 1932] 311 f.). Constantine V was more educated and more "fashionable" a man than his father Leo III. On the one hand he wrote a theological treatise on the images; on the other his passion for horses was so great that it caused his disreputable nicknames *Καβαλλίνος* and *Κομπόνημος*. This and the accusation of "effeminacy," that is to say sodomy, raised against Constantine in spite of his being three times married (cf. the sources in Martin and Fliche op. cit. 39 f.), should be borne in mind when we study the representations from the hippodrome (see below) and the portraits not only of Constantine himself, but also of his

favourite chariot driver (cf. *Vita S. Steph. Jun.*, Migne, *P. Gr.* C 1172 B), which were substituted for Christian art, and also when we attempt to understand his aversion against monasticism (cf. p. 139 ff.). Thus Byzantine iconoclastic profane art, meant to replace religious-monastic art, may have comprised even a distorted revival of Greek agonal-athletic art.—Leo V was an Armenian; Michael II and his son Theophilus were Phrygians.

<sup>6</sup> Mansi, *Concilia* XIII 109 B. This passage has been used by E. Caspar, *Geschichte des Papsttums* II (Tübingen 1933) 648, who acknowledges the connection between Jewish-Islamic and Byzantine iconoclasm, as does also Chr. Dawson, *The Making of Europe* (London 1936) 172. See also E. J. Martin, *A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy* (London, New York, Toronto, without year) 31.

<sup>7</sup> This seems to allude above all to the Jewish relapses into idolatry described in the Old Testament; cf. the continuation of Germanus' letter, Mansi op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> Mansi op. cit. 109 D-E.

Germanus says that also the Saracens seem to hit upon something similar, but that they can be easily refuted, because they venerate a real idol, the Kaabah, the black stone of Mekka, and because they cultivate all kinds of superstitions. Toward the end of his letter<sup>9</sup> Germanus refers to the infidels in general, but probably having in mind chiefly the Jews and Mohammedans, when he points out that there would be danger for the belief in the Church's infallibility if the images were now rejected: for enemies of the cross could boast that idolatry had been practiced for centuries by the Christians.

The patriarch Germanus does not expressly state in this letter that Thomas of Claudiopolis' iconoclasm was stimulated by the Jewish and Islamic example, but the fact that he mentions that factor in so close a connection with Thomas' heretical views and actions, makes it nevertheless probable that such was his opinion.

The next important source is a report about the origins of iconoclasm, which was publicly read by the presbyter John, representative of the Anatolian bishops, during the second council of Nicaea, that is to say about fifty years after the events, and which is again preserved in the acts of this council.<sup>10</sup> It was stated that a Jewish magician from Tiberias, of the name of Τεσσαρακοντάπηχς,<sup>11</sup> induced the caliph Yazid II, who reigned from 720 to 724, to order the destruction of all images, prophesying a long reign to him if he would do so. Yazid agreed.<sup>12</sup> Thus even the Christian churches were deprived of their decoration throughout Yazid's empire,<sup>13</sup> upon the instigation of the Jew Τεσσαρακοντάπηχς; and this happened, as the acts of Nicaea say, before the evil had entered this country, that is to say the Byzantine empire.<sup>14</sup> When the pseudo-bishop of Nacolia — Constantine of Nacolia — and his followers had heard of these events, the Nicean report goes on, they imitated the Jews and Arabs in their crimes against the churches.

Now Constantine of Nacolia was doubtless one of the initiators of the iconoclastic movement in the Byzantine empire, along with Leo III himself, with Thomas of Claudiopolis<sup>15</sup> and probably also Theodosius, archbishop of Ephesus.<sup>16</sup> Our

<sup>9</sup> Op cit. 124 D-E.

<sup>10</sup> Op. cit. 197 ff.

<sup>11</sup> This name is composed of τεσσαράκοντα (40) and πήχς (the cubit).

<sup>12</sup> Hostility not only against idolatry, but against representations of human figures is to be observed in the Islamic world at least from the second quarter of the 8th century; cf. L. Bréhier op. cit. 446 and H. Stern, in *Byzantion* XI (1936) 145 f., also the article quoted there: H. Lammens, "L'islam primitif en face des arts figurés," *Journal Asiatique* 1915, p. 239 ff. — Human figures were later admitted in non-religious Mohammedan art, for instance in Persian illuminated manuscripts. The fact of the iconoclastic activity of Yazid II is also attested by the Bishop of Messana, present at the council of Nicaea, who said that when he was a boy he had lived in Syria at the time of Yazid II (Mansi, op. cit. 200B); furthermore by the Syrian Dionysius of Tell-Mahré (died 845) in his *Chronicle* (ed. and transl. by J. B. Chabot, in: *Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études* CXII [1895] 17; cf. L. Bréhier op. cit. 446, also E. J. Martin, *A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy* 23 f.); finally by 9th century Byzantine writers like Theophanes, *Chronographia*, *Annus Mundi* 6215, ed. C. De Boor I (Leipzig 1883) 401 f., or Migne, *Patr. Gr.* CVIII 812 A; Nicephorus, *Antirrheticus* III, Migne, *P. Gr.* C 528 f. The fact has been contested by

some authors without reason (Schenk, in: *Byz. Zeitschr.* V [1896] 276; Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles* III 2 [Paris 1910] 617, 627, note 3, 630, note 1; L. Bréhier, Article *Beser*, in: *Dictionnaire de l'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique* VIII [1935] 1171). Dionysius of Tell-Mahré says nothing about Jewish influence upon Yazid, but reports other idiosyncrasies of the caliph: he ordered all white dogs, white doves, white cocks and blue-eyed (fair haired?) men to be killed; this latter order was however not carried into effect.

<sup>13</sup> Mansi op. cit. 197 D-E. — The centre of the Umayyad caliphate was Syria.

<sup>14</sup> Op. cit. 197E: Καὶ τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ ἀπεκόσμησε τὰς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τοῦ φαρμακοῦ Ἑβραίου ἀρεῶδως τὰς ὑπὸ τὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοῦ, πρὸ τοῦ φθᾶσαι ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ τὸ κακόν.

<sup>15</sup> There were two different episcopal towns Claudiopolis in Asia Minor. Claudiopolis in Bithynia, see of an archbishop, metropolis of the province of Honorias, and Claudiopolis in the province of Isauria (cf. Gams, *Series Episcoporum* 438, 442). Thomas of Claudiopolis is called bishop, not archbishop by the sources.

<sup>16</sup> The archbishop Theodosius of Ephesus, son of the emperor Tiberius III was certainly an iconoclast under Constantine V; he presided over the iconoclastic council of 754. Pope Gregory II, in his first letter to Leo III (Jaffé, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Wat-



knowledge about Constantine and Thomas is chiefly derived from three letters of the patriarch Germanus: the one directed to the bishop of Claudiopolis has been quoted before, the other two were written to Constantine and to his metropolitan John of Synnada.<sup>17</sup> The three letters have been very competently discussed by G. Ostrogorsky, who has proved that Constantine of Nacolia and Thomas of Claudiopolis had been in Constantinople shortly before Leo III opened the iconoclastic campaign.<sup>18</sup> Constantine had failed to convince Germanus<sup>19</sup> of his ideas, but it is very likely that he and Thomas and their friends<sup>20</sup> had won the emperor instead, although the sources do not say this and we are unable to see whether Leo had already developed similar intentions on his own account. The most important fact for us is at any rate that the acts of the council of Nicaea established a causal connection, ("imitation," see above), between Byzantine and Jewish-Islamic iconoclasm,<sup>20a</sup> through the medium of Constantine of Nacolia; he is made responsible for the origin of the heresy also by Tarasius who was patriarch of Constantinople at the time of the second council of Nicaea; Tarasius asserted this clearly on the occasion of the public reading of Germanus' letter in the Nicene council.<sup>21</sup>

tenbach etc., Nr. 2180; cf. E. Caspar, in: *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ser. III, Vol. III [1933] 29), blamed Leo III for having chosen Theodosius as his adviser; it is very likely therefore that he was among the enemies of the images even under Leo III. Ostrogorsky in the article cited in note 18 and Caspar loc. cit. have proved that the two existing letters of Gregory II to Leo III are genuine, apart from interpolations in the first.

<sup>17</sup> They are likewise included in the acts of the second council of Nicaea. Mansi, *Conc.* XIII 100 ff.

<sup>18</sup> G. Ostrogorsky, "Les débuts de la querelle des images," *Mélanges Diehl* I (Paris 1930) 238; he points out rightly that Germanus in writing to Thomas of Claudiopolis after the latter's visit to Constantinople would not have praised the orthodoxy of the Christian emperors regarding the images, if Leo had already declared himself as their enemy.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Germanus' letter to John of Synnada and the somewhat later one to Constantine himself, loc. cit. — Constantine of Nacolia had deceived the patriarch by making him believe that he had changed his mind after Germanus' admonitions. Cf. for the details Ostrogorsky, op. cit., also Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. 627 ff.; L. Bréhier, in: Fliche and Martin, *Hist. de l'église* V 447; the chapters written by Ch. Diehl, in his *Manuel d'art byzantin* I (Paris 1925) 360 ff., in: *Cambridge Medieval History* IV (Cambridge 1927) 1 ff., and in: *Histoire générale*, published by G. Glotz: *Histoire du moyen âge* III (Paris 1936) 259 ff.; I shall in general quote this latest of Diehl's comprehensive publications on the subject. On the contrary, it is sufficient to cite the *Histoire des conciles* by Hefele-Leclercq, leaving aside Leclercq's more recent article *Images (culte et querelle)*, in: Cabrol-Leclercq, *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, because the author repeats here almost literally what he had said in his notes to Hefele's work, so far as iconoclasm is concerned.

<sup>20</sup> It is uncertain to what extent the iconoclastic bishops had followers among their

flocks. A true iconoclastic party appears only later, especially in the time of Constantine V (741–775); it is then composed chiefly of soldiers of the army, which was devoted to the emperors, and of higher circles among the dignitaries of the court and in the administration and secular clergy.

<sup>20a</sup> This connection would be much more obvious if it could be ascertained that the Jew *Τεσσαρακοντάπηχvus* (= "40 cubits"), mentioned in the acts of Nicaea, was identical with a man called "the son of 40 cubits," who had been a patrician in the service of Leo III according to the Arabic source *Khitab al 'Uyun*, dating from the second half of the 11th century (cf. the translation by E. W. Brooks, in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* XIX [1899] 26). J. Starr, in his article "An Iconodulic Legend and its Historical Basis," *Speculum* VIII (1933) 500 ff., takes the identity for granted. But the matter is dubious since the Arabic source is late and confused and partly dependent upon Byzantine sources like Theophanes (cf. also note 22). The name *Τεσσαρακοντάπηχvus* (or in a shorter form *Σεραντάπηχος*) is not quite as rare as Starr thinks, since, according to Theophanes, not only the adviser of Yazid II (Theophanes, *Chronogr.* A.M. 6215), but also a personality in the reign of the Empress Irene was called so (ibid., A.M. 6291, Migne, *P. Gr.* CVIII 954 B). The identification, attempted by Starr, of *Τεσσαρακοντάπηχvus* with the Mohammedan Beser (Basir), the iconoclast adviser of Leo III (see below), seems, if not quite impossible, even more uncertain than the identity of "40 cubits" and the "son of 40 cubits." Starr, for the rest, considers the Nicene report on *Τεσσαρακοντάπηχvus* as partly legendary, especially in so far as his Jewish origin and, generally speaking, in so far as the alleged involvement of Jews in iconoclasm are concerned. However this be, there remains at least the fact that the council of Nicaea connected Byzantine iconoclasm with the iconoclastic activity of Yazid II.

<sup>21</sup> Mansi, *Conc.* XIII 105 B and 107 A; cf. Ostrogorsky, op. cit. 236.

The patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople who wrote his *Antirrhetici* against the arch-iconoclast of the emperors, Constantine V (died 775), as late as the first quarter of the 9th century, is in general well informed. Therefore it is important that in his third *Antirrheticus* he too says that the edict of the caliph Yazid II against the images caused the iconoclastic evil in the empire.<sup>22</sup>

It is true that the possibility cannot be excluded completely that the causal relation between Jewish-Islamic and Byzantine hostility against the images existed more in the views of the iconophile writers than in reality. For the acts of Nicea and the iconophile authors in general emphasize at least as much as the actual historical connection, which we have dealt with till now, the spiritual affinity between iconoclasm on the one hand and Judaism and Mohammedanism, as well as Manicheism on the other.<sup>23</sup> It will therefore depend ultimately upon our critical examination of the intrinsic character of Byzantine iconoclasm, how we shall interpret these statements of the sources.

The trustworthiness of the last mentioned Nicene report is however increased by a detail: Yazid II upon the advice of Τεσσαρακοντάπληχus, is said to have destroyed also those images that were ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς πόλεωv κατὰ κόσμον . . . καὶ εὐπρέπειαν . . .<sup>24</sup> This destruction of the profane images in public places as well as that of the religious ones in churches, originated in Jewish and Islamic views which, in their stricter form, excluded artistic representations of human beings or even of all animated beings in general, and not only religious representations.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Migne, *P. Gr.* C 529C. Cf. also Stephanus Diaconus, *Vita S. Stephani Junioris* (written about 808), Migne, *P. Gr.* C 1116B, where St. Stephen, martyr under Constantine V, is said to have made the Greeks, the Jews, the Syrians and the heretics responsible for the origin of iconoclasm. The *Oratio* . . . de . . . imaginibus . . . adversus . . . Constantinum Cabalinum (Migne, *P. Gr.* XCV 309 ff.) and the *Epistola ad Theophilum imperatorem* de . . . imaginibus (loc. cit. 345 ff.), once erroneously attributed to St. John Damascene, were written about 780 and the middle of the 9th century respectively (cf. *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* VIII [1924] 707). The *Oratio* relates (loc. cit. 336 f.) that the imperial dignity and a long reign were foretold to Leo III by Jewish magicians, but under condition that he would destroy all images after his succession; and so he did in the 10th year of his reign, still under Jewish influence. The *Epistola* (loc. cit. 356 f.) tells the same story but connects it with the iconoclastic persecution of Yazid II, asserting that after the death of the caliph the same Jews who had advised him went to Isauria, (mistakenly believed to be the native country of Leo III), and imported the same prophecy to the youthful Leo. A similar story is told in the *Epistola* (loc. cit. 365 ff.) concerning the Emperor Leo V and the causes for his iconoclasm; yet in this case the seducers are said to have been a witch and a magician called Sabbatius, who are not specified with regard to their religion. All these stories are obviously legendary and formed after the model of the reports of the Nicene council and of Theophanes and Nicephorus about Yazid II and his Jewish iconoclastic advisers.—N. Jorga, *Histoire de la vie byzantine* II (Bucharest 1934)

32, who still believed that the *Epistola ad Theophilum imperatorem* (died 842) was a work of St. John Damascene (died 754), seems to consider it as a reliable source and therefore calls Leo III an *esprit superstitieux*, on p. 32 of the Volume, erroneously referring to him also the parts dealing with Leo V. Strangely enough, on p. 34, Jorga contradicts himself in characterizing both Leo III and Leo V as *absolument dénués de superstitions*. Jorga's study: "Les origines de l'iconoclasm," *Bulletin de l'Académie Roumaine* 1929, was not at my disposal.—Starr, *Speculum* VIII 500 ff., who quotes some further Byzantine variations of the story, likewise refers to the *Oratio* and to the *Epistola* as to works of John Damascene.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. for instance *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, op. cit. XIII 157 D. — So far as the Manichees are concerned, we have no evidence for their historical connection with the iconoclasts. For a very slight spiritual relationship between iconoclasm and Manicheism cf. note 44 and p. 148.—For the Paulicians cf. p. 133 and note 34.

<sup>24</sup> Mansi, op. cit. 197 D-E. It is added that Τεσσαρακοντάπληχus suggested this in order to dissimulate his animosity toward Christianity. That is almost certainly an arbitrary interpretation.

<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless there was a large cycle of religious Jewish art as early as the third century A.D. (Dura). Islam before about 700 objected only to idolatry, not to all the representations of human beings (cf. L. Bréhier, in: Fliche and Martin, *Hist. de l'église* V 446). For the changing phases in the Jewish attitude to the images cf. J. B. Frey, "La question des images chez les juifs à la lumière des récentes découvertes," *Biblica* XV (1934) 265 ff., espe-

On the contrary, Byzantine iconoclasm emphasized a certain species of non-religious art — the imperial imagery — substituting it, as we shall see, for the sacred images of Christian tradition.

Beside the evidence for the relation between the Saracen and Byzantine iconoclasm which we have met, we have the testimony of Theophanes, in his *Chronographia* (written ca. 810–814), about a man called Beser (or Basir).<sup>26</sup> Leo III, Theophanes says, had found a companion and a helper in his madness in Beser, who had been born as a Christian in Syria, but had apostasized to Mohammedanism. It is possible that he was forced to do so, for according to Theophanes, he had later on escaped into the Roman empire from serfdom under the Arabs. Leo III became friendly with him because of his physical strength and because he held the same heretical views as he; Leo or his son Constantine made him a patrician. In mentioning the death of the patrician Beser in the war of Constantine V against the usurper Artavasdus, Theophanes calls Beser *Σαρακηνόφρονα*.<sup>27</sup> It is not very likely that Beser gave the idea of iconoclasm to Leo III, but he may very well have encouraged and influenced Leo's attitude.

We gather from Germanus' letters to John of Synnada and to Thomas of Claudopolis that Constantine of Nacolia and probably also Thomas of Claudopolis justified their iconoclastic views by the prohibition of idolatry found in the Old Testament.<sup>28</sup> The same is true for Leo III himself, as can be seen from the first of the two letters by which Pope Gregory II replied to lost letters of the emperor.<sup>29</sup> Now, iconoclastic tendencies had arisen in the Church for the same general reason more than once in previous centuries.<sup>30</sup> They were aroused in this particular moment by Islamic iconoclasm, which had been preceded by Jewish hostility against the images. As we have seen, the acts of Nicaea assert that Constantine of Nacolia imitated the Jewish and Mohammedan iconoclastic attacks of his time. Even if this be exaggerated, we can at least assume that Constantine and his companions knew about these events. But the principal problem for us remains: how and why did Byzantine iconoclasm in the 8th century become a movement of so great importance? And this leads to the other question: why did the emperors accept and enforce it? The influence of a few bishops of Asia Minor and their followers upon Leo III and even the example of Islam and contemporary Judaism, which revived an old trend against imagery, are in themselves not a sufficient explanation

cially p. 298 f. on Jewish iconoclasm in the late 5th and in the 6th century, and also on Jewish accusations raised against the Christians, because of their images, in the 6th century (according to the frequently quoted apology of Bishop Leontius of Neapolis).

<sup>26</sup> Theophanes, *Chronographia*, Annus Mundi 6215 and 6218, ed. De Boor I 402 and 405 or Migne, *P. Gr.* CVIII 812B and 817A.—Cf. Starr, *Speculum* VIII 501 f.

<sup>27</sup> Loc. cit., A.M., 6233, ed. De Boor I 414 or Migne loc. cit. 836C.—The fact that Beser is mentioned on this occasion also, prevents us looking upon him as a legendary figure, as Ostrogorsky, op. cit. 236 would like to do; (cf. also L. Bréhier, in: *Dict. de l'hist. et de géogr. eccl.* VIII 1171 f.).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Mansi, op. cit. 100B–C for Constantine of Nacolia; in the letter to Thomas of Claudopolis only a general refutation of the iconoclastic interpretation of *Exod.* XX 4 and

*Deut.* V 8 is to be found, without special reference to Thomas himself (loc. cit. 117 B).

<sup>29</sup> Jaffé-Wattenbach, *Reg. Pont. Rom.* 2180; last edition: Caspar, in: *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ser. III, Vol. III, p. 73, line 37 ff.—Cf. also note 16.

<sup>30</sup> The attitude of suspicion toward images seems to have been rather general in the earliest time of the Church, in spite of the decoration of the Catacombs; we have not to deal with the question on this occasion. In later centuries there was for instance the frequently quoted prohibition of images by the council of Elvira in Spain of 306 and the breaking of images by bishop Serenus of Marseille, whom Gregory the Great blamed for this reason. For other examples cf. Cabrol-Leclercq, *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturgie* VII 1, 180 ff., Article *Images*, and L. Bréhier, in: Fliche and Martin, *Hist. de l'église* V 445.

for this phenomenon. For one is bound to ask: why did Leo follow the Jews, the Mohammedans and the Bishops of Asia Minor?<sup>31</sup>

Some modern historians have rejected the discussed source evidence altogether, for the reason that it is not likely that the same emperor Leo III who fought with tenacity and success against Islam from his accession to the throne and who forced the Jews to accept baptism from 722 would have been inclined to adopt any of their religious views.<sup>32</sup> Other authors have, perhaps with more right, held probable that Leo followed nevertheless a policy which would make Christianity more acceptable, not only to Mohammedans and Jews, but possibly also to certain heretical groups, of Manichee character and allegedly hostile to images, above all the Paulicians of Asia Minor, a sect kindred to Manicheism; Leo's own origin from Northern Syria, open to influences from regions in which all kinds of trends hostile to imagery or at least to the representation of human form were current has been discussed in this connection; furthermore, it has been supposed that Leo may have been impressed by the military virtue of the Mohammedans and also of the Paulicians, whom he may have known in his native Syria or when he was a general in Asia Minor.<sup>33</sup> The Paulicians, like the Manichees, were opposed to exterior signs of the faith in general, including the images, but it is a controversial point, whether in the time of Leo III or even later, they were breakers of images in the strict sense like the Byzantine iconoclasts.<sup>34</sup> Certain 19th century writers finally, stressing the military and juridical reforms of Leo III, have tried to characterize the iconoclastic emperors as rationalists: according to such anachronistic views these 8th and 9th century rulers would have objected to the images and to the monks, who were their principal upholders, propagators and painters, for reasons which would show them akin to the rationalistic sovereigns of the 18th century enlightenment<sup>35</sup> or even to the Prussian political reformers of Napoleonic times.<sup>36</sup>

The alleged facts, namely the desire of the emperors to reconcile so far as possible Mohammedans, Jews and sectarians with the Christian Byzantine empire, their inner reforms and their hostility against the monks, may be illustrative as historical or psychological background of the iconoclastic position, but they still do not sufficiently explain why the emperors selected the images for the object of their attacks. It is difficult to see how such reasons alone should have implied necessarily the particular iconoclastic measures which were taken.

All the more we must not forget that the iconoclasts gave reasons for their actions — according to the testimony of the iconophiles themselves — and that

<sup>31</sup> Ostrogorsky, op. cit. does not attempt to explain the influence of the iconoclastic bishops of Asia Minor upon Leo III.

<sup>32</sup> So for instance Diehl, in: Glotz' *Hist. générale, Hist. du moyen âge* III 262.

<sup>33</sup> These possibilities are discussed for instance in Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. III 2, 619, but also by v. Schubert, op. cit. 330, by Dawson, op. cit. 171 f. and others. — Leo III and above all Constantine V, in pursuing their iconoclastic policy, relied largely upon the army, recruited chiefly in Asia Minor. Yet, in spite of modern hypotheses to this effect, there is no evidence that the soldiers were iconoclasts, because they came from Asia Minor. After all, they had but to obey the orders given by the emperors.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. E. J. Martin, *A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy*, Appendix: *The Iconoclasts and the Paulicians*. — Cf. also H. Grégoire, "Les Pauliciens et l'iconoclasme," in the "Résumés"

of the Congress of the Byzantinists in Rome 1936, p. 41 (not at my disposal). — Schenk, in: *Byz. Zeitschrift* V 285 ff., is the foremost representative of the Paulician theory. Cf. also K. Schwarzlose, *Der Bilderstreit*. . . (Gotha 1890) 44 ff. and J. Pargoire, *L'Eglise byzantine de 527 à 847* (Paris 1905) 253 f.

<sup>35</sup> These views are dealt with in detail in Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. and Vasiliev, *Hist. de l'empire byz.* I 334 ff.; they are not completely futile in so far as they draw our attention to an important point: namely to the fact that, at least from Constantine V, iconoclasm was clearly and closely connected with hostility to monasticism. We shall have to return to this subject which is treated by Leclercq himself, op. cit. and emphasized in the quoted works of Diehl and Vasiliev.

<sup>36</sup> This strange comparison is repeatedly used by Schenk, op. cit.

their principal reason was their aversion to what they called idolatry.<sup>37</sup> This brings us back again to the account given by the iconophile sources, of the connection between the earliest iconoclasts and Mohammedanism and Judaism. I think we need not object to the reality of this connection if we understand it in the right way. Of course there could be no question of the iconoclastic emperors or bishops sympathizing with the Islamic or the Mosaic religion; they felt certainly as Christian, even more Christian than the iconophiles. But it happens that people perceive or believe to perceive some truth in their enemy's position: so Constantine of Nacolia and his associates may have appreciated the seemingly anti-idolatrous attitudes of Jews and Saracens. The emperors again, in their efforts to strengthen their position in the empire, were bound to behold that the Mohammedan caliph as well as the Jewish kings of the Old Testament claimed to have a power more directly derived from God than that which the Christian emperor could claim; for there was no Jewish or Mohammedan Church comparable with the Church of the Christians, which is the result of the Incarnation. Now the Incarnation is also the great fact which allowed the Fathers of the Church after some hesitation to recognize a Christian art and made them consider as no longer valid the Old Testament prohibition against making "the likeness of anything that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath nor of those things that are in the waters under the earth"<sup>38</sup>—a prohibition that by the way was not strictly followed either in pre-Christian or in post-Christian Jewish history and was indeed obviously directed first of all against idolatry and only secondarily against art, which was closely connected with the then pagan religions all round Israel.<sup>39</sup>

The supernatural mystery of the Incarnation, surpassing Creation, opened up the possibility of Christian imagery through the fact that God himself has assumed human nature and could be reproduced in his humanity. The reality of the Incarnation and a relative divinity of imagery are therefore, as we shall see later, dependent upon one another, according to the iconophiles.

The existence of the Church as the unity of the incarnated Christ with the Christians and the existence of a religious art representing the incarnated Christ and his Saints to the Christians are two interrelated facts, both resisted or neglected by Judaism and Mohammedanism, which did not believe in the Incarnation. Jewish-Islamic iconoclasm therefore could appeal to the emperors for the reason that it involved an ascendancy over a very important part of religious life of man, which had been, by the Incarnation, gifted with a spiritual liberty, contradicting on principle any unlimited power of government. The Byzantine emperors certainly did believe in the Incarnation, but they did not accept the following two consequences: the absolute supremacy of the Church in spiritual matters and the terrestrial representation of the celestial world in Christian imagery. Many historians have stated that the iconoclastic controversy developed from a rather ritual question to a fundamental contest between Church and State, that is to say the emperor. But the truth is that iconoclasm was from its beginning an attack upon the visible representation of the *civitas Dei* on this earth. Not only because the images had such an important place in the Byzantine Church, theologically and liturgically, that an attack against them was ipso facto an attack against the Church but also and still more because, as we shall see, the emperors showed unmistakably that even in maintaining the belief in the supreme, supernatural government of Christ, they did not wish to permit on this

<sup>37</sup> See above, p. 132.—The other reasons, like the impossibility of the *περιγραφή* (cf. p. 145), contain an explicit or implicit reproach

of idolatry.

<sup>38</sup> *Exod.* XX 4, *Levit.* XXVI 1 and *Deut.* V 8.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. also note 25.

earth any other but their own image or more exactly the imagery of their own imperial natural world. They wished even more ardently than their predecessors and than most of the occidental emperors to be the Christian, the sacred emperors — βασιλεὺς καὶ ἱερεὺς εἰμι, "I am King and Priest," wrote Leo III to Pope Gregory II,<sup>40</sup> following the old caesaropapistic theory—but they understood this in such a way that only their sacred empire was to be the material form of Christendom in the terrestrial world; the Church would be only the liturgical function of the empire. Accordingly the supernatural should remain abstract, Christ and his heavenly world should not and could not be expressed visibly in images.

It is certainly significant that the most violent iconoclast Constantine V held views on the two natures of Christ that led him close to monophysitism;<sup>41</sup> although there is no evidence for a historical derivation of iconoclasm from monophysitism. The monophysite heresy, according to which the human nature of Christ is absorbed in the divine nature, is kindred to iconoclasm in that it makes Christ so inaccessible to humanity and to the human world that he threatens to become an abstractum. Wladimir Solowjew, in his book on Russia and the universal Church,<sup>42</sup> has shown long ago that Byzantine caesaropapism had quite generally an interest in upholding the heresies which attacked the perfect unity or the entirety of the divine and the human nature in Christ (Arianism, Nestorianism, monophysitism, monotheletism); for the dissolution of this unity or the diminution of the entirety of each nature, in narrowing the extension of Christ's government in the human world widened the extension of the emperor's rulership. And Solowjew has even pointed out, in a more general way than is being done in this article,<sup>43</sup> that the same antagonism against a perfect realization of the Incarnation in the terrestrial world was also the reason for the iconoclastic struggle against Christ's image and against images of holy persons in general.<sup>44</sup>

But was Byzantine iconoclasm not in spite of all merely a sincere reaction against a real danger of idolatry, arising from the fact that the Greek Church did not only make but also worship the images? The question of the veneration of images and of the form which this veneration might take played an enormous role in the iconoclastic controversy, and yet it was not the essential point, for the struggle, almost from the beginning, was directed not only against worship, but also against any use of religious images.<sup>45</sup> Besides the theology of the worshippers of images dis-

<sup>40</sup> Quoted in the second letter of Pope Gregory II to Leo III: Jaffé-Wattenbach, *Reg. Pont. Rom.* 2182; last edition: in: *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ser. III, Vol. III, p. 85, line 382. — Cf. for those letters note 16.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. G. Ostrogorsky, *Studien zur Geschichte des Byzantinischen Bilderstreits (Historische Untersuchungen)*, published by E. Kornemann and S. Kaehler, V [1929] 24 ff. Cf. also L. Bréhier op. cit. V 467.

<sup>42</sup> French edition: *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle* (Paris 1922), introduction, p. XXV.

<sup>43</sup> I became acquainted with Solowjew's book after having written most of this article.

<sup>44</sup> The iconophiles reproached the iconoclasts also for Manicheism (cf. pp. 131 and 148); yet the relationship is a very slight one, for the Manichees were much more radical in rejecting the corporeal world.

<sup>45</sup> This remains true although Ostrogorsky, who, in: *Mélanges Diehl* 238 ff., denies the existence of an imperial edict before 730, is probably right in asserting that Leo III had

between 724 and 726 tried by peaceful means to convert his subjects to his opinion regarding the images, before enforcing the first iconoclastic measures; cf. also Diehl, op. cit. III 265. — Theophanes, *Chronographia*, A. M. 6217 (ed. De Boor I 404 or Migne, P. Gr. CVIII 816A), as well as Nicephorus, *Breviarium historicum de rebus gestis post Mauricii imperium* (ed. De Boor, *Nicephori . . . opuscula historica* 58, or Migne, P. Gr. C 964B) use the words καθαιρεῖν, καθαιρεῖς, as they refer to the first plans and acts of Leo III against the images, and those words signify "take down," or "destroy." Germanus, in his letter to Thomas of Claudiopolis, writes likewise about the εἰκόνων καθαιρεῖν, ordered by Thomas (cf. Mansi, *Conc.* XIII 108E). The *Vita S. Stephani Junioris* says that Leo announced his intentions with the words: Εἰδωλικῆς τεχνουργίας ἀπαρχοῦσης τῆς των εἰκόνων ἀνατιπύσεως, οὐ δὲ ταύτας προσκυνεῖν (Migne, P. Gr. C 1084C); yet since the making of images is called an idolatrous art in this passage, one should not press the

tinguished between the λατρεία, that is to say the true adoration or cult of God, which is de fide, on the one hand, and the τιμητική προσκύνησις of the images on the other hand, which is similar to the veneration of the Saints, the relics, the book of the gospels, the cross, and which did not exclude literal prostration, kissing and offering of incense and lights;<sup>46</sup> the veneration of the images was also called a veneration by relative love, because directed only relatively to the image and really to its prototype.<sup>47</sup> It is no doubt very probable that people didn't always make this distinction and it may be that the iconoclasts felt in part sincerely repulsed by excesses of image-worship. Yet if we do not forget how much Byzantine iconoclasm was an undertaking of the emperors themselves we shall understand without any possible doubt that we must not consider the Byzantine iconoclasts merely as puritans<sup>48</sup> — although the Protestant iconoclasts of the 16th century judged them in this way according to their own views. The first great inconsistency of the Byzantine iconoclasts was that they do not really follow the Old Testament commandment to which they refer,<sup>49</sup> namely not to represent in images and not to adore anything in heaven or earth, but that they felt concerned only with religious art — an inconsistency which was repeated by the Protestants so far as making not as venerating profane images was concerned. There is of course a certain general relationship between Byzantine-oriental and northern Protestant iconoclasm, a relationship which has always been noticed by Protestants. In both cases we find a refusal to venerate God under visible forms — a religious attitude recurring periodically since prehistoric times, especially in the east and north — and, as a consequence of denying or, at least, limiting the sacramental order of the world, also the view that the State is the highest visible form of life on the earth. The special characteristic of the imperial Byzantine iconoclasm, which distinguishes it from the iconoclasts of the Reformation, was however the simultaneous increase of a profane imperial art which was meant to replace religious art in the churches and in the public buildings and places. It is one of the great merits of the book of Grabar already mentioned to have gathered all the available material concerning profane imperial art in the iconoclastic period, which is not very numerous be-

fact that the author (writing about 80 years after the events), mentions only the prohibition of image worship on this occasion. Moreover, he himself reports a little later the destruction of a famous Constantinopolitan image of Christ, placed over a door of the imperial palace which was called ἡ ἀγία Χαλκή (cf. loc. cit. 1085 C; it is difficult to be sure whether the image was a statue of bronze and caused the door to be called Χαλκή or whether this name originated from the material of the door, while the image was a mosaic or painting; cf. *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et lit.* VII [1927] 2449 ff., 2456: Article *Jesus Christ* [Portraits] V 440, 442). This first reported destruction of a sacred image upon order of Leo III happened as early as 726 or 727. — An ancient Latin translation of the *Vita S. Stephani junioris* relates that Leo, before proceeding to any demolition of images, had them moved higher up on the walls of the churches, in order to prevent worship. After having been rejected almost unanimously by the more recent authors, this report has been admitted as possible by L. Bréhier, op. cit. 450. But even if Leo had acted merely against image worship in the very first beginnings of iconoclasm, his and his son's later policy proves that their aversion to images was

a much deeper and more comprehensive one.

<sup>46</sup> *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, *Conc.* XIII 377C-E; Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, ed. 21–23 (Freiburg i.Br. 1937), p. 147.

<sup>47</sup> *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, op. cit. XII 1086B: . . . σχετικῶ πόνῳ προσκυνούμεν . . . St. Theodore of Studion, in the 9th century phase of the contest, states not only a relative veneration, but also a relative identity between the image and its prototype; cf. *Antirrheticus I* 11 (Migne, *P. Gr.* XCIX 341B-C): . . . εἰκόνα Χριστοῦ . . . κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τι; 12 (loc. cit. 344B): . . . ἐν εἰκόνι εἶναι τὴν θεότητα . . . σχετικῇ δὲ μεταλήψει . . .

<sup>48</sup> The possibility of the predominance of the religious reasons in 8th century iconoclasm has been amply discussed and traced back to the early Christian period by W. Elliger, "Zur bilderfeindlichen Bewegung des 8. Jahrhunderts," in: *Forschungen zur Kirchengeschichte und zur christlichen Kunst für Johannes Ficker* (Leipzig, 1931) 40 ff.; but there is no real proof of the historic continuity.

<sup>49</sup> As stated above even the Jews did not always adhere literally to the commandment, which in fact strikes essentially against idolatry.



cause of the destruction of most of the iconoclastic monuments, and to have pointed out its important development at this very time.

It cannot be my intention to trace back the profane, yet sacred cult and the juridical significance of the images of the Byzantine emperors to its old Roman and oriental origins; there are excellent works on this topic; I mention only besides the book of Grabar that of Louis Bréhier and Battifol<sup>50</sup> and the more recent studies by H. Kruse<sup>51</sup> and by Alföldi.<sup>52</sup> The Church herself, particularly in the east, had granted a certain degree of veneration — different however from the cult or adoration (*λατρεία*) of God and the veneration of the Saints — to the Christian emperor, and his images. The proskynesis, the prostration before the emperor, as well as the attribution of the circular nimbus to the emperor and the empress in Byzantine works of art testify to this fact.

Now, the stressing of the imperial portrait and of scenes in which the emperor, his court or his profane world in general appear is the one main feature of imperial art in the iconoclastic period; the other one is the reintroduction of representations of animals, plants, and ornaments which are destined to replace the Christian scenes; this meant a turning back into a powerful stream of Hellenized and Romanized oriental or of orientalized Helleno-Roman art, which had largely influenced the ornamental part of Early Christian art although it had not lacked human representations and symbols of Christian character.

Emphasizing of the imperial art in the proper sense can be found in the first place in the coins, these symbols of the State's power par excellence. In the iconoclastic period there are a considerable number of coins which show on both sides the emperor's portrait (the coins of Constantine V are almost extensively of this kind),<sup>53</sup> whereas, before the iconoclastic emperors, the reverse showed usually the cross (sometimes flanked by figures of emperors) or, under Justinian II (685–695 and 705–711), even the image of Christ.<sup>54</sup> The emperor is represented either in the form of a bust or enthroned or standing and bearing the Labarum, the Constantinian banner of the Christian empire, sometimes being blessed by the hand of God, which is stretched from the heavens. The imperial seals of Leo III showed originally his portrait on the obverse and the Mother of God on the reverse;<sup>55</sup> obviously as an iconoclastic measure two new types were introduced: one has Leo's son Constantine V on the reverse (on the obverse still Leo himself), the other has on the obverse the cross, on the reverse the inscription alone.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore the iconophile sources contain allusions to the fact that the iconoclastic emperors spared and even multiplied their own portraits not only on the coins but also in statues and other works of art, for instance, in large representations of their victories, probably frescos or mosaics, whilst they destroyed the images of Christ and the Saints. And it seems that the second iconoclastic emperor, Constantine V, even enforced a more intense worship of the imperial icons, while scorning any veneration of the religious ones.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>50</sup> *Les survivances du culte impérial romain* (Paris 1920).

<sup>51</sup> *Studien zur offiziellen Geltung des Kaiserbildes in römischen Reich* (*Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* XIX 3. Paderborn 1934).

<sup>52</sup> "Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am römischen Kaiserhof," *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung*, XLIX (1934), and "Insignien und Tracht der römischen Kaiser," *ibid.* L (1935).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Grabar, *L'empereur dans l'art byzantin* 167; illustrations in W. Wroth, *Catalogue of the*

*Imperial Byzantine Coins in the British Museum* II (1908), pl. XLII ff.

<sup>54</sup> Grabar, *op. cit.* 163 ff.; Wroth, *op. cit.* pl. XXXVI ff. Images of Christ and the Blessed Virgin are very frequent upon the coins of the post-iconoclastic period, cf. Wroth, *op. cit.* pl. L ff.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. N. Lihačev, "Sceaux de l'empereur Léon III l'Isaurien," *Byzantion* XI (1936) 473 f.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Lihačev, *loc. cit.* 469 ff. — For the veneration of the cross by the iconoclasts cf. p. 138 and note 61.

<sup>57</sup> Grabar, *op. cit.* 168; 167. Cf. Nicephorus,



We also know that Constantine V during whose reign the violent persecution of image worship and worshippers reached its paroxysm ordered that the representation of the six oecumenic councils in the Milion of Constantinople be destroyed and replaced by illustrations of horse and chariot races in the hippodrome.<sup>58</sup> The great public performances in the circuses and in the hippodromes at which the emperors sometimes assisted not only as spectators but also as participants, were in the Byzantine empire as well as in ancient Rome (and in places and times less remote from us) an official matter of great importance, glorifying not only bodily strength, skill and elegance, but also the empire's glory and power. The emperor's victories in wars as also in the chase and in games, won personally or by his soldiers and his jockeys, hunters and players, were equally considered as an expression of the emperor's success and triumph.<sup>59</sup> Therefore the replacing of the images of the councils and of the religious images in general by the images from the hippodrome and the general predilection of the iconoclastic emperors for such scenes,<sup>60</sup> which is testified by the sources, means that the emperor, in those cases, substituted the cult of the empire for that of the Church. Even the emphasizing of the veneration and artistic representation of the cross in the iconoclastic period seems to be due in part to the fact that the cross had become since Constantine the Great the palladium of the empire;<sup>61</sup> besides it corresponded better, as a symbol, to the abstract character of iconoclasm.

Let us now, still following Grabar's study, take a glance at the iconoclastic revival of non-figurative art which now returned to the churches. The already mentioned *Life of St. Stephen the younger*, martyr of the iconoclastic persecution under Constantine V, written in the intermission before the second persecution under Leo V and Theophilus, tells us that Constantine V removed all the holy images of the life of Christ from the church of Mary *ἐν Βλαχέρναις* in Constantinople and substituted images of trees, birds, beasts surrounded by wreaths of ivy with cranes, crows and peacocks; he made the church a storehouse of fruits and a cage for birds, says the orthodox writer quoting Psalm LXXVIII.<sup>62</sup>

Where images of Christ, of the blessed Virgin, of the Saints had been before, animals and plants alternated with representations of horse races, the chase, theatre scenes and chariot races.<sup>63</sup> The most detailed description of iconoclastic decoration — though not in religious but in profane buildings — is given by the continuator of Theophanes, who describes the palace of Theophilus, the iconoclastic emperor of the 9th century. Here again there were mosaics and paintings of animals and trees, but also paintings of trophies, and mosaics representing statues which plucked fruits, also all kinds of mechanical automatons, golden lions and birds which could move and roar or sing, on the whole a fairy tale like the Arabian Nights.<sup>64</sup>

*Antirrheticus I*, Migne, *P. Gr.* C 276C-D; *Antirrheticus III*, loc. cit. 513A; *Apologeticus pro imaginibus*, loc. cit. 561A. — It is generally admitted that Michael the Syrian made a mistake in asserting in his *Chronicle* (ed. and transl. by J. B. Chabot, II [Paris 1901] 491), that Leo III, like the ruler of the Arabs (Yazid II, see above), destroyed not only the images of the Saints but also those of the emperors and others. Michael generalizes an ancient trend of oriental iconoclasm — to be found among non-Christians and Christians and of a more truly anti-idolatrous character —, which was however not dominant in Byzantine 8th and 9th century iconoclasm.

<sup>58</sup> Grabar, op. cit. 169; cf. *Vita S. Stephani, Jun.*, Migne, *P. Gr.* C 1172A-B.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Grabar, op. cit. 62 ff.

<sup>60</sup> *Vita S. Stephani Junioris*, loc. cit. 1113A.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Grabar, op. cit. 170; 32 ff; L. Bréhier, op. cit. 467, with further bibliographical reference; also G. Millet, "Les iconoclastes et la croix," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, XXXIV (1910) 96 ff.

<sup>62</sup> Grabar, op. cit. 171; cf. *Vita S. Stephani Junioris*, loc. cit. 1120 C-D.

<sup>63</sup> *Vita S. Stephani Junioris*, loc. cit. 1113A.

<sup>64</sup> Diehl, *Manuel d'art byzantin I* (1925) 367 f.; cf. Continuation of Theophanes' *Chronographia*, Migne, *P. Gr.* CIX 153 ff.

Actually nothing has survived from this profane iconoclastic art if we make exception for a few geometrical ornamental decorations in the cavern churches of Cappadocia.<sup>65</sup> But we may gain an idea of Byzantine art of this period through approximately contemporary Islamic works like the mosaics in the Umayyad mosque of Damascus, and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.<sup>66</sup> Oriental and Hellenistic elements seem to have been equally strong in Byzantine iconoclastic art. The refinement of the profane art of this period was to be a benefit for religious Byzantine art after the victory of orthodoxy and is an indirect preparation for the artistic bloom of the late 9th and 10th centuries in the Byzantine empire of the Macedonian dynasty, a period which is inadequately called Byzantine Renaissance.<sup>67</sup>

On the basis of the study of imperial iconoclastic art in Byzantium the conclusion — which Grabar has not drawn — seems to me inevitable, namely that there is a mutual causal relation between this profane imperial art and the origin of iconoclasm. The religious art of the Byzantine iconophiles had imbued the daily life of the people in a most effective and overwhelming way with religion. We shall soon see, how according to the iconophiles the religious images were to such an extent a true representation of Christ and his Saints that they were in some way identical with it and consequently able to bring those prototypes down to the earth. But it was just this intense and visible terrestrial representation of the Kingdom of God through the Church and their images which the iconoclastic emperors wanted to replace by a more abstract conception of Christendom which left more room for the idea and the reality of the empire.

In fairness to the iconoclastic emperors the fact may be recalled once more that the most prominent among them (Leo III, Constantine V and Leo V) were above all great soldiers who had to defend the empire in a dangerous period. On the other hand the *vita contemplativa* in a wider sense prevailed in Byzantine Christendom of that time; and it is much less important that there were superstitious excesses in worshipping the images, the relics and the Saints,<sup>68</sup> than that monasticism and image worship, which was favoured very much by the monks, were the most vital and popular forms of religion. As modern authors have supposed, the place of monasticism and image worship among the people may have led the iconoclastic emperors and their advisers, and also part of the higher clergy, to the opinion that a ritualism suspect of idolatry, and a religious quietism were endangering not only the spiritual welfare, but at the same time also the military strength of the empire;<sup>69</sup> in forming this opinion their attention may have been drawn to the religious practice of conquering Islam, consisting essentially of prayer and the Holy War. Yet the superiority of the *vita contemplativa* was always part of the Christian doctrine and is actually a teaching of Christ Himself (Luke X, 41–42); we may therefore reduce the argument to the fact that there existed some evils which would furnish reasons for the iconoclastic movement and the attacks against monasticism, when it was decided to disregard the tradition and the reasons in favour of the images and the monks.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Cf. De Jerphanion, *Les églises rupestres de Cappadoce* (Paris 1925 ff.).

<sup>66</sup> Cf. for instance D. T. Rice, *Byzantine Art* (Oxford 1936) 76 (bibliography).

<sup>67</sup> Cf. also the recent article of C. R. Morey, "The Byzantine Renaissance," *Speculum* XIV (1939) 139 ff.

<sup>68</sup> Best survey in Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles* III 2, 611 ff.

<sup>69</sup> See the review of those opinions in Hefele-

Leclercq, op. cit. 619 ff.; Leclercq joins them in a more cautious form whereas N. Jorga, *Histoire de la vie byzantine* II 32 ff., falls into exaggerations. See also W. Elliger, "Zur bilderfeindlichen Bewegung des 8. Jahrhunderts," in: *Forschungen zur Kirchengeschichte und zur christlichen Kunst für Johannes Ficker* 43. — Cf. also p. 141 f. on the economic side of the problem.

<sup>70</sup> The latest scholarly historian of the Byzantine empire, A. A. Vasiliev, follows the

It is needless to emphasize that the iconoclastic emperors believed that they possessed responsibility, authority and competence in religious questions. Constantine V himself wrote a theological treatise against the images.<sup>71</sup> Leo III, in his *Ecloga* (an abridged and modernized edition of the *Code of Justinian*),<sup>72</sup> stressed and strengthened the Christian element in the practice of law. It was a general political theory of the earlier middle ages that Christian rule had a quasi-ecclesiastical character, that the Christian ruler and above all the Christian Emperor was *rex* and *sacerdos*, Βασιλεὺς καὶ ἱερεὺς, *vicarius Dei*<sup>73</sup> on this earth, a theory which, chiefly because of the Constantinopolitan patriarch's antagonism to the Pope, led to more permanent political consequences in the Byzantine empire than in the western world; therefore the term caesaropapism is rightly applied to Byzantium in the first place. Now, in the iconoclastic controversy, the government of the Byzantine emperors passed beyond the earlier stages of caesaropapism and approached the stern regions of omnipotence of the State. More recent experiences may help us to understand how in such periods every expression of human life can come within the grasp of a supreme will, and all the more when these expressions are so important in the life of a people as the images were for the great majority of the eastern Christians. Secondary, but typical points which I shall enumerate briefly, confirm, I think, the thesis that iconoclasm was but an outgrowth and indeed the climax of the caesaropapistic theory and practice of the State, as represented by some of the most successful Byzantine emperors.<sup>74</sup>

1) The resistance of the orthodox party to the assaults of the iconoclastic emperors was in part paralyzed by the latter's victorious fight against other enemies of Christendom, namely Islam and the Bulgarians.<sup>75</sup>

views expressed by Diehl and others, as he states: . . . "le développement excessif du monachisme et l'accroissement rapide du nombre des monastères allaient à l'encontre des intérêts séculiers de l'état byzantin" (*Histoire de l'empire byzantin* I 341). Vasiliev goes on to say that the monasteries attracted many gifted young men who would otherwise have fulfilled their functions in life as peasants, soldiers or public officers. But it is more than dubious whether one is justified in arguing in this way, even if there were some individuals who had chosen the religious life in order to escape public duties; and even if I. D. Andreiev is right in estimating the number of monks in the Byzantine empire of the iconoclastic period at 100,000. (I was unable to use the book of Andreiev on the patriarchs Germanus and Tarasius of Constantinople [Serguiev Posad 1907], written in Russian, but it is quoted by Vasiliev, loc. cit. 340). Apart from the superiority of the *vita contemplativa*, there is the undeniable contribution of monasticism to mediaeval culture in the broadest sense. To the view that the possession of large estates by the monasteries was a disadvantage to the Byzantine state, Ostrogorsky (in: *Byz. Zeitschrift* XXX [1929-30] 400) has rightly objected that it is not probable that any scarcity of land existed at that time in the Byzantine empire.

<sup>71</sup> Fragments contained in the *Antirrhetici I* and *II* of the patriarch Nicephorus; cf. Ostrogorsky, *Studien zur Geschichte des byz. Bilderstreits* 7 ff.

<sup>72</sup> Ed. Zachariae v. Lingenthal, in: *Collectio*

*librorum iuris Romani ineditorum* (1852); cf. for the *Ecloga* L. Bréhier, loc. cit. 438 (also bibliography) and Diehl, loc. cit. 259.

<sup>73</sup> For *vicarius Dei* as title of the emperor in the west cf. my book *Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit* (*Veröffentlichungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung* II [Baden bei Wien 1936], note 411 (with bibliography). Since Innocent III *vicarius Dei* is an official title of the Pope.

<sup>74</sup> A similar solution was given by K. Schwarzlose, *Der Bilderstreit* 50, yet he has failed to explain sufficiently why the images were attacked by caesaropapism.

<sup>75</sup> This can be observed in the historical work of the patriarch Nicephorus, in the aforementioned *Breviarium*, ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 52 ff. or Migne, *P. Gr. C* 957 ff.; in spite of being an almost fierce enemy of Constantine V, belittling his victories in the polemic work against him (*Antirrheticus III*, Migne, *P. Gr. C* 508 f.), Nicephorus reports Constantine's and his father's exploits in an objective way in the *Breviarium*. The 10th century writer Genesis says that after the death of the initiator of the second iconoclasm, Leo V, Nicephorus made a statement to the effect that the empire had lost an impious ruler, but a great defender of public interest (Diehl, op. cit. 296; cf. Genesis, *Regum Lib. I*, Migne, *P. Gr. CIX* 1009 C).—Even the acts of the second council of Nicaea (Mansi, op. cit. XIII 355) praised the iconoclastic emperors for their military and political achievements.

2) The iconoclastic party could count upon the ambition or the weakness of a certain number of high dignitaries, some of whom were nevertheless later ill-treated or even sentenced to death. Such were the cases of the two patriarchs who had been set up at the will of the emperors after the deposition of the valiant nono-genarian patriarch Germanus by Leo III. The first of them, Anastasius,<sup>76</sup> after having joined with many of the orthodox the revolt of the usurper Artavasdus against Constantine V<sup>77</sup>, was ignominiously paraded around the hippodrome, mounted on an ass and exposed to the mockery of the crowd.<sup>78</sup> In the reign of Constantine V, the second of these patriarchs, Constantine, who had agreed to swear publicly that he was not a worshipper of images,<sup>79</sup> was nevertheless a few years later charged with high treason, first deposed and exiled, finally tortured and beheaded.<sup>80</sup>

3) The instincts of the populace were excited by public propaganda which did not shrink from calumnious proceedings. So Constantine V forced the iconophile monks of Constantinople to appear in the hippodrome, each holding a woman by the hand, that he might expose them to ridicule.<sup>81</sup> And when Leo III, in the beginnings of iconoclasm, declared that the volcanic eruption, which happened in 726 between the Greek islands of Thera (Santorin) and Therasia, was a consequence of idolatry, justifying in this way his measures against the images,<sup>82</sup> then we may assume that this was in part a speculation based upon the superstition of his subjects, even if Leo himself participated in it to some extent.

4) The confiscation and secularization of the property of the iconophiles, particularly the monasteries, appears to have been a very important factor in the iconoclastic struggle; some historians have seen in the fiscal measures and generally speaking in the economic aspect one of the principal features of iconoclasm.<sup>83</sup> The Russian byzantinist C. N. Ouspenski has even gone so far as to say that the iconoclastic movement was in reality an attempt of the emperors to despoil the monasteries of their large estates for the sake of the small land owners and directly or indirectly of the State.<sup>84</sup> According to Ouspenski the iconophiles overemphasized the theological questions involved, in order to set up a smoke-screen for the real economic issue. This hypothesis is based upon the *Νόμος γεωργικός*, a Code of agricultural law, often attributed to Leo III, but recently admitted to be of an uncertain date, and perhaps written already in the 7th century.<sup>85</sup> But even if the *Νόμος* had been issued by Leo III, it is doubtful whether the small free landowners

<sup>76</sup> Cf. for his succession after Germanus Theophanes, *Chronographia* A. M. 6221, ed. De Boor I 408 or Migne *P. Gr.* CVIII 824; *Vita S. Stephani Junioris*, Migne, *P. Gr.* C 1085.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. A. Lombard, *Constantin V* (Paris 1902) 22 ff.

<sup>78</sup> Diehl, op. cit. 270, where the sources are quoted.

<sup>79</sup> Nicephorus, *Breviarium*, ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 73 or Migne, loc. cit. 984 C.

<sup>80</sup> Op. cit., ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 75 f. or Migne, loc. cit. 985C-987A.

<sup>81</sup> Op. cit., ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 72 or Migne, loc. cit. 985A-B.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Ostrogorsky, in: *Mélanges Diehl* 240. The question discussed there, whether the eruption happened shortly before or after the beginnings of Leo's iconoclastic activity, is unimportant for us.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. 617 f., note 2 (to p. 616); 618 f., note 3; Diehl, op. cit. 263, 273; Vasiliev, op. cit. I 351. — The confisca-

tion of the papal patrimonies in Calabria and Sicily and the contemporary increase of taxes in these regions still belonging to the Byzantine empire have no causal relation to the origin of iconoclasm; the measures were on the contrary decreed by Leo III as a consequence of the resistance of the Popes Gregory II and III and of Italy in general against iconoclasm. See the edict of Leo III in: Fr. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches I* (München-Berlin 1924) Nr. 300.

<sup>84</sup> I was unable to make use of C. N. Ouspenski's *Sketches on Byzantine History* (Moscow 1917), written in Russian; the book is however quoted and its results are to some extent accepted by Vasiliev, op. cit. — Cf. the important objections raised by G. Ostrogorsky in his study: "Die vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit der Isaurier," *Byz. Zeitschrift* XXX (1929-30) 399.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Vasiliev, op. cit. 324 ff.

and the agricultural communities mentioned in it were created by Leo's initiative; they are more likely of an older origin.<sup>86</sup> And it is still more questionable whether there existed any relationship between those economic developments and the iconoclastic hostility toward monasticism. There remains only the fact that the wealth of many of the iconoclastic monasteries was in all probability an additional motive for the iconoclastic persecution. For the rest the whole problem of the relation between the empire and the Church was involved in the origins of iconoclasm, as has been explained above.

5) At the apex of the persecution under Constantine V the omnipotence of the State did not stop at the war against the images and their defenders, but banned also other exterior signs of religious fervor, as relics, and even the veneration of the Saints and the prayers to them; furthermore certain churches were secularized and above all attacks were launched against the celibacy of the monks who were finally forbidden to wear their habit and were obliged in some places to choose between marriage and death.<sup>87</sup> The forcible transfer finally of large groups of inhabitants of Armenia and Northern Syria to the Balkans and to Constantinople itself, was undertaken by Constantine V for various reasons. There is however a certain probability that a considerable number of these Asiatic immigrants, who included monophysites and Paulicians and had lived in the vicinity of the Mohammedans, inclined toward iconoclasm;<sup>88</sup> we have seen that the first iconoclastic bishops came from Asia Minor and that Leo III himself was a native of Northern Syria.

Every kind of violence on the one side, martyrdom on the other side was the last consequence of the war against the sacred images. And this is true, although to a less extent, even for the revival of iconoclasm in the 9th century, and particularly during the reign of Leo V.<sup>89</sup>

The images and their worship were indeed too deeply rooted in the soul of the Christians and particularly of the Eastern Christian peoples to be overthrown permanently. It is not my intention to describe the diverse external vicissitudes of the iconoclast disturbances. As the persecution of the images had been implicitly and explicitly a persecution of the Church, the victory of the iconophiles meant also a great victory for the Byzantine Church. It has been said with good reason that with the end of iconoclasm Byzantine caesaropapism was replaced by a dyarchy of emperor and patriarch.<sup>90</sup> Patriarchs like Photius in the second half of the 9th and Michael Cerularius in the middle of the 11th century would not have been possible without the victory over iconoclasm.

A further consequence of the iconophile victory is that the elaborate doctrine of images as developed on the basis of the older Greek tradition during the controversy was to predominate forever in Byzantium. The very character of this doctrine was bound to fix it permanently and at the same time to influence profoundly the content and formal aspect of the images themselves. The second phase of iconoclasm is at least as important for the development of the doctrine as the first; St.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Vasiliev, op. cit. and the works quoted by him.

<sup>87</sup> The most reliable report on the persecution: Nicephorus, *Breviarium*, ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 71 ff. or Migne, loc. cit. 981B ff., also on the martyrdom of St. Stephen the Younger. Cf. L. Bréhier, op. cit. VI (1937) 108 ff.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. also L. Bréhier, op. cit. 463, Diehl, op. cit. 271, after Theophanes and Nicephorus. — Besides the Asiatics, Greeks were likewise trans-

ferred to Constantinople (cf. Theophanes, *Chronographia*, A.M. 6247, ed. De Boor I 429 or Migne, *P. Gr.* CVIII 865 A).

<sup>89</sup> Cf. the Letters of Theodore of Studium, for instance II 12, Migne, *P. Gr.* XCIX 1152 f.; cf. also L. Bréhier, op. cit. VI 232 f.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. G. Ostrogorsky, in: *Seminarium Kondakovianum* IV (1931) 133 ff. The most important source for this dyarchy is the 9th century collection of laws, called *Epanagoge*.

Theodore of Studion (died 826) surpasses in some regards even St. John Damascene (died 754), when defending the images with theological arguments.<sup>91</sup>

I have already mentioned the connection of the images with the dogma of the Incarnation in the theory of the Byzantine iconophiles,<sup>92</sup> a connection which is of general importance for the Christian world in so far as it makes the possibility of Christian art dependent upon the Incarnation. But the Byzantine iconophiles went further than that on two essential points. For them this connection became eventually a necessary one, the Incarnation implied necessarily the making and worshipping of images;<sup>93</sup> and further, the relation between the image and its prototype, that is to say for instance with Christ, the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, was a relation of identity, a relative identity of course which was not a crude material one, but was, as we shall see, defined in a very significant way. Both ideas, the necessity of images and the identity with the prototypes, had their basis in the large role which pseudo-Dionysian, neo-Platonic and Platonic elements played in Byzantine theology. If more magical elements were present in the background of the Byzantine theological doctrine, we must grant nevertheless that the distinction between the different ways of veneration of an image of Christ and of Christ himself were very strictly distinguished by the iconophile theologians.<sup>94</sup> In spite of eventual excesses of iconolatry the reproaches of the iconoclasts in this regard seem to me unjustified, so far as the doctrine is concerned.

The iconophiles can claim for their principle of identity the authority of St. Basil, whose words: "the honour of the veneration of the image is transferred to its prototype," are quoted over and again.<sup>95</sup> It is true that St. Basil had said this speaking about the internal relations in the Holy Trinity, but nevertheless the claim is right because this sentence of his demonstrates his conception of the relation between image and prototype.<sup>96</sup> St. John of Damascus, the great theologian of the iconophiles in the first phase of the controversy, quotes beside St. Basil chiefly Pseudo-Dionysius as his authority; he interprets Dionysius' conception of the hierarchical structure of the universe as a hierarchical series of prototypes and images: Christ as image of the Father, the *προορισμοί* or ideas as prototypes in God of the things, men as images of God, the Old Testament events as prototypes of the

<sup>91</sup> I am trying to characterize the orthodox doctrine of the images as a unit, though distinguishing occasionally between the phases of its development, especially between the views of St. John Damascene as representative of the first and of St. Theodore of Studion as the representative of the second phase. The patriarch St. Nicephorus, the third great theologian and historian in the iconoclastic controversy agrees with the two others, yet is not quite as original a thinker. — A somewhat fuller account of the doctrine of the iconophiles has been given in my article in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ser. III, Vol. I, p. 1 ff.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, *Cons.* XIII 229 E ff.: Ἀμνημονήσαντες τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον ἐκ παρθένου γέννησιν καὶ τούτου το μέγα καὶ σωτήριον μυστήριον, ὅπερ αὐτὸς σαρκὶ ἐπιδημήσας ἡμῖν ἐχάρισατο, ῥυσάμενος ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων πλάνης . . . Αὐτοὶ (namely the iconoclasts) . . . τὰς εἰκόνας τοῦ κυρίου καὶ τῶν ἁγίων αὐτοῦ οὐ διέστειλαν, τῇ τῶν δαιμόνων εἰκόνι αὐτὰς παραπλησίως εἶδωλα ὀνομάσαντες . . . Cf. also the negative statement of the iconoclastic

council of 754 in *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, op. cit. 337C: *Εἴ τις τὴν ἀπερίγραφον τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν διὰ τὸ σεσαρκῶσθαι ἐπιτηδεύει δι' ὕλικῶν χρωμάτων ἐν εἰκόσιν ἀνθρωπομορφῶς περιγράφειν . . . ἀνάθεμα* (it should be noted that the iconophiles themselves rejected the circumscription in an image of the divine οὐσία, but admitted that of the ὑπόστασις, see below). Cf. also St. John Damascene, *De imaginibus oratio I*, Migne, *P. Gr.* XCIV 1245A: Πάλαι μὲν ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἀσώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος οὐδαμῶς εἰκονίζετο. Νῦν δὲ σαρκὶ ὀφθέντος Θεοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συναναστραφέντος εἰκονίζω Θεοῦ τὸ ὁρώμενον.

<sup>93</sup> See p. 145.

<sup>94</sup> See above p. 135f.

<sup>95</sup> St. Basilus Magnus, *Liber de Spiritu Sancto* 18, 45, Migne, *P. Gr.* XXXII 149C: . . . ἢ τῆς εἰκόνης τιμὴ ἐπὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον διαβαίνει. Quoted for instance in John of Damascus, *De imaginibus oratio I*, Migne, *P. Gr.* XCIV 1261D.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. also Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. 1215 ff. (appendice III), who gives further bibliographical reference on the question.

New Testament, and last but not least the holy icons as images of Christ and the Saints.<sup>97</sup>

Now let us ask John Damascene and Theodore of Studion in what the identity between an artistic image of Christ and its prototype, that is to say Christ himself, consists. (The image of Christ was the principal problem, the solution of which was the standard valid also for the images of the Mother of God and the Saints). They answer that it cannot be an identity either according to the image's matter, which may for instance be wood and colour,<sup>98</sup> or according to the prototype's essence (*οὐσία*), which is divine,<sup>99</sup> nor even according to the humane nature of Christ, which is different from the nature of the image.<sup>100</sup> But — and this is the most important formulation among other ones — it is an identity according to the hypostasis, to the person of Christ.<sup>101</sup> It is true that this formulation does not say how this hypostatic identity between Christ and His image is possible, but nevertheless the definition was of the utmost importance. For although it was denied by the iconophile theologians that the identity be a real identity with the divinity, the very introduction of the trinitarian term of the hypostasis saved something of divinity for the image: the hypostasis, the person of Christ, comprises his divine as well as his human nature. And indeed we find Theodore of Studion writing: Οὕτω καὶ ἐν εἰκόνι εἶναι τὴν θεότητα εἰπὼν τις οὐκ ἂν ἀμάρτη τοῦ δέοντος.<sup>102</sup> In a still more important sentence he refers to the fact that man himself is created after the image and likeness of God; therefore there is something divine in the art of making images. And since images can be copied, Christ as man and image of God can be again reproduced in images.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Cf. John Damasc., *De imag. oratio* I 10 and III 19, Migne, P. Gr. XCIV 1240D and 1340C.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. John Damasc., *De imag. oratio* I 16, loc. cit. 1245A: Οὐ προσκυνῶ τῇ ὕλῃ, προσκυνῶ δὲ τὸν τῆς ὕλης δημιουργόν. Cf. Theodore of Studion, *Antirr. I*, Migne, P. Gr. XCIX 341C.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Theodore of Studion, *Antirr. I* 11, loc. cit. 341B: Οὐκ ἂν ποτε μανεῖν ἂν τις τοσούτον . . . ταῦτ' ὑπολαμβάνειν κατ' οὐσίαν . . . ὡς ἂν Χριστὸν καὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐν κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπολήψασθαι ἢ φράξεν. Cf. *Antirr. III* 3, 1, loc. cit. 420D: Τὸ πρωτότυπον οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι. Cf. *Antirr. I* 20, loc. cit. 349B-C: Εἰ τις διὰ τοῦ περιγράφεσθαι τὴν τοῦ Λόγου σάρκα συμπεριγράφεσθαι φιλονεικοῖ τὴν θεότητα, . . . αἰρετικός ἐστιν. Cf. also the last quotation in note 92.

<sup>100</sup> Theodore of Studion, *Antirr. I*, loc. cit. 344B: Ὅπου γὰρ οὐδὲ αὐτῆς ἀναστηλωθείσης σαρκὸς ἢ φύσις πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον ἢ σχέσις, πολλοῦ γὰρ ἐν εἰποῖς τὴν ἀπερίγραπτον θεότητα, ἢ τοσούτον καὶ ἐνεστί καὶ προσκυνεῖται ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι, ὁσῶτερ ἐν σικῇ τῆς ἐνωθείσης αὐτῇ σαρκὸς ὑπάρχει.

<sup>101</sup> Theodore of Studion, *Antirr. III*, 3, 1, loc. cit. 420D: Continuation of the second last quotation in note 99: . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὁμοιότητα. Cf. I. c. 3, 9, I. c. 424D: . . . μὴ ἄρα καὶ ἡ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα προσκύνῃς - κατὰ τὸ μοναδικὸν τῆς ὑποστατικῆς ὁμοιώσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἑτεροῖον τῶν φύσεων. Cf. also Theodore's important and terse letter *De cultu sacrarum imaginum* to his uncle Plato, Abbot of Sakkudion, where the identity according to the divine nature (or essence) within the Holy Trinity is again very clearly distinguished from the personal (hypostatic) identity between Christ and his image: Migne, P. Gr. XCIX 501A: Οὕτε γὰρ τὴν τῆς

εἰκόνας οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γεγραμμένον προσεκύνῃσιν. . . . Loc. cit. 501B: Ἄλλο δὲ φυσικὴ εἰκὼν καὶ ἄλλο μιμητικὴ. Ἡ μὲν οὐ φυσικὴ διαφορὰν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον ἄλλ' ὑποστατικὴν, ὡς Τίς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα . . . Ἡ δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν φυσικὴν διαφορὰν ἔχουσα ἄλλ' οὐκ ὑποστατικὴν, ὡς ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν. Ἄλλη μὲν γὰρ φύσις ὑλογραφίας καὶ ἕτερα τοῦ Χριστοῦ - οὐκ ἄλλη δὲ ὑπόστασις ἀλλὰ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένη. Loc. cit. 504A: . . . ἡ δὲ ἀληθὴς τῶν Χριστιανῶν πίστις . . . ὡς μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τῇ κοινῶι τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογεῖ προσκύνῃσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς εἰκόνας Χριστοῦ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν προσκύνῃσιν ὁμολογεῖ κατὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ. — Less outspoken yet Joh. Damasc., *De imag. oratio* I 4, loc. cit. 1236C: . . . ἡ σὰρξ λόγος γέγονεν, οὐκ ἀπολέσασα τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, ταυτιζομένη δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν Λόγον καθ' ὑπόστασιν. Διὸ θαρρῶν εἰκονίζω Θεὸν τὸν ἄορατον, οὐχ ὡς ἄορατον, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁρατὸν δι' ἡμᾶς γεγόμενον μετέχει σαρκὸς τε καὶ αἵματος. — Other formulations used by Theodore of Studion to define the identity between the holy images and their prototypes: according to relationship (τὸ πρὸς τι or σχέσις), to the identity of names (τὸ ὁμώνυμον), to similitude (ὁμοίωσις or ταυτότης τῆς ὁμοιώσεως); cf. the quotations in my article, cited in note 91.

<sup>102</sup> *Antirr. I* 12, loc. cit. 344B. Cf. also note 100 and the last quotation in note 101, from St. John Damascene.

<sup>103</sup> *Antirr. III* 2, 5, loc. cit. 420A. For the development of the concept of an analogy between the creative acts of God and of the human artist, cf. E. Panofsky, "Idea" (*Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*) and my short remarks on p. 10 of my article quoted in note 91. For



The iconoclasts were of course strictly opposed to this solution of the problem. Their chief argument was — as we learn from the iconophile sources — the impossibility of the *περιγραφή*, of the circumscription of the divinity; God cannot be circumscribed in a picture or in any other work of art.<sup>104</sup> Whosoever tries to do that, is bound to fall into idolatry and into one of the great heresies: Nestorianism is chiefly mentioned, but also monophysitism and others.<sup>105</sup>

It is this iconoclastic argument of the impossibility of the *περιγραφή* of our Lord in the images, which led the holy abbot Theodore of Studion to the strict formulation of the contrary of this impossibility, namely to the necessity of the images and of their veneration. It is necessary to repeat and to emphasize that the ultimate basis of this argument is the fact of the Incarnation. As perfect man, Christ not only can but must be represented and worshipped in images: let this be denied, says Theodore, and Christ's *οικονομία*, the economy of the salvation, is virtually destroyed.<sup>106</sup> Regarding the particular derivation of Theodore's doctrine one can say that it is based on the hierarchical order of the images of St. John of Damascus, but it transcends the latter's system by making a still more definite use of neo-Platonic, perhaps also of late peripatetic ideas. The higher step — the prototype — is bound to produce the lower — the image. The image is a necessary outgrowth of the prototype, to be compared with the shadow of a natural body, with the impression of a seal.<sup>107</sup> The prototype includes its image potentially (*δυνάμει*).<sup>108</sup> This latter term may perhaps be of Aristotelian origin, nevertheless the whole system recalls very strongly the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. The uppermost grade in the neo-Platonic world of ideas, the Hen, being replaced by the Logos, the personal Christ, and the lower ideas being replaced in part by personal Angels

instance to St. Bonaventure, who follows St. Augustine, there is an aspect of Christ, the Word and Son of God, according to His *dispositionem aeternam, secundum quam* (Filius Dei) *dicitur mundus archetypus et ars plena omnium rationum viventium* (Comment. in IV Libros Sententiarum I 27, 2, 4, ed. Quaracchi I [1882] 490a); cf. Augustinus, *De Trinitate* VI 10, 11, Migne, *Patr. Lat.* XLII 931; cf. likewise Johannes Scotus Eriugena, *De divisione naturae* II 24, Migne, *P.L.* CXXII 579B (a text kindly indicated by Dr. Lawrence Lynch).—For the concept of the *ars aeterna* cf. also E. Gilson and Ph. Böhner, *Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis Nikolaus von Cues* (Paderborn 1937) 455.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Theodore of Studion, *Antirr.* III 1 and 2 passim, loc. cit. 392 ff.; also Nicephorus, *Antirr.* I passim, Migne, *P. Gr.* C 205 ff., *Antirr.* II 9 ff. loc. cit. 349 ff.—Another argument of the iconoclasts, reported by Theodore of Studion, *Antirr.* III 3, 11, loc. cit. 425A, and 4, 2, loc. cit. 428D: if identical adoration could be offered to Christ and to his image *a φῶς* (namely Christ) and *a θεός* (namely the image "set up" by the artist) must needs exist simultaneously which is impossible.—The antithesis *φῶς*—*θεός* was used in a different sense in antiquity and became later on very important for canon law: *ius naturale*—*ius positivum*; cf. St. Kuttner, "Les origines du terme 'droit positif'" *Revue historique du droit français et étranger*, Ser. IV, Vol. XV (1936) 728ff.

<sup>105</sup> See p. 148 note 127.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Theodore of Studion's important

letter to the Abbot Plato of Sakkudion, *De cultu sacrarum imaginum*, Migne, *P. Gr.* XCIX 505A: . . . ἥς (namely the worship of Christ's image) *ἀναρουνμένης ἀνήρται δυνάμει καὶ ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ οἰκονομία*. Cf. also his *Problemata ad Iconomach.* 12, l. c. 484B: . . . ἄρα οὐχ οὗτος ἀπαγορεύει Χριστὸν ἐγγράφεσθαι, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτον ὁμώνυμος τὴν σάρκα Χριστοῦ ἀναρνούμενος . . . ;

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Theodore of Studion, *Antirr.* III 4,2, l. c. 429A: *Εἰ παντὶ σώματι ἀμερίστως παρέπεται ἡ οἰκία σκιά καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις εἰποι σωφρονῶν ἄσκιον σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι τὴν σκιὰν ἐπομένην, ἐν δὲ τῇ σκιά τὸ σῶμα προηγούμενον, οὕτως οὐκ ἂν τις εἰποι Χριστὸν ἀνεκρίνοντον, εἴπερ σῶμα ἐν αὐτῷ κεχαρκτηρισμένον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν κανταῦθα ἐν μὲν Χριστῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ εἰκόνα ὑφαστῶσαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰκόνι Χριστὸν δρώμενον ὡς πρωτότυπον. Ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἄμφω ἅμα εἶναι δέδεικται, ἦνλκα Χριστὸς ὥπται, τότε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ εἰκὼν δυνάμει, ἄφ' οὗ καὶ μετεήρκεται εἰς ἡγνιασθὲν ὅλην ἀποσφραγισθεῖσαν. *Antirr.* III 4,9, l. c. 432D: "Ἄλλο σφραγὶς καὶ ἕτερον ἀπόμαγμα. Ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀπομάξεως τὸ ἀπόμαγμα ἐν τῇ σφραγίδι. Οὐκ ἂν δὲ εἴη σφραγὶς ἐνεργὴς μὴ ἀποτυπωμένη ἐν τινι ὅλῃ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Χριστὸς, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ τεχνηγῇ εἰκόνι φανεῖται, ἀεργὸς καὶ ἀνεέργητος ἐστὶ κατὰ τοῦτο. Ὅπερ καὶ ἐνοεῖν ἀποπον. *Antirr.* III, 4, 10, l. c. 433A: Τὸ γὰρ μὴ προβῆναι εἰς ὅλην ἀποσφράγιμα καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀνθρωπομόρφον ἀναρρεῖ. *Antirr.* III 4, 12, l. c. 433B: Εἰ σώματος σκιά μερισθῆναι οὐχ οἶόν τε . . . οὐδὲ Χριστοῦ ἡ οἰκία αὐτοῦ εἰκὼν ἀποτυμηθῆναι δύναται.*

<sup>108</sup> Cf. the end of the first quotation in note 107.



and Saints (Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita!) the painted or carved images of these holy persons could take the place of the corporeal bodies of the neo-Platonic system.

A more practical fact confirms this interpretation of the iconophile doctrine. I am speaking of the *ἄχειροποίητοι*, the images which were supposed to have originated without intermediary of human hands; a belief very characteristic of Byzantine religious art, passed from there to the occident and still surviving in Christian countries of the east and south.<sup>109</sup> The origin of these *ἄχειροποίητοι* is sometimes imagined as a kind of supernatural emanation or impression. Famous and sacred examples of images of Christ were and are derived from the legendary impression of His Face on a veil. This legend appears first in the 6th century, in connection with an image allegedly sent to king Abgar of Edessa in Northern Syria by Christ.<sup>110</sup> The legend of the impression of the Holy Face on the veil of St. Veronica is probably of later date.<sup>111</sup>

It can be understood easily that the idea of a certain identity between the images and their divine or holy prototypes was to influence largely the matter and form of Byzantine art.

The most obvious consequence is the conscious conservation of types which had been found for definite representations and were believed sacred by their relation to the prototypes. So the Byzantine Christ as powerful Pantokrator is repeated over and again. Several types of the Blessed Virgin with the Divine Child develop: for instance the Hodegetria, one of the most majestic types of the Madonna in art; or the Glykophilusa, the Virgin as sweet and loving mother. It is not as if the charge of monotony formerly raised against Byzantine art were justified; there was enough possibility of external and intrinsic variations and of diverse combinations of elements. But if we take Byzantine iconography as a whole, it can safely be stated that its conservatism was much greater than that of occidental iconography.

The second consequence of the principle of identity of the Byzantine images with their prototype is the survival of a certain degree of naturalism in Byzantine art, again more than in occidental art. The very conception of hypostatic or personal identity, which, as we have seen, is sometimes defined in the iconophile sources as an identity according to the similitude or likeness, had at least a share in the maintenance of a certain naturalism. This becomes very clear in a chapter of Theodore of Studion, in which he discusses the question of what would be the effect of a possible lack of skill in the artist upon the identity between the worship received by the image and that destined for the prototype. He solves the problem by stating that the identity does not exist in so far as there is a discrepancy, but only in so far as there is a similitude.<sup>112</sup>

On the other hand the images were assimilated to their holy or even in some way divine character. This was of course the most important and also the most difficult task of the Byzantine artists. They reached the hieratic form by selecting and transforming certain characters current in late antique art, especially majestic severity and a slightly melancholic beauty. This transfiguration created perfect figures of tremendous religious earnestness and of saintly loveliness; it included a certain abstraction from nature, a certain schematization; yet it never led to

<sup>109</sup> Cf. for instance E. v. Dobschütz, *Christusbilder* (Berlin 1899) 28 and 37 ff.

<sup>110</sup> Dobschütz, op. cit. 102 ff.; cf. also Martin, *Iconocl. Controversy* 21 ff.; *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturgie* VII 2, 2459 ff.; St. Runciman, "Some Remarks on the Image of Edessa," *Cambridge Histor. Journal* III (1931) 238 ff., especially p. 246 f. on the importance of the image of Edessa in the argumentation of the

iconophiles. With the help of the *ἄχειροποίητοι*, the iconoclastic arguments, taken from the Old Testament prohibition of the adoration of the *χειροποίητα*, could more easily be refuted.

<sup>111</sup> Dobschütz, op. cit. 197 ff.; *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et de liturg.*, loc. cit. 2458 f.

<sup>112</sup> *Antirr. III* 3,5, loc. cit. XCIX 421C.

such a sovereign and finally still more creative contempt of naturalism as in early mediaeval occidental art.<sup>113</sup> It may be mentioned on this occasion that, as a lasting consequence of iconoclasm, sculpture in the round disappeared completely from Byzantine art,<sup>114</sup> while reliefs were admitted. There was no official prohibition of statues; the old association of statuaric art with pagan idolatry as well as the oriental artistic trend which transformed plastic forms into pictorial patterns led to this result.

A last result of the principle of relative identity concerned the choice and distribution of the scenes from the life of Christ and the Blessed Virgin to be represented in the Byzantine church buildings. The very belief in the mysterious presence of the represented scenes, such as for instance the resurrection of Christ or the nativity of the Virgin, made the Byzantines consider the images not only as an illustration and as a suggestion of the holy stories, not only as means of edification and of teaching; the images, for the Byzantines, did not only represent, but they were in some way present as the history of the redemption. Therefore gradually a holy canon of images developed which corresponded to the principal liturgical feasts and regulated also the places of the images in the church.<sup>115</sup>

After these considerations I think we can understand all the better the outstanding importance which the images had for the Byzantine Church, an importance which they never had in the occident, where the more sober view that the images are *litteratura laicorum* always prevailed.<sup>116</sup> Neither the theory of identity nor that of the necessity of the images is to be found in the west; on the other hand the west never knew the extreme Byzantine form of caesaropapism and consequently only mild reflections of Byzantine iconoclasm.

Let us now turn for a moment to the controversy about the images between Charlemagne and his theologians like Alcuin and Theodulf of Orleans on the one side and Pope Hadrian I on the other. It was a direct result of Hadrian's agreement with the first re-establishment of the images in Byzantium by the second council of Nicaea in 787. The Frankish point of view is expressed in the *Libri Carolini*,<sup>117</sup> that of the Pope in a long letter on the images, preserved in the *Codex Carolinus*.<sup>118</sup> It must be emphasized that neither of these two documents penetrates to the heart of either the iconophile or the iconoclastic doctrines. Both sources recognize without any doubt that images are allowed in the Church. Yet while Hadrian agrees with the relative worship and follows the older arguments of the Greek fathers like St. Basil and Pseudo-Dionysius, the Franks scorn worship, claiming as their chief authority the teaching of Gregory the Great. And there is a still more significant difference. For the Franks the religious images are only reminders<sup>119</sup> and paradigmata. Their value is small, if compared with the Holy Writ, says Rabanus Maurus,<sup>120</sup> who wrote in the second period of the controversy between the Pope and the

<sup>113</sup> Occidental naturalism which developed in the second half of the middle ages from occidental anti-naturalism, is something fundamentally different from the late antique and Byzantine naturalism.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. also L. Bréhier, *La querelle des images*; Vasiliev, op. cit. I 381.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. G. Millet, *Recherches sur l'iconographie de l'évangile* . . . (1919), Chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>116</sup> The doctrine of images in the west has been treated in a more detailed way on p. 12 ff. of my article, cited in note 91. — The expression *laicorum litteratura* occurs from the 12th century on (Honorius Augustodunensis, Siccardus of Cremona, Durandus, etc.), but

the idea received its first famous formulation through Gregory the Great. For instance *Reg.* XI 10, *M.G. Epist.* II 270: . . . *nam quod legentibus scriptura hoc idiotibus praestat pictura cernentibus*. Cf. also L. Gougaud, "Muta Praedicatio," *Rev. Bened.* XLII (1930) 168 ff.

<sup>117</sup> *M. G., Concilia* II, Suppl.

<sup>118</sup> *M. G., Epist.* V 5 ff.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. *Libri Carolini* III 16; 23, *M. G. Concilia* II Suppl. 138; 153.

<sup>120</sup> *Carmen* 38, *M. G., Poetae* II 196:

*Nam scriptura pia norma est perfecta salutis  
Illa (i.e. pictura) oculis tantum pauca  
solamina praestat.*

Franks, which corresponds more or less to the second period of Byzantine iconoclasm during the reign of Leo V and Theophilus. For the Popes the worth of the images is their immediate visibility. Hadrian I, in his letter to Charlemagne, defended the images with these words: . . . *quia visione sacrarum imaginum ad speciosam formam domini et salvatoris nostri Iesu Christi secundum carnem sanctaeque genitricis et sanctorum pertinet*.<sup>121</sup> And Pope Nicholas I, in the next century, praises the very visible quality of images, saying that they show the object of their love to the Christians *ad tremendum terribiliter*.<sup>122</sup>

A more didactic and symbolical conception of imagery in the north and west of Europe and a more direct in Rome and Italy are expressed in the works of art themselves. German frescos and miniatures of the Ottonian period for instance suggest a deeper meaning beyond the image in the expressive gestures and eyes of their figures; whereas in 11th century Roman works like the famous frescos in the lower church of St. Clement the artist intended to concentrate all that he wanted to express in the dramatic reproduction of the events in the picture.

I cannot, on this occasion, enter further into the difference between northern and southern occidental art in the middle ages.<sup>123</sup> Summing up the contrast between the conception of art in the Christian occident, considered as one complex, and in the Christian orient, one may say that in the 8th and 9th centuries there is no concept of Christian imagery in the west which can be compared with the deep speculations of a John Damascene and of a Theodore of Studion. And yet the doctrine of identity included a profound spiritualism and at the same time an extreme sensualism, which were in some way kindred to the intellectual presuppositions of the iconoclasts themselves.<sup>124</sup> It is not quite accidental that the iconoclasts, who were blamed for inclining not only to Judaism, Mohammedanism and Manichaeism,<sup>125</sup> but also to monophysitism,<sup>126</sup> charged the iconophiles themselves with monophysitism and above all with Nestorianism.

The respective arguments are not very clearly developed by the sources.<sup>127</sup> Let us therefore try to state the case for the iconoclasts: The iconophiles, according to them, are like the monophysites who blend and confuse the two natures in Christ; for they believe that He was so much God even as Man that Christ, the God-Man, would needs be circumscribed in an image of Christ. But the iconophiles are also like the Nestorians; for whosoever tries to circumscribe Christ in an

<sup>121</sup> *M.G., Epist.* V 19.

<sup>122</sup> *M.G., Epist.* VI 437.

<sup>123</sup> For the influence of the doctrines upon the works of art themselves, in the east as well as in the west (on both sides of the Alps), see my study on Italian painting in the 11th century cited in note 1.

<sup>124</sup> This has also been felt by G. K. Chesterton, cf. his *St. Thomas Aquinas* (London 1933) 94 f. — Ostrogorsky, *Studien zur Geschichte des Byz. Bilderstreits*, believes that the iconoclasts and the iconophiles had different notions of what an image is, and sees the very reason for the iconoclastic conflict in this fact. Cf. against this thesis H. Barion, in: *Römische Quartalschrift* XXXVIII (1930) 80 ff., and my article in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, loc. cit. 6, note 20.

<sup>125</sup> See note 23.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, *Concilia* XIII 157 D, and Theodore of Studion, *Antirr.* III 1, 25, loc. cit. 401A, where the iconoclasts are compared to diverse mono-

physite sects (theopaschites, akephaloi, etc.).

<sup>127</sup> The iconophiles compared to the monophysites by the iconoclasts: cf. the acts of the iconoclastic council of 754, in *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, loc. cit. XIII 244D; also loc. cit. 252A-B; 260A. — The iconophiles compared to the Nestorians by the iconoclasts: cf. *ibidem* 241E; also loc. cit. 256A-B; 259E f.; also Theodore of Studion, *Antirr.* III 1, 22, and *Problemata ad Iconomach.* 13, loc. cit. 400C and 484B-C. — The iconoclastic view regarding the similitude between iconophiles and Nestorians could have been turned against the iconoclasts themselves, like the argument regarding monophysitism. But the iconophiles have apparently enumerated Nestorius among the forerunners of the iconoclastic heresy only for the reason that he was one of the principal heretics: in *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, loc. cit. 400A and 416C, the three iconoclastic patriarchs of Constantinople are compared to Arius, Nestorius and to the monophysite Dioscurus.

image, actually divides him into two persons, since only a human person can be represented in a work of art; the iconophiles have therefore only the image of a man whom they call God, that is to say they produce an idol.<sup>128</sup> Both of these arguments are exaggerated and unjust; the iconophiles could reply to them in referring to their belief in the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, which according to them was duplicated in the image in an identical way.<sup>129</sup> But nevertheless the iconoclast charges may be explained to some extent by the fact that the image worshippers insisted that Christ in his humanity and divinity is really, although not materially, identical with his image.

The Church in the west stuck much more closely to the truth that there can be on this earth no identity with God, neither in images nor in man, who himself is made to the image and likeness of God, nor in any creature.<sup>130</sup> That means an immense variety of terrestrial beings. But it also means a permanent change and over and again new creative efforts in art,<sup>131</sup> whereas, as we have seen, the chief types of Byzantine art remained largely fixed by the principle of identity.

It must also be stated that the victory of the Byzantine Church over iconoclasm and extreme caesaropapism did not lead to a renewal as deep as the great occidental Church Reform of the era of Gregory VII with its lasting consequences for all spheres of life, not least in the field of Christian art. The victory of orthodoxy in Byzantium was closely followed by the broadening of a traditionalistic and nationalistic antagonism toward the west, and the see of St. Peter especially, which led to the schism of Photius in the 9th and to the permanent one of Michael Cerularius in the 11th century.<sup>132</sup> The patriarchs of Constantinople who claimed universality for the east were even interested in preserving a moderate form of caesaropapism as a bulwark against the universality of Rome,<sup>133</sup> and so the Byzantine Church did not share in the transformation of western Christendom in the era of the controversy of investitures.<sup>134</sup> As a result the stubborn and yet in some regards venerable traditionalism of the Byzantine as well as of the other oriental Churches and later the Russian Church kept the religious images, as being gifted with relative divinity, essentially unchanged and unaltered in their religious and in their artistic character, until in post-mediaeval times the influence of the fundamental changes in western Christianity broke the spell of the great old form of Byzantine religious art.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>128</sup> Cf. also Elliger, op. cit. 50 ff. But Elliger overlooks completely the fact that the iconoclasts were even nearer to monophysitism than the iconophiles (cf. 135). Moreover he does not clearly show the intrinsic connexion of iconoclasm as well as of monophysitism and other heresies with caesaropapism, pointed out so well by Solowjew (see p. 135 and note 42).

<sup>129</sup> See above.

<sup>130</sup> It is characteristic that St. Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica* 3, 25 3, will grant to the image of Christ even the *adoratio latriae* . . . *propter rem cuius imago est*, but does not at all mention the possibility of any identity between Christ and his image.

<sup>131</sup> In the west the Augustinian conception, continued by John Scotus Eriugena and St. Bonaventure, which understood the creating Word of God as "Ars aeterna," is characteristic for the thoughts on art in general. Cf. also note 103.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. A. Michel, *Humbert und Kerullarios I* (*Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der*

*Geschichte*, published by the Görres-Gesellschaft, XXI [1924]).

<sup>133</sup> Cf. p. 142 on the dyarchy of emperor and patriarch from the end of the iconoclastic controversy. Cf. also Solowjew, op. cit., introduction p. XXXIII.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. my *Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit*, Chapter on Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida's contests with Berengar of Tours on the one hand and with the patriarch Cerularius on the other.

<sup>135</sup> While reading the proofs, there came to my attention the study of J. Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire 641-1204* (*Texte und Forschungen zur Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Philologie* XXX [1939]). On p. 75 f. Starr, without proof, denies any influence of the Jews on the iconoclastic movement. He considers the sources in question to be legendary; cf. note 20a of this article. On p. 90 f. of his study Starr maintains the erroneous attribution of the *Oratio* . . . *de . . . imaginibus* . . . *adversus* . . . *Constantinum Cabalinum* to St. John Damascene; cf. note 22.

# The Canzone d'Amore of Cavalcanti According to the Commentary of Dino del Garbo

## TEXT AND COMMENTARY

OTTO BIRD

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N.B. The first half, only, of this study (up to and including *Historical Analysis, Stanza II*) is published in this number of *Mediaeval Studies*. The second half will be published in our next issue. (Ed.)

### *Introduction*

POETRY, in spite of what poets may say to the contrary, can never completely avoid the influence of philosophy. For if poetry deals with words, it deals, not only with the beauty of sound, but also with the ideas those sounds signify. Therefore in its ideal structure it cannot but feel the influence of philosophy, which is the province of ideas in their purity; for ideas, as it were, seek their natural place as their source as well as their end. Yet it cannot be denied that some poetry is more philosophic than others. In the Middle Ages Dante of course comes immediately to mind, and "Dante and his Circle" have come to have something of the same position in Mediaeval Literature that the "Metaphysical Poets" have in English. But after Dante, Guido Cavalcanti undoubtedly is the most representative of the philosophic tendency of this school — perhaps in this it is significant that Cavalcanti was Dante's *primo amico*. Of all his work, however, one poem in particular entitles Guido to this position of philosophic poet, that poem being the *Donna mi prega*, or *Canzone d'Amore*. And although it must never be forgotten that Guido, as a poet, is primarily concerned with the beauty of his poem, nevertheless philosophy will enable us to better appreciate that beauty by acquainting us with the ideas he uses so freely as belonging to the heritage of his time. It is not a question of finding in the philosophers the immediate "sources" of Guido's poem; it is rather that of locating the various ideas Guido makes use of in those places where we can most readily recapture their significance. And here the value of a mediaeval commentator is obvious, since he has already done part of the job of locating these ideas and thereby given us something further to concentrate upon.

This poem is, according to tradition, the answer Cavalcanti gave to a certain

request made to him by Guido Orlandi in the name of a certain lady.<sup>1</sup> Thus Orlandi's poem in which he makes this request runs as follows:

Onde si move ed onde nasce Amore?  
qual e'l su' proprio loco ov'e' dimora?  
e sustanzia, accidente, o memora?  
e cagion d'occhi, o voler di core?

Da che procede suo stat' o furore?  
come foco si sente che divora?  
di che si nutre? domand'io ancora;  
come, quando ed a cui si fa signore?

Che cosa e, dico, Amore? ae figura?  
a per se forma o e' somiglia altrui?  
e vita, questo Amore, o e morte?

Chi 'l serve, de saver di sua natura:  
io ne dimando voi, Guido, di lui:  
odo che molto usate in sua corte.

And in the *Donna mi prega* Guido manages in one way and another to consider each of the questions Orlandi asks; in fact the eight questions which Guido sets for himself in the first stanza of his poem comprehend these listed by Orlandi. In answering them, however, Guido made use of the philosophic and scientific knowledge of his time to such an extent that his poem has been said to be more of a scientific treatise than a poem. But be that as it may, the philosophic interest of his poem is evident from the fact that so many men who are most generally known for their work in philosophy have commented upon it. Thus Egidio Colonna, or Giles of Rome, is attributed with a commentary on this poem, and both Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola also turned their hand to it.<sup>2</sup>

Amongst the commentaries, however, the one by Dino del Garbo is probably the earliest;<sup>3</sup> in fact it is practically contemporary with the poem, since Dino died in 1327, just twenty-seven years after the death of Guido. Consequently, Dino has the advantage of enjoying the same intellectual atmosphere that Guido was in when writing the poem. Furthermore, as a physician, Dino was trained in the same science that Guido is noted for — that of natural science. Thus Boccaccio tells us (*Decameron*, VI, 9) that Cavalcanti was "un de migliori laici che avesse il mundo, et ottimo filosofo naturale," whereas Villani writes that Dino was "grandissimo Dottore in Fisica, et in piu scienze naturali et Filosofiche, il quale al suo tempo fu il migliore, e piu Sovrano Medico, che fosse in Italia."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, at least in the historical contingencies, Dino enjoys inestimable advantages as a commentator, and for that reason should be of profit to us as a guide to the understanding of this most difficult of Guido's poems.

<sup>1</sup> "Guido Orlandi in nome di una donna a Guido Cavalcanti, e la Canzone 'Donna mi prega' ne e la risposta" in MS. Riccardiano 2846, as quoted by Pietro Ercole, *Rime di G. Cavalcanti*, Livorno, Vigo, 1885, p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> Egidio Colonna, *L'Esposizione del Mro. Egidio Colonna . . .* Siena, Marchetti, 1602. Marsilio Ficino, *Comento di Marsilio Ficino . . . sopra il Convito di Platone*, Firenze, 1534, Orazione VII, cap. i. Gio. Pico della Mirandola, *Opere di Girolamo Benivieni . . . col commento*

della Ill. s. Conte Gio. Pico della Mirandola, Venetia, Zopino, 1522, Lib. III, cap. i.

<sup>3</sup> It is almost certain that the commentary attributed to Egidio Colonna (died 1316) does not belong to him and is of a later date. Cf. Fran. Pasqualigo, *La canzone di Guido Cavalcanti 'Donna mi prega'*, Venezia, Olschki, 1891, pp. 6-8.

<sup>4</sup> Giovanni Villani, *Historia Florentini*, X, xl, in Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, XIII, p. 626.

Dino himself, as has been said, was a *medicus*, and what we know of his life is little more than a chronicle of the times and places in which he held the Chair of Medicine.<sup>5</sup> He was born in Florence and sometime around 1295 went to Bologna to study Medicine in the university there. But as he himself tells us in the proem of one of his works, he stayed there for only one year because of the war which broke out when Azzo d'Este attacked the city and which continued from 1296 to 1299. The war ended, Dino returned to resume his medical studies and after four years took his doctorate, i.e. circa 1304. He then lectured in Bologna for two years and after that went to Siena.<sup>6</sup> He could only have stayed there, however, about two years, for he must have been back in Bologna by 1308 inasmuch as he tells us that the sixth year of his lecturing at Bologna was 1311;<sup>7</sup> consequently, since he lectured there for two years, 1304-1306, before going to Siena, he must have returned in 1308, so as to make 1311 the sixth year of his lectureship at Bologna. From Bologna he went to the University of Padua, probably about 1313, where he could not have stayed later than 1319, for at that time he was back in Florence.<sup>8</sup> But he probably stayed there only a short time before returning to the University of Siena, where he remained until 1325,<sup>9</sup> when he went back to Florence, where he died on the 30th of September, 1327.<sup>10</sup>

With the exception of his commentary on the *Donna mi prega* all of his works are medical writings. Thus he has commentaries on parts of the *Canon* of Avicenna, one on the *De generatione embrionis* of Hippocrates and one on the surgery of Galen, an epistle *De coena et prandio*, a book of *Quaestiones medicinae* and another *De virtutibus medicamentorum*.<sup>11</sup>

Concerning Dino's commentary on Cavalcanti, in which we are here more particularly interested, it is found in the original Latin, so far as is now known, in only one manuscript. For although mention is made of a 1498 Venetian edition by various writers of the eighteenth century and later, there is no record of anyone having actually seen this edition.<sup>12</sup> Besides this manuscript, there is only the Italian translation published by Ciciapiorci from the Magliabechian MS. vii, 1076, which he compared with the translation in the Laurentian MS. xx, Pluteo 41, in his edi-

<sup>5</sup> The best account of Dino del Garbo is given by Girolamo Tiraboschi, in his *Storia della letteratura italiana*, Firenze, Molini, 1807, T. V., pt. 1, pp. 245-250; and I have drawn most heavily upon it for the account that follows.

<sup>6</sup> Dinus de Garbo, *Comment. super quarta fen primi Canonis Avicennae*, 1544, Proem., (quoted in Tiraboschi, *op. cit.* p. 246-247): "Studueramus Bononiae uno anno in scientia Medicinae, deinde propter guerram, quae tunc Bononiae erat (cioe per quella che fece a' Bolognesi, dal 1296 al 1299, il march. Azzo d'Este) recessimus et adhaesimus patri. Reversi sumus ad Studium Bononiae (cioe circa il 1300); studuimus continue quattuor annos in scientia Medicinae; in quarto vero anno Dei gratia mihi concedente fuimus doctorati in ista scientia, ac legimus duobus annis. Postmodum vero quam fuit privatum Studium Bononiae, coacti recessimus a Studio illo, et venimus ad Civitatem Senarum, et venimus ibi ad salarium vocati."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quam ego Dinus de Florentia incepti componere cum legi Bononiae anno VI meae

lecturae MCCCXI."

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*: "Deinde vero vocatus ad Studium reparandum a Comuni Paduae, ibi legens hoc opus reincepi et processi . . . et tunc quidem propter malum statum Civitatis Paduae Florentiam redii, et reassumens hoc opus Florentiae . . . terminavi . . . et completum est hoc opus a me anno Christi 1319 die 25 mensis Novembris."

<sup>9</sup> *Secundis liber canonis Avicennae, op. cit.*, p. 249: "Et finita est . . . anno Christi 1325, die 27 mensis Octobris, quam ego Dinus de Florentia minimus inter Medicos Doctores incepti cum vigit Studium in Civitate Senarum, et quum Florentiam redii propter illius studii diminutionem et annihilationem."

<sup>10</sup> Villani, *loc. cit.*: "Nel detto tempo (1327) a di 30. di Settembre mori in Firenze Maestro Dino del Garbo."

<sup>11</sup> For editions of these cf. L. Thorndike, *A Catalogue of Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin*, Cambridge, Mediaeval Academy, 1937 under Dino del Garbo in the index.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Pasqualigo, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

tion of the poems of Cavalcanti.<sup>13</sup> The Latin version, then, I am presenting now from the Chigian MS. L.V. 176, which is described by Arnone as follows: <sup>14</sup>

E un volume pergameneo in-4 del secolo xv, dal titolo: *Vita di Dante*, di carte numerate 79 e non numerate e bianche 5. Ha lettere iniziali colorate, ed e adorno di eleganti miniature. Nella 3<sup>a</sup> carta non numerata e scritto modernamente a lapis: "Lassato per legato a Papa Alessandro VII dal Conte Federigo Ubaldino, che l'acquisto da Parigi, ove l'haveva portato seco Iacobo Corbinelli fiorentino, autore delle Postille moderne, e come fuoruscito era andato in Francia a ricoverarsi dall Regina Caterina de'Medici." Dopo la Vita di Dante si trova (c. 29) la canzone *Donna mi prega*, a cui tien dietro il commento in latino di Dino del Garbo. Le note marginali, sparse nel commento, sembrano di mano di Celso Cittadini.

This text is presented here along with the text of the poem accompanying it, which has been corrected according to the explicit and implicit changes which Dino makes upon it in the course of his interpretation of the poem; in other words, the text of the poem here included is as near as it is possible to the text that Dino had before him while he was making his commentary. The differences from the poem of the Chigian MS. are, on the whole, quite minor, usually being only changes in spelling, although there are a few places where Dino reads a different word altogether. But in each case these variants have been noted at the foot of the page, where the reading of the manuscript text is noted. I have also accompanied the poem with an English translation, which, insofar as it is possible, is the one Dino would make if he were speaking English. The difficulty, of course, comes in making the meaning of the poem clear in a very literal translation, for besides the use of so many technical philosophical terms, which demand a lengthy explanation to make their meaning clear, Guido's Italian is so very elliptical that it demands expansion in English to make any sense out of it. In my translation I have attempted a compromise in the hope of keeping as close to the Italian text as possible while at the same time allowing some sort of meaning in English. Thus, I have retained the philosophical terms, leaving to the analysis of the commentary their full explication, while I have put in brackets the words which at the very minimum will expand the ellipses. However, it should not be forgotten that this translation is based on Dino's interpretation of the poem, which might be open to discussion at practically every stage, yet only where it seems evidently far-fetched have I noticed it at the foot of the page.

Concerning the text of the commentary, it has been transcribed as it is in the manuscript, except, of course, for the expanding of the genitive *e* to *ae* and the insertion of *he* in such words as *apprehensio*. I have, however, repunctuated and divided the work into sections. The only other changes are the few cases of obvious misreading, which are noticed at the foot of the page. Finally, as to the sources quoted, I have noted only those explicitly mentioned by Dino, and I have left to the analysis any other texts that would be helpful.

In the analysis of the commentary I have begun by paraphrasing small sections of Dino's commentary (in small type), and then analyzed the philosophic doctrine it is dealing with. However, I do not mean to imply that the texts I bring forward to facilitate the understanding of Dino's thought are "sources" for Dino in the sense that he actually used such and such books for his commentary. In most cases

<sup>13</sup> In *Rime di Guido Cavalcanti ecc. per opera di Antonio Cacciaporci*, Firenze, Carli, 1813, pp. 76-115, "Volgarizzamento inedito del commento latino di Maestro Dino del Garbo sulla canzone *Donna mi prega* ecc. Fatto per Ser Jacopo Mangiatroja notaio e cittadino

fiorentino." This Italian version has been compared with the Latin text by J. E. Shaw in *Italica* XII (1935), pp. 102-105.

<sup>14</sup> Nicola Arnone, *Le rime di Guido Cavalcanti*, Firenze, Sansoni, 1881, pp. xxxi-xxxii, n. 5.



the doctrine in question was so general in XIII-XIVth century scholasticism that he could have got it from innumerable places. But since Aristotle is at the source of most of these psychological and physiological doctrines, I have tried to locate the basis for Dino's interpretation in Aristotle. However, since we are dealing here with a XIVth century version of Aristotle, it is not always possible to find this Aristotelian doctrine in the text of Aristotle himself and, consequently, it is necessary to turn to his mediaeval commentators. But in this case the problem is less one of hoping to find exactly the book that Dino got such a doctrine out of, than that of finding texts which will explicate his meaning while at the same time maintain the general consistency of his thought. Consequently, in citing these texts to accomplish the analysis of Dino's commentary, I do not at all mean to imply that Dino actually used them, but only that they are examples of scholastic thought which enable us further to understand the work of both Dino and Cavalcanti. Thus it amounts to an essay on the use of scholastic philosophy in the poetry of that time.

Finally in conclusion I attempt to review in general Dino's interpretation of the poem, and, while pointing out its inadequacies, show in what way it can aid us in understanding what is after all a very obscure poem. For although Dino's interpretation is not the only one that can be given of this poem, it does make manifest the problems which must be faced by one who would come to any sort of understanding of the *Canzone d'Amore* of Cavalcanti.

When Mr. Ezra Pound raised the problem of the interpretation of Guido's poem in his edition of Cavalcanti,<sup>15</sup> Professor Gilson suggested that a more detailed study of Dino's commentary upon it would be profitable. Owing to Mr. Pound's gracious gesture in communicating his copy of the MS of the commentary to the Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, I was able to take advantage of this opportunity of examining the problem and I wish hereby to express my gratitude to both of these gentlemen who have, each in his own way, aided me in the preparation of this study.

O. B.

<sup>15</sup> Ezra Pound, *Guido Cavalcanti, Rime*. Genova, Edizione Marsano, S.A. Anno X (1931).

# The Canzone d'Amore of Guido Cavalcanti

## Text

*Chemincia la cancone di Guido de messer  
Cavalcante de Cavalcanti di Firenze:*

### I

- Donna mi priega che io deggia dire  
d'uno accidente, che sovent'e fero,  
et e si altero, ch'e chiamato amore;  
si chillo nega, possa il ver sentire.  
5 Et al presente conoscente chero,  
perch'io non spero ch'uom de basso core  
ad tal ragione porti conoscenza;  
che senza natural dimostramento  
non o talento di voler provare  
10 la dove <sup>a</sup> posa et chi lo fa creare,  
et quale e sua vertu et sua potenza,  
l'essenza, poi ciascuno <sup>b</sup> suo movimento,  
el piacimento che 'l fa dire amare,  
et s'uomo per vedere il puo mostrare.

### II

- 15 In quella parte dove sta memoria  
prende suo stato, si formato come  
dyaphano da lume d'una obscuritate.<sup>o</sup>  
Lo <sup>d</sup> quale da marte viene et fa dimora.  
Egli'e creato et a sensato nome,  
20 d'alma costume et di cor volontate.<sup>o</sup>  
Vien da veduta forma che s'intende,  
che prende nel possibile intellecto,  
come'n subgetto,<sup>f</sup> loco et dimoranza.  
En quella parte mai <sup>g</sup> non a possanza,<sup>h</sup>  
25 perche da qualitate <sup>i</sup> non discende;  
risplende in se perpetuale effecto,  
non a dilecto ma consideranza,<sup>j</sup>  
si che non puo <sup>k</sup> largire <sup>l</sup> simiglianza.<sup>m</sup>

### III

- 30 Non e vertude ma da quella viene  
ch'e perfectione, che si <sup>n</sup> pon <sup>o</sup> tale

<sup>a</sup> dove) ove.

<sup>b</sup> ciascuno) ciascun.

<sup>c</sup> obscuritate) obscuritate.

<sup>d</sup> lo) la.

<sup>e</sup> volontate) voluntade.

<sup>f</sup> subgetto) subgetto. dimoranza) dimo-  
ranca. <sup>g</sup> mai) gia.

<sup>h</sup> possanza) possanca.

<sup>i</sup> qualitate) qualitate.

<sup>j</sup> consideranza) consideranca.

<sup>k</sup> puo) puote.

<sup>l</sup> largire) largir.

<sup>m</sup> simiglianza) simiglianca.

<sup>n</sup> che si) chessi.

<sup>o</sup> pon) pone.

- non rationale ma che sente, dico.  
 Fuor di salute giudicar mantiene,  
 che <sup>p</sup> la'ntentione per ragion <sup>q</sup> vale;  
 discerne <sup>r</sup> male, in cui e vinto, amico.  
 35 Di sua potençza segue spesso morte,  
     <sup>s</sup> se forte la vertu fosse impedita  
     la quale aiuta alla <sup>t</sup> contraria via;  
     non perche opposito natural sia,  
     ma quanto che da buon perfectio <sup>u</sup> torte.  
 40 Per sorte non puo dire huom caggia vita,  
     che stabilita non a signoria.  
     A <sup>v</sup> simil puo valere <sup>w</sup> quando huomo oblia.

IV

- L'esser'e quando 'l <sup>x</sup> volere e tanto  
 ch'oltra misura di natura torna;  
 45<sup>v</sup> poi non s'adorna di riposo mai.  
     move cangiando colore, <sup>z</sup> riso in pianto,  
     et la figura con la paura storna;  
     poco soggiorna. Ancor di lui vedrai  
     che 'n gente de valore il piu si truova.  
 50 La nuova qualita muove sospiri;  
     et vuol ch'huom miri non fermato loco —  
     destando si ella, la qual manda fuoco;  
     ymaginar non puote che il pruova.<sup>a</sup>  
     Et non si muova perche allui sitiri;  
 55 et non si <sup>b</sup> giri per trovarvi gioco,  
     ne certamente gran saver ne poco.

V

- Di simil tragge complexion <sup>o</sup> lo <sup>d</sup> sguardo  
 che fa parere lo piacere. Certo  
 non puo coverto stare <sup>e</sup> quando e si <sup>f</sup> giunto —  
 60 non gia selvaggi <sup>g</sup> la belta suo dardo —  
     che tal volere per temere e sperto,  
     consegue <sup>h</sup> merto spirito ch'e punto.  
     Et non si puo conoscer <sup>i</sup> per lo viso,  
     compreso <sup>j</sup> bianco in tale obgetto <sup>k</sup> cade;  
 65 et chi bene aude, forma non si vede,  
     perche li mena che da lui procede,  
     fuore di colore esser diviso,

<sup>p</sup> che) chel.

<sup>q</sup> ragion) ragione.

<sup>r</sup> discierne) discerne.

<sup>s</sup> in marg.: forte impedita.

<sup>t</sup> alla) la.

<sup>u</sup> perfectio) proposto.

<sup>v</sup> a) ad.

<sup>w</sup> valere) valer.

<sup>x</sup> 'l) lo.

<sup>y</sup> in marg.: Per che il riposo la una certa  
 degnita sed dicit degli. Dogni reposo mi pareva  
 indigna.

<sup>z</sup> colore) color.

<sup>a</sup> non puote che il pruova) nol puo chi non  
 lo pruova.

<sup>b</sup> si) li.

<sup>c</sup> complexion) complexione.

<sup>d</sup> lo) om.

<sup>e</sup> stare) star.

<sup>f</sup> si) se.

<sup>g</sup> selvaggi) selavage.

<sup>h</sup> consegue) non segue.

<sup>i</sup> conoscer) conoscier.

<sup>j</sup> compreso) complesso.

<sup>k</sup> obgetto) obgetto.

OTTO BIRD

- absciso <sup>1</sup> mezo <sup>m</sup> obscuro, luce raude.  
 Fuor d'ogni fraude che <sup>n</sup> dice degna in fede,  
 70 che solo di costui nascie merzede. °

RITORNELLA

- Tu puoi sicuramente gir, cancone,  
 ove ti piace, ch'io t'o si adornata  
 ch'assai laudata sara tua ragione  
 dalle persone ch'anno intendimento,  
 75 di star con l'altre tu non ai talento.

*Translation*

i

- A lady asks me that I would tell  
 of an accident which is often fierce  
 and is so great that it is called love;  
 so that if anyone denies it, let him hear the truth.  
 5 And for the present I seek men of understanding,  
 for I do not hope that one of base heart  
 could bring understanding to such reasons;  
 for without natural demonstration  
 I have no desire to try to prove  
 10 where it is posited and who makes it created,  
 and what its virtue is and its power,  
 its essence and its every movement,  
 the pleasingness which makes it called loving,  
 and whether one can show it by sight.

ii

- 15 In that part where memory is  
 it (love) takes its state so formed as  
 a diaphan by light from an obscurity.  
 It <sup>1</sup> comes from Mars and makes its rest.  
 It is created and has a sensible name,  
 20 a habit of the soul and will from the heart.  
 It comes from a seen form which is understood,  
 which takes its place and rest  
 in the possible intellect as in a subject.  
 In that part (the intellect) it never has any power,  
 25 because (the intellect) <sup>2</sup> does not descend from quality;  
 it shines in its own perpetual effect,  
 and has no delight but consideration,  
 so that it cannot grant a likeness (to love as a passion).

<sup>1</sup> *post absciso leg. in.*  
<sup>m</sup> mezo) meco.

<sup>n</sup> che) *om.*  
 ° merzede) mercede.

<sup>1</sup>It Dino takes to refer to love, the subject understood of *prende*, although it may refer to *obscuritate*.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted Dino supplies a subject here—intellect—which governs the remaining lines of the stanza.

iii

- (Love) is not a virtue but comes from that  
 30 which is a perfection, which is posited as such,  
 not rational but which senses, I say.  
 It maintains an unsound judgment,  
 for the intention is rendered valid by reason;  
 he, in whom reason is conquered, discerns badly what he loves.  
 35 Death often follows from its power,  
 if, perchance, its virtue is impeded  
 which helps the contrary way;  
 not because it is a natural opposite (does love cause death),  
 but inasmuch as it twists (man) from his perfect good.  
 40 One cannot say that man loses life through chance,  
 since stability has no sovereignty (in chance).  
 When man forgets (love), he can become well again.<sup>3</sup>

iv

- (Love's) essence is when its desire is so great  
 that it goes beyond the measure of nature;  
 45 then it is no more adorned with repose.  
 It moves, changing color, (from) laughing to weeping,  
 and distorts the face with fear;  
 it rests little. Moreover you will see  
 that it is found most among people of worth.  
 50 Its new quality moves sighs;  
 and wills that man contemplate a non-fixed place —  
 if it is awakened, it makes fire;  
 he, who has experience of it, cannot imagine (anything else).  
 And let no one move (towards love) because he is attracted to it;  
 55 Let no one go (to it) to find joy,  
 nor certainly either great wisdom or little.

v

- The look which makes pleasure appear  
 takes its complexion from the like. Certainly <sup>4</sup>  
 (love) cannot stay hidden when it has happened —  
 60 yet beauty has not a savage <sup>5</sup> dart —  
 such a desire (as love) is experienced in fear,  
 which follows by merit of the spirit which is stung.  
 And it cannot be known by visual  
 comprehension, which is concerned with such an object as white;  
 65 he who understands well, does not see (love's) form,  
 because it produces there what proceeds from it (viz. its effects),  
 being divided from all color,  
 and cut off in an obscure medium, it takes away light.

<sup>3</sup> Here Dino takes a *simil* to refer to the condition of the man before he was afflicted with this passion—"like what he was."

<sup>4</sup> Certainly seems to go better with the pre-

ceding sentence, so as to read: "which makes pleasure appear certain."

<sup>5</sup> Dino understands by *savage*, "dull and weak," i.e. innocuous.

OTTO BIRD

70     It is beyond all fraud because worthy in faith,  
       for only from that is mercy born.

RITORNELLA

       You can go securely, canzone,  
       wherever it pleases you, for I have so adorned you  
       that your reason will be much praised  
       by persons who have understanding;  
75     with others you have no desire to stay.

# The Commentary of Dino del Garbo on Cavalcanti's Canzone d'Amore

Rome

Chigiano L. V. 176.

F. 29ra

## I

**I**NCIPIT scriptum super cantilena Guidonis de Cavalcantibus a magistro Dino del Garbo egregio medicinae doctori editum.

Ista cantilena quae tractat de amoris passione dividitur in tres partes. In prima ostenditur quot et quae sunt ea quae dicuntur de ipso. Secundo, de illis quae proponit determinat. Tertio, in ponendo finem dictionis ostenditur sufficientiam eorum quae dixit. Ibi, secunda, *In quella parte dove sta memoria*; tertia, ibi, *Tu puoi sicuramente*. In prima parte, quae est primus versus, tria ponuntur. Primo, ostenditur intentio generalis. Secundo, qualis debet esse auditor \* huius sermonis. Tertio, in speciali ostenditur quot et quae intendit dicere de amore. Secunda, ibi, *et al presente*. Tertia, ibi, *che senza naturale*. (5)

Volens igitur auctor determinare de passione amoris, praemittit causam moventem ipsum ad tractandum de amore. Causa autem movens ad hoc est mulier vel domina quae ipsum rogavit. Causa quare istud attribuitur mulieri vel dominae fuit duplex; una est quia huiusmodi passio, quae est amor, de quo loquitur ut plurimum circa mulierem versatur, et licet aliquando erga masculum versetur, sed quia raro, cum sit talis amor bestialis et ideo praeter naturam, ideo solum hic proponit circa mulierem. Secunda causa fuit quia forte hic auctor vexabatur tunc passione ista circa aliquam mulierem, et ideo ut ei applauderet, proponit hanc causam circa mulierem. Sed adverte quod licet causa propter quam motus fuit ad tentandum hoc circa amorem fuerit mulier vel domina quam forte dilexerat, tamen non dixit quod haec domina sibi praeciperet, sed dixit quod rogavit eum, ut ostenderet ea quae tractat hic non dicet in quantum passionatus tali passione amoris. Nam qui hoc modo passionatus est cogitur ad exequendum ea quae vult res quam amat; unde et hoc modo illud quod ei dicit domina quam amat est ei praeceptum sicut dictum domini servo. Sed illa, quae dicet, referet in scientifico modo et veridico tracto ex praeceptis scientiae naturalis et moralis. In talibus autem quae sic dicuntur ab aliquo, ille qui dicit optinet locum magistri, cum sit sciens; cum vero recipit ea quae dicitur, optinet locum discipuli cum sit ignorans et addiscens. Et ideo sicut magister optinet locum principatus, ita in hac materia voluit se ostendere quantum in hoc optinere locum principantis et magistri, et ideo sicut subditi verbum ad dominum non debet esse cum praecepto sed cum rogamine. Subditus enim non debet praecipere domino sed rogare. Sic iste propter hanc causam vertens se ad istam intentionem non dixit: *Donna mi comanda*, sed dixit: *Donna mi priega*. Et nota quod significanter dixit *donna* ut ostenderet quod ista petitio est iusta cui debet satisfacere, cum esset potens in satisfaciendo. In hoc enim verbo ostenditur quod petitio est iusta ratione illius qui petit; nam tunc est petitio iusta cui satisfieri debet ra-

\* auditor) auctor; but, as is evident from p. 161, l.32, the correct reading is auditor.

tione illius qui petit quando petens cognoscit illud quod (29rb)petit, et quando qui petit es persona digna. Hinc autem hoc nomen *donna* attribuitur mulieri cum iam habeat cognitionem perfectam, quoniam mulieri quae est in aetate puerili in qua cognitio non est perfecta non attribuitur hoc nomen *donna*. Iterum etiam attribuitur mulieri dignae; nam illud nomen attribuitur mulieri honestae; mulier enim meretriciaria non dicitur *donna*. Et maxime attribuitur hoc nomen mulieri quae est proles alicuius familiae quae non est omnino viliter nata; unde dignitatem habet ex honestate et ex prole generationis suae. (5)

Deinde subdit, *d'uno accidente* etc., ubi de hac passione de qua tractare intendit dicit quattuor: primo, quod erat accidens: secundo, quod erat accidens ferox; tertio, quod erat accidens altum, id est, magnum; quarto, quod vocatur amor. Dicitur autem haec passio accidens primo, quia non est substantia per se stans, sed est alteri adhaerens sicut subiecto ut appetitus animae, simili modo sicut animae passiones quae sunt ira, tristitia, timor, et similia. Secundo, dicitur accidens quia potest advenire et etiam recedere sicut accidentia alia. Tertio, dicitur accidens quia advenit ab extrinseco. Et licet secundum aliquid possit quis habere dispositionem intrinsecam per quam facilius incurrat in hanc passionem, ut postea declarabitur,<sup>1</sup> tamen accidens ipsum principaliter est res extrinseca. Dicitur autem haec passio accidens ferox ratione intemperantiae quae est in hac passione, ut declarabitur postea.<sup>2</sup> Sed dicitur accidens magnum ratione effectuum quos inducit in corpus; convertit enim plus et alterat quasi aliae passiones, ut declarabitur in processu cantilenae.<sup>3</sup> (10) (15) (20)

De causa autem quare haec passio vocatur amor ponere non curamus quoniam de nominibus nulla debet esse cura, cum rei essentiam cognoscamus. Nam secundum Philosophum, nomina rebus ad placitum imponuntur.<sup>4</sup> Deinde subdit, *si chi lo nega* etc., quasi dicat sic: oportet nos loqui de isto accidente ut quicumque negat ipsum esse, quia ignorat quiditatem et essentiam eius, possit veritatem cognoscere de ipso, et credat ipsum esse aliquid. (25) (30)

Deinde subdit: *et al presente conoscente chero* etc., id est, in praesenti materia quaero quod homo qui audiet ista sit cognoscens, id est, intelligens, id est, subtilis intellectus.

Deinde subdit: *parchio non spero* etc., id est, non spero quod bestialis et depressi intellectus talem sermonem quem dicam possit intelligere. (35)

Deinde subdit: *che senza natural dimostramento*, etc., id est, sine naturali demonstratione quasi velit dicere quod ea quae dicit extrahet ex principiis scientiae naturalis, et non solum extrahet ex principiis scientiae naturalis, imo ex principiis scientiae moralis et astrologiae; et ideo auditor huius sermonis debet esse intelligens. (40)

Deinde subdit: *la dove posa*, etc. Quas res proponit dicere de amore: prima, ostenditur in qua parte habet esse amor sicut in subiecto; secunda, quid est creans, id est, generans ipsum in illo subiecto; tertia, quae sit virtus eius, puta ostendere utrum sit virtus vel procedens ex virtute; quarta, quid potest inducere (29va) amor in corpus, et hoc non est aliud nisi ostendere effectus eius; quinta, suam essentiam, scilicet, quid sit amor; sexta, motus amoris, id est, alterationes diversas quas amor facit; septima, unde causatur complacentia ex qua fit amor, et ex qua homo movetur ad loquendum de amore; octava, utrum amor possit ostendi visibiliter an non. Primam ergo rem tangit cum (45)

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 167.

<sup>4</sup> Arist., *De interpret.*, I, i, 16a20.



dicit, *la dove posa*. Secundam, cum dicit, *et chi lo fa creare*. Tertiam ibi, *et quale e sua vertu*. Quartam ibi, *et sua potentia*. Quintam ibi, *l'essentia*. Sextam ibi, *poi ciascuno*. Septimam ibi, *Et il piacimento*. Octavam ibi, *Et s'uomo*. Et ita licet principaliter proponat dicere, tamen etiam quaedam intermiscet.

II

*In quella parte* et cetera. Hic prosequitur de his quae proposuit dicere de amore, et in ista instantia vel versu determinat de duobus primis, scilicet, de subgetto amoris et de ipso principio vel causa generante amorem. Primo ergo, ostendit in qua parte habet esse amor. Secundo, quid sit creans vel generans. Secundo ibi. *Lo qual da marte viene*. Hic igitur vult dicere quod amor habet esse in parte memoriali quoniam impressio speciei rei, ex qua creatur amor, conservatur in memoria et retinetur in ea sicut lumen, procedens ab aliquo corpore luminoso quod lumen infundit, habet recipi et retineri in corpore dyaphano, quod illuminatur quod tamen prius erat obscurum et erat de se privatum lumine. Declaratum est enim in scientia naturali quod lux est actus corporis dyaphani.<sup>5</sup> Et ideo dyaphanum est illud quod de se lucem non habet, est tamen aptum recipere et retinere lucem quae infunditur a corpore luminoso sicut apparet de aere, qui est corpus dyaphanum quod de se lucem non habet; unde ratione huius dicitur corpus obscurum, est tamen aptum recipere lucem a corpore luminoso sicut est corpus solare aut aliud corpus lucens. Similiter declaratum est in scientia naturali quod sicut lumen recipitur in aere, et species rerum coloratarum cum lumine intentionaliter, et non recipitur res ipsa materialis. Lapis enim non est in anima sed species lapidis, ut dicit Philosophus.<sup>6</sup> Et propterea in memoria illius qui amat non retinetur et conservatur res materialis quae amatur, sed species rei intentionalis, et sicut dyaphanum existens prius obscurum perficitur quando lumine informatur, ita et virtus memorialis<sup>b</sup> perficitur quando informatur specie quae retinetur et conservatur in ea. Et ideo iste optime dixit quod ita informatur memoria ex specie rei ex qua causatur amor, sicut dyaphanum luce quod de se erat obscurum et imperfectum. Sed debes hic intelligere, ne erretur, quod quando iste dicit quod amor habet esse in parte memoriali quod illud dictum quantum ad speciem rei ex cuius apprehensione causatur amor; species autem illa figitur et conservatur in memoria, sed passio ipsa quae est amor non habet esse proprie in memoria, sed habet esse in appetitu sensitivo sicut in subgetto in quo habent esse passionem animae omnes, sicut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, amor et similia accidentia, sicut declaratum est in scientia morali et naturali,<sup>7</sup> et iste idem ponit etiam. (5) (10) (15) (20) (25) (30) (35)

Deinde cum dicit, *Lo quale da marte viene* etc. vult auctor ostendere quod amor est res generata vel creata, et ideo dicit, *Egli'e creato et a sensato nome*, id est, habet nomen sensibile, id est, denotans aliquam rem sensibilem, cum istud nomen amor denotet et significet aliquam passionem nobis sensibilem, quemadmodum quaelibet alia passio sensualis habet proprium nomen, ut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, et similia. (40)

Similiter etiam vult hic ostendere quae est res generans vel creans istam passionem, et quia ad generationem alicuius passionis in anima concurrunt duae res. Una est dispositio naturalis alicuius corporis; videmus enim quod (45)

<sup>b</sup> memorialis) materialis.

<sup>5</sup> Arist., *De ani.*, II, vii, 418b10.

<sup>6</sup> Arist., *De ani.*, III, viii, 432a1.

<sup>7</sup> cf. Arist., *De ani.*, II, iii, 414b2-6.

secundum diversas dispositiones naturales corporum homines sunt apti incurrere diversas passiones; quidam vero faciliter incurrunt in iram, quidam in tristitiam, quidam in laetitiam, et sic similiter ex dispositione corporis naturalis quidam sunt apti ut faciliter hanc passionem incurrant amoris (29vb). Alia res concurrit ad causandum aliquam passionem quae est res extrinseca quae suam ymaginem vel speciem causat in virtute sensitiva ad quam cognitionem vel apprehensionem consequitur appetitus talis vel talis, in quo appetitu istae passiones fundantur. Ideo auctor ut complete ostenderet quae est res generans istam passionem, primo ostendit quae est dispositio naturalis corporis quae reddit hominem aptum ut faciliter istam passionem incurrat. Secundo ostendit quae est res extrinseca ex cuius apprehensione consequitur in appetitu passio amoris. Secunda ibi; *vien da veduta forma*, vel posset incipere ibi, *D'alma costume*. (5)

In prima parte quia dispositio naturalis per quam aliquis inclinatur ad incurrendum faciliter in aliquam passionem ex principiis proprie nativitatis hominis contrahitur, et inter ista principia nativitatis alicuius praecipua et principalia sunt corpora celestia, nam ut dicit Philosophus in *Physicis*, *homo hominem generat et sol*.<sup>8</sup> Et in *De generatione animalium* dicit quod in spiritu genitivo est natura existens proportio naturalis ordinationi astrorum.<sup>9</sup> Ideo merito iste auctor vult ostendere a quo corpore caelesti concurrente in generatione alicuius, datur haec dispositio naturalis, per quam aliquis faciliter inclinatur ad incurrendam hanc passionem quae dicitur amor. Hoc autem ostendit in verbo illo quod praemisit cum dixit, *Lo quale da marte viene et fa dimora*. Nam ista passio dicitur procedere a marte isto modo, quoniam astrologi ponunt quod quando in nativitate alicuius mars fuerit in domo veneris, ut in tauro vel in libra, et fuerit significator nativitatis eius, significabit natum fore luxuriosum fornicatorem et omnibus veneris abusivis sceleratum; unde quidam sapiens qui dicitur Aly in *Commento quadripartiti* dicit quod quando in nativitate alicuius venus participat cum marte, dat in amoramentum, fornicationem, luxuriam et talia similia,<sup>10</sup> quae omnia pertinent ad ad passionem amoris de quo loquitur auctor in hac cantilena. (15)

Deinde subdit, *d'alma costume* etc., id est, amor de quo dictum est quod est res creata et generata est mos animae, id est, quaedam passio quae adnectitur moribus animae, et appellat hic mores animae accidentia quae sunt dictae passiones. (20)

Deinde subdit, *Et di cor voluntate*,<sup>11</sup> id est, passio insequitur voluntatem in appetitum sensitivum qui est in corde. Et ex isto verbo apparet quod iste ponit quod amor, prout est passio animae quemadmodum ira et tristitia sunt etiam quaedam passiones, habet esse in appetitu sensitivo; in virtute autem memoriali habet esse, ut dixi supra,<sup>12</sup> non prout est passio sed ratione speciei rei quae apprehenditur, ad cuius apprehensionem consequitur appetitus talis in quo causatur haec passio. Dixit autem hic auctor quod consequitur appetitum sensitivum qui est in corde. Nam iste loquitur imitans Aristotilem philosophum qui posuit quod appetitus et omnis virtus sensitiva habet esse in corde,<sup>13</sup> sed medici posuerunt quod habet esse in cerebro,<sup>14</sup> quae autem (25)

<sup>8</sup> voluntate) *Ad. quae in marg.*

<sup>8</sup> Arist. *Phys.*, II, ii, 194b14.

<sup>9</sup> Arist. *De gen. animal*, II, iii, 737a1.

<sup>10</sup> Haly ben Ridwan, *Comment. in quadripartiti Ptolemaei*, Venetiis, apud scotum, 1519 (Paris, B.N. Res. V.190), tract. 3, libri 4, cap.

13: In qualitatibus anime nati, f. 72r.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. p. 162.

<sup>12</sup> Arist., *De part. animal.*, III, iv, 666a11.

<sup>13</sup> Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, ed. I. Muller, Leipzig, 1874, VIII. p. 667 sq.

opinionum sit vera non est presentis intentionis discutere. Et nota quod istum appetitum vocavit voluntatem, quae videtur intellectui attinere, ut ostenderet quod licet amor fiat in aliquo ex dispositione naturali per quam quis inclinatur ad incurrendum faciliter hanc passionem, tamen fit etiam ex proposito et per electionem quod pertinet ad voluntatem quae est libera et liberi arbitrii, cum se habeat indifferenter ad opposita et est simile hic, sicut etiam est in aliis passionibus ut, verbi gratia, de ira; nam(30ra) aliquis licet sit dispositus ex natura ad faciliter incurrendum in iram, tamen per voluntatem potest se retrahere ab ea, et potest etiam in eam incurrere, et simili modo etiam de amore. Et ideo ad denotandum hoc, dixit quod non solum erat mos animae, id est, passio sed etiam erat consequens voluntatem. (15)

Deinde cum dicit, *Vien da veduta forma* etc., auctor, quia amor, ut dictum est,<sup>14</sup> passio est quaedam animae, et passio causatur in anima ex apprehensione alicuius rei quam consequitur appetitus, vult ostendere quae est res ex cuius apprehensione consequitur talis appetitus ut in ipso causetur haec passio quae est amor. Et vult dicere quod passio quae est amor causatur ex apprehensione alicuius formae visibilis quae quidem comprehenditur, ut postea dicit,<sup>15</sup> sub ratione complacentiae; quae complacentia causatur, aut quia videtur sibi forma illius rei pulchra, vel ex gestibus illius formae qui sibi placent quicumque gestus sint illi. Et ita talis apprehensio fit ab intellectu ad quem pervenit species illius formae visibilis. Hic enim est ordo in apprehensione humana, sicut declaratum est in scientia naturali, quia primo species rei pervenit ad sensus exteriores, ut ad visum, vel auditum, vel tactum, vel gustum, vel olphatum, deinde ab illis pervenit ad virtutes sensitivas interiores sicut pervenit ad fantasiam primo, deinde pervenit ad cogitativam, et ultimo ad memorialem; ab istis autem virtutibus procedit postea ista species ad virtutem nobiliorem, quae virtus in homine est altissima inter virtutes adprehensivas, et ista est virtus possibilis, quae dicitur possibilis ad differentiam intellectus agentis qui etiam est in nobis, sed quia intellectus agens non est de virtutibus adprehensivis de quibus loquimur hic. Sed intellectus possibilis est ille qui recipit species rei, et recipiendo speciem rei cognoscit rem. Ideo dicit quod pervenit ista forma primo apprehensa a visu usque ad intellectum possibilem, et non amplius procedit ad aliam virtutem, sed cognoscit quia non est alia virtus apprehensiva quae sit in nobis altior et nobilior quam sit ista; et hoc est quod vult dicere iste auctor cum subdit, *che prende nel possibile intellecto, come in subiecto loco* etc. id est, qui est sicut subiectum et locum specierum rerum apprehensarum, et istud concordat cum verbo Philosophi posito in tertio *De anima*, qui dicit quod *anima est locus specierum, sed non tota, sed pars eius intellectiva*,<sup>16</sup> et subdit, *et dimoranza*, id est, et species istius rei moratur quia, scilicet, non procedit ad aliam virtutem neque ad alium locum. (20) (25) (30) (35) (40)

Sed hic oportet duo notare; primum est quod licet auctor dicat quod ista passio quae est amor causetur ex apprehensione formae quae primo videtur per visum, non intelligit hic solum sensus visus, imo intelligit omnem alium sensum exteriorem. Nam res quae amatur ab aliquo ut, verbi gratia, est mulier, non solum placet ex qua complacentia procedit amor, ut postea dicit,<sup>17</sup> ratione eius quod amans comprehendit quod est pulchra ratione coloris, et figurae eius et quantitatis et finium. Imo etiam aliquando placet ratione eius quod comprehenditur per sensus alios, verbi gratia, ratione (45)

<sup>14</sup> Cf. p. 162.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. p. 172.

<sup>16</sup> Arist., *De ani.*, III, iv, 429a27.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. p. 172.

loquela eius, et aliorum gestuum qui comprehenduntur per alios sensus. Sed tamen quia ut in pluribus haec complacentia ex qua causatur in appetitu passio amoris primo venit ex forma quae comprehenditur per visum, hinc est quod auctor solum expressit de sensu visus. Secundo, oportet notare quod illud quod hic auctor dicit de intellectu possibile non ob(30rb) aliud dicit nisi ut ostendat quod apprehensio quae cadit in amatore, secundum quod hic est sermo de amore apud homines, convenit non est pure sensitiva, imo etiam intercidit apprehensio intellectiva, et propterea in animalibus brutis cadit talis modus amoris et amicitiae de quo non est haec presens intentio. (5)

Deinde cum dicit, *En quella parte mai non a posanza* etc., removet auctor quasi errorem vel dubium quod ex dictis posset insurgere. Quia enim dixerat quod ista forma visibilis, ex cuius apprehensione causatur amor, pervenit usque ad intellectum possibilem, potuisset aliquis credere quod per haec verba quod ipse voluisset quod passio amoris haberet esse in intellectu possibili; quod non est verum. Et ideo istum errorem vel dubium removet sic dicens, *En quella parte* etc., hoc est dicere quod, licet sit dictum quod causans amorem sit species alicuius formae visibilis quae postea apprehenditur ab intellectu possibili, tamen passio amoris non habet esse in intellectu possibili; quia intellectus possibilis non est virtus particularis corporea, quia intellectus possibilis non est forma quae proveniat ex qualitatibus elementorum per admisionem eorum sicut proveniunt aliae formae corporeae quae dicuntur formae elementales quia descendunt ab elementis et qualitatibus eorum. Et hoc est quod iste vult dicere, quando dicit, *perche da qualitate non discende*. Imo intellectus est quaedam forma a particularitate et corruptibilitate, quae corruptibilitas procedit a qualitatibus elementalibus, et ideo in tali forma quae est intellectus possibilis primo et proprie recipitur, ad quod est universale, et incorruptibile. Et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum subdit, *Risplende in se perpetuale effecto*, id est, operatio quae est sicut effectus animae respectu alicuius quod est perpetuum et incorruptibile, sicut et iste intellectus est incorruptibilis; et propterea, quia intellectus non est virtus corporea particularis sicut sunt virtutes sensitivae, dum amor, de quo loquimur hic, sit quaedam passio corporalis et particularis, talis passio non habet esse in intellectu, cum in eo etiam non sint aliae passionem corporales ut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, et similia. Operatio intellectus est pura consideratio et apprehensio spiritualis; et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum subdit, *Non a dilecto*, id est, non habet delectationes corporales quales sunt delectationes quae aliquando sunt in passione amoris, et propter hoc intendit quod in se nullam aliam habet passionem qualis est ira, tristitia, et similia. Dixi autem quod nullam habet delectationem corporalem, quia delectationem spirituales quae delectatio sequitur ad suam propriam operationem, quando est perfecta, bene habet. Unde Aristoteles decimo *Ethycorum* dixit<sup>18</sup> quod *philosophia affert numerabiles delectationes puritate et sinceritate*. Talem ergo delectationem bene habet intellectus, sed delectationem quae est de istis passionibus animae sensualibus inter quas passionem connumeratur ira, tristitia, gaudium, amor, et similia non habet, sed operatio intellectus est pura consideratio et apprehensio spiritualis; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, *ma consideranza*, id est, quod operatio intellectus est considerare et cognoscere. (10) (15) (20) (25) (30) (35) (40) (45)

Deinde subdit; *si che non puo largire simiglianza*, id est, et propterea non potest illuc, id est, ad intellectum (30va) pervenire similis passio, sicut est amor vel aliae passionem corporeae, et ideo Philosophus dixit primo *De anima*,<sup>19</sup> qui (50)

<sup>18</sup> Arist., *Ethic. Nic.*, X, iv, 1174b20.

<sup>19</sup> Arist., *De ani.*, I, iv, 408b13.

dixit animam gaudere vel tristari simile est ac si aliquis dixerit eam texere vel haedificare, quasi dicat sicut illud ultimum non dicimus; ita etiam non debemus dicere quod proprie anima tristetur vel gaudeat, et refert suum sermonem ad animam loquendo de ipsa pro parte eius intellectiva.

III

*Non e vertude* etc. In isto versu vel stantia prosequitur de aliis duobus quae praeponit, videlicet, de virtute amoris et de potentia amoris. Et dividitur in duas partes. Nam primo determinat de virtute amoris; secundo determinat de eius potentia; secunda pars incipit ibi, *Di sua potentia segue spesso morte*. In prima parte vult dicere quod amor non est virtus sed est procedens ex operatione alicuius virtutis, gratia cuius est notandum quod in anima sunt tria. Nam in ipsa sunt virtutes quae sunt potentiae naturales eius, quae potentiae sunt multae, quarum omnium radix est anima, sicut sunt intellectus, voluntas, fantasia, extimativa, memoria, et virtus sensitiva communis et particularis, et appetitus sensitivus, et est etiam virtus vegetativa quae nutrit corpus. Sunt etiam in ipsa virtutes quae dicuntur intellectuales, ut sunt sapientia, intellectus, et scientia, ars, et prudentia. Et quaedam sunt virtutes morales, ut sunt temperantia, liberalitas, fortitudo, magnanimitas, et similia. Sunt etiam in ipsa passiones circa quas passiones consistunt virtutes morales quae animam in talibus passionibus rectificant, ut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, audacia, amor et similia. Modo amor non est virtus quae sit de potentiis naturalibus animae, neque est virtus quae est habitus intellectualis vel moralis, sed amor est passio quaedam appetitus quemadmodum ira vel tristitia non sunt virtutes sed sunt passiones appetitus. Licet tamen amor non sit virtus, procedit a virtute, et hoc est quod iste subdit, *Ma da quella vienne*. Dicitur autem amor procedere a virtute, non prout virtus est habitus intellectualis, quia dictum est prius quod amor habet esse in intellectu possibili, neque etiam procedit a virtute quae est habitus moralis, quia talis virtus est in appetitu ut regulatur a ratione. In tali autem appetitu in quo est amor, de quo loquitur hic, non est ratio regulata, ut ipse statim dicet, et ideo dicitur procedere a virtute, prout virtus summitur pro aliqua potentia animae, quoniam procedit ex operatione virtutis sensitivae quae est in nobis. Nam amor est passio quaedam appetitus qui appetitus consequitur formam rei apprehensae per sensum primo exterioriorem, et deinde per virtutes sensitivas interiores, ut dictum est supra.<sup>20</sup> Unde in amore concurrit duplex passio sensitiva, scilicet, cognoscitiva et appetitiva, quia omnis appetitus qui est in nobis insequitur cognitionem, et licet in amore concurrat operatio potentiae cognoscitivae sensitivae, tamen amor non habet esse proprie, ut in subiecto, in potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva, sed habet esse in appetitiva sicut omnis alia passio,<sup>d</sup> et hoc ideo est quia in cognitione sola est motus rerum ad animam, sed in appetitu est motus animae ad res. Cognoscimus enim res, prout sunt in nobis, sed appetimus eas, prout sunt in seipsis, et ideo Philosophus dicebat septimo *Metaphysicae*,<sup>21</sup> quod *bonum et malum, quae sunt objecta appetitus, sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum, quae sunt objecta intellectus, sunt in anima*, et quia secundum passiones trahimur passimur (30vb) ad cognitionem rei agentis in ipsam. Ideo licet in passionibus concurrat operatio potentiae sensitivae cognoscitivae ex qua consequitur talis appe-

<sup>d</sup> passio) potentia.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. p. 164.

<sup>21</sup> Arist., *Metaphys.*, VI. iii, 1027b26.

titus in nobis, amor tamen, qui est passio, non habet esse, ut in subiecto, in potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva, sed habet esse in appetitu, quando appetitus trahitur ad cognitiones rerum quas appetit. Et quia hic appetitus, in quo habet esse haec passio, est appetitus sensitivus et non est appetitus intellectivus, quia in intellectu non habet esse haec passio, ut dixi prius,<sup>22</sup> et licet, ut dixi prius,<sup>23</sup> in amore de quo loquimur hic concurrat aliqua apprehensio intellectus, tamen passio amoris non habet esse in intellectu, et ideo appetitus, in quo habet esse amor, non est intellectivus sed sensitivus. Similiter autem quia hic appetitus sensitivus non est regulatus a ratione, imo est efferens et divertens a ratione, ideo amor procedit a virtute quae non est rationabilis sed sensibilis, et hoc est quod vult dicere iste auctor cum subdit, *che perfectione che si pon tale, non rationale ma che sente dico.* (5) (10)

Deinde cum dicit, *fuor di salute guidicar mantiene* etc., vult auctor probare quod appetitus in quo habet esse amor est appetitus qui non est regulatus a ratione, quia hic appetitus non insequitur iudicium rationis rectum et salvum. Nam hic appetitus consequitur iudicium in quo iudicatur aliquid amicum et diligendum, quod tamen non est ita, et ideo dicit auctor, *Fuor di salute*, id est, haec passio ponit iudicium hominis extra salutem, id est, extra salutem quia iudicium quod est in amore non est iudicium sanum, imo est corruptum. Iudicat enim habens amorem quod iudicandum non est, et illud quod dictum est declarat cum subdit, *che la ntenzione per region vale*, quasi dicat quod intentio iudicandi tunc valet, id est, tunc est recta, quando est cum ratione, scilicet, bona. Nunc autem ille in quo est amor discernit male aliquid esse amicum, id est, amabile quod tamen secundum rectam rationem non est amabile, et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum subdit, *discerne male, in cui e vinto.* (15) (20) (25)

Deinde cum dicit, *Di sua potentia segue spesso morte*, vult auctor ostendere quae sit potentia amoris, id est, quid potest amor inducere in corpus, et intelligit hic potentiam quae est respectu effectus intensioris quem amor potest in corpus inducere. Nam adeo potest haec passio corpus alterare quod multotiens inducit mortem quae est ultimum terribilium, sicut etiam aliquando accidit mors in vehementibus aliis passionibus animae, et hoc est quod primo proponit hic auctor cum dicit, *Di sua potenza* etc. Secundum quem autem modum amor inducat mortem declarat auctor cum dicit et subdit, *Se forte la vertu fosse impedita*, quasi dicat quod amor tunc interficit quando est adeo vehemens quod propter ipsum impediuntur opera virtutis vegetativae vel virtutis vitalis quae conservat vitam et operationes eius in corpore humano. Videmus ad sensum corpora illorum, in quibus est amor adeo vehemens et non consequuntur neque adimplent eorum desiderium, arefieri et desiccari et tandem consumi et mori, et istud videmus non solum in amore accidere, imo etiam hoc accidit in omni vehementi cogitatione et solitudine animae. Impediunt enim in talibus animae operationes virtutis vitalis quae dicitur iuvare contrariam viam, id est, quae conservat vitam quae est contraria mortis, et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum dicit, *Se forte*, id est, fortasse, *La vertu fosse impedita; la quale a vita alla contraria via.* (30) (35) (40) (45)

Subdit autem postea auctor iste, *Non perche opposta natural sia.* (31ra) In quo verbo vult ostendere secundum quem modum haec passio impedit opera virtutis vitalis propter quod impedimentum inducit mortem, et vult dicere quod amor non impedit opera virtutis vitalis neque inducit mortem quia proprie amor sit aliquid contrarium naturale ipsi vitae quemadmodum in-

<sup>22</sup> Cf. p. 165.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. p. 165.

ducunt mortem aliae aegritudines, verbi gratia, sicut est malaegri naturalis complexionis. Ista enim inducit mortem quia est contraria bonae complexionis in qua stat vita. Amor autem non est res quae sit proprie contrarium naturale ipsa vitae, sed amor inducit mortem in quantum in ipso amore homo torquetur, id est, removetur a bono suo perfecto, et a bona sua, et a perfecta sua naturali dispositione, et hoc est quod vult dicere auctor cum dicit, *Non perche opposito natural sia; ma quanto che da buon perfetto torte*. Nam in amore quando est valde vehemens aliquis removetur a bona sua dispositione naturali, et tendit versus melanconicam sicut ponunt medicinae auctores,<sup>24</sup> et hoc est propter vehementem cogitationem quae est in ipso, et solitudinem circa rem quam amat. Nam ex hoc accidit quod virtus distrahitur tota quasi ab operibus nutrimenti eo quod ipse actus unius virtutis intenditur valde, actus aliarum virtutum valde remittitur. Et quia in amore intenditur valde actus animatae virtutis, ideo diminuitur et debilitatur valde operatio nutrimenti propter quod corpus decedit et removetur a sua bona dispositione naturali, et tendit in dispositionem malam et aegram propter quod ultimo corpus consumitur et moritur. Sic ergo amor interficit non quia sit aliquid contrarium directe naturale sed quia in ipso distrahitur virtus naturalis ab operationibus propriis nutrimenti. Subdit autem postea, *per sorte non puo dire huom ch'aggia vita*, quasi velit dicere, neque a sorte, id est, neque a casu accidit quod amor inducat mortem sicut possit aliquis dicere; quia casus non est res stabilis et firma, cum sit causa sui effectus non ut in pluribus sed in paucioribus, et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, *che stabilita non a signoria*. Modo videmus ad sensum quod amor hoc multotiens facit, scilicet, quod quando aliquis vehementer perseverat in ipso, et videmus etiam quod quando quis obliviscitur eius, ex oblivione sola redit ille homo ad dispositionem suam naturalem, et propterea medici ponunt<sup>25</sup> quod maxima cura istius passionis, scilicet, amoris est ut homo distrahitur a cogitatione illius quod amat, et obliviscatur eius. Et propterea ex hoc amor interficit multotiens, hoc est signum quod amor non interficit a casu et quomodocumque, imo interficit per se. Sed ex hoc quod ex sola sui oblivione quis ab hac passione curatur, et redit ad dispositionem naturalem absque alia alteratione et curatione facta per medicinas exteriores, est signum quod amor interficit non quia sit aliquid contrarium naturale, sed interficit per alium modum, qui dictus est, et hoc est quod vult dicere ultimo *a simil puo valere quando huomo oblia*, id est, obliviscitur, hoc est dicere, eius sola valet ad curationem et notionem impediendi et mortis sicut ista primo valet ad inducendum mortem. Nam hoc non faciunt ut contrarium naturale aliquod sed faciunt modo dicto.

#### IV

(31rc), *L'essere* etc. In isto versu vel stantia prosequitur auctor de aliis duobus quae proposuit dicere de amore, scilicet, de essentia amoris, et de motibus quos amor inducit in corpus. Primo ergo, dicit in quo consistat quiditas et essentia amoris. Secundo, ostendit qui sint motus eius, id est, quas alterationes inducit diversas in corpus; secunda pars incipit ibi, *Move cangiando colore*. In prima ergo parte cum dicit, *l'essere*, intendit dicere quasi dicat quod

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Canon*, III. Fen. I, tract. IV, cap. 23 (Venetiis, Juntas, 1608, t. I, p. 494a): "Haec aegritudo (amor) est sollicitudo melancolica similis melancoliae."

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Ibid.*, cap. 24 (t. 1, p. 494b): "Cura . . . Illud enim facit eos fortasse

oblivisci delectationis eorum, aut ingeniatur, ut ipsi diligunt aliud ab eo, quod diligunt, quod fit ex eis, quae lex permittit. Deinde cogitatio ipsorum a secundo abscindatur, antequam confirmatur, et postquam obliti fuerint primi."

essentia amoris in hoc consistat quod est passio quaedam in qua appetitus est cum vehementi desiderio circa rem quam amat, ut, scilicet, coniungatur rei amatae, et hoc est quod vult dicere ista cum dicit, *Quando'l volere e tanto ch'oltra misura di natura torna*, quasi velit dicere quod in amore est tantum desiderium in appetitu ad hoc ut coniungatur rei amatae quod est ultra mensuram, id est, terminum naturalem; nam istud desiderium in amore adeo est magnum quod quasi videtur esse infinitum, unde non habet terminum, sicut naturalia sunt mensurata et terminata. Causa autem quare in amore est tantum desiderium in appetitu ut coniungatur rei amatae est quia res amata est sicut finis illius qui amat, et sicut propria perfectio appetitus in quo est passio amoris; nunc autem quaelibet res appetit coniungi suo fini in infinitum. Unde et Philosophus etiam primo *Polyticae* <sup>26</sup> dixit quod quaelibet ars et cognitio appetit suum (31rd) finem in infinitum intelligere. Tamen hic, quod non proprie dicitur appetitus infinitus quia non habet terminum ultra quem possit augeri appetitus respectu finis proprii, et propterea referens se ad illum intellectum, dixit hic auctor quod amor est quaedam passio consistens in appetitu in quo est desiderium ut coniungatur rei amatae tantum quod est ultra mensuram termini naturalis, quoniam in eo est quasi infinitum desiderium, et cum isto appetitu in quo est haec passio est etiam sollicitudo cogitationis continuativae circa rem amatam; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum subdit, *poi non s'adorna di riposo mai*, et istud dictum de diffinitione essentiae amoris concordat cum eo quod auctor [*medicinae*] <sup>o</sup> dicit de amore diffiniendo ipsum. Dicit enim amor est sollicitudo melanconica, similis melanconiae in qua homo iam sibi inducit incitationem cogitationis super pulchritudinem quarumdam formarum et figurarum quae insunt ei; deinde adiuvat ipsum ad illud desiderium eius, et non consequitur.<sup>27</sup> Et Aly Abbas dixit, quod amor est sollicitudo animae in illud quod amatur et cogitationis in ipsum perseverantia.<sup>28</sup>

Sed notandum gratia perfectionis intellectus eorum quae hic dicuntur de amore, quod amor accipitur duplex: uno modo communiter et large secundum quod est quaedam passio per quam inclinatur et movetur appetitus in aliquam rem quae videtur sibi bona propter complacentiam eius ratione cuiuscumque (31va) actus illius rei, et isto modo non accipitur hic. Nam isto modo amor est circa multa de quo amore non est presens intentio, et de omnibus amicis adinvicem est hoc modo amor quia amici amant se adinvicem, et tamen non amant se amore de quo est haec presens intentio. Et potest etiam esse amor in uno respectu alterius, et tamen non erit amicitia inter eos; omnis enim qui est amicus alicui amatur ab illo, sed non omnis qui amat aliquem amatur ab illo, et ideo licet omnis amicitia sit cum amore, non tamen omnis amor est cum amicitia. Sed alio modo accipitur amor specialiter proprie pro passione quadam quae iam adeo est in appetitu vehementer impressa ut difficulter removeatur ab ipso, quae passio est proprie circa actus venereos in quibus actibus est furiositas et intemperantia, cum in illos actus homo inclinatur ex appetitu naturali. Et hoc modo intelligitur hic de ista passione quae dicitur amor, quae passio propter vehementem eius impressionem

<sup>o</sup> medicinae) om.

<sup>26</sup> Arist., *Pol.*, I. iii, 1257b25.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *op. cit.* (p. 494a): "Haec aegritudo est sollicitudo melanconica similis melanconiae, in qua homo sibi iam induxit incitationem cogitationis suae super pulchritudinae quarundam formarum, et figurarum quae insunt ei. Deinde adiuvat ipsum ad illud

desiderium eius, et non consequitur."

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Haly filius Abbas, *Liber totius medicinae* . . . , Theorice IX, cap. viii (Lugduni, 1523, p. 104vb): "Amor autem est anime sollicitudo in id quod amatur et cogitationis in id ipsum perseverantia."



iam alterat corpus alteratione non naturali, unde iam quod in ipsum dicatur aegrotare eroticos,<sup>†</sup> quod et auctores medicinae qui de aegritudinibus et de eorum curis determinant, tractant de hac passione, et modum etiam curationis suae, et vocatur talis passio ereos \* ab auctoribus medicinae.

Deinde cum dicit, *move cangiando colore*, loquitur auctor de motibus ipsius amoris, id est, de diversis alterationibus quas haec passio inducit in corpus, et vult dicere quod in hac passione corpus alteratur diversis et contrariis alterationibus, quod quia non accidit in aliis passionibus animae ut in ira, in tristitia, in timore, et in similibus. Nam in amore corpus alteratur nunc ad istum colorem, nunc ad illum qui est oppositus; similiter etiam alterat nunc ad risum, nunc ad planctum; et hoc est quod vult dicere, post cum dicit, *Muove cangiando color, riso in pianto*. Similiter etiam in amore corpus nunc alteratur ad gaudium et spem, nunc ad timorem et desperationem; et hoc est quod vult dicere, cum dicit, *Et la figura con paura storna*, hoc est dicere, aliquando ponit figuram hominis similem figurae hominis gaudentis. Causa autem istarum diversarum alterationum quas amor inducit in corpus est propter diversitatem ymaginationum quae representantur sibi de re quam amat. Nunc autem representatur sibi aliquid de ipsa propter quod gaudet, laetatur et sperat, nunc vero representatur sibi aliquid propter quod timet, tristatur et desperat, et secundum hoc accidit quod in ipso diversimode movetur calor naturalis et spiritus, quia nunc movetur ad intra, nunc ad extra, nunc partim ad intra, nunc partim ad extra, secundum quod diversimode movetur in diversis passionibus animae, ex cuius motu diverso accidit diversificatio coloris corporis ita ut nunc sit unius coloris, nunc alterius, et nunc assimiletur figura eius figurae timentis, nunc gaudentis, nunc ridentis, nunc plorantis. Et ideo subdit auctor, *Poco soggiorna*, id est, parum quiescit in cogitationibus suis talis homo, quando est in cogitatione alicuius rei subito pervenit ad ipsum species rei quam desiderat et abscinditur a cogitationibus illius rei primae, et secundum diversitatem ymaginationum quas habet dare quam (31vb) desiderat movetur subito et de uno modo passionis in alium, et parum in una passione quiescit, et istud declarabit in verbo illo quod subdit, *La nuova qualita*.

Deinde cum dicit, *Ancora di lui vedrai* etc., intermisce auctor in quibus maneriebus hominum quantum ad mores civiles frequentius accidit haec passio, et vult dicere quod haec passio amoris ut plurimum reperitur in hominibus nobilibus; et appellat hic nobiles homines illos qui sunt magni et potentes, vel ex progenie eorum, vel ex divitiis multis, vel ex virtute cum in hominibus enim istis frequentius reperitur haec passio amoris, et causa huius est multiplex. Una causa est et ista videtur esse potissima inter alias, quia homines alii populares sunt plus dediti cogitationibus quae versantur circa opera civilia quae necessaria sunt in vita; nam quidam dant se uni artificio, quidam vero alteri, et ideo distrahuntur multum a tali cogitatione et sollicitudine quae est in hac passione; homines vero nobiles et potentes, quia circa talia opera artium non vacant, plus sunt apti incurrere tales cogitationes quae circa hanc passionem versantur. Secunda causa est quia licet in amore quando est mul-

<sup>†</sup> eroticos) potiot. But I know of no such word, and Rev. J. T. Muckle has kindly offered the emendation with the following explanation: "my conjecture is that potiot is a corruption of the Gk. ἐρωτικός transliterated into Latin. The e has been lost under the influence of the final e in aegrotare; the p is a wrong transliteration of the Gk. π; οτι is the same as ωτι: ot may easily be an abbreviation for oc=os in Greek, the final c being mistaken for

a t. This would make the Gk. ἐρωτικός written in abbrev. ἐρωτός." The word ἐρωτικός is used to denote an erotic pathological condition—a form of hereos; cf. J. L. Lowes, "The Lovers Malady of Hereos," in *Modern Philology*, XI, (1913-1914), pp. 518, 520.

\* ereos) creos, but cf. Lowes, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-546, where many sources are cited.

tum impressus appetitus non sit liber, imo est servus et ducitur secundum appetum huius passionis. Tamen in principio quando incipit haec passio in impetu adhuc appetitus est quasi liber ita ut possit amare et possit desistere ab amore, et ideo initium huius passionis incipit multotiens ex proposito. Nunc autem omnis homo citius proponit rem appetere quam facile potest acquirere; quod enim acquiri non potest aut cum difficultate magna acquiritur homo non sic appetit. Nunc autem homines nobiles et potentes facilius possunt acquirere rem amatam et ei coniungi quam homines populares et viles. Nam habent divitias et virtutes per quas citius hoc acquirunt quam illi qui ea non habent. Tertia causa est quia amor tunc magis perficitur et imprimitur in amante quando cognoscit quod redamatur a re amata. Nunc autem facilius movetur animus rei amatae ad readmandum aliquem nobilem quam aliquem vilem, quoniam in nobili sunt gestus et mores primi placibiliores ex quibus movetur quis ad amandam aliquem quam sint in aliis, et propterea optime dixit iste quod haec passio plus invenitur in istis quam in aliis. (5) (10) (15)

Deinde cum dicit, *La nuova qualita muove sospiri* etc., declarat auctor illud quod prius dixit in verbo illo, *Poco soggiorna*. Vult enim ostendere quae est causa quare homo in quo est haec passio parum quiescit in aliqua passione, puta vel in gaudio, vel in tristitia, vel in timore; et parum etiam quiescit in aliqua cogitatione diversa a cogitatione rei quae amatur, et cum hoc etiam ostendit causam cuiusdam accidentis quod saepe accidit in hac passione, quod accidens est suspirium, nam amantes multotiens suspirant. Et vult dicere quod quando in amante renovatur in apprehensione sua species rei amatae quae conservatur in memoria, tunc ista species, renovata in apprehensione, movet ipsum ad suspiria sicut videmus ad sensum, quod quando amans aliquid agit vel cogitat, et subito ad eum perveniat cogitatio rei amatae, tunc suspiria emittit, et propterea quia in tali subita renovatione apprehensionis generatur quaedam angustia circa cor propter diversum motum subitum qui accidit in calore et spiritu eius, qui quidem (32ra) motus diversus est causa suspiriorum; et istud vult dicere cum dicit, *La nuova qualita muove sospiri*. Et haec est causa quia talis homo non potest firmiter circa res alias cogitare, nec etiam aliquid aliud potest firmiter ymaginari, quia cum homo qui est in perfecto amore est in cogitatione alterius rei, subito quasi venit sibi in apprehensione species rei quam diligit; et hoc accidit quia species rei quam amat in memoria eius, licet sit in potentia, quando de ea non cogitat, tamen est in potentia multum propinqua actui. Unde ex modica alteratione accidit quod talis species fiat in actu et tunc circa ipsam cogitat, et ideo disrumpitur et abscinditur species prima et apprehensio prima; et hoc est quod vult dicere iste cum dicit, *et vuol ch'uom miri non fermato loco*, id est, et facit haec passio ut homo non firmiter possit cogitare in aliquo. *Destando si ella*, id est, excitata species rei<sup>h</sup> quae amatur quae erat conservata in memoria. *La qual manda fuoco*, id est, quae species facit inflammationem, id est, motum inflammativum spiritu et calido naturali; tamen ex motu isto provenit motus, ad virtutem cogitativam, propter quod cogitur necessario homo cogitare circa ipsam; et ideo subdit *ymaginar non puote huom che nol pruova*, aliter, *che il pruova*, et melius. Et ideo homo qui habet experientiam talis passionis non potest aliquid firmiter ymaginari quod sit aliud ab ymagine rei quae amatur; et quia non potest firmiter aliquid aliud ymaginari, ideo nec potest circa aliam rem cogitare cum virtus ymaginativa deserviat cogitativae repre- (20) (25) (30) (35) (40) (45)

<sup>h</sup> rei) re.

sentando sibi ymaginationem rei circa quam virtus cogitativa cogitat et iudicat.

Deinde cum dicit, *et non si muova perche allui si tiri*, intermiscet auctor quoddam verbum in quo vult quasi tibi consulere circa hanc passionem amoris, et vult dicere quod aliquis non moveatur ad adhaerendum isti passioni quae est amor, quoniam amor, cum est bene inpressus et est in suo fervore animus amantis, in totum est factus servilis, ita quod quasi nulla libertas ei remanet. Et ideo dicit quod nullus adhaereat ei quia credat in tali passione solatium vel gaudium invenire, quoniam, ut dictum est prius,<sup>29</sup> in tali aliquando accidit multa angustia et multa tristitia et multus timor; et hoc intendit cum subdit, *et non sigiri pertrovvarvi gioco*. Neque etiam aliquis adhaereat ei quia credat in ipso invenire sapientiam multam vel paucam, quia in ipso nulla est sapientia, neque discretio, imo potius, quasi ultio, ille qui amat, cum bene est in fervore ipsius, devenit in fatuitatem et insipientiam, et ideo dictum est supra auctoritate auctoris<sup>30</sup> quod haec passio est sollicitudo melanconica similis melancoliae; et hoc intendit cum subdit, *ne certamente gran saver ne poco*, et in hoc vult etiam auctor dicere quod nulla astutia atque prudentia valet quando animus est vehementer passionatus hac passione quoniam in totum quasi libertatem perdit, et fit servilis in cogitationibus in quibus cogitur de re amata. Et ideo optime consulit iste quod nullus debet moveri ad hoc ut isti passioni adhaereat, ut in ipsa nulla sit utilitas neque solatii neque sapientiae et virtutis, gratia enim istorum duorum maxime moventur homines ad aliquid operandum, et ideo merito istis duobus eos ostendit privari passione amoris.

V

(32rb) *Di simil tragge* etc. In isto versu vel stantia tractat auctor de aliis ultimis que proponit dicere de amore. Et primo ostendit unde causatur complacentia ex qua aliquis movetur ad amandum. Secundo ostendit utrum amor sit res apprehensa per visum an non; secunda ibi, *Et non si puo cognoscer per lo viso*. Prima pars dividitur in duo, quia primo facit quod dictum est, secundo, intermiscet quamdam aliam proprietatem de qua non dixerat quae consequitur hanc passionem; secunda ibi, *Certo non puo covert ostare*.

In prima parte vult dicere quod species rei visibilis, ex cuius comprehensione in appetitu alicuius causatur amor, comprehenditur sub similis et convenientis et proportionalis, et talis comprehensio sic facta sub ratione similis et convenientis est quae facit rem quae comprehenditur esse placibilem alicui, et ex hoc in appetitu illius causatur amor illius rei; nichil enim displicet alicui, nisi in quantum comprehenditur sub ratione dissimilitudinis et disconvenientiae. Ex hoc enim movetur quis ad odium alicuius rei, sicut propter similitudinem et convenientiam movetur ad amorem illius. Causatur ergo complacentia propter quam movetur aliquis ad amandum rem aliquam quia res ista comprehenditur sub ratione similis et convenientis; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, *Di simil tragge complexion lo sguardo, che fa parere lo piacere*. Et signanter dixit auctor *che fa parere*, quia illud licet videatur illi qui amat esse placibile et propter hoc amandum, tamen secundum rei veritatem et secundum iudicium regulatum a ratione non est ita, sicut multotiens alicui videtur aliquid esse bonum, non tamen simpliciter in rei veritate est bonum.

Deinde cum dicit *certo non puo covert stare* etc., intermiscet quamdam aliam proprietatem quae est in hac passione et reddit etiam causam eius. Et vult dicere quod amans qui habet amorem in suo fervore non potest celare pas-

<sup>29</sup> Cf. p. 170.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. note 24.

sionem suam, quoniam talis homo non potest desistere quin loquatur de ipso, et quin etiam loquatur de re quam amat, et quin etiam faciat gestus et mores hominis amantis; et hoc intendit primo cum dicit, *Certo non puo coverto stare, quando e si giunto*, id est, quando est ita vehementer impressus. Quae autem sit causa quare iste, in quo est haec passio, ipsam non potest bene celare, auctor subdit, cum dicit, *non gia selvaggi la belia suo dardo*, quasi dicat *la belia*, id est, res, quae videtur alicui pulchra propter quam pulchritudinem quae sic sibi apparet esse movetur ad amandum ipsam, non habet dardum silvestrem, id est, pigrum et debilem. Appellat autem iste auctor dardum talis rei quae hanc passionem facit stimulum eius in movendo animum amantis. Nam res amata inprimens hanc passionem adeo stimulat animum, ut propter stimulum eius cogatur ad loquendum et ad faciendum gestus propter quos non bene talis suam passionem celare potest, imo adeo aliquando stimulat animum quod in loquendo et in monstrando suam passionem nichil timet; et dato quod aliquando incurrat magnum periculum, secundum quod ad sensum multotiens videmus, quod talis homo, loquendo de amore talis dominae vel talis, interficitur ab aliis, et tamen talis in quo adeo animus stimulatur nichil de tali periculo et timore considerat ut sibi praevideat. Et hoc est quod vult dicere iste auctor cum subdit, *che tal volere per temere e sperto*, id est, talis appetitus est probatus in experientia per timorem quia, scilicet, ut dictum est, non considerat timorem periculi qui sibi potest imminere, imo celando passionem suam. Et causam istius, auctor subdit cum dicit *consegue merto spirito ch'e punto*, id est, et merito hoc consequitur, scilicet, quod amans non potest celare passionem suam, et quod etiam non curat de timore periculi quod sibi supervenire potest, quoniam spiritus qui est organus animae preventus, id est, commotus a specie rei amata ymaginata et apprehensa, necessario est causa ut homo moveat linguam, et loquatur, et gestus etiam faciat in quibus manifestet passionem quae causatur ex ipso ex qua amat, quoniam declaratum est in scientia naturali quod motus causatur in nobis ex alteratione facta in spiritu a speciebus ymaginatis et fortiter apprehensis.

Deinde cum dicit, *Et non si puo cognoscer per lo viso*, loquitur auctor de ultimo verbo quod proponit dicere de amore; vult enim ostendere utrum amor possit per visum cognosci et comprehendi. Et haec pars dividitur in duo, quia primo manifestat hoc, secundo intermiscet quamdam aliam proprietatem de qua nondum dixit, quae consequitur hanc passionem; secunda ibi, *Fuor d'ogni fraude*. In prima parte vult dicere quod amor non est res quae possit cognosci per visum quemadmodum cognoscitur color albus, vel alius color; nam circa tale objectum cadit potentia visiva, scilicet, circa colorem. Nunc autem amor est circa accidens aliud quam sit color; et ideo non est res apprehensa per visum. Et hoc vult dicere cum dicit, *Et non si puo cognoscer per lo viso, compreso bianco in tale obiecto cade*, et istud verbum probat quod amor non possit comprehendi per visum, prout amor est passio in amante. Sed cum subdit, *et chi bene aude forma non si vede*, vult ostendere et probare quod amor non possit comprehendi per visum ratione rei amatae, quia per visum non potest cognosci quod illa est res amata; nam forte alicui videretur, quod amor solum esset res quae haberet pulchritudinem coloris et figurae et talium quae comprehenduntur per visum. Modo auctor vult ostendere hoc non esse verum, et ideo dicit, *Et chi bene aude*, id est, et quicumque bene intelligit, et cognoscit *forma*, scilicet, talis qualis est amor, non videtur, scilicet, ratione rei amatae; quoniam vult totus amor procedat a re quae est extra colorem, scilicet, pulchrum, et quae est divisa et abscisa ab omni pulchritu-

dine, et est res obscura secundum medium, id est, est res turpis secundum aliquam partem sui et aliquando ex toto est auferre omnem lucem, id est, extra omnem pulchritudinem. Videmus ad sensum multotiens quod aliqua res amatur ab aliquo in qua secundum rei veritatem, nulla est decorositas, neque pulchritudo, licet ita videatur illi qui diligit, propter quod per visum non potest discerni amor, respectu rei circa quam versatur amor, ita ut dicamus quod circa illam rem versetur amor quae habet pulchritudinem quoniam multotiens versatur circa rem contrariam rei pulchrae; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, *per che li mena che da lui procede, et fuori di colore esser diviso, absciso mezo obscuro, luce raude.* (5) (10)

Deinde cum dicit, *Fuor d'ogni fraude dice* etc., intermiscet quandam (32vb) aliam proprietatem quae est in hac passione de qua non dixerat, et vult quod, quando amor est perfecte in aliquo, est extra omnem fraudem ad rem amatam quia est cum perfecta fidelitate absque fraude in omnibus quibus credit et potest complacere rei amatae; quoniam quando ille qui diligit habet appetitum defraudendi rem amatam, tunc non est amor in ipso perfectus. Et propterea nos videmus quod illi in quibus est amor valde incensus, dato quod coniungantur rei amatae, tamen si crederent displicere rei amatae, non attentarent coniungi rei amatae, neque attentarent violentiam aliquam sibi ingerere; et hoc intendit primo cum dicit, *fuor dogni fraude che dice degna in fede.* (15) (20)

Deinde postea cum subdit, *Che sola di costui nascie merzede*, vult auctor reddere causam predictorum, scilicet, quare est quod amans omnem fidelitatem gerit circa rem amatam, et nullam habet fraudem circa ipsam, quoniam ex ipsa passione sola inter alias passiones animae oritur misericordia, scilicet, respectu rei amatae, quoniam amans qui est vehementer afflictus ista passione semper est in appetitu et in affectione ut res amata misericordiam habeat erga ipsum. Secundum enim quod apparet per Aristotalem secundo *Rethoricae*,<sup>31</sup> misericordia est tristari et compati de malo alterius, quoniam illud malum habet ille indigne. Nunc autem dictum est prius<sup>32</sup> quod in hac passione amoris est multa tristitia et multa angustia quae angustia et tristitia oriuntur ex hoc quod amans non coniungitur rei amatae; et ideo amans appetit ut res amata misereatur ei ut, scilicet, compatiatur ei de tristitia et angustia quam habet ex ipsa, et quod res amata cogitet quod illud habet indigne. Nam ex hoc accidit quod res amata facilius inclinatur et movetur ad hoc ut obediat appetitui amantis; et hoc est quod vult dicere iste cum dicit, *che solo da costui nascie merzede.* Quia igitur amans semper appetit ut res amata misereatur ei, hinc est quod nullam fraudem vult gerere circa rem amatam, sed habet fidelitatem totam circa ipsam. Timet enim ne misericordiam haberet a re amata, et optime dixit auctor, *Che solo da costui nascie merzede.* (25) (30) (35) (40)

### RITORNELLA

*Tu poi* etc. In isto versu vel stantia, quae potius dicitur ritornellus, auctor in ponendo finem dictis ostendit sufficientiam eorum quae dixit, et quia manifestum est quod dicit, exponere non curemus.

<sup>31</sup> Arist., *Rhet.*, II, viii, 1385b10:

<sup>32</sup> Cf. p. 170.

# Historical Analysis of the Commentary

## I

P. 160, ll. 3-10:

Division of the poem: This poem, which considers the passion of love, is divided into three parts. In the first part the poet states what he is going to say about love; he raises the problems about his subject which he is going to attempt to answer. In this part, which is the first stanza, Guido does three things: First he shows his general intention. Secondly, he states what kind of person the reader of this poem should be; in other words, he states what kind of audience he is addressing, beginning with *et la presente* (1.5). Thirdly, he states in particular what he intends to say about love; he posits the problems he is going to consider, beginning with *che senza naturale* (1.8). Having thus stated what he is going to do, Guido in the second part of the poem, from the second through the fifth stanza, undertakes to accomplish these things. Finally by way of conclusion in the *ritornella* Guido shows the sufficiency of what he has said.

P. 160, ll. 11-13:

Since our author is going to write about love, he sets forth first the reason why he is writing about this subject. He is writing about love because a woman or lady has asked him about it.

Having divided the poem into its parts, Dino can now begin his analysis. Thus, beginning here with the introductory stanza, he considers Guido's general intention in writing this poem, which is contained in the first four lines of the poem. Here Dino finds that Guido is laying down the causes which have led him to write about love. And in good scholastic fashion he lays down all four causes. For as Aristotle shows in his *Metaphysics* V. ii, 1013 b 16-26 and *Physics* II. iii, 194 b 16 sq., there are four main ways by which a thing is dependent upon another for its being. The first is as a thing is dependent upon its matter: for instance, as a bronze statue is dependent upon its bronze for being what it is, natural bodies upon the elements, earth, air, fire and water, a syllogism upon its terms, or the whole upon its parts. This dependence is that of material causality. But among those things on which a thing depends for being what it is there must be, besides the matter, something to actualize that matter, and this is the form. Thus, in the case of the whole and its parts, it is the order of the whole that determines the parts; it is the army that makes men to be soldiers or the city that makes men citizens; or in works of art it is the form, for instance, that is put upon the bronze that makes it a bronze statue; or in natural things it is rational animality, for instance, that makes man to be man. And this dependence is that of formal causality, the intrinsic active principle of the thing whereby it is what it is, whereas the material cause is the intrinsic passive principle out of which the thing is made. But besides these intrinsic causes there are also external dependencies. There is the dependence of a thing upon that by whose operation it has come into being, as a son depends on his father or the statue on the sculptor for its existence. Such a dependence is that of efficient causality. And finally there is the dependence of a thing upon its end, that for the sake of which it exists, as beatitude in the case of man. Such is final causality.

Consequently, in these lines of his commentary Dino is determining the efficient cause of Guido's writing about love. In this case it is some woman or lady, for as Guido says in the very first line, *Donna mi priega*. Thus, it is due to a lady asking him about love that Guido has written this poem.

For the distinction Dino makes between "lady" (*domina*) and "woman" (*mulier*), *vide infra*, p. 177 sq.

P. 160, ll. 13-19:

There are two reasons why Guido should say that a woman or lady has led him to write about love. In the first place this love of which he writes usually has a woman for its object, although at times it may concern another man. Such love, however, is rare since it is a bestial love and against nature; consequently, Guido considers here only that love for woman. Secondly, he may attribute his writing this poem to a lady because he is in love with some lady, and consequently, in order to praise her he says he has written this poem because of her.

Such a love as is considered in this poem is bestial and contrary to nature when it is between men because, as St. Thomas says, (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II. 154,1,c.) it frustrates the end of the venereal act, which is the begetting of children. Consequently, being contrary to the nature of man, such a love is much rarer than that which man has for woman. Therefore, Guido in writing about excessive concupiscent love posits it as concerning a woman, although it might be that his analysis would apply also to love between men.

But Guido may also attribute his writing to a lady because, being in love with her, he would in this way praise her. For it would be praise for her in that the whole poem would then be written for her sake at her own instigation, and thus what beauties the poem has would be due to her.

P. 160, ll. 19-35:

But although it may be the woman he is in love with who has caused him to write this poem, nevertheless he does not say that she *commanded* him to write. Instead, he says she *asked* him. By this he would show that what he says here is not said as if in the passion of love. For he who is impassioned with love thinks he must do whatever his beloved wishes, so that whatever she says is to him as the command of a master to a servant. But whatever Guido says in this poem is said in a scientific and veridical manner from the precepts of natural and moral philosophy. And he who speaks this way with knowledge assumes the place of master, while the one receiving what is said, being in ignorance and desiring to learn, assumes the place of student. Therefore, just as the master has a higher place than the student, so in this matter Guido would show that he is the master and the lady the student. Consequently, the lady addressing him *asks* rather than *commands* him to speak of love, for one can only fittingly address a master with requests and not commands. Thus, Guido, since he is going to speak like a master on this question of love, writes *Donna mi priega* and not *Donna mi commanda*.

Here by an acute analysis of the significance of *priega* Dino shows how Guido has determined the formal cause of the poem. For since he writes that the lady *asks* him rather than *commands* him to speak about love, he shows that he is going to have the place of a master in this poem rather than that of a lover, subject to every whim of his lady. Therefore, the form of the poem is the scientific expression of a master, albeit in verse, rather than the lyrical expression of a lover, and thus at the very start Guido forestalls those who will criticize his poem for not being what it was never meant to be, namely a passionate account of love.

Since then Guido is speaking as a master in this poem, he will treat his subject in a scientific and veridical manner from the principles of natural and moral science. As science is the knowledge of things through their causes, he will attempt to give a causal analysis of love, and since science aims at the truth, he will attempt to ascertain the truth about love. Hence he speaks in a veridical manner rather than a rhetorical one, for instance, which he might use were he trying to persuade his lady of his love. Furthermore, since love is a passion of the soul (*vide infra*, p. 186 sq.), he will use the principles of natural and moral science for his analysis. He will use natural science or physics because love properly concerns only those beings which have their own principle of change, and such beings are the object of natural science. For as St. Thomas says (in *Phys.* I. lect. 1, n. 4, t. 2, p. 4), "Naturalis enim philosophia de naturalibus est; naturalia autem sunt quorum principium est natura; natura autem est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est; de his igitur, quae habent in se principium motus, est scientia naturalis." But of all the natural sciences Guido will principally use psychology, for since love properly happens only to living creatures, he will make most use of that science which considers animated natures, and this is psychology; (cf. St. Thomas, *loc.cit.*). Finally since love most properly concerns man alone, among the creatures in this earthly realm, Guido will make use of moral science or ethics, which considers human operation as ordered to an end, as St. Thomas says *In ethic.*, I. lect. 1, n. 2-3. Consequently, for his analysis Guido will primarily use the *De Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, for these two works are the principal authorities for these sciences he is going to use in his analysis of the nature of love. But for a general discussion of the classification of the sciences in the Middle Ages, cf. J. Mariétan, *Problème de la classification des sciences d'Aristote à St. Thomas*, Paris, Alcan, 1901.

P. 160, l. 35-p. 161, l. 9:

Furthermore, it is significant that Guido says that a lady (*Donna*) asked him. For by this he would show that hers is a just petition which he must satisfy insofar as he is able. But a petition is just when the one making it knows what he asks and is a worthy person. This word *donna*, however, satisfies both of these conditions. For this word is said of a woman only when she has a complete knowledge; it is not, for instance, used of a girl who has not yet rounded out her years of experience. In the second place this word is used only of women of worth, for it is said of women of character (*honestae*); and never, for instance, of a harlot. In fact for the most part this word is used of women of noble birth who have worth from their character and birth.

Here, then, Dino shows by analysing the significance of *donna* that the final cause of this poem is that of satisfying a worthy person, since *donna* implies that the petition that is made of him is a just one which he must satisfy insofar as he is able. For since he addresses her as *donna*, Guido shows that a person of knowledge and worth is asking him about love, so that it is incumbent upon him to answer her. For, as Dino says, this word is used only of women who have worth or dignity because of their character (*honestas*) and birth, for as Cicero says (*Att.* 7,11,1), "Ubi est autem dignitas, nisi ubi honestas." But in the *De Officiis*, I, iv, 14, Cicero describes more fully what this is: "Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc animal sentit quid sit ordo, quid sit quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae ad aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit: quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat



cavetque ne quid indecore effeminative faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis, ne quid lubricitudo aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum." Thus, *honestas* is seen to be spiritual beauty, which, I take it, we refer to most frequently today as "character." At any rate it is from this and the fact of noble birth that a woman acquires the dignity whereby she may merit the name of *donna*. And here it is well to recall that this position of the *Donna* is a common element in the poetry of the *dolce stil nuovo* and goes directly back to the Provençal troubadours; cf. R. Renier, *Il tipo estetico della donna del Medioevo*, Ancona, 1885.

P. 161, ll. 10-13:

Then, beginning in line 2, *d'uno accidente*, etc., Guido says four things concerning this passion which he intends to consider. First he says it is an accident, secondly that it is a fierce accident, thirdly that it is a high or great accident, and finally that it is called love.

Here, then, Guido begins his determination of the material cause of the poem; he determines what the subject matter of his poem is.

P. 161, ll. 13-20:

He calls this passion an accident first because it is not a substance subsisting by itself but adheres in another as in a subject, namely as an appetite of the soul such as the other passions of the soul, as anger, sadness, fear and the like. Secondly, it is called an accident because it can come and go like other accidents. And thirdly it is an accident because it is extrinsic to the nature of the thing. But although there may be some who have an intrinsic disposition whereby they readily incur this passion, as is afterwards declared, nevertheless as an accident it is principally extrinsic.

Dino gives three reasons in order to explain how love is an accident. In the first place love is an accident because it is not a substance. A substance, as Dino says, is that which subsists by itself (*per se stans*); it does not exist as in another. For as Aristotle says, (*Cat.*, v, 2a34-2b6) everything else but first substance is either affirmed of first substance or present in such as its subject. This is evident from particular examples. We predicate "animal" of "man," so we predicate also "animal" of any particular man. Were there no individuals existing of whom it could thus be affirmed, it could not be affirmed of the species (the second substance). Color again is *in* body, and so also in this or that body. For were there no bodies existing wherein it could also exist, it could not be in body at all. Therefore, all things whatsoever, save what we call primary substances, are predicates of primary substances or present in such as their subjects. They underlie all other things (*Cat.* v, 2b15) and as such are the ultimate subjects. And that which adheres in another as in a subject, namely in the substance, is an accident, (cf. *Phys.* I. iii, 186a34). Consequently, since love inheres in another and does not stand by itself as a subject, love is an accident. Love is never found as existing by itself, but is always found in some person who *happens* (*accidit*) to be in love. It is something which happens to a person just as the other passions of the soul, anger, sadness, fear and the like. But for love as a passion of the soul, *vide infra*, p. 186-187.

But, in the second place, as an accident, love is like certain others in that it can come and go. For an accident, as Aristotle says (*Top.* I, v, 102b6-9), may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as the sitting-posture may belong or not belong to the same thing, or likewise whiteness, for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white and at another

not white. However, in this ability to come and go love is characterized as a separable, as opposed to an inseparable accident, such as masculinity, which is inseparable from him who has it.

Thirdly, love is an accident in that it is something that is extrinsic to the nature of the thing having it. Although it is true that some may have an intrinsic disposition whereby they incur this passion more easily than others (*vide infra* p. 189) nevertheless it remains that love is principally a thing coming from the outside. It is *principaliter* an extrinsic thing inasmuch as it has its beginning (*principium*) in an extrinsic form, but *vide infra*, p. 193. But in this love is distinguished as an extrinsic accident from those which follow from the very nature of the thing in which they inhere, such as the proper properties of a thing, which although they do not indicate the essence of a thing, they still belong to that thing alone, (*Top.*, i, v, 102a18), such as risibility in man.

Thus, Dino in commenting upon Guido's saying love is an accident has shown (1) that it is an accident as opposed to a substance, (2) that it is a separable accident and (3) that it is an extrinsic accident.

P. 161, ll. 20-22:

Guido says this passion is a fierce accident because of the intemperance there is in this passion.

*Vide infra* p. IV

P. 161, ll. 22-24:

And he calls love a great accident by reason of the effects it produces in the body, for it causes greater changes than other passions, as is declared in the course of the poem.

*Vide infra*, p. IV. But it should be noted here that Dino is translating *altero* by *great*. Cf. p. 11: "altum, id est, magnum," for he takes it as referring to the effects of love such as are described in the fourth stanza.

P. 161, ll. 25-27:

Finally Guido says this accident is called love. But no reason can be given why this passion should be called by this name rather than any other. There is no necessary relation between the essence of a thing and its name, for as Aristotle says, names are imposed on things by convention.

No reason can be given why this passion should be called love rather than something else because there is no necessary relation between the essence of a thing and its name, such that knowledge of the essence would yield knowledge of the name. For as Aristotle says in his *De Interpretatione*, I, ii, 16a27-30, a word signifies something by convention. Thus no sound is a word by nature but it becomes one by becoming significant, that is by being taken by man to stand for and to refer to something else. Some sounds may signify something naturally, such as a groan or a laugh, but such sounds are not words or names. Cf. St. Thomas, *In Perih.* 1, lect. 2, n. 8, v. 1, p. 13. Consequently, since the word *love* signifies this passion of which we speak by the agreement of man, there is nothing in the nature of this sound by which it should signify what it does. Therefore, no reason can be given for this signification except the agreement of man that such a sound shall stand for such a passion, and what is thus established by convention can only be known by discovering that convention.

P. 161, ll. 28-30:

Then in line 4 Guido adds what amounts to this: we must speak of this accident in order that whoever should deny it, through ignorance of its nature, may now be able to know the truth about it and come to believe that it is something.

Although with the discussion of accident all four of the causes have been given, Dino takes this line in the sense of a further final cause. Thus, besides satisfying the request of a worthy person, he will also answer those who have denied love (*si chi lo nega*, etc.). For if any deny love, through ignorance of its nature, he can learn the truth about it from this poem and come to know what it is.

Therefore summing up all the causes of this poem, we can say that because a lady has asked him, Guido, speaking as a master from the principles of natural and moral philosophy, is making this poem on the passion of love in order to satisfy a lady's request as well as to persuade those, who deny it, of its nature.

P. 161, ll. 31-40:

In lines 5-9 Guido states what kind of audience he is addressing in this poem. Thus he says that in this matter he wants a knowing man (*al presente conoscente chero*), that is, an intelligent man, one with a refined and trained intellect (*subtilis intellectus*). For there is no hope that those of unrefined and untrained intellects, those *di basso core*, could understand what is in this poem. For such would be without knowledge of natural demonstration (*senza natural dimostramento*) on which this poem is based inasmuch as what is said here is drawn from the principles of natural science, as well as from those of moral science and astrology. Consequently, if the poem is going to demand some acquaintance with psychology, ethics and astrology, it is necessary that the reader be *conoscente*.

Here we see the demand, which runs through the whole of the *dolce stil nuovo*, for *il cor gentile*. Love and the service of love in poetry is only for those of nobility of heart and intellect, and not for those of *basso core*, who are unable to understand it. Cf. the canzone of Guido Guinizelli, *Al cor gentil, repara sempre Amore*, in L. di Benedetto, *Rimatori del Dolce Stil Novo*, Torino, 1925, pp. 3-6.

But in this poem Dino claims Guido has even more reason than usual to ask for a man who is *conoscente*. For as we have already seen (cf. p. 177), Guido is going to use natural and moral science for his analysis of love. But here Dino also adds the science of Astrology, which is used to account for those who are so disposed to readily incur this passion of love, but for this *vide infra*, p. 189 sq.

P. 161, l. 41-p. 162, l. 4:

Finally, in lines 10-14, Guido begins stating in particular what he is going to show about love. He is going to try to prove (1) *la dove posa*, i.e. where love has its being as in a subject; (2) *chi lo fa creare*, what, namely, creates or generates it in that subject; (3) *et quale e sua vertu*, whether it is a virtue in the sense of a power or faculty of the soul or an intellectual or moral virtue; or whether it is not a virtue but proceeds from one; (4) *et sua potentia*, what, namely, it is capable of producing in the body — i.e. its effects; (5) *l'essentia*, what love is, namely, its quiddity or nature; (6) *poi ciascuno suo movimento*, that is the motions of love, namely, the alterations which love causes; (7) *et il piacimento che'l fa dire amare*, what causes the pleasingness (*complacentia*) which is the cause of love such that man speaks of it; and finally (8) *et s'uomo per vedere il puo mostrare*, whether love can show itself visibly or not.

Such is the list of problems as Guido wrote them and as Dino del Garbo interprets them, and as such it is principally the same as the list of questions that Guido Orlandi addressed to Cavalcanti, as we have already seen in the Introduction

(p. 151). There was no need for Dino to go into greater detail here as to what the problems are. As Guido answers them, Dino comments sufficiently on the answers to fully explicate the problems, and we shall follow his lead here in putting off a detailed consideration of them until their solution arises. However, Dino might have considered why these and no other questions were asked. Likewise, he might have attempted to determine why they are asked in this order, whether, namely, there is not some principle of order behind them. Furthermore, he does not ascertain whether these questions are mutually exclusive; it appears at first glance, for instance, that question 4 and 6 are pretty much the same, for to determine love's effects would be to account for the alterations love causes. All of these would appear to be proper questions for a commentator to consider. However, it may be that Dino felt there was no need to consider in particular the nature of these questions inasmuch as they are the conventional questions which the poets asked about love rather than the proper questions a scientist would ask in investigating the nature of a passion of the sensitive soul. A sign that this is so is evident in Guido's managing to answer those questions which Guido Ordlandi had addressed to him, who was addressing him not as a scientist but as a poet.

For a consideration of the love-questions the poets considered cf. S. Santangelo, *Le tenzone poetiche nella letteratura delle origine*, Geneva, 1928.

## II

P. 162, ll. 5-9:

Division of the stanza: here, Guido begins to consider those things which he has proposed to say about love. In this stanza he answers the first two questions he has asked, namely (1) *la dove posa*, i.e. the subject in which love is, and (2) *chi lo fa creare*, i.e. the principle or cause generating love, which he begins in line 18, with *La qual da marie viene*.

P. 162, ll. 9-14:

In answer to the first question, then, Guido means to say that love has its being (*esse*) in the memory because the impressed species of the thing, which causes love, is conserved and retained there, in the memory, just as light, proceeding from a luminous body, is received and retained in the diaphanous (*diaphanum*), which was obscure because deprived of the light which illuminates it.

But here it is evident that Dino is not beginning his commentary upon the very first line of this stanza. For Guido says that love takes its state in that part where the memory is ("in quella parte dove sta memoria prende suo stato"), and such would appear to be the answer to the question as to where love is located. However, inasmuch as Guido immediately makes an analogy which shows how love is in the memory, this answer is not without its qualifications; it is not the complete answer. Therefore, Dino in commenting upon this passage first considers the analogy before undertaking to say why and how love is in the memory. Since love is in the memory, and since these conditions are implied in the analogy, Dino begins by expanding and interpreting this analogy. The analogy Guido makes, then, shows from the activity of light on the diaphanous how love is in the memory; thus, he says that love takes its state in that part where the memory is, so formed as the diaphanous of light from an obscurity, ("si formato come dyaphano da lume d'una obscuritate"), which is the analogy Dino has here expanded. As stated strictly, Dino's expansion of it would read that the impressed species of the thing causing love is to the memory as the light from a luminous body is to the diaphanous.

However, before we go on to see what sense this makes, it should be noted that Dino is reading these three lines of Guido so as to take *stato* as the antecedent of *si*

*formato*. Thus he understands Guido to be saying that love's state in the memory is formed as a diaphan is formed by light; love is acting upon the memory whereas the diaphan is acted upon by the light according to Guido's statement. Consequently, our analogy is that love is to the memory as light is to the diaphan, where the difficulty of expression lies in Guido's expressing the one side of the analogy as active and the other as passive, with the result that the subject of *si formato* appears to be love, whereas, according to Dino, it actually is *stato*.

P. 162, ll. 14-20:

It is declared in natural science that light is the act of a diaphanous body. Therefore, the diaphanous (*dyaphanum*) is that which of itself does not have light and yet which is apt to receive and retain the light which comes to it from a luminous body; as is apparent from the case of air, which is a diaphanous body that does not of itself have light. Consequently, it is called an obscure body and yet is one that is apt to receive light from a luminous body, such as the sun.

From this it appears that we are to seek an understanding of our analogy in a certain doctrine of light, wherein the *diaphanum* supplies a certain function. And this doctrine is the one elaborated by Aristotle in his *De Anima* (II, vii) to account for the sense of sight, which, in turn, was promulgated and developed by the mediaeval commentators. Therefore, let us turn to Aristotle and his mediaeval commentators to see what the position of the *diaphanum* is in this doctrine, for in locating its place and function we shall have occasion to determine the meaning of the other terms which are necessary for the explication of our analogy.

In order to account for the sense of sight, we have to consider, according to Aristotle, three different terms. For besides the power of sight and its proper object, we must also consider the medium of sight. Now, the object of sight is color, as Aristotle says (*De Anima*, II, vii, 418a29), but this object is not apprehended by the sight except through some medium. That a medium is necessary is evident from the fact that if one should place a colored object upon the eye, one cannot see it, (*ibid.*, 419a13-15). But this medium through which the visible object is rendered present to the power of sight is the *diaphanum* or transparency. Thus, it is the action of color upon the diaphanum which, in turn, acts upon the eye which results in the object being seen (*ibid.*, 419a18-21).

What, then, is the nature of this diaphanum? As its name shows, it is a transparency, and, thus, such things as air and water are diaphanous. However, they are not the diaphanous itself; for if air according to its nature was the diaphanous, then water could not be, since it does not have the nature of air. Therefore, the diaphanum must be some one nature which is common to air and water and all other transparent things, (*ibid.*, 418b4-9). Furthermore, this diaphanum is something, as Dino says, which of itself does not have light and yet which is apt to receive and retain the light from a luminous body. For that it does not of itself have light is evident from the fact that diaphanous things are sometimes in darkness, as in the case of air at night, and consequently, it can be called an obscure body, as Dino says. Yet, as apt to receive light, it is in potency in its darkness, and it is actualized when it is illuminated by some luminous body, such as fire or the sun, (418b10-13). And then it is light, for as Aristotle says, light is the act of the diaphanum *qua* diaphanum (418b9). Thus, in daytime the air as diaphanous is actualized *as* diaphanous, not as air, and there is light, and in this light the visible object is rendered present to the sense of sight. For color, as the visible object, is that which moves the diaphanum in act, which movement as communicated to the eye causes the act of seeing. Whence nothing is visible without the actualized dia-

phanum, for nothing is visible without light, but, as actualized, the diaphanum is light.

P. 162, ll. 20-23:

Light is received in the air intentionally, just as the *species* of colored things is received by us in seeing, and not the material thing itself. For, as Aristotle says, the *species* of the stone, and not the stone itself, is in the soul.

Having seen *that* there must be a medium for sight, as well as something of *what* it is, we now turn to the question of *why* there must be a diaphanum. In so doing, we shall be considering the operation of the diaphanum and, thus, be drawing closer to the basis on which our analogy is founded. We have seen that a medium is necessary in the case of sight from the fact that if one should place a colored object upon the eye, one cannot see that object. The reason for this is that sight is not an act performed according to material principles, such as the sense of touch is. But sight is a formal and spiritual act whereby the form only of the thing is grasped, and not the form in its matter. Consequently, a medium is necessary between the object and the eye where that object may attain the proper spirituality to be grasped by the eye; cf. St. Albert, *In II de anima*, Tr. III, cap. xiv, vol. 5, p. 258b: "si quis ponat quod coloratum est super oculum, non videbit ipsum: et hujus causa est, quia coloratum secundum tactum non agit in aliquid nisi actione physica, quae est per principia materialia ipsius: color autem non fit in visu per actionem physicam, sed per actionem formalem et spirituales . . . et ideo indiget corpore in quo prius efficiatur spiritualis antequam in oculo generetur: et haec est necessitas quare oportet medium esse in sensu visus." Rendered thus spiritual, by being abstracted from its matter, the thing, now as a form only, is called the *species* or *intentio* of the thing, which when impressed upon the sense of sight produces the vision of the thing seen. It is the form or species of the thing and not the thing itself that is in the eye; for as Aristotle says, it is not the stone, but the species of the stone which is in the soul (*op. cit.* III, viii, 432a1). For in looking at a stone, my eye does not become petrified. Furthermore, if one should argue that it is not the stone anyway, but the color of the stone that is the object of sight, still it would not be true that the color is in the eye in the same way it is in the stone; for in that case the eye would become colored as its object is, which is not so. Therefore, it is necessary to conclude that the object as it exists in its own right as a thing enjoys a different sort of existence than that which it has purely as an object known. As a thing, it has the existence proper to a thing as such, namely *esse materiale*, a form in matter. As a species or intention, the thing has the existence proper to it, not as a thing, but as an object of knowledge, namely *esse intentionale* or *spirituale*, inasmuch as it is in this state abstracted from its matter; cf. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, Tr. III, cap. vi, p. 241a: "Adhuc autem manifestum est formam sensibilem secundum esse materiale esse in re sensata extra animam, et rem, et ibi rem afficit sua qualitate: secundum autem hoc esse non est in medium nec etiam in anima: quia si color esset in aere sicut in colorato, oporteret quod videremus aerem esse coloratum et oculum esse coloratum colore quem recipit: et hujus contrarium videmus: ergo secundum aliud esse est in abstractione quam in materia propria . . . esse autem intentionale et spirituale." It is this latter sort of being that the object enjoys in the medium and in the soul. It is no longer the thing it was in its material conditions, but has become an object of knowledge and as such is presenting itself ('tending towards,' as *intentio*) to be known. The thing has become spiritualized by being abstracted from its matter in order to meet the conditions of the knowing

power, which can grasp only the form of the thing. But just as the thing as *species* has an existence other than it has in its natural existence (*in esse materiale*), so light has an existence in the diaphanum other than it has in the luminating body. In both instances the *species* and the light are existing *intentionaliter*. (*Op. cit.*, Tr. III, cap. xii, (p. 255b): "lumen est intentio, spirituale esse habens in perspicuo (diaphano).") This especial point is of importance to us historically in that it enables us to know that Dino was not using the commentary of St. Thomas on the *De Anima*. For on this point Thomas says, *In De Anima*, II, lect. xiv, n. 420 (Pirotta edit.): "Alii vero dixerunt quod . . . lumen deluens a luce habet esse intentionale, sicut species colorum in aere . . . autem est falsum." Although this does not tell us whether Dino was following some commentator, and if so, what one, yet it does enable us to dismiss St. Thomas as a source, at least on this particular point.) The light is in the diaphanum, as we have seen, as in a subject, and this subject is not, as it were, its proper matter; for, if it were, the diaphanum would always have light and color, which it does not. It is there, then, in a purely formal way, it is there intentionally; and, by being there, it actualizes the diaphanum so that it can become the medium in which the visible object is rendered visible to the eye.

P. 162, ll. 23-29:

Similarly in the memory of the lover is conserved the species of the intentional thing, and not the material thing, which is loved. Likewise, the diaphanum, which was previously obscure, is perfected by being informed with the species, which it retains and conserves. Therefore it is excellently said by Guido that the memory is informed by the species of the thing causing love just as the diaphanum which was previously obscure and imperfect, is informed by light.

Thus, we have now discovered the likeness on which Dino has established his analogy. For, it will be recalled, that he stated this analogy as reading that the impressed species of the thing causing love is to the memory as the light from a luminous body is to the diaphanum. The likeness then, which validates this analogy is the intentional being which both the *species* and the light have. For the material thing which causes love is not in the memory, any more than the physical luminous body is in the *diaphanum*. In both cases they are there intentionally, as we have seen above. It remains, however, to see how the memory is perfected by the *species* of the object causing love; for, as Dino says, the memorial power is perfected when it is informed by the *species*, just as the *diaphanum*, which was before obscure, is perfected when it is informed with light. If this is so, then we shall have another likeness on which to establish our metaphor, and it will be made doubly secure.

The likeness here is evident in the very words with which Dino states this analogy, for both the memory and the *diaphanum* are perfected by being *informed*. *Perfected* here means the same as actualized, for, as St. Albert tells us, the Latins rendered the Greek *endelechia* either by *perfectio* or *actus* (*op. cit.* Tr. I, cap. iv, vol. 5, p. 123a). Thus, Dino says that both the memory and the *diaphanum* are actualized in the same way, namely by being *informed*: that is, by acquiring a form which will realize the perfection which up until now they had only in potency. In the case of the *diaphanum*, as we have already seen, it is the light from a luminous body which brings it out of obscurity into the light to which it has been in potency; thus the *diaphanum* is *perfected* by being *informed* by a luminous body, and becoming actualized as light, after having been in obscurity. Likewise, the memory, when it has nothing to remember, can be said, analogously with the *diaphanum*, to be in obscurity; it is in potency to its act of remembering. It will be actually remembering,

in other words, it will be perfected, only when it has something to remember, which happens when it has the form of a thing which has been apprehended. For the memory is the treasure house of the *intentiones* of apprehended things, which it keeps custody over by firmly retaining them even after the original apprehension has been forgotten (Avicenna, *De anima*, P. IV, cap. 1, f. 17vb). Thus, like the *diaphanum*, the memory is perfected by being informed; it is informed with the form of the apprehended thing, which it firmly retains to itself. And in each case it is a form which has intentional existence, for the form existing in the memory is a *species* such as we have considered above in speaking of sight. It is true that it is a *species* which has undergone considerable development since becoming the *species* apprehended by an external sense, but here it is sufficient to point out that, like that of sight, the *species* in the memory is a form with intentional existence; concerning the changes the *species* undergoes in going from the eye to the memory, we shall have more to say in considering the cause of love (cf. p. 194).

Consequently, as interpreted by Dino, Guido has a double reason for saying love is in the memory like light in the *diaphanum*. First, love is in the memory as the apprehended *species* of that which causes love and, consequently, is there intentionally just as light is in the *diaphanum*. Secondly, this *species*, as a form, perfects the memory by giving it something to remember, just as the *intentio* of a luminous body perfects the *diaphanum* by making it light; in each case, before being informed, the memory and the *diaphanum* were obscure — the *diaphanum* literally so, the memory analogously. Therefore, to refer back to the words of the poem, we see that Dino has accounted for the analogy and at the same time determined the sense of its language. Thus, he understands *stato* as the antecedent of *si formato* in order to establish the metaphor, so that it reads: "In quella parte dove sta memoria (Amore) prende suo stato (ch'e) si formato come dyaphano da lume d'una obscuritade." Reading it thus, Dino explains the metaphor as we have analyzed above, in the course of it showing that (1) *stato* will refer to both the *species* causing love and light as having an intentional existence, (2) *formato* can apply to both memory and the *diaphanum* as being perfected by being informed, and (3) *obscuritade*, likewise, can apply to both memory and the *diaphanum* as signifying, analogously, their state before being informed by their respectively proper forms. Thus Dino has certainly done a thorough enough job in accounting for the sense of these lines. The only thing he leaves open to argument is his initial reading of *stato* as the antecedent of *si formato*, and the very success of his interpretation after taking it in that way is a strong argument for the validity of that reading.

P. 162, ll. 29–36:

But here it must be understood, lest one fall into error, that when Guido says that love has its being in the memorial part, he is referring to the *species* of the thing, which, when apprehended, causes love, for that *species* is fixed and conserved in the memory. But love as a passion does not properly have its being in the memory, but is in the sensitive appetite as in a subject, in which all the passions of the soul have their being, such as anger, sadness, fear, love and similar accidents, as is declared in natural and moral science.

Thus, before proceeding to consider what Guido has to say about the cause of love, Dino qualifies the sense in which we are to understand that love is in the memory. For love can be said to be in the memory only when we take love as referring to the *species* of the thing, which, when apprehended, causes love, which is fixed and retained in the memory; and it is in this sense that love has been taken in



the preceding analysis. For properly love is a passion and has its being, not in the memory, but in the sensitive appetite as in a subject.

By passion, as is evident from the word itself, is meant a suffering, an enduring or undergoing (*passio* from *patior*). But it is not the soul alone that undergoes the suffering, for as Aristotle says (*De Anima*, I. i, 403a17-19), all the passions of the soul seem to be associated with the body — anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage and joy, as well as loving and hating; for when these appear, the body suffers something. Therefore a passion is something that happens to the soul as it is joined to the body. But in II, iii, 414b2-6 Aristotle specifies what part of the soul the passions are to be attributed to, for he says that where there is sensation there is also appetite, for appetite consists of desire, anger and will. But where there is sensation there is joy and sadness, the delightful and grievous; and where these are there is desire, which is the appetite for the delectible. Consequently, passion is to be located in the sensitive part of the soul. Furthermore, it is in the appetitive part of the sensitive soul. But the appetite, as Aristotle tells us, is the motive power of the soul (*De anima*, III. x, 433a31); in this it is distinguished from the apprehensive or apperceptive powers of the soul, sense and intellect, according to which the apprehended thing becomes in the apprehending power according to the mode of that power, as we have seen in the case of sight (cf. p. 183). But the operation of the appetite is that of being moved by the appetible object according as it is intellected or imagined (*ibid.*, 433b10-11). Consequently, according as there are different kinds of apprehension, that of intellect and that of imagination or sense, there will be different appetites. Thus we are brought back to the first passage from Aristotle where he says that appetite consists of desire, anger and will. But will is that which moves a man when he acts according to reason (*ibid.*, 433a24-25); consequently, the will is the rational appetite, but for a fuller discussion *vide infra*, p. 192. Thus we are left with desire and anger as comprising the sensitive appetite, and it is on these that the mediaeval commentators distinguished respectively the concupiscible and irascible parts of the sensitive appetite. But perhaps because Aristotle had said that movement is characterized by either avoiding or pursuing something (*ibid.*, III. ix, 432b29), some were led to say that the concupiscible is that part of the appetite which moves towards a thing apprehended as a good, whereas the irascible is that part of the appetite which moves away from, fleeing that which is apprehended as bad. Thus St. Albert, following Avicenna (cf. *De anima*, IV. c. iv, 20r2) writes: "Motum autem animale dico, qui fit per praecedentem apprehensionem boni vel mali: quam apprehensionem boni vel mali in animali sequitur appetitus, vel motus ad aliquid, vel motus ab illo, sive fuga . . . Nota ergo, quod sicut dicit Avicenna, virtutis appetitivae duae sunt partes, vis concupiscibilis, et vis irascibilis. Concupiscibilis est vis imperans moveri ut appropinquetur ad ea quae putantur ut utilia, appetitu delectandi. Vis vero irascibilis est, quae imperat ad repellendum a se quod putatur nocivum vel corrumpens, appetitu vincendi." — *In de anima*, II. xx, t. 5, p. 523b. St. Thomas, however (and St. Albert after him in a later work — cf. *Sum. de creat.* II, 66, R, t. 35, p. 558) argues that this is an improper distinction, for contraries belong to the same power, as both white and black fall under the power of sight; therefore since the good and bad are contraries, they must belong to one power (*In de anima*, III. lect. xiv, n. 806). Consequently, he distinguishes the two according to different respects of the good apprehended. Thus the concupiscible part is ordered to the appetible good as delectible to sense, whereas the irascible is ordered to the appetible good as perfecting the delectible things so as to be able to use them at will; so it is, as it were, the *propugnatrix concupiscibilis*, whence its object has been called the arduous, (*ibid.* n. 804-805). Thus

the irascible part rises up against those things which militate against the concupiscible accomplishing its end (cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I. 81, 2, c). To take love as an example, desire for a certain woman is a passion of the concupiscible appetite, but if in attaining that desire, someone should interfere and try to hinder that attainment, the irascible appetite would rise up against him and in anger it would fight against that person so as to achieve what it has desired, in other words, the irascible would come forward to fight for and defend the concupiscible. But this is sufficient for our present purpose of locating the passions, although we shall have to return later to consider the concupiscible and irascible parts more in detail.

But it remains to be seen whether the passions belong to the sensitive or the rational appetite. However, since we have already seen (p. 186) that the passions happen to the soul as joined to the body, the passions can only properly be located in the sensitive appetite, for the intellect, and consequently the rational appetite, is in itself unmixed with body (cf. p. 199). Therefore, the passions are properly the operations of the sensitive appetite, and hence are those things which a man suffers in his body when he is moved by the appetible object. Thus St. Thomas says, *In Ethic. Nic.*, II, lect. v, n. 292: "passiones proprie dicantur operationes appetitus sensitivi, quae sunt secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, et quibus homo quodammodo ducitur."

Hence since love is in the memory not as a passion of the soul but as the *species* of the thing which causes love, we are considering love at this stage as it exists in the apprehensive powers of the soul and not as it exists in the sensitive appetite. Consequently we are engaged in considering love in the line of its conceptual development, which receives its fullest explication in lines 21-28 of Guido's poem (cf. p. 194). Therefore, we are in a position now to see why Guido should have said that love is in the memory. Dino, however, does not explicitly answer this question, but he has given all the materials for an answer in showing how love is in the memory as the *species* of the thing which causes love. It only remains to see whether the memory holds a particular and conspicuous place in the line of development from the *species* of a desirable object to the motion of the sensitive appetite towards that object. But that it does is evident from what St. Albert says in his commentary on the *De memoria et reminiscencia*, Tr. I, cap. i, t. 9, p. 99a: "Hoc autem est quod dicitur (Aristotelis, 450a14), quod memoria sit primi sensitivi . . . nos tenemus quod primum sensitivum esse, quod est fons et origo sensualitatis, et cui contingit sentire secundum se semper et in omni sensibili . . . Patent, quod primi sensitivi est sicut a quo est primus motus ejus, sicut phantasia dicitur motus a sensu secundum actum factus. Sic igitur dicitur memoria esse primi sensitivi sicut id in quo quiescunt motus primi sensitivi, et a quo fit reflexio in rem primo per sensum acceptam." Thus memory is related to the *primum sensitivum*, i.e. the common sense (for which cf. p. 195), as to the source of its act, and it is in the memory that the motion of the sensible perception, which begins as a whole in the common sense, comes to rest. Thus in sensible apprehension common sense and memory are the two termini (for this progression in human apprehension cf. p. 193 sq.). But the common sense is the fountain and origin of *sensualitas*, i.e. of sensual movement, the passions of the sensitive appetite (cf. St. Albert, *Sum. Theol.* P. II. Tr. XV, q. 92, m. 1, tome 33, p. 193-194). Consequently, memory is the completion of the act begun in the common sense, which is the source of sensual movement. Thus, Guido can say love is in the memory inasmuch as memory presents the completed *species* of the object perceived to the appetite, which as it moves towards that object, gives rise to the passion of love (cf. p. 186).

But in this case memory is no longer concerned exclusively with the reproduction

of the past, but it has an active part in the production of a present perception. Thus we may have here a trace of the Augustinian analysis of the memory. For St. Augustine in analysing sensible perception required of the memory much the same sort of work that Kant did in the reproduction of the manifold by imagination. Thus in the case of hearing a sound, memory is necessary in order to unite the impressions that make up the sound, for every sound has a beginning, middle and end, and, if the memory did not preserve the beginning until we had reached the end, we would never have the perception of that sound (*De musica*, VI, c. 8, n. 21; t. 32, col. 1174; and cf. Et. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, pp. 83–85). Consequently, if love comes from a seen form, as Guido says, then the memory is necessary, inasmuch as memory unites the impressions that make up any one perception. Hence Guido can say love is in that part where memory is, since it is in the memory that the visible apprehension is completed, which causes love to arise in the appetite.

Furthermore Guido would have another reason for saying at the beginning that love is in the memory, for just as love is properly in the sensitive soul and yet participates in the rational soul (cf. p. 196–197), so the memory, as Aristotle says, belongs properly to the sensitive soul, although accidentally to the rational soul (*De mem. et remin.* i, 450a14); for we can remember things we have known as well as those we have sensed, and yet since this is accomplished only through the reproduction of the sensible species upon which our knowledge depends (cf. p. 196), the memory properly belongs to the sensitive soul. Consequently, as located in the memory, love will have the same character as the memory, namely that of belonging properly to the sensitive soul and yet participating in the rational one, and it is the work of this second stanza to determine the position of love in these two respects. Thus he is able by this to state generally what he is going to determine in particular above love, namely, that it is in that part which participates in both sense and intellect.

P. 162, ll. 37–42:

Then when Guido says (1.18), *lo quale da marte viene*, etc. he would show that love is a generated or created thing, and therefore he says (1.19) *egli'e creato et a sensato nome*, that is, it has a sensible name, denoting some sensible thing, since this name *love* signifies some sensible passion in us, just as other sensual passions have their proper name, such as anger, sadness, fear and the like.

Here then we begin the second part of this stanza, where Guido undertakes to answer the question *chi lo fa creare*. But before he can begin to seek the cause of love he must show it is a thing that has been caused. Consequently, Guido immediately adds that *egli'e creato et a sensato nome*. But if it is something created or generated, for Guido obviously does not literally mean that love is produced totally *ex nihilo*, then there must be some cause which brings it into being; and it is this cause which is to be under consideration in this part. Furthermore, by saying it has a *sensato nome* we are to understand that it is some sensible thing — *sensato* being taken here as functioning as a transferred adjective referring to that which the *nome* signifies. Consequently, by this we are to understand that love is something that is sensed, and thus we have moved a step further towards the statement of love as a passion of the sensitive soul, which Guido achieves temporally in saying *d'alma costume*, etc. (1. 20, but cf. p. 190 for explication). For as we have seen from analysing the preceding lines, love as it is in the memory may be either intellectual or sensible (cf. *supra*). Therefore in this line Guido has further specified the nature of love by saying it is sensible, although he has not yet said whether it is

an act or passion of the sensitive soul. But for a full account of the progression in this stanza, *vide infra*, p. 193.

But the principal purpose of this line with regard to this second part is to point out that love is a generated thing and, more particularly, a sensible generated thing, so that now one can properly inquire into the cause of its generation; for before one can ask *why* a thing is, one must first know *that* it is. But as to why this line should be considered before the line about love coming from Mars, which is the line prior to this, *vide infra*, p. 193.

P. 162, l. 43–p. 163, l. 13:

However, it must be known that there are two things which occur in the generation of a passion. One is the natural disposition of the body, for we see that according to different natural dispositions of their bodies men are apt to incur different passions. Some for instance incur anger very easily or sadness or joy, and thus similarly some men because of the natural disposition of their body are apt to incur this passion of love very easily. The other cause of a generation of a passion is the extrinsic thing whose *image* or *species* causes in the sensitive power that knowledge or apprehension from which the appetite gets its desire, and it is in the appetite that these passions are founded. Therefore in order to show completely what the cause of this passion is, Guido first states the natural disposition which renders a man apt to readily incur this passion in saying *lo quale da marte viene* and secondly shows what the extrinsic thing is whose apprehension causes the passion of love to follow in the appetite, in *vièn da veduta forma* or else perhaps in *d'alma costume*.

But before we inquire into the cause of this passion, Dino points out that there are two things which concur in the generation of a passion, one intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic. Thus besides the extrinsic thing, which gives rise to love after it has been apprehended by the appetite (cf. p. 194), we find that some people are by nature more apt to have this passion than others. Consequently there must be some intrinsic cause which so disposes one, and this is the natural disposition of the body to which Dino refers. For by a disposition we are to understand, as Aristotle says, a certain arrangement of parts (*Metaphys.* V. xix, 1022bl); thus by a certain arrangement of bodily elements some men are by nature disposed towards shame or fear (*Categor.* viii, 9b15–20). But the bodily elements are fire, air, earth and water which result from the various combinations of the elemental qualities, the hot and cold, the dry and moist (but for this cf. p. 199). And it is the proportion these qualities have in the body which determines the complexion of the body, which constitutes the natural disposition of the body (cf. p. III). Consequently, due to the bodily complexion some men have a natural aptitude for the passion of love. Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, P. IV, cap. iv, f. 20va: “Dicemus nunc quod actiones iste (concupiscibilis & irascibilis) et quod accidentia ista sunt ex accidentibus quae accidunt animae, sed dum est in corpore: quae non accidunt ei nisi propter consortium corporis; et ideo trahunt secum complexionones corporum. Accidunt etiam ipsa cum accidunt complexionones in corporibus; quasdam enim complexionones sequitur aptitudo irascendi: et quasdam aptitudo concupiscendi, et quasdam pavor et timor.” We shall have to consider the complexion of the body further on (cf. p. III), but here it is sufficient merely to note that the disposition of the body does have some influence upon love; for all Guido is doing here, as Dino says, is to note the cause of such natural dispositions, which he does by saying *lo quale da marte viene*.

P. 163, ll. 14–31:

The natural disposition by which one is apt to readily incur a certain passion is

determined by the principles proper to one's nativity. But of these the principal ones are the celestial bodies; for as Aristotle says in the *Physics* (II. ii, 194b14), man and the sun generate man, and again in the *De generatione animalium* (II. iii, 737a1), he says that there is in the generative spirit a nature existing in proportion to the natural ordination of the stars. Thus Guido in saying *lo quale da marte viene et fa dimora* would show what celestial body rules over the nativity of one who has a natural disposition to readily incur the passion of love. For this passion is said to proceed from Mars because, as the astrologers say, anyone born when Mars is in the house of Venus or in Taurus or Libra will be an exceedingly lustful fornicator and vicious in all venereal abuses. Thus Ali ben Ridhwan says in his *Commentary on the Quadripartitum of Ptolemy* that one born when Venus is in conjunction with Mars is given to love-making, fornication, voluptuousness and the like, all of which pertain to the passion of love about which Guido is speaking in this poem.

Although Dino here refers us to the authority of Ali ben Ridwan, at the crucial point Ptolemy has more to say than Ali does about the lustfulness of those born under Mars and Venus. Cf. Ptolemy, *Quadripartitum cum commento Haly Heben Rodan, Venetiis*, apud Scotum, 1519 (Paris, B.N. Res. V. 190), Tract. 3, libri 4, cap. 13: in qualitatibus anime nati, f. 72r: "Quod si haec eadem stella (Mars) in predicti (Venus) coniunctione conversabitur natus multus ac superfluous erit in coitu . . . suos et alienos decipiens, appetitus festini, fastidiosus, coniugatarum et virginum corruptor, versutus acutus, inordinatus deceptor." Ali however is reserved and adds nothing; in fact he says here, "Totum hoc dictum similiter est manifestum per glosas preteritas in verbis que dixit de saturno: et inde accipere poteris totam significationem martis secundum suam naturam." Then, further on (Tract. 4, cap. 4, f. 83r) Ali writes: "Et postquam ita est convenit quod mars et saturnus habeant in luxuria significationem: et est manifestum quod si hi duo planete: participationem habuerint cum luminaribus bono aspectu erit coniugium secundum legem: et si non fuerit bono aspectu: significat quod erit ibi fornicatio et similia. Quapropter venus cum marte qualitatem amoris efficit absolute. Et propter hoc faciunt venus et mars res que sunt inamoramentum . . . propter quod significat figura que fit de venere et marte: omnem rem que est inamoramentum."

P. 163, ll. 32-35:

Then Guido adds *d'alma costume* (1.20), that is, the love about which we are speaking here, besides being a created or generated thing, is a custom of the soul (*mos animae*), i.e., a certain passion of the soul. For by *customs (mores)* here he means those accidents of the soul which are called passions.

Here then we have finally reached Guido's statement of love as a passion. In the first of this stanza love is presented as a *species* in the memory and hence, as we have seen, capable of being either intellectual or sensitive. But in line 19 love is stated to have a sensible name and consequently to belong to the sensitive soul. Here, however, we find that love is a passion of the soul and hence belongs to the appetitive rather than the apprehensive part of the sensitive soul. For Guido says that it is a "custom of the soul," and although it may seem forced to take this as meaning love is a passion, Dino justifies this reading by translating *costume* as *mos*, wherein the ambiguity of the word makes more evident the sense in which this can be taken as referring to a passion. For the Latin *mos* can signify either a moral virtue or a custom or habitual action; but our word *habit*, if taken in technical as well as general usage, has this same ambiguity, for technically as *habitus* it can signify a moral virtue; so it would be better here to translate Guido's *costume* as *habit*; and the Greek also has this in *ἥθος* and *ἔθος*. Taking *costume* then in the sense of moral virtue,

which as Aristotle says (*Eth. Nic.*, II, i, 1103a24–25) we have a natural aptitude for, as realized through habitual acting, we will be able to see how this means that love is a passion. For as St. Thomas says in commenting upon this passage of Aristotle (*In Ethic. Nic.* II. lect. i. n. 249), moral virtue pertains to the appetite. Consequently, if *costume* in Guido's line be understood as *mos*, we here have Guido saying that love pertains to the appetite and hence is a passion, for as we have seen (p. 186) the motion of the sensitive appetite is a passion. But that *mos* was current, though improperly, in the sense of an act of the appetite is witnessed by St. Albert, VI *Ethic.* Tr. IV. cap. iii, t. 7. p. 460a: "Dicitur enim mos ex inclinatione naturali appetitus actus; et hic mos ad naturam refertur et non proprie mos vocatur." However, if *costume* be understood here in the sense of *mos* as referring to the appetite, then as *mos* we should expect some reference to its subjection to reason, for as properly signifying a moral virtue, *mos* refers to the appetite as it is apt to obey reason. Nor are our expectations disappointed for Guido immediately adds, *et di cor voluntate*, to which we shall now have to turn to see how love is subject to reason, cf. p. 192.

P. 163, l. 36–p. 164, l. 1:

Then Guido adds, *et di cor voluntate*, that is, love is a passion following upon the will in the sensitive appetite, which is in the heart. From this it appears that here Guido posits that love, inasmuch as it is a passion of the soul such as anger and sadness, has its being in the sensitive appetite; for it has its being in the memory, as has been said, not as a passion but as the species of that thing which, when apprehended, causes the passion of love to arise in the appetite. But here he says that it follows upon the sensitive appetite which is in the heart, and in this follows Aristotle, who posited that the appetite and every sensitive power has its being in the heart. Doctors, however, hold that it has being in the brain. But it is not our present concern to determine which opinion is true.

Having shown that love as a passion does not properly have its being in the memory, Dino in this line understands Guido to say that love is properly in the heart. Thus Dino is here interpreting the significance of *cor*. But love is properly to be located in the heart because the heart is the seat of the passions. In fact the passions can be defined as certain motions of the heart; thus Aristotle says (*De Anima*, I, i, 403a30) that anger is a surging of blood or heat about the heart. But the heart is the seat of the passions because it is the principle of movement inasmuch as the movement of the body is realized through the activity of the animal spirits which are generated by the heart; but for this doctrine *vide infra*, p. IV sq. Nevertheless, here it suffices to point out that Aristotle did hold that the heart is the seat of the passions; cf. *De part. animal.* III, iv, 666a11. Some others, however, maintained that the brain is the seat of the passions and of movement, and, although not intending to discuss the truth of the matter, Dino adds this evidently to put in a word for his profession, since it was the *medici* who held this opinion. Cf. Galen, *De placitis Hippoc. et Plat.* VIII. and for a discussion concerning the truth of these opinions, cf. St. Albert, I *De mot. animal.* Tr. II, cap. 1–2, t. 9, pp. 269–273.

P. 164, ll. 1–11:

Guido significantly refers to the will here (*et di cor voluntate*), which seems to reach to the intellect, in order to show that although love may arise from a certain natural disposition by which one is apt to readily incur this passion, nevertheless it also arises from purpose (*ex proposito*) and choice, which pertains to the will which is free and has freedom of judgment, since it faces opposites indifferently. In this love is similar to other passions, as anger, for instance. For although one should be dis-

posed by nature to readily incur the passion of anger, he still is able through his will to refrain from it or else to give in to it. In order then to denote this, Guido says that love is not only a custom of the soul but is also a passion that is consequent upon the will.

Now that we have come to the place of the will in the development of the passion of love we can resume our consideration of love as a custom of the soul, a *mos animae* (cf. p. 190). For as *costume* implied, as will be recalled, that love referred to the appetite, we have still to determine whether love does not also obey the reason inasmuch as *mos*, in virtue of which we have been able to give this interpretation to *costume*, properly denotes moral virtue. But if we are free to love or not to love, as we evidently are, love must somehow pertain to the reason, for our freedom is rooted in our reason. But since the consent that we give to our loving or refusing to love is an act of the will, it is to the will that we must first look to find what relation it has to reason. Now Aristotle tells us (*Ethic. Nic.* III. ii, 1111b20-30) that will is closely akin to choice, although not the same. For will is concerned with ends while choice is concerned with means to that end. Thus, for example, we will to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy, or again we will to be happy, for it would not be fitting to say that we choose to be happy, since in general choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control. But happiness is the *per se bonum*, which is the proper object of the will (*ibid.* 1113a22-24) and is always willed as the end. But since all things that offer themselves may not be real goods but only apparent ones, being particular goods that are apprehended, deliberation and choice are necessary for determining which particular goods will be suitable means for realizing the end which is the *per se bonum*, the general good. And it is here that the reason and intellect are involved (*ibid.*, 1112a16), in which lies the basis of the freedom of the will. For the reason must deliberate which particular goods are to be followed to attain the desired end. But in this act of deliberation and choice it is not determined to any certain one, for the intellect lacks any material organ and so is not determined to one by its matter, as the eye is, for instance, to colored surfaces (cf. p. 182); it is somehow all things, and consequently any of all the things offered to it, as apprehended as a good, can be chosen and willed. But this apprehension of a good and the consequent choice or refusal of this good is the work of the will, for, as has been said, the good is the object of the will, whereas the intellect is properly ordered to the true. But since the apprehension which the will follows is that of the intellect, the will is called as we have seen (p. 186), the rational appetite. And it is in virtue of belonging to the rational soul that the sensitive appetite is subject to the will. For as Aristotle says, the inferior are subject to the superior powers; thus the superior moves the inferior spheres among the celestial bodies (*De Anima*, III. xi, 434a15). Consequently, since reason is superior to the sensitive appetite in men, in virtue of being freer from matter, the motions of that appetite are subject to the deliberation of reason before the will gives its consent to that motion. Thus, although by nature my appetite might move towards Helen, because she is beautiful, before actually loving her I would deliberate whether or not such a love were a real good, and thus it sometimes happens that in the height of passion deliberation will intervene and halt the whole course of our action. But that the passions may sometimes overrule the judgment of reason is also a fact, but for a discussion of this see the analysis of lines 32-34 of Guido's poem (p. III).

But now sufficient has been said to show the significance of *costume* in this line. For as understood as *mos*, we have seen how love can be called a custom of the soul. For though strictly it is improper, nevertheless since love like a moral virtue per-



tains to the sensitive appetite and yet is subject to the will, there is some reason for calling love by such a name. And this enables us to account for the progression of the stanza up to this point. For we have now accounted for both the possibilities that existed in saying that love is in the memory, which allowed love as *species* of the thing causing love to be in both the sensitive and rational souls (cf. p. 188). But, as we have seen, love is in the sensitive soul in virtue of being properly a passion of the sensitive appetite, and yet it also reaches the intellect inasmuch as it is subject to the will. But having thus gotten back to the intellect again, Guido now proceeds in the following lines of this second stanza to analyze the nature of love as it is in the intellect and thus to achieve a rounded whole out of the stanza. But before proceeding to this part, where Guido considers the external cause of love, it is necessary to review this progression more particularly in order to attempt an answer to the difficulties encountered above (p. 189) as to why Dino should have considered line 19 before line 18. This line, as will be remembered, served the principal purpose of pointing out that love is a generated and sensible thing and so determined the field of enquiry so that Guido could proceed to consider the causes of that generation. But then directly in the next line Guido further specifies his subject matter by saying it is a passion of the soul which is in the heart and subject to the will. But it was necessary for him to specify that it is in the heart lest one think he was going to enquire into the cause of love as it exists in the memory, as was said only four lines back. Furthermore, by specifying it as subject to the will, Guido qualifies the sense in which the natural disposition of the body is a cause of love, as stated in line 18. Consequently, lines 19–20 specify the subject quite particularly so that Guido has made sure of that of which he is going to seek the cause. As an internal cause, however, the natural disposition of the body concerns the disposition of the matter which receives the form of the passion love, and is thus somewhat outside the development of the succeeding lines. Consequently, it may have been for some such feeling that Guido stated that love comes from Mars, in order to get this fact out of the way for the future development and yet to include it in order to complete his account of the causes of love, even though lines 19–20 are naturally prior as determining the field of enquiry of this second part of the stanza. And thus to answer Dino's doubt (cf. p. 189) as to whether Guido begins his account of the external cause in the line beginning *d'alma costume* (20) or *vien da veduta forma* (21), I should say for the reason just given that the latter is the proper division. Of course, all this difficulty would be avoided if line 18 were taken with the preceding lines, for our whole difficulty here arises from taking this line about love coming from Mars as belonging to this second part. Dino, however, does not take it in this way, for reasons we have already considered, although we shall have to return to this problem later.

P. 164, ll. 12–21:

When Guido says, *vien da veduta forma*, etc. (21), he would show what that thing is which, on being apprehended moves the appetite, thereby giving rise to the passion of love. For this passion is caused by the apprehension of some visible form which is comprehended as pleasing (*sub ratione complacentiae*), as shall be said later. But this pleasingness is itself the result of either the form seeming beautiful or its motions being pleasing. But this apprehension is brought about by the intellect after the *species* of the visible form has come to it.

Having stated that love is a generated thing specified as a sensible passion located in the heart and yet subject to the will, Dino can now turn to consider what the external cause of this is, which Guido states in saying *vien da veduta forma, che s'intende*.



But not any visible form will give rise to love and consequently Dino says that love arises from a form that is apprehended as pleasing, which is discussed in detail further on (p. V). But such an apprehension is brought about after the *species* of the visible form has come to it. Consequently, the first step in exegesis is to explain how the visible form reaches the intellect, which Dino accomplishes by showing the order in human apprehension.

P. 164, ll. 21-28:

This is the order in human apprehension as it is declared in natural science. First, the species of the thing comes to the exterior senses, as sight, hearing, touch, taste or smell; from these it goes to the interior powers of the soul, first to the fantasy, then to the cogitative power, and finally to the memorial power; thence it transcends the sensitive order and comes to the possible intellect which is the highest of the apprehensive powers.

Such is the order as Dino states it, but in that it differs from the order usually given by the scholastic philosophers it offers some difficulties of explication. The distinction between the external and internal powers of the sensitive soul is common enough. It distinguishes those powers which directly apprehend their objects as existing outside the soul from those which apprehend their objects as existing within the soul. Thus St. Albert in III *De anima*, Tr. I. cap. i, t. 5, p. 316a: "Est earum (potentiae sensitivae) quaedam sunt apprehensivae de foris existentibus suis agentibus, quaedam autem sunt apprehensivae, ita quod sua agentia proxima sunt et intus." But the external powers are those commonly called the five senses, and their mode of apprehension has been sufficiently considered above in the case of sight. The enumeration of the internal powers as given by Dino, however, differs considerably from that usually given. Inasmuch as he says the first of these is called *phantasia*, we might suppose he is following Avicenna, since Avicenna says the first of the internal powers is the *phantasia* or *sensus communis* (*De anima*, P. I. cap. v, f. 5rb). But the rest of Dino's list does not at all tally with Avicenna's. For whereas Dino enumerates only the cogitative and memorial power after the fantasy, Avicenna gives the imagination, the cogitative, estimative and memorial powers. Consequently, Dino is either omitting several of the powers or using some of his terms to comprehend more than one power. On the testimony of Avicenna himself we can take the latter as the case. Cf. *Canon*, I. Fen. I. Doc. 6, cap. 5, t. 1, p. 75: "Et virtus quidem comprehensiva occulte est sicut genus quinque virtutem: una est virtus, quae vocatur *sensus communis* et *phantasia*; et apud medicos quidem sunt una virtus, sed apud certificantes, qui sunt ex philosophis, duae sunt virtutes . . . Et secunda quidem est virtus, quam medici vocant *cogitativam* . . . et est *extimativa* . . . Quidam autem hominum sunt qui praesumunt et hanc virtutem *imaginativam* vocant, sed tamen non curamus: quia de nominibus nom disputamus. Sed intentiones et differentias intelligere debemus. Et medico quidem non est curandum, ut hanc virtutem sciat . . . Tertio vero ver illarum quas nominant medici, est quinta aut quarta, quum certificaverimus, quae est virtus *conservativa* et *memorialis*." Thus the doctors take some powers to comprehend what the philosophers distinguish as two separate powers; they name common sense and fantasy as one power and also designate as *cogitativa* the estimative and imaginative (in man the cogitative) powers, while they agree with the philosophers in calling the last of the interior powers the memory. Therefore, Dino in naming only three interior powers of the soul is only following his profession and by these three comprehends the five powers which the philosophers designate. But it is now necessary to see how these powers operate in carrying the sensible object to the intellect, and in con-

sidering these powers it is better to follow what Avicenna says of them in the *De anima* rather than in the *Canon*, since, as a philosopher, he goes into much greater detail to consider their nature and mutual relations.

From the external senses the forms or *species* apprehended come to the first of the interior powers of the soul, the common sense. This power is located in the first concavity of the brain, and its work is to receive the impressions of the five senses. Once these impressions have been received by the common sense, they are conserved by the imagination, which is located at the extremity of the anterior concavity of the brain, and whose work it is to keep these impressions of the five senses even after the sensible things causing the sensations have been removed. These images conserved in the imagination are compounded and divided by the *vis imaginativa*, which in man is called the *cogitativa*, and which is located in the middle concavity of the brain. But whereas all these powers operate according to the *species* which the external senses abstract, the next power, the estimative, apprehends those sensible qualities which the external senses cannot even perceive. Thus, the sheep which sees a wolf knows immediately it must flee by reason of its estimative power, for it apprehends that, if it does not, its life will be endangered. This faculty is located at the top of the middle concavity of the brain. Finally, there is the memorial power, located in the posterior concavity of the brain, which conserves the intentions which the estimative power perceives; thus, the memory is in the same relation to the estimative power as the imagination is to the common sense (Avicenna, *De anima*, P. I. cap. v, f. 5rb).

Now inasmuch as these diverse powers have diverse functions to perform, they apprehend according to diverse modes of apprehension. But since, as we have seen in the case of sight, to apprehend is to abstract the form of a thing from its matter, these powers are diverse according to the diverse grades of abstraction at which they apprehend. And these grades are determined according to the completeness with which the form is abstracted from matter and its conditions or appendices (*loc. cit.*, P. II, cap. ii, f. 6vb). Thus, for example, sight needs these accidents of matter when apprehending its form, since it does not make a complete abstraction of the form from its matter, but needs certain matter present in order to make its apprehension possible. Imagination, on the other hand, makes a more complete abstraction and, consequently, has no need for the matter in order to accomplish its apprehension; thus, although the matter of the form it apprehends is absent or even destroyed, it can still hold the form stable, whereas if the matter were not present to sight, it could no longer apprehend its form. But although the imagination makes its form clear of matter, it does not make it completely clear of material accidents, for the forms which are in the imagination are still sensible with a certain quality and quantity as well as place and, thus, individual. The estimative power, however, transcends this order of abstraction in that it apprehends immaterial intentions which are not in their matter, although it happens to them to be in matter inasmuch as figure and color and place and the like are things which it is impossible to have except in corporeal matter. Thus goodness and badness, the fitting and unfitting are things which in themselves are not material, although it happens to them to be in some body. Consequently, estimation is a purer abstraction and closer to simplicity than the two preceding. But it is not completely clear of matter, for it apprehends particular things according to their proper matter and according to the comparison of one thing to another and, consequently, apprehends its form still with some of the accidents of matter. The only power in which forms are completely free of matter and its accidents is the intellect, for it apprehends forms which have been made clear of matter and its accidents in every

way; it apprehends one nature free of quantity, quality, place and position. In this it differs from the apprehension of sense, imagination, or estimation. It accomplishes the most complete abstraction of form from matter of any of the powers of the soul (Avicenna, *loc. cit.* and f. 7ra).

P. 164, ll. 28–41:

This intellect is called *possible* to differentiate it from the agent intellect, which is also in us, but is not an apprehensive power, which is all we are concerned with here. The possible intellect is that which receives the *species* of the thing, and in receiving that *species*, knows the thing. Therefore, Guido says that the form, which is first apprehended by sight, comes to the possible intellect and does not proceed any further to any other power because there is no other apprehensive power in us which is higher or more noble than this one. Thus he says, *che prende nel possibile intellecto, come in subiecto loco*, etc. (22–23); that is, it takes its place as in a subject in the possible intellect, which is the subject and place of the apprehended species of things, which is in agreement with Aristotle (III *De Anima*, iv, 429a27), who says that the soul is the place of species, though not as a whole, but only in its intellectual part. Then Guido says, *et dimoranza*, that is, the *species* of this thing comes to rest there because it does not proceed to any other power or place.

As we have just seen above (p. 195), it is in virtue of accomplishing the most complete abstraction that Dino refers to the intellect as a more noble power than any of the others of the soul, in fact, the highest of them. But having come to the intellect in following the order of apprehension, we now take leave of Avicenna, for Dino in considering the intellect posits the agent intellect as existing within us, thereby giving evidence he is not here following Avicenna, who posits it as existing outside us in an Intelligence (cf. *De Anima*, P. V., cap. v, f. 25rv and also *Metaphys.* IX, cap. iv, f. 105r). Consequently, let us now turn back to Aristotle, keeping in mind, however, Dino's interpretation that both the possible and agent intellect are within us, that is, not separated from the soul of man. But as to what is Aristotle's own opinion on this question of the intellect, cf. G. Rodier, *Aristote, Traité de l'ame*, Paris, E. Leroux, 1900, t. II, p. 459–467.

Concerning the intellect, Aristotle says in the *De Anima*, III, v. 430a10–15, that in every being there is an element which plays the role of matter and an element which plays the role of form; the one is in potency to all, the other produces in act all of its kind. Consequently, there must be in the soul also an intellect apt to become all and an intellect capable of producing all. But these are respectively the possible and agent intellect, for it is possible for the one to become all things, since it is in potency to all, but it is none of these until actualized by the other. The agent intellect accomplishes this work, as we have seen (p. 195), by abstracting and thus freeing the species, apprehended by sense, from all matter and the conditions of matter. Thus Aristotle goes on to say (430a16) that the agent intellect is in respect to the intelligibles in potency, which it renders into act, like light is in respect to the colors in potency, which it renders into act. For as we have seen above (p. 182), light actualizes color insofar as it renders the diaphanous in act and thereby allows the color to meet the condition of the seeing power and so become actually seen; likewise, the agent intellect actualizes the intelligible in potency by infusing it with its light whereby it, as a sensible species, is made to meet the conditions of the intellect by being freed of all its material conditions and so becomes actually known. Thus the agent intellect accomplishes its work by making the object, which has been apprehended by the senses, universal, which is the condition for things to be known, for as Aristotle says knowledge is of the universal. Consequently, by abstracting the universal from the sensible species the agent intellect actualizes the possible intel-

lect and in this act is as art in respect to its matter (432a12). For just as it is the work of art to induce a form into matter, so it is the work of the agent intellect to induce the universal, which it has abstracted from the sensible species, into the possible intellect. Thus the possible intellect is as the recipient of that which the agent intellect has to give, and therefore, Dino says that it is the last of the apprehensive powers inasmuch as the apprehension, in this case knowledge, is realized when the agent intellect has deposited the universal in the possible intellect, or in other words, when it has actualized it.

Thus we have followed the species of the thing from its beginning in sense up to its final rest in the intellect. But the species at this stage is no longer the same as it was when first apprehended by sight. It has been successively further deprived of its matter by going, as we have seen, through the internal powers of the soul until in the possible intellect it is rendered completely abstract by the agent intellect; as such the object has met the conditions of human knowledge and is known. Thus, in being known by the intellect, the object is apprehended by all the apprehensive powers of the soul: the external senses give the first experience of the object, which is correlated by the common sense and impressed on the imagination, after which the cogitative power combines and organizes it with the other images it has; the estimation, then judges it good or bad, fitting or unfitting and the like, which judgment is conserved in the memory. Finally the intelligible species is abstracted and deposited in the possible intellect, where the object attains its end as such in being known.

Therefore Guido says that this form, which causes love, goes from the apprehension of sight to the possible intellect, where it takes its rest, since there is no further power for it to proceed to. As an object of apprehension, it has reached its end there in being known and there it stays as in the subject and place of the apprehended species of things, for as Aristotle says (*De anima*, III, iv, 429a27), the soul in its intellectual part is the place of species.

P. 164, l. 42–p. 165, l. 9:

But two things should be noted here. In the first place, although Guido states that love is caused by the apprehension of a form which is first seen by sight, we are not to understand by this that he means only the sense of sight to the exclusion of all the other external senses. For the thing which is loved, such as a woman, pleases the lover not only because he comprehends what is beautiful in her color, figure and quantity, which are all apprehended through sight; she may also please through other motions, which are comprehended by other senses, such as her speech and other motions. But because this pleasingness, which causes the passion of love in the appetite, in most cases comes from a form which is comprehended by sight, our author in this place states love as arising only from the sense of sight. Secondly, it should be noted that what Guido says here about the possible intellect shows that the apprehension which the lover has is not purely sensitive; for inasmuch as it comes to the possible intellect it partakes of the intellect. Consequently Guido is speaking in this poem only of the love that man has, and it is not his intention to treat of love and friendship among the brute animals, which are without intellect and therefore do not have this kind of love.

But in thus stating that love arises from sight, Guido has not only the authority of poets, who presumably have also been lovers, but also that of the philosophers. For Aristotle notes in the *Ethics* (IX. v, 1167a5–7) that the pleasure of sight is the beginning of love, since no one loves who is not delighted with the form seen. For as St. Thomas says in his commentary on this text (*In Ethic.* IX. lect. v, n. 1824) one begins to love a woman because he is delighted with her beauty. But we shall have

to go into a further discussion of this when we consider how this pleasingness is the cause of love (cf. p. V).

Secondly, Dino notes that what is said here about the possible intellect shows that the apprehension which the lover has is not purely sensitive; for inasmuch as it comes to the possible intellect it partakes of the intellect. Consequently, Guido is speaking in this poem only of the love that man has, and it is not his intention to treat of love and friendship among the brute animals, which are without intellect and, therefore, do not have this kind of love.

But having seen what Dino's interpretation of these lines is, it will be well to consider briefly how well his interpretation fits the text. Guido's words are, as will be recalled, that love comes from a seen form which is understood so that it takes its place and rest in the possible intellect, as in a subject ("vien da veduta forma che s'intende, che prende nel possibile intellecto, comen subgetto, loco et dimoranza"). It comes from a seen form, as we have seen, because the pleasingness from which love arises usually is comprehended by sight; the other senses may comprehend some pleasingness, but sight is foremost. Likewise, it comes from sight, just as all our concepts arise from a form perceived by sense. But this is a form *che s'intende*, which can be taken literally as "which intends itself." For as a form apprehended, its whole existence is *intentionale*; it is continually tending toward the knowing power of the subject. As such, in this case it goes through, as we have seen above, all the apprehensive powers of the sensitive soul, being further abstracted from its matter by each successive power, until it is deposited in the memory. From here it is completely abstracted from all sensible matter and rendered an intelligible *species* by the agent intellect and deposited in the possible intellect ("nel possibile intellecto"). Here it takes its place as in a subject ("comen subgetto loco") and here it remains, since there is no further power or place for it to go ("et dimoranza"). The thing from which this form was abstracted is now known, and the form itself, now a concept, is that through which the thing tends towards the intellect and through which the intellect tends towards the thing. Cf. E. Gilson, "Review of *G. Cavalcanti Rime*," in *Criterion*, XII (1932-33), p. 109: "The origin of our concepts is a form perceived by our senses (*veduta forma*), abstracted from the sensible image by an act of understanding (*che s'intende*) and impressed by the active intellect in the possible intellect (*nel possibile intellecto*), where it stays as in its receiving and conserving subject (*chome in subgetto locho e dimoranza*)." Consequently, since the form from which love arises reaches the intellect, love is not wholly confined to the sensitive soul; there is something intellectual about it. This agrees with what was said in the preceding lines about love being subject to the will, for the will, as we have seen, is known as the rational appetite. Therefore, the love of which Guido speaks in this poem is properly human, for brute animals, having neither intellect nor will, cannot participate in it.

P. 165, ll. 10-24:

But beginning with, *en quella parte mai non a posanza*, etc. (1.24), Guido removes any quasi error or doubt that may have arisen from what has just been said. For since it has just been said that the cause of love is the species of some visible form which comes to the possible intellect, one might think that by these words Guido meant to say that the passion of love has its being in the possible intellect. But this is not true, and thus to remove any such doubt Guido says that love as a passion does not have its being in the possible intellect, for the possible intellect is not a particular corporeal power inasmuch as it is not a form which comes from the mixing together of the elements and their qualities. And Guido says this in, *perche da qualitate non discende*.

Here then Dino begins to consider what sort of existence love has in the intellect, for in this way he can show why it is that love as a passion has no power or place in the intellect, as Guido says in line 24. But here we are to understand that it is love as a passion which has no place in the intellect, for as we have seen (p. 186), a passion is that which a man suffers in his body from the motion of the sensible appetite towards its object. Consequently, since the intellect is unmixed with body, love as it exists in the intellect will not have the character of a passion. Thus love is to be differently considered according as it is in the sensitive appetite, where it exists as a passion of the body, and in the intellect, where, as lacking any sensitive affection, it is not a passion; cf. St. Thomas, *In de anima*, I. lect. x, n. 162: "Et ideo haec, amor, odium, gaudium et huiusmodi possunt intelligi, et prout sunt in appetitu sensitiva et sic habent motum corporalem conjunctum: et prout sunt in intellectu et voluntate tantum absque omni affectione sensitiva, et sic non possunt dici motus, quia non habent motum corporalem conjunctum." And at present we are concerned with love as it exists in the intellect, where it has no being as a passion, since the intellect is not a corporeal power, nor mixed with body.

That the possible intellect (as well as the agent intellect, cf. *De anima*, III. v, 430a17) is not mixed with body in any way is clear from what Aristotle says in the *De anima*, III iv, 429a18-26: For since the intellect knows all things, it must be unmixed with matter; that is, it must not be determined to any one thing, but be possible in respect to all. In this, as St. Thomas points out in commenting upon this passage (*In de ani.* III. lect. vii, n. 681) the intellect is distinguished from the senses which are determined to one thing; thus sight is determined to visible things, hearing to audible, etc., whereas the intellect wholly lacks any such determination. For if it were determined to one thing, it would be unable to know other things, just as the sight, if it were determined to any one color, would be unable to see other colors; thus just as the sense of sight is unmixed with color, since it is apt to see colors, so the intellect is unmixed with sensible and corporeal things, since it is apt to know all sensible and corporeal things. Therefore, as Aristotle goes on to say, it is unreasonable that the intellect should be mixed with body either as having the qualities, such as hot or cold, or some organ, such as a sensitive power; that is the intellect is not mixed with either a simple or a composite body. But since a composite body is one that is composed out of the simple, it is sufficient to state that the intellect is not mixed with the simple bodies in order to show the intellect is in no way mixed with body, and this is what Guido accomplishes in saying *da qualitate non discende* (1.25). For the simple or first bodies are the elements, which, as Aristotle says (*De generatione*, II. i, 329a24-26), come from prime matter as accompanied with contrariety. But this contrariety of prime matter is due to the first or elemental qualities, which are those to which all others can be reduced and yet which themselves cannot be further reduced, namely the hot and dry, moist and cold (*ibid.*, 329b25-29). And from these the elements are constituted according to the various combinations of the qualities; thus fire is the hot and dry, air the hot and moist, water the cold and moist, and earth the cold and dry (*ibid.* II, iii, 330b-6). Therefore, by saying that the possible intellect does not "descend from quality," Guido means that it is not in any way mixed with body; for if it does not come from the first qualities, it is not constituted of the elements, which are the simplest parts of all bodies. Consequently, since the intellect is not mixed with body, love cannot exist in the intellect as a passion, for as a passion it must be mixed with body, and hence love as a passion has no being in the intellect, since it is not a corporeal power.

P. 165, ll. 24-34:

The intellect is a certain form removed from particularity and corruptibility, since corruptibility proceeds from the elemental qualities. Therefore the possible intellect first and properly receives what is universal and incorruptible. And this is what Guido would say in *risplende in se perpetuale effecto* (l. 26), that is, the operation of the intellect is as the effect of the soul in respect of something that is perpetual and incorruptible. Consequently, since the intellect is not a particular corporeal power such as the sensitive powers, love cannot exist as a passion in the intellect, since it is a certain particular corporeal passion.

If the intellect is not at all mixed with matter, as we have just seen, then it is free of all corruptibility and particularity, since these are due to the presence of matter. It is free of corruptibility since it is free of the elemental qualities, which are the source of corruptibility. For as Aristotle says, generation and corruption are from contraries (*Phys.* VIII. vii, 261a34); but as we have seen above (p. 134), the contraries of prime matter, i.e. the first contraries, are the elemental qualities. Therefore the changing of these qualities have as a result generation and corruption (*De gen. et corrup.* II, i, 329a6). But since the corruption of one thing is always the generation of another (*ibid.* I, iii, 318a24-25), we find for instance that the corruption of fire is the generation of air, for fire, being hot and dry, becomes air, the hot and moist, when the dry is dominated by the moist (*ibid.* II, iv, 331a26-30). Thus by this change of the elemental qualities the elements are transformed, but since the elements are the simplest bodies of which all complex bodies are composed, their generation and corruption will cause the same in any complex body. Consequently, since the intellect is not constituted by the elements, it will be free from all corruption. Furthermore, it is not mixed with matter, being unmixed with the elements and their qualities, and therefore will be beyond any particularity, for as Aristotle says, it is matter that individualizes things (*Metaphys.* V, vi, 1016b35; cf. also XII, viii, 1074a33); thus Socrates and Plato for instance are diverse individuals on account of their matter, for both have the same specific form of man. Therefore the intellect, being removed from particularity and corruptibility, is first and properly concerned with that which is universal and incorruptible, which is signified by Guido in saying *risplende in se perpetuale effecto*. For as Dino says, its operation is as the effect of the soul in respect to what is incorruptible. But its operation is dependent on its being in act, which is brought about, as we have seen by the agent intellect according as it separates the potentially intelligible from matter and its conditions by shining upon it, just as light in shining upon colors makes them illuminated; cf. St. Albert, III *De anima*, Tr. II, cap. xviii, t. 5, p. 364b: "et sic ille intellectus (agens) potentia intelligibilia facit actu intelligibilia per hoc quod separet ea a materia, et a conditionibus materiae, *resplendendo* super ea, sicut lumen resplendo super colores facit eos resultare in lucido." (italics mine). Since, however, the intelligibles in this state are completely separated from matter, they are removed from any of the consequences of matter and hence are perpetual and incorruptible. Therefore, considered in itself (Guido's *in se*), i.e. without reference to the material means on which our intellect depends, the effect of the intellect, as in act, is to have the intelligibles completely separated from their matter and shining in the light of its intelligibility. Cf. St. Albert, III *De somno et vig.* Tr. I, cap. vi, t. 9, p. 184b: "Avicenna et Algazel per omnia concordantes dicunt animam intellectualem non esse in corpore, sed potius *illustrare in ipsum suum splendorem*. Dicunt enim quod intellectus in homine de natura intellectus est agens, et est *proprius eius effectus*." (italics mine).

Thus we see again why love as a passion cannot be located in the intellect, for that which belongs to a corporeal and hence corruptible power could not be in the intellect, which is incorporeal and incorruptible.

P. 165, ll. 34-47:

The operation of the intellect is pure consideration and spiritual apprehension, which is what Guido says in *non a dilecto*; i.e. it has no corporeal delectations such as are in the passion of love and hence has no passion such as anger, sadness and the like. However, although the intellect has no corporeal delectation, it does have a spiritual delectation which follows from its proper operation when perfect. Whence Aristotle says in the *Ethics* that philosophy affords many delectations of purity and stability. But this delectation is not such as that of love, which is corporeal, as a passion of the sensitive soul. For the operation of the intellect is pure consideration and spiritual apprehension, which Guido says in *ma consideranza*, i.e. its operation is to consider and know.

Here Dino shows that the operation of the intellect is not such as would satisfy the passion of love. For its operation is pure consideration and spiritual apprehension, but as pure and spiritual, it cannot be concerned with anything so material as a passion of the sensitive appetite. Therefore love as a passion will not properly be located in the intellect. But by consideration and spiritual apprehension Dino signifies the first two operations of the intellect (cf. St. Thomas, *In de Anima*, I, lect. x, n. 164), which Aristotle considers in the *De anima*, III, cap. vi. The first operation of the intellect is the apprehension of simple or indivisible things; thus the apprehension of Socrates as man is the apprehension of the simple concept man. But when I apprehend that Socrates is a white man, I accomplish the second operation of the intellect, which is the compounding and dividing of concepts so as to express a judgment; thus in apprehending that Socrates is a white man, I put together the concepts of man and whiteness so as to make the judgment, "Socrates is a white man." But since I am dealing with concepts in these operations, which have been gotten, as we have seen, by abstraction from the materials of sense, I will have no corporeal delectation from such an operation; whence Guido says of the intellect, *non a dilecto ma consideranza*. However, as Dino points out, *dilecto* here is to be taken only in the sense of corporeal delectation, inasmuch as there is a certain spiritual delectation connected with the intellect. For as Aristotle points out, there are two kinds of delectation, one of the body and the other of the soul (*Eth. Nic.* III, x, 1117b29). Consequently although the intellect has no corporeal delectation, being completely unmixed with body, it does have a spiritual one, which follows from its own proper operation when perfect, just as any power, corporeal or not, has its proper delectation when operating perfectly (*ibid.* X, iv, 1174b20). Thus Aristotle says that philosophy affords many delectations of purity and stability (*Ibid.* 1177a25). But this is not the delectation such as would occur in love, which is corporeal as a passion of the sensitive soul. Therefore, when Guido says that the intellect has no delight but consideration, he means that it has no corporeal delight, but its operation is considering and knowing, whose delight is not corporeal, but spiritual; whence love as a passion will have no place therein.

P. 165, l. 48-p. 166, l. 4:

Consequently, in *si che non puo largire simiglianza* (28), Guido says that no such passion as love or any other corporeal passion can come to the intellect. For as Aristotle says in the *De anima* (I, iv, 408b13), to say that the soul is happy or sad is similar to saying it weaves or builds.



Now for the reasons given (p. 199 sq.) Guido states his conclusion that the intellect cannot grant a likeness to love as a sensitive passion, for since it is incorporeal and incorruptible it can in no way have a likeness of that which is corporeal and corruptible, as the passion of love is. Yet if love were to exist in the intellect, it would have to be there as a certain likeness, for the intellect knows a thing through the likeness it has of that thing. For as Aristotle says, the intellect in act is the same as the thing in act (*De anima*, III, vii, 431a1), wherefore there must be a likeness in the intellect to the thing known; and this likeness is the intelligible species by which the intellect knows the thing; cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 85, 2: "id quod intelligitur primo, est res, cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo." But as we have seen above (p. 196-197), the intelligible species is completely abstracted from matter and its conditions; it is universal and hence incorporeal and incorruptible. Consequently if love were to be in the intellect, it would be there as somehow abstracted from all its matter, as a universal or concept, so that it would no longer properly have the character of a passion of the sensitive soul, which is material in virtue of being connected with the sensitive appetite which is a corporeal power. Therefore Guido says that the intellect can make no likeness of love as a passion, for it would have to abstract it from the very conditions which make it a passion. As in the intellect then, love will not have the character of a passion, but will be only that form from which love can arise once the appetite has grasped it; but we shall have to consider how this happens when we come to the fifth stanza.

In resume, then, love as a passion has no existence in the possible intellect, because it, the possible intellect, does not descend from quality, that is, it is unmixed with any corporeal form, which comes from a mixing of the qualities of the elements. Here it is well to note that Dino understands *amore* to be the subject of *non a posanza*, whereas he takes *intellecto* to be the subject of the causal clause and of all that follows in this stanza. *Qualitate* is taken, as we have seen, to signify the first qualities which constitute the elements, of which, in turn, every corporeal form is composed. The intellect is said not to descend, (*non descende*) from quality in the sense of not coming from what is first as simplest in the composition of corporeal forms. Therefore, since love has its existence from some corporeal thing, inasmuch as it is a sensitive passion, it does not have any existence in a completely incorporeal power such as the intellect is. In fact, the form from which love arises, as it exists in the intellect, generates no corporeal and corruptible things such as love is; it is universal as an intelligible basking in the light of intelligibility and, hence, being completely removed from matter and its conditions, it is purely spiritual and incorruptible. But it has been rendered thus by the intellect, and, therefore, Guido says that the intellect shines in its own perpetual effect (*risplende in se perpetuale effecto*). Since, however, this form is in the intellect as an object of knowledge, it does not generate any corporeal delight, but it generates knowledge. What delight it does generate is purely spiritual as the delight which the intellect has in functioning perfectly, which is in knowing; whence Guido says that it has no delight but consideration (*non a dilecto ma consideranza*). Cf. Gilson, *Cavalcanti, Rime*, op. cit., p. 109: "Considered as a form that is simply understood in the intellect, love has no real power (*e in quella parte mai non a posanza*); in other words, being then a purely rational quality, it does not generate delight, but knowledge (*non a diletto ma consideranza*); quite different is the sensible emotion generated by the contemplation of a beautiful form, it delights and, sometimes, it kills." This being so, the intellect can grant no likeness to love as a sensitive passion; it can hold no likeness of a corporeal and corruptible thing. Whence Guido says, *non puo largire simiglianza*. Con-

sequently, since love exists in the intellect only as the form of that from which love arises, which is being known but not desired, it is not there as a passion; but is there as incorporeal and incorruptible whereas love derives its power, and exercises it, from being a corporeal and corruptible thing. Therefore, love does not find its proper existence in the intellect.

We have, then, in the second stanza the answer to the first two questions which Guido posited, namely where love is and who created it ("la dove posa et chi lo fa creare"). We have seen in what sense love is in the memory in the first part of the stanza, and in the second part we have learned that Mars and a seen form are the causes of love. These are not, however, either unqualified or complete answers to these questions, and already in the course of this one stanza we have found that love is not only in the memory but is also somehow in the heart as well as in the possible intellect. Furthermore, concerning the second question, we have found that not only can the causality of Mars be frustrated by the will, in the case of love, but the causality of the seen form is not merely sensitive: it reaches the intellect, so that there is something intellectual as well as sensual to love. In one sense, then, an answer has been given in this stanza to these two questions, but in another sense, the complete answer cannot be given until we have finished the poem. Therefore, in the course of the poem we shall not only be answering new questions as they arise, but we shall also be completing our answers to the questions that have gone before.

*(To be continued)*

# The Franciscan *Ordo Missæ* in the Thirteenth Century

V. L. KENNEDY, C.S.B.

THE General Chapter of the Friars Minor held at Narbonne in 1260 under the presidency of St. Bonaventure, then Minister General, decreed that the text of the breviaries and missals should be corrected according to the *exemplar verius*.<sup>1</sup> We may assume then that by the year 1260, there was in circulation a missal which was recognized as the official mass book of the Friars Minor; and, in fact, the libraries of Europe have preserved a comparatively large number of copies of this Franciscan missal, some of which may be dated as early as this period.<sup>2</sup> The subsequent good fortune and high destiny of this missal are well known. Rudolph of Rivo, (+1403), a devotee of the ancient Roman rite, complains that in his day all the service books at Rome are "new and Franciscan" as a result of the decree of Nicholas III (1277-1280) who imposed the missal and the breviary of the Friars Minor on the clergy of Rome.<sup>3</sup> Popularized by the sons of St. Francis, this missal was widely used throughout Europe in the late Middle Ages and served as the base for the definitive Roman missal imposed on the Latin church by Pius V in 1570.<sup>4</sup>

The history of the origin and development of this mass book up to 1260 still presents some puzzling problems to the historian and not a few details require clarification. Although we know that St. Francis himself gave a definite Roman trend to the liturgical services of his Order,<sup>5</sup> we are far from certain of the identity of the person or persons who adapted the service books of Rome to the needs of the Franciscans. We intend to confine ourselves here to the question of the missal; the history of the breviary has been reasonably well done<sup>6</sup> and we shall not touch on it here except incidentally and in so far as it is inseparable from the history of the missal. The problem will be dealt with under the following heads: (a) The Liturgi-

<sup>1</sup> Studeant ministri quod usque ad sequens capitulum generale littera breviorum et missalium corrigatur secundum exemplar verius quod habere poterunt secundum ordinis approbatam consuetudinem. "Diffinitiones Capituli Generalis Narbonensis," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, iii (1910), 502. (ed. Delorme).

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, ms. 426 (223), — a Franciscan missal dated 1254-1261. Cf. V. Leroquais, *Les Sacramentaires et les Missels manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1924), p. 125-127.

<sup>3</sup> Sciendum tamen quod Nicolaus papa tertius, natione Romanus de genere Ursinorum . . . fecit in ecclesiis urbis amoveri antiphonarios, gradualia, missalia et alios libros officii antequam quinquaginta et mandavit ut de cetero ecclesiae Urbis uterentur libris et breviariis Fratrum minorum, quorum regulam etiam confirmavit. Unde hodie in Roma omnes libri sunt novi et Franciscani . . . *De canonum observantia liber*. Propositio xxii. (ed.

Mohlberg, vol. 2, p. 128.)

<sup>4</sup> Cf. P. Batiffol, *Leçons sur la messe* (12 ed. Paris, 1927), pp. 2-5. J. Baudot, O.S.B., *Le missel romain*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1912), pp. 89-96; 113-124.

<sup>5</sup> Rule of 1223, c. 3. *Opuscula S. P. Francisci* (Quaracchi, 1904), p. 66. — Et clerici faciant divinum officium secundum ordinem Sanctae Romanae ecclesiae, excepto psalterio, ex quo habere poterunt breviaria.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Baümer-Biron, *Histoire du bréviaire*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1905), pp. 22-33. P. Batiffol, *History of the Roman Breviary* (London, 1912), pp. 120-176. A. Le Carou, O.F.M., *L'Office divin chez les frères mineurs au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1928). All three studies are somewhat defective since they do not take into account the *Ordo romanae ecclesiae curiae . . . temporibus Innocentii tertii*. For the importance of this document, see the excellent study of Michel Andrieu, "L'Ordinaire de la chapelle papale et le Cardinal Jacques Gaetani Stefaneschi," *Ephemerides Liturgicae* xlix (1935) 230-260.

cal Work of Haymo of Faversham. (b) The *Ordinationes divini Officii* and the *Indutus planeta*. (c) The *Ordo missae* and the *Indutus planeta*.

(a) *The Liturgical Work of Haymo of Faversham*

Salimbene, the thirteenth century chronicler of the Franciscan Order, tells us that John of Parma, Minister General from 1247 to 1257, sent a letter to all the houses of the Order in which he gave instructions that the ecclesiastical office should be celebrated in a uniform way by all.<sup>7</sup> Fortunately, a copy of this letter, which begins: *Quia sicut indubitanter*, has been preserved for us by Luke Wadding in his *Annals*.<sup>8</sup> In the course of this letter, in which he demands uniformity not only in the Office but also in the celebration of Mass, John of Parma makes two statements which are of interest to us here:

a) . . . *districte duxi praesentibus injungendum quod praeter id solum quod ordinarium missalis et breviarium a fratre Aymone sanctae recordationis praecessore meo pio correctum studio et per Sedem Apostolicam confirmatum et approbatum postea nihilominus per generale capitulum noscitur continere, ut nihil omnino . . . in choro cantari vel legi . . .*

b) *In missarum celebratione uniformitatem doceatis a cunctis fratribus quantum fieri poterit observari; ut videlicet hostiam a sinistra sacerdotis et calicem ad dexteram, juxta ritum Romanae ecclesiae, ex traverso altaris componant. Corporalia et pallam quae per se divisam debent calici superponi, disponent, necnon hostiam frangant, et sumant sicut in rubricis missalis quod habemus a curia continentur . . .*

Apparently then, about the year 1250 John of Parma the Minister General believed that the missal in use in his Order was essentially that of the Roman curia and that this missal had undergone some modification or correction<sup>9</sup> at the hands of his predecessor Haymo of Faversham who had held the highest office in the Order from 1240 to his death in 1244.

We find some confirmation for these statements in the Franciscan missal itself. The mass book of the Friars Minor always bears the title: *Ordo missalis Fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem curiae romanae*. In the oldest copies of this missal, the feast of St. Clare canonized in 1255 is missing or has been added *après coup*;<sup>10</sup> on the other hand all copies contain the feasts of: St. Francis of Assisi canonized in 1225; St. Anthony of Padua canonized in 1232; St. Dominic canonized in 1234; and St. Elizabeth of Hungary, canonized in 1235. We may assume that the work of adapting the curial missal to the needs of the Friars was done between 1235 and 1255; there is then no internal evidence against Haymo's composition of the *Ordo missalis Fratrum Minorum*.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Quod frater Joannes de Parma unam per totum ordinem misit epistolam in qua praecipiebat ecclesiasticum officium uniformiter ab omnibus cantaretur. Chronica* (ed. Holder-Egger), *Mon. Germ. Hist. Scriptores* vol. 32, p. 301. This letter was certainly known to the author of the *Catalogus Generalium Ministrorum* (ante 1304) who gives its contents in speaking of John of Parma. Cf. *ibid.* p. 662.

<sup>8</sup> *Annales Minorum* ad annum 1249; 3rd ed. p. 208-209.

<sup>9</sup> We assume that the phrase *prio correctum studio* modifies both *ordinarium missalis* and *breviarium*; such an interpretation is grammatically sound.

<sup>10</sup> e.g. Paris, Bibl. Maz. ms. 426; Leroquais, *op. cit.* p. 127.

<sup>11</sup> At the present stage of our research, we

hesitate to attribute the composition of the Franciscan missal unreservedly to Haymo. We suspect that there was an early imperfect attempt at adaptation, similar to the place of the Breviary of St. Clare in the history of the breviary. At least one manuscript that we know of, contains a missal which appears to be earlier than the regular Franciscan type; it contains a considerable number of rubrics apparently taken from the *Ordinarium* in use at the curia in the time of Innocent III, and lacks some of the features always found in the regular missal. We hope to return to this question at a later date when it will be possible to secure the necessary photostats from various belligerent countries. It may be possible to reconstruct the actual missal of the curia by the help of these documents.

It is quite impossible to say just how much work was involved in this composition; so far, at least, no copy of the curial missal of the first half of the thirteenth century has been discovered.<sup>12</sup> Two hypotheses are possible: (a) there existed a missal *secundum consuetudinem curiae romanae* essentially the same as what we now know as the Franciscan missal; the masses for the new saints were added and the copyist simply inserted the words *Fratrum minorum* in the title. (b) An entirely new mass book was composed from the service books in use at the curia, so as to give priests of the Order a convenient, serviceable missal. In support of the first hypothesis, we have the statement of John of Parma "missalis quod habemus a curia," and the fact that there is little in the new missal that would not be found in a Roman mass book of the time; the order of the material is essentially the same as found in the old Lateran Missal;<sup>13</sup> the *Ordo missae* shows but few changes from that described by Cardinal Lotario (Innocent III) in his *De sacro altaris mysterio*.<sup>14</sup> Further, we know that Innocent III reformed the liturgy to meet the needs of the curia and this reform probably involved the composition of a missal for the curia.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, in support of the second hypothesis, the objection may be raised: if the missal of the Friars is nothing but that of the curia, why then did Nicholas III impose the Franciscan missal on the churches of Rome rather than the curial mass book? We do not, of course, know the answer; his choice may have been due to the fact that a larger number of Franciscan missals were available. In any case, our ignorance of the exact content of the curial missal, makes it impossible to determine exactly the difference between the two mass books; we may assume from the statement of John of Parma and from the title of the book itself, that the Franciscan missal was basically and essentially the same as that of the Roman curia.

Haymo of Faversham is credited with another liturgical composition. The author of the Chronicle of the Twenty-four Ministers General, writing about 1369, states:<sup>16</sup>

Hic (Haymo) etiam in capitulo generali deffinitorum quod tenuit Bononiae fecit illam rubricam de agendis in missa quae incipit *Indutus planeta sacerdos* et fecit divinum officium diligentius corrigi et rubricas alias suppleri de voluntate domini Innocentii Papae IV privilegiis declarata.

This is simply a development of a similar notice for Haymo which was written about 1304 in the Catalogue of the Ministers General.<sup>17</sup>

Hic (Haymo) fecit divinum officium corrigi et rubricas suppleri de voluntate et beneplacito domini Innocentii Papae IV privilegiis declarata.

This statement that Haymo was the author of the rubric *Indutus planeta* is repeated by subsequent writers<sup>18</sup> and is generally accepted as true by modern Franciscan

<sup>12</sup> Cf. previous note.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. A. Ebner, *Quellen u. Forschungen zur Geschichte u. Kunstgeschichte des Missale Romanum in Mittelalter. Iter Italicum*. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1896), pp. 168-169.

<sup>14</sup> P.L. 207, 802-914.

<sup>15</sup> Hic (Innocentius III) etiam officium ecclesiasticum in melius correxerat et ordinavit et de suo addidit et de alieno dempsit. Salimbene, *Chronica* (ed. Holder-Egger) *Mon. Germ. Hist. Scriptores* vol. 32, p. 31.

<sup>16</sup> *Chronica xxiv Generalium Ordinis Minorum in Analecta Franciscana* vol. 3 (Quaracchi, 1897), p. 247.

<sup>17</sup> *Catalogus Generalium Ministrorum Ordinis*

*Fratrum Minorum in Mon. Germ. Hist. Scriptores* vol. 32, p. 660. The same document is published as *Chronicon xiv vel xv Generalium Ministrorum Ordinis Fratrum Minorum in Analecta Franciscana* vol. 3, p. 696. For the decree of Innocent IV referred to here, cf. Potthast, *Regesta Rom. Pontificum* vol. 2, p. 970, N. 11420; also Sbaralea, *Bullarium* I, 344.

<sup>18</sup> e.g. *Chronica Fr. Mariani in Archivum Fran. Hist.* ii (1909) 305; *Speculum Minorum* (Rothomagi, 1509), Tract, iii, fol. 222<sup>v</sup>, in margin; *Speculum Minorum seu Firmamentum Trium Ordinum* (Venetiis, 1513), fol. 32. (*Breve memoriale Ordinis Fr. Min.*); Wadding, *Annales* ad an. 1242.

scholars.<sup>19</sup> It is curious, however, that the chronicler of 1304 does not seem to know about this phase of Haymo's liturgical activity. No doubt it is possible that a writer in 1369 could be in possession of facts which were unknown to an earlier chronicler but his testimony should not be accepted at face value without some supporting evidence.

The rubric *Indutus planeta* referred to here is a little book of directions for a priest saying Mass according to the Roman rite; its real title as found in early manuscripts is: *Ordo agendorum et dicendorum a sacerdote in missa juxta consuetudinem ecclesiae romanae*. It has been published in a number of early Franciscan printed collections<sup>20</sup> and again in modern times by a rather well-known liturgical scholar who edited it as a sixteenth century document and one that was probably not Roman.<sup>21</sup> There is no indication in any thirteenth or fourteenth century manuscript, so far as we now know, of the author. John of Parma in his letter *Quia sicut indubitanter*, when giving directions to his subjects on the celebration of Mass does not refer to it; neither does the Chapter of Narbonne (1263). On the other hand, the *Indutus planeta* is found in at least one Franciscan missal of the second half of the thirteenth century;<sup>22</sup> apparently its use was prescribed by the General Chapter held at Paris in 1266. Nicholas Glassberger in his *Chronica* gives us the following information:

Anno Domini 1266 fuit capitulum generale Parisiis . . . item moneantur fratres ut uniformiter se habeant in officio missae secundum ordinationem et rubricam illam quae incipit: *Indutus planeta sacerdos*.<sup>23</sup>

This statement of Glassberger's is supported by a rubric found in an early fifteenth century Franciscan breviary (Paris B.N. Lat. 760):

f. 266: Item diffinivit generale capitulum Parisiis celebratum quod moneantur fratres ut uniformiter se habeant in officio missae secundum ordinationem et rubricam illam quae incipit: *Indutus sacerdos*.<sup>24</sup>

It is to be noted that the Chapter of Paris did not make any mention of the author. However, before we come to any conclusion, we must study the *Indutus planeta* in relation to the other liturgical documents of the period.

### (b) *The Indutus planeta and the Ordinationes divini officii*

An other Franciscan liturgical document of the thirteenth century is the *Ordinationes divini officii* or as it is sometimes called the *Caerimoniale Vetustissimum*.<sup>25</sup> This is a

<sup>19</sup> H. Golubovich, O.F.M., "Cereemoniale Ordinis Minorum Vetustissimum," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* iii (1910) 56; Eusèbe Clop, O.F.M. "S. François et la liturgie de la chapelle papale" *ibid.* xix (1926) 787; Hugo Dausend, "Franziskanerorden u. Entwicklung der Liturgie," *Franziskanische Studien* xi (1924) 170. P. Gratien, *Histoire de la fondation et de l'évolution de l'Ordre des Frères mineurs aux xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1928), p. 170, etc., etc.

<sup>20</sup> e.g. *Speculum Minorum* (Rothomagi, 1509), Tract. iii, fol. 222<sup>v</sup> ff. *Monumenta Ordinis Minorum* (Salamanca, 1511), Part. ii, fol. 226 ff.

<sup>21</sup> J. Wickham Legg, *Tracts on the Mass* (Henry Bradshaw Society vol. 27) (London, 1904), pp. 178-188. This edition is based on the text found in early sixteenth century Roman missals, cf. *Introduction* p. xxix. In his notes to the *Indutus planeta*, p. 251, Legg says: 'this direction . . . renders it likely that we are not dealing with Roman rubrics.'

<sup>22</sup> Paris, B. N. Lat. 10,503, fol. 134 ff.; cf.

Leroquais, *Les sacramentaires et les missels*, etc. vol. 2, p. 128.

<sup>23</sup> *Analecta Francescana* II, p. 78. On this Chapter of Paris, cf. F. Ehrle, *Die ältesten Redaktionen der Generalconstitutionen d. Franziskanerordens in Archiv für Literatur- u. Kirchengeschichte* vol. 6 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1892), pp. 38-40. The *Diffinitiones* of this chapter were published by A. G. Little, "Definitiones capitulorum generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum 1260-1282," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* vii (1914) 678, from a late thirteenth century manuscript; unfortunately the notice about the *Indutus planeta* is here omitted; but as Little points out (p. 676) "Fatendum est in nostro MS. omissiones . . . esse graviore . . ."

<sup>24</sup> Quoted from: V. Leroquais, *Les breviaires manuscrits*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1934), p. 439.

<sup>25</sup> Edited by Fr. Hieronymus Golubovich, "Cereemoniale Ord. Minorum Vetustissimum seu Ordinationes Divini Officii," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* iii (1910) 55-81.

series of regulations for the celebration of the Divine Office and the conventual Mass. Franciscan scholars following the editor of this document, Fr. Hieronymus Golubovich, are agreed (a) that John of Parma is the author of the *Ordinationes*, (b) that Haymo of Faversham is the author of the *Indutus planeta*.<sup>26</sup> Now if one takes the trouble to read through the text of the *Indutus planeta*, he will find therein two references to the *Ordinationes*:

a) Quales autem et quot ministri et qualiter se debeant habere in missa ordinata vel sollemni, praesente vel non praesente episcopo, in ordinationibus divini officii declarabitur.

b) De benedictione vero incensi et incensatione et aliis quae pertinent ad sollemnitatem habebitur in ordinationibus.<sup>27</sup>

Apparently then, if John of Parma, Minister General from 1247 to 1257, is the author of the *Ordinationes*, Haymo of Faversham, Minister General 1240-1244 cannot be the author of the *Indutus planeta*, or if Haymo is the author of the *Indutus planeta*, then John cannot be the author of the *Ordinationes*. Since the *Indutus planeta* quotes the *Ordinationes*, the latter should be the prior document, or both might be the work of one man.<sup>28</sup> However this does not necessarily mean that Haymo is not the author of the *Indutus planeta*, for the argument submitted by Father Golubovich that John of Parma is the author of the *Ordinationes* is unsound on more than one count.

In his introduction to the text, he presents the following arguments in favor of the authorship of John of Parma: (a) The *Ordinationes* are first mentioned in the General Chapter of Pisa (1263) but no early writer gives any indication of the authorship if we except Fr. Marianus (+1523) who assigns the treatise to Haymo of Faversham. (b) However, from the implicit testimony of the London manuscript of the *Ordinationes*, it is quite clear that the author is John of Parma: Article 29 of the text found in this manuscript mentions John's letter *Indubitanter*; Articles 24 and 29 show that the *Ordinationes* must be subsequent to the chapter of Metz (1251). (c) Articles 37 and 49 of the same text were revised by an apostolic letter dated June 1, 1256; and since there is no mention of the feast of St. Clare (canonised 1255), these statutes must have been issued before 1255. The author is John of Parma who promulgated the *Ordinationes*, in all probability, at the chapter of Genoa (1254).<sup>29</sup> In describing the manuscripts employed for the edition of the

<sup>26</sup> The only Franciscan writer, so far as we have been able to discover, who disagrees with these conclusions is P. Eusèbe Clop who claims both the *Ordinationes* and the *Indutus planeta* for Haymo: "S. François et la liturgie de la chapelle papale," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* xix (1926) 35-36.

<sup>27</sup> The text will be found in an Appendix to this article

<sup>28</sup> The use of the future tense (*declarabitur*, *habebitur*) in the two references to the *Ordinationes* might indicate that author of the *Indutus planeta* had in mind the composition of the *Ordinationes*; on the other hand the *Indutus planeta* is the normal place for these rubrics and the composer would normally place them therein, unless they had already appeared in another document (the *Ordinationes*), in which case, a reference would save considerable labor. Further, if the *Indutus planeta* preceded the *Ordinationes* why does the latter not refer to the former for the rubrics on the celebration of Mass? In any case, any argument, based on

the use of the future tense in these references, will have to take into account all the evidence given in this article for the priority in time of the *Ordinationes*.

<sup>29</sup> *Archivum Fran. Hist.* iii (1910) 58-60. A few of these dates are apparently faulty. It has since been shown that the Chapter of Metz took place in 1254. Cf. P. Michael Bihl, O.F.M. "De capitulo generale O.M. Metensi anno 1254 adsignando," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* iv (1911) 425-435. What was then the date of the Chapter of Genoa at which John of Parma is supposed to have promulgated these statutes? If we are not mistaken, the next General Chapter after that of Metz (1254) is the Chapter of Rome in 1257 at which John of Parma was succeeded by St. Bonaventure. P. F. Delorme suggests that the *Ordinationes* were promulgated by the Chapter of Rome (1257), cf. "Diffinitiones capituli generalis Narbonensis," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* iii (1910) 501.

text, Fr. Golubovich informs us that he used as base the fifteenth century London manuscript (British Museum 21,115) since it alone preserves the complete text, i.e. it contains some twenty-two paragraphs which are missing almost completely in other manuscripts and printed editions. These other manuscripts are: Oxford, Bodleian misc. 75, xiii century (O); Vatican, Reg. 429 xiv century (V); Rome, "penes Cappuccinos," xiv century (C); Rome, Colleg. S. Antonii, no date (R); Bologna, Archigymnasium 16,b,V.24, xv century (B). The printed editions appeared in 1509, 1511 and 1512; they are designated by the letters S, M and F respectively.<sup>30</sup> According to our editor, all these manuscripts and editions are defective or interpolated; only the fifteenth century London manuscript has the true text.<sup>31</sup> It is conceivable that such may be a true statement of the case; the chances are however that exactly the opposite is true, namely, that the original text will be found in the thirteenth and fourteenth century manuscripts and that the late London manuscript is interpolated.

If we examine the critical apparatus of his edition, we find that where the text is common to all the manuscripts, the London included, the variants are confined to a word, a phrase, the addition of a feast or a list of feasts; that is to say, they are the natural and normal variants to be expected in a liturgical text.<sup>32</sup> When we come to the twenty-two additional articles (20-25; 28-29; 34-37; 48-51; 70-75) we find the following information in the notes:

- a) OCSVMAFR non habent #20-25 inclusive.<sup>33</sup>
- b) OMFSCVAR non habent prorsus #28-29.<sup>34</sup>
- c) Solum quidam codd, a nobis collati vel unam vel alteram ex istis #34-37 habent.<sup>35</sup>
- d) OMFCVSAR non habent #48-51.<sup>36</sup>
- e) #70-75 desunt in OCVMFVSAR.<sup>37</sup>

We submit that it is quite clear from Fr. Golubovich's edition that the London manuscript is a badly interpolated text of the *Ordinationes* and that the original text can be very easily determined from the early manuscripts.<sup>38</sup> Further, the whole argument for the authorship of John of Parma is unsound since it is based essentially on interpolated articles (24, 29, 37, 49) of this late fifteenth century manuscript. Let us hope that some Franciscan scholar will give us a truly critical text of these statutes; then, we may be able to determine from internal evidence the date of composition, if not the name of the author.

In the *Ordinationes* there are some twenty-five articles which deal with the celebration of Mass and the attendance of the Friars at Mass; the duties of the priest, deacon, subdeacon and acolytes for a solemn Mass are given briefly and regulations are laid down for the conduct of those assisting in the choir and for the order to be observed in approaching the Holy Table.<sup>39</sup> Apparently it is the conventual service both of the Office and the Mass with which the *Ordinationes* are primarily concerned. On the other hand, the *Indutus planeta* deals with a priest saying a private Mass or the conventual Mass in a small monastery where the number of assistants is

<sup>30</sup> Archivum Fran. Hist. iii (1910), 62-63.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Ibid.* notes for page 65, or page 73, or page 77.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* p. 67, n. (j).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 68, n. (b).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* p. 69, n. (m).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* p. 72, n. (a).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* p. 75, n. (f).

<sup>38</sup> Fortunately in the edition of Fr. Golu-

bovich, the interpolated articles are printed in larger type; but even if we eliminate these, there still remain many readings which belong to the London manuscript rather than to the original text.

<sup>39</sup> In the edition of Fr. Golubovich (AFH iii, 64-81) the following paragraphs deal with the duties of the ministers: 83-108; the conduct of the choir: 31-33; 40; 57-64, etc.; order for communion: 110.



limited;<sup>40</sup> as we pointed out above, the *Indutus planeta* refers back to the *Ordinationes* for the rules for incensing and for the duties of the ministers in a *missa ordinata et sollemni*. We suggest that the *Ordinationes* are a first attempt to supplement the meagre rubrics of the missal, and since even this collection was quite insufficient for the celebration of a private Mass, a complete set of rubrics for this latter purpose was composed: the *Indutus planeta*.

Both these documents appear to be later than the letter *Quia sicut indubitanter* of John of Parma, since he does not refer to either of them. On the other hand, the General Chapter of Pisa (1263) decrees: *Ordinationes generales de officii chori quae incipiunt: Ad omnes horas canonicas*, etc., uniformiter et generaliter ab omnibus observentur;<sup>41</sup> and, as was seen above, the General Chapter of Paris (1266) imposed the use of the *Indutus planeta*. There is no contemporary evidence on the authorship of either one or the other; the statement found in the Chronicle of the Twenty-four Ministers General (c.1369) is too late to be given credence; the same is true of Fr. Marianus' (+1523) assertion that Haymo is the author of both these documents.<sup>42</sup> Until such time as further evidence is available, we see no reason why these documents should be dated earlier than the generalate of St. Bonaventure (1257-1274).

### (c) *The Ordo Missae and the Indutus planeta*

In the Franciscan missals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the *Ordo missae* comes, as it does now in the Roman missal, between the Masses for Holy Saturday and Easter Sunday. It is invariably preceded by a collection of rubrics: *Inc. Adventus Domini celebratur*. Here are given the rules for Advent, the Quarter Tenses, the *Gloria in excelsis*, the number of collects, the *Alleluia* and the *Credo*. In the *Ordo missae* we find a uniform text up to the Canon; for the Canon, some missals give more detailed rubrics than others. Moreover, in some missals the *Indutus planeta* is inserted before the *Ordo missae*;<sup>43</sup> in one case, at least, the *Indutus planeta* has been incorporated into the *Ordo missae*.<sup>44</sup> The expansion of the rubrics for the Canon and the insertion of the *Indutus planeta* are further indications that the original *Ordo missae* was too concise and did not give the celebrant sufficient directions for saying Mass.

The Franciscan *Ordo missae* is as follows:<sup>45</sup>

<sup>40</sup> We frequently meet such phrases as the following: *si diaconus ministrat; si non affuerit subdiaconus; cum ministro vel ministris*. Cf. text in Appendix to this article.

<sup>41</sup> A. G. Little, "Definitiones cap. gen. Ordinis F. M. 1260-1282," *Archivum Fran. Hist.* vii (1914) 678.

<sup>42</sup> *Compendium Chronicarum Fratrum Minorum* ad an. 1242. *Archivum Fran. Hist.* ii (1909) 305.

<sup>43</sup> e.g. Vatican Ottob. Lat. 574 (saec. xiv in.). The *Indutus planeta* is found in many Roman missals as late as the sixteenth century. Cf. J. Wickham Legg, *Tracts on the Mass* (London, 1904), p. xxix.

<sup>44</sup> Paris B.N. 10,503, fol. 134 ff. Selections of the *Indutus planeta* are published from this manuscript by V. Leroquais, *Les sacramentaires et les missels manuscrits*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1924), pp. 128-129.

<sup>45</sup> The edition of the *Ordo missae* is based on the following manuscripts:

(a) Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine ms. 426 (223), xiii century (1254-1261), fol. 151-158. Leroquais, *op. cit.* pp. 125-127. (M)

(b) Rome, Vatican, Reg. Lat. 2048, xiii century end, fol. 121-135. Cf. Ebner, *Iter Italicum*, pp. 242-244; the text of the Canon is published *ibid.* pp. 349-351. (V)

(c) Rome, Vatican, Ottob. 574, xiv century comm. fol. 143 ff. Ebner, *op. cit.* 235-236. This is a Roman missal. (O)

(d) Rome, Vatican Lat. 4743, xiv century late, fol. 193v-209v. Ebner, *op. cit.* pp. 215-216. (G)

For the text of the Canon, we use in addition to the above:

(a) Paris, B.N. Lat. 826, xiv century comm. fol. 136-151. Leroquais, *op. cit.* pp. 201-203. This is a Roman missal. (P)

(b) The text of the Canon published by Ebner from Naples, B.N. VI, G 38, xiii century middle. Ebner, *op. cit.* pp. 313-317. (N)

Purely orthographical variants are not noted. The spelling of the text is changed, when necessary to conform to modern liturgical Latin.

Paratus sacerdos cum intrat ad altare dicit: *Introibo ad altare Dei.* R. *Ad Deum qui laetificat juventutem meam.* Ps. *Judica me Deus* totum<sup>46</sup> cum *Gloria* et *Sicut erat* Deinde repetitur V. *Introibo.* R. *Ad Deum.* V. *Adjutorium nostrum in nomine Domini.* R. *Qui fecit.* Deinde facit confessionem. Exhinc dicat V. *Deus tu conversus vivificabis nos.* R. *Et plebs tua laetabitur in te.* V. *Ostende nobis Domine misericordiam tuam.* R. *Et salutare tuum da nobis.* V. *Domine exaudi.* R. *Et clamor.* V. *Dominus vobiscum.* R. *Et cum.* Oratio: *Aufer a nobis quaesumus Domine cunctas iniquitates nostras ut ad sancta sanctorum puris mereamur mentibus introire. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.* R. *Amen.* Postea inclinatus dicit hanc orationem: *Oramus te Domine ut per merita sanctorum tuorum quorum reliquiae hic sunt et omnium sanctorum tuorum indulgere digneris omnia peccata mea.* R. *Amen.*

Qua completa ascendit ad altare et deosculans illud accipiens thuribulum a diacono incensat altare, et reddito thuribulo diacono perlegit Introitum cum ministris. Deinde dicit *Kyrie eleison*, deinde *Gloria in excelsis Deo*<sup>47</sup> si est dicendum. Quo finito antequam dicat V. *Dominus vobiscum* osculetur altare in medio. In fine Gradualis aut Alleluia aut Tractus inclinatur se diaconus coram altari et dicit hanc orationem: *Munda cor meum ac labia mea omnipotens Deus qui labia Isaiae prophetae calculo mundasti ignito ita me tua grata miseratione dignare mundare ut sanctum evangelium digne valeam nuntiare. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.* R. *Amen.* Dicta oratione et accepto textu inclinatur se sacerdoti celebrativo et petit benedictionem. Tunc dicit sacerdos: *Dominus sit in corde tuo et in labiis tuis ut digne et competenter annunties evangelium suum.*

Quando sacerdos offert hostiam super altare dicit hanc orationem: *Suscipe sancte pater* (etc. Same as now.)

Quando mittit aquam in calicem dicit:

*Deus qui humanae substantiae* (etc. Same as now.)

Quando offert calicem super altare dicit:

*Offerimus tibi Domine calicem* (etc. Same as now.)

Deinde dicit:

*In spiritu humilitatis et in animo contrito* (etc. Same as now.)

Sequitur oratio super hostiam et calicem cum signo crucis:

*Veni sanctificator omnipotens Deus et benedic* (etc. Same as now.)

Cum ponit incensum in thuribulo dicit:

*Per intercessionem beati Michaelis archangeli* (etc. Same as now.)

Cum incensat oblata dicit:

*Incensum istud a te benedictum ascendit ad te Domine* (etc. Same as now.)

Quando reddit thuribulum diacono dicit:

*Accendat in nobis Dominus ignem* (etc. Same as now.)

Tunc inclinatur se sacerdos<sup>48</sup> ante altare et dicit hanc orationem:

*Suscipe sancta Trinitas hanc oblationem* (etc. Same as now.)

Erigens<sup>49</sup> se deosculatur altare et<sup>50</sup> vertit se ad populum dicens:

*Orate pro me fratres ut meum ac vestrum sacrificium* (etc. Same as now.)

Circumstantes vero respondeant:

*Suscipiat Dominus sacrificium* (etc. Same as now.)

Sequens praephatio dicitur quotidie a vigilia nativitatis usque ad epiphaniam et in purificationis Beatae Mariae:

*Per omnia saecula saeculorum.* R. *Amen.* (etc.)

(Here follow the text, generally with notes, of the prefaces for: Nativity, Epiphany,

<sup>46</sup> totum . . . erat] om. M.

<sup>47</sup> Gloria . . . Deo] cum notis G.

<sup>48</sup> sacerdos] om. M. O.

<sup>49</sup> Erigens] praem. Hic G.

<sup>50</sup> et vertit se . . . dicens <dicat> M; <et dicit> O.

Lent, Easter, Pentecost, Apostles, Blessed Virgin, Holy Cross, Trinity, and the common preface.)

*Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus Dominus Deus sabaoth* (etc. Same as now.)

Hic inclinet se ante altare et cum omni humilitate dicat:

Type I <sup>51</sup>

*Te igitur clementissime Pater per Jesum Christum filium tuum dominum nostrum supplices rogamus ac petimus uti accepta habeas et benedicas haec dona haec munera haec sancta sacrificia illibata in primis quae tibi offerimus pro ecclesia tua sancta catholica quam pacificare custodire adunare et regere digneris toto orbe terrarum una cum famulo tuo papa nostro N. et antistite nostro N. et omnibus orthodoxis atque catholicae et apostolicae fidei cultoribus.*

Commemoratio pro vivis.<sup>53</sup>

*Memento domine famulorum famularum tuarum N. et omnium circumstantium . . . aeterno Deo vivo et vero.*

Infra actionem.<sup>54</sup>

*Communicantes et memoriam . . . auxilio.*

*Per Christum Dominum nostrum.*

Infra actionem.<sup>55</sup>

*Hanc igitur oblationem . . . grege numerari.*

*Per Christum Dominum nostrum. R. Amen.*

*Quam oblationem tu Deus in omnibus quaesumus benedictam ratam rationabilem acceptabilemque facere digneris ut nobis corpus et sanguis fiat dilectissimi filii tui domini nostri Jesu Christi.*

*Qui pridie quam pateretur accepit . . . ex hoc omnes: Hoc est enim corpus meum.*

Hic deponat hostiam et levet calicem dicens:

*Simili modo posteaquam coenatum est accipiens et hunc praeclarum calicem in sanctas et venerabiles manus suas item tibi gratias agens benedixit dedit discipulis suis dicens:*

<sup>51</sup> Type I is found in M, N. In O the Canon has been torn out.

<sup>52</sup> Type II is found in V, G, P, and in margin of N.

<sup>53</sup> Commemoratio pro vivis] (Hic fit com. p. v.) N.

Type II <sup>52</sup>

*Te igitur . . . petimus Hic erigit se et osculatur altare et erectis manibus dicat uti accepta . . . benedicens Hic ter signetur tam super hostiam quam super calicem Haec dona, haec munera . . . cultoribus.*

Commemoratio pro vivis.

*Memento . . . deo vivo et vero.*

Infra actionem.

*Communicantes et memoriam . . . auxilio.*

*Per c.d.n.*

Alia infra actionem.

*Hanc igitur oblationem . . . grege numerari.*

*Per c.d.n. R. Amen.*

Hic communiter signetur tertio (*sic*) tam super hostiam quam super calicem. *Quam oblationem tu Deus . . . ut nobis* Hic separatim semel signetur super hostiam et postea super calicem *corpus et sanguis fiat . . . Christi.*

Hic accipiens hostiam reverenter levet eam junctis manibus dicendo: *Qui pridie etc.* et teneat eam usque *Simili modo.*

*Qui pridie quam pateretur . . . ex hoc omnes: Hoc est enim corpus meum.*<sup>56</sup>

Hic deponat hostiam et levet calicem dicens:

*Simili modo posteaquam coenatum est . . . gratias agens* Hic deponat calicem in altari tenens cum sinistra manu<sup>57</sup> dextra benedicat; benedictione facta iterum

<sup>54</sup> Infra actionem (Infra canonem) N.

<sup>55</sup> Infra actionem (infra canonem) N.

<sup>56</sup> corpus meum] (Hic elevet corpus altius et reponat *add.* G.

<sup>57</sup> manu (manuque) G; manu . . . benedicat (manu et dextera benedicens) N.

*Accipite et bibite ex eo omnes. Hic est enim calix sanguinis mei novi et aeterni testamenti qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.*

*Haec quotienscumque feceritis in mei memoriam facietis.*

*Unde et memores Domine nos tui servi . . . de tuis donis ac datis hostiam puram hostiam sanctam hostiam immaculatam panem sanctum vitae aeternae et calicem salutis perpetuae.*

*Supra quae propitio ac sereno vultu . . . immaculatam hostiam.*

Hic inclinatur se dicens: <sup>58</sup>

*Supplices te rogamus omnipotens Deus . . . majestatis tuae ut quotquot ex hac altaris participatione sacrosanctum filii tui corpus et sanguinem sumpserimus omni benedictione coelesti et gratia repleamur. Per eundem C. D. N. Amen.*

Commemoratio pro defunctis.

*Memento etiam Domine famulorum famularumque tuarum N. qui nos . . . indulgeas deprecamur. Per eundem C. D. N. Amen.*

Hic percutiat pectus suum aliquantulum altius dicens: <sup>60</sup>

*Nobis quoque peccatoribus . . . largitor admitte. Per C. D. N.*

*Per quem haec omnia Domine semper bona creas sanctificas vivificas benedixisti et praestas nobis. Per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso est tibi Deo patri omnipotenti in unitate Spiritus Sancti omnis honor et gloria.* <sup>61</sup>

*Per omnia saecula saeculorum.*

*R. Amen. Oremus. Praeceptis salutaribus moniti . . . dicere.*

*Pater noster qui es . . . Sed libera nos a malo. R. Amen.*

*elevet eum usque Unde et memores. benedixit dedit . . . peccatorum.*

*Haec quotienscumque . . . facietis.*

Hic reponatur calicem. <sup>58</sup>

*Unde et memores . . . de tuis donis ac datis Hic tres primas cruces faciat super panem et calicem quartam super panem quintam super calicem. hostiam puram . . . perpetuae.*

*Supra quae propitio ac sereno vultu . . . immaculatam hostiam.*

Hic inclinet se sacerdos et dicat:

*Supplices te rogamus omnipotens Deus . . . majestatis tuae Hic erigens se et osculetur altare et dicat ut quotquot ex hac altaris participatione sacrosanctum filii tui Hic primo super hostiam deinde super calicem signet corpus . . . sumpserimus Hic signet seipsum dicens: omni benedictione . . . Amen.*

Commemoratio pro defunctis.

*Memento etiam Domine . . . deprecamur. Per e.c.d.n. Amen.*

Hic percutiat pectus suum aliquantulum altius dicens.

*Nobis quoque peccatoribus . . . largitor admitte. Per c.d.n.*

*Per quem haec omnia . . . bona creas Hic tertio (sic) simul signet super hostiam et calicem dicens sanctificas . . . nobis. Hic discooperiat calicem et accepta hostia tertio cum ea signet super sanguinem dicens Per ipsum et cum ipso. Hic cum ipsa hostia bis inter se et calicem signet dicens est tibi . . . gloria. Hic cum <sup>62</sup> dextera manu tenens hostiam calicem parum erigat cum utraque manu et dicat: Per omnia.*

Cantus sequentis *Pater noster* dicitur in festis duplicibus et semiduplicibus et dominicis diebus.

*Per omnia saecula saeculorum. R. Amen.*

<sup>58</sup> Hic reponatur calicem (Hic elevetur altius et deponatur) G.

<sup>59</sup> Hic . . . dicens] om. N.

<sup>60</sup> dicens (dicit) N.

<sup>61</sup> gloria] (Hic reponatur calicem et discooperiat dicens) add. N.

<sup>62</sup> Hic cum] N is defective here.

*Libera nos quaesumus Domine ab omnibus malis . . . securi.*

*Per eundem dominum nostrum Jesum . . . Spiritus Sancti.*

*Per omnia saecula saeculorum. R. Amen.*

*Pax Domini sit semper vobiscum.*

*R. Et cum spiritu tuo.*

*Fiat commixtio et consecratio . . . vita aeterna. Amen.*

*Agnus Dei qui tollis peccata mundi miserere nobis.*

*Domine<sup>65</sup> Jesu Christe qui dixisti . . . qui vivis et regnas per omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen.*

*Hic osculatur altare dicens<sup>67</sup>*

*Pax tecum. R. Et cum spiritu tuo.*

*Domine Jesu Christe fili Dei vivi . . . qui cum eodem patre et spiritu sancto . . . saeculorum. Amen.*

*Alia oratio. Perceptio corporis . . . ad medelam percipiendam.*

*Qui vivis.*

*Panem<sup>68</sup> coelestem accipiam et nomen Domini invocabo.*

<sup>63</sup> Hic. cooperiat] *om.* N.

<sup>64</sup> Patena] <dicendo> *add.* G. N. continues directly with the next rubric.

<sup>65</sup> Hic . . . Vicibus] <Et antequam det pacem ministro dicit> *add.* G.

<sup>66</sup> Domine] <Ad pacem osculando altare

Hic reponat calicem et cooperiat.<sup>63</sup>

*Oremus, Praeceptis . . . dicere.*

*Pater noster . . . a malo. R. Amen.*

Sequens *Pater noster* cum suo cantu dicitur in minoribus festis et in diebus ferialibus. *Per omnia . . . a malo. Amen.*

*Libera nos quaesumus Domine . . . securi.*

Hic accipiat patenam et signet se cum ipsa et submittens eandem hostiae ponat hostiam in patenam et discooperiat calicem et cum reverentia frangat hostiam per medium super calicem et mediam quae est in dextera manu ponat in patena et de illa quae est in sinistra accipiat particulam et quae remanet in sinistra adjungatur particulae quae est in patena.<sup>64</sup>

*Per eundem . . . Spiritus Sancti.*

Hic illam partem quae remanet in dextera teneat super sanguinem et calice parum erecto dicat: *Per omnia saecula saeculorum. R. Amen.* Hic cum illa particula quae tenet in manu tertio signet tantum super sanguinem dicens.

*Pax Domini . . . vobiscum. R. Et . . . tuo.*

Hic mittat particulam in sanguine dicens *Fiat commixtio . . . aeterna. Amen.*

Hic dicitur *Agnus Dei* tribus vicibus.<sup>65</sup>

*Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti . . . saeculorum. Amen.*

Hic elevet se et osculetur altare dans pacem ministro dicens *Pax tecum. R. Et*

*Inclinatus autem dicat hanc orationem antequam communicet. Domine Jesu Christe . . . saeculorum. Amen.*

*Alia oratio. Perceptio corporis . . .*

Hic remota palla super calicem et erigat aliquantulum et cum dextera manu recipiat corpus domini et teneat super patenam dicens cum reverentia et humilitate *Panem coelestem . . . invocabo.*

dicit inclinatus hanc orationem] *praem.* N. (Hic inclinatus dicit h. o. Ad pacem o. a.) *praem.* P.

<sup>67</sup> Hic . . . dicens] *om.* N.

<sup>68</sup> Panem] (Hic dicit tribus vicibus) *praem.* N.

Oratio. *Domine non sum dignus . . . anima mea.*

Alia oratio. *Corpus Domini nostri Jesu . . . in vitam aeternam. Amen.*

*Quid retribuam Domine . . . mihi. Calicem salutaris accipiam . . . invocabo. Laudans . . . et salvus ero.*

*Sanguis Domini nostri Jesu Christi . . . aeternam. Amen.*

Oratio. *Quod ore sumpsimus Domine . . . remedium sempiternum.*

Alia oratio. *Corpus tuum domine . . . sacramenta. Qui vivis.*

*Placeat tibi sancta trinitas . . . propitiabile. Per c.d.n. Amen.*

Hic dicitur tribus vicibus *Domine non dignus . . . mea.*

Hic signet se cum ipso corpore et reverenter sumat. Si quid inde remanserit in patena cum digito reponat in calicem. Hic accipiat corpus domini et dicat cum reverentia: *Corpus Domini . . . aeternam. Amen.*

Hic accipiat calicem et dicat cum reverentia. *Quid retribuam . . . mihi. Calicem salutaris . . . invocabo. Laudans . . . ero.*

Hic sumat sanguinem Christi et dicat *Sanguis Domini . . . aeternam. Amen.* Postquam communicaverit dicat hanc orationem *Quod ore sumpsimus . . . sempiternum.*

Alia oratio. *Corpus tuum . . . sacramenta. Qui vivis.*

Hic dicta communionem, antequam dicat *Dominus vobiscum* osculetur altare. Item. cantato <sup>69</sup> *Benedicamus Domino* vel *Ite missa est* et benedicto populo et secrete dicta oratione *Placeat* osculetur altare et <sup>70</sup> dicat *Trium puerorum*. Finita missa dicat hanc orationem <sup>71</sup> *Placeat . . . propitiabile. Per c.d.n. Amen.*

The original form of the Franciscan *Ordo missae* is probably the simpler of the two (Type I). In one of the earliest extant manuscripts of a Franciscan missal, the rubrics for the canon as given above in Type II are written in the margin, while the text of the canon itself contains the rubrics of Type I:

Naples, Bibl. Naz. VI, G. 38. fol. 156.

*Te igitur clementissime Pater . . . rogamus ac petimus uti accepta habeas et benedicas haec dona, haec munera . . . cultoribus.*

. . . . .

Hic percutiat pectus suum; aliquantulum altius dicit

*Nobis quoque peccatoribus famulis tuis . . . Per c.d.n.*

*Per quem haec omnia Domine semper bona creas sanctificas benedixis et praesta nobis. Per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso est tibi Deo patri omnipotenti in unitate Spiritus Sancti*

(in margin)

Hic erigat se et osculetur altare et erectis manibus dicat

Hic ter signet tam super hostiam quam super calicem . . .

Hic tertio simul signet super hostiam et calicem dicens

Hic discooperiat calicem et accepta hostia tertio cum ea signet

Hic cum ipsa hostia bis inter se et calicem signet dicens<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> cantato (dicto) G.

<sup>70</sup> et dicat *Trium puerorum*] om. P.

<sup>71</sup> Finita . . . orationem] om. P. This repetition of the rubric for the *Placeat* is characteristic of the Franciscan missals in which the Type II Canon is found. A similar reduplication will be

observed in the rubrics for the communion of the Host. Both these cases are indications of patchwork, i.e. of the correction or amplification of an earlier text by a not too clever scribe.

<sup>72</sup> Quoted from A. Ebner, *Iter Italicum*, pp. 314-316.

It would appear that some scribe attempted to correct this missal by means of a "later edition" of the *Ordo missae*. One is tempted to suggest that this particular missal shows the effect of the decree of the Chapter of Narbonne (1260), viz. that the missals be corrected *secundum exemplar verius*. However that may be, it is clear from the Naples manuscript that the original Franciscan *Ordo missae* is that given above as Type I.<sup>73</sup>

When we examine the relationship between this document and the *Indutus planeta*, we see that the composer of the *Indutus planeta* made use of the Franciscan *Ordo missae* Type II, expanding and developing the rubrics which he found therein:

*Indutus planeta*

Cum vero venit ad *Pater noster* elevat manus et extendit sicut prius usque ad *da propitius pacem* ubi accipiens patenam signans se simpliciter cum ipsa submittens eam hostiae et discooperiens calicem facit fractionem super calicem frangendo hostiam per medium et ponens illam partem quae est in sinistra manu in patenam et illa vero quae est in dextera frangit per medium et particulam quae remanet in sinistra manu conjungit parti quae est in patena. Altera vero quae remanet in dextera erectus sacerdos tenet super calicem et parum elevato calice dicit *Per omnia saecula saeculorum* et iterum desposito calice tertio signat super sanguinem cum particula quae tenet in dextera dicens *Pax domini sit semper*; quo dicto mittit particulam ipsam in sanguine dicens *Fiat commixtio*.<sup>74</sup>

*Ordo missae* Type II

*Pater noster . . . a malo. Amen.*  
*Libera nos quaesumus . . . securi.*  
Hic accipiat patenam et signet se cum ipsa et submittens eandem hostiae ponat hostiam in patenam et cum reverentia frangat hostiam per medium super calicem et mediam quae est in dextera manu ponit in patena et de illa quae est in sinistra accipiat particulam et quae remanet in sinistra adjungatur particulae quae est in patena.  
*Per eundem Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum . . . Spiritus sancti* Hic illam partem quae remanet in dextera teneat super sanguinem et calice parum erecto dicat: *Per omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen.* Hic cum illa particula quam tenet in manu tertio signet tantum super sanguinem dicens: *Pax Domini sit semper vobiscum. R. Et . . . tuo.*  
Hic mittat particulam in sanguinem dicens: *Fiat commixtio . . . aeternam. R. Amen.*

If after comparing these texts, any doubt remains that the *Ordo missae* is the earlier text, such doubts will be quickly dispelled by examining the rubrics in these two documents for the consecration of the Host:

*Indutus planeta*

Cum vero perventum est ad *Qui pridie quam pateretur* ductis plane digitis super pallam altaris accipit hostiam dicens

*Ordo missae* Type II

Hic accipiens hostiam reverenter levat eam junctis manibus dicendo *Qui pridie* et tenet ipsam usque *Simili modo*.

<sup>73</sup> We suspect from certain variants to be found in the Naples manuscript particularly in the early part of the *Ordo missae*, that this early Franciscan missal may contain the original text of the Roman curial *Ordo missae* before any Franciscan reform of the text took place. We hope to return to this problem at a later date. Another question that requires special treatment is the relationship between the Franciscan *Ordo missae* and that found in the missal of the papal chapel composed in the fourth

quarter of the thirteenth century. The rubrics for the canon are almost identical with those of the Type II published above. For this missal, cf. M. Andrieu, "Le missel de la chapelle papale à la fin du xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle" *Miscellanea Fr. Etlre*, vol. 2 (Rome, 1924), pp. 348-376. The text of the *Ordo missae* has been published by J. Brinktrine, "Ordo et Canon Missae," *Ephe-merides Liturgicae* li (1937) 198-209.

<sup>74</sup> The text will be found in the Appendix to this article.

*accepit panem et parum elevans signat eam dicens benedixit et dicto Hoc est enim corpus meum et adorato corpore Domini levat illud reverenter ita quod a circumstantibus possit videri; postquam deponit in loco suo.*

*Qui pridie quam pateretur . . . Hoc est enim corpus meum.*

*Hic deponat hostiam et levet calicem dicendo*

*Simili modo etc.*

Here the *Indutus planeta* has introduced an entirely new element, the elevation of the Host, which does not appear in the Franciscan *Ordo missae*, either Type I or Type II.<sup>75</sup> We may safely assume that the *Indutus planeta* is the later document.

Our study of these documents, which deal in one way or other with the Franciscan Ordinary of the Mass in the thirteenth century, permits us to place them, tentatively,<sup>76</sup> in chronological order and to suggest approximate dates for each.

(a) The Franciscan Missal with *Ordo missae* Type I. This was composed between 1235 and 1255; it is possibly the work of Haymo of Faversham, Minister General 1240–1244.

(b) The letter *Quia sicut indubitanter* of John of Parma, Minister General 1247–1257, which prescribed uniformity in the celebration of Mass.

(c) The Franciscan Missal with *Ordo missae* Type II. We suggest that this “second edition” was the *exemplar verius* referred to by the General Chapter of Narbonne (1260).

(d) The *Ordinationes divini officii*. These statutes governing the conventual office and the Mass are anterior to 1263, when they are first mentioned at the Chapter of Pisa.<sup>77</sup>

(e) The *Indutus planeta*. This *ordo* for a priest saying a private Mass or the conventual Mass in a small monastery is the latest of these documents; it is anterior to the Chapter of Paris (1266) which seems to have prescribed its use.

## APPENDIX

Incipit <sup>78</sup> ordo agendorum et dicendorum a sacerdote in missa juxta consuetudinem ecclesiae romanae.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>75</sup> The elevation of the Host, as is well known, was introduced first at Paris by Eudes de Sully (1196–1208). Rome was apparently very slow to adopt the practice. So far as we know, the *Indutus planeta* is the earliest liturgical document of Roman origin to mention it. Two Franciscan writers, both professors at Paris, speak of it and in all probability before the composition of the *Indutus planeta*: Alexander of Hales (+1245) *Summa* IV, q. 37; and William of Melitona (+1260) *Opusculum super missam* ed. Lampen, p. 50. We suspect that it was the influence of their teaching which led to its introduction into the Franciscan Mass.

<sup>76</sup> We use the word “tentatively” because we know well that any hypothesis, no matter how carefully constructed, may be completely demolished by the discovery of new material. Some day, there may come to light the records of the General Chapters held from 1240 to 1260 with new information on this question.

<sup>77</sup> We hesitate to date this document more accurately until such time as we have a critical edition based on early manuscripts. We place the *Ordinationes* later than the *Ordo missae* Type II since the former seems to speak of the elevation of the Host. Cf. the edition of Fr. Golubovich AFH iii, p. 69, #32.

<sup>78</sup> This edition of the text is based on the following manuscripts:

- (a) Paris, B.N. Lat. 10,503, xiii century second half, fol. 134–140. A Franciscan missal. Cf. Leroquais, *Les missels* etc. vol. 2, pp. 128–130. (P)
- (b) Vatican Ottob. 574, xiv century comm., fol. 138<sup>v</sup>–142<sup>v</sup>. A Roman missal. A. Ebner, *Iter Italicum*, pp. 235–236. (V)
- (c) Vatican Ottob. 15, xiv century comm., fol. 290 (355) — 293<sup>v</sup> (358<sup>v</sup>). This manuscript contains a collection of Franciscan documents, including both the *Ordinationes* and the *Indutus planeta*; a detailed description of it will be found in: Fr. Ehrle, *Die ältesten Redaktionen der Generalconstitutionen der Franziskanerordens*, *Archiv für Literatur- u. Kirchengeschichte* vol. 6 (1892), pp. 74–75. (O)
- (d) Paris, B.N. Lat. 828, xiv century (1342–1352), fol. 106<sup>v</sup>–118. A Roman missal. The *Indutus planeta* is very defective here; parts from it are used to supply rubrics for the *Ordo missae*. (C)
- (e) The edition of J. Wickham Legg,



Indutus sacerdos planeta stet ante gradum altaris et junctis manibus mediocriter elevatis dicat antiphonam *Introibo ad altare Dei etc.* R. *Ad Deum qui etc.* Ps. *Judica me Deus cum Gloria Patri et Sicut erat.* Deinde repetatur antiphonam *Introibo*, R. *Ad Deum qui.* V. *Adjutorium nostrum.* R. *Qui fecit.* Deinde facit confessionem absolute inclinatus mediocriter et stat<sup>80</sup> taliter inclinatus donec responsum fuerit *Misereatur tui etc.* et tunc erigens se facit absolutionem. Qua facta dicit capitula: V. *Deus tu conversus* R. *Et plebs* V. *Ostende nobis* R. *Et salutare* V. *Domine exaudi* R. *Et clamor* V. *Dominus vobiscum* R. *Et cum spiritu tuo.* Oremus. *Aufer a nobis etc.*—et dicitur haec oratio aliquantulum alte dum ascendit sacerdos ad altare<sup>81</sup>—*per Christum Dominum nostrum.* R. *Amen.* Postea inclinatus coram medio altaris junctis manibus dicit sub silentio hanc orationem: *Oramus te Domine*<sup>82</sup> *per merita sanctorum quorum reliquiae hic sunt etc.* et si non fuerint ibi reliquiae dicat *ut per merita omnium sanctorum indulgere etc.* Qua completa erigit se et manus super altare deponens osculatur illud.

§ De junctione manuum.

Et nota quod jungendae sunt manus quotiens se sacerdos inclinat ante altare; et in collectis, secretis et postcommunione quando venit ad *Per Dominum* ultimum si plures dicantur; et postquam inceperit *Gloria in excelsis Deo* et *Credo*; et quando vadit ad sedem et quando revertitur ad altare; et in fine praefationis; et antequam levet hostiam cum dicit *fiat dilectissimi etc.*; et ante *Pater noster* cum dicit *et praestas nobis*; et quando accipit hostiam a patena ut frangat super calicem; et quotiens vadit a libro usque ad medium altaris et quando revertitur ad librum dicto *Dominus vobiscum*; et si vadit ab altari ad piscinam vel revertitur et quando a sacristia vadit indutus ad altare et quando completa missa revertitur<sup>83</sup> ad sacristiam.

§ De inclinationibus.

Item nota quod primo inclinat se sacerdos ante gradum altaris in confessione ut praedictum est. Secundo cum dicit *Oramus te Domine.* Tertio post evangelium cum dicit *Suscipe sancta Trinitas.* Quarto cum dicit *Te igitur.* Quinto cum dicit *Supplices te rogamus omnipotens Deus.* Sexto ante pacem cum dicit *Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti.* Septimo post pacem cum dicit *Domine Jesu Christe fili Dei vivi.*<sup>84</sup> Octavo post missam cum dicit *Placeat Sancta Trinitas.* Et sciendum quod istae inclinationes profunde fiunt<sup>85</sup> coram altari. Sunt et aliae inclinationes quae fiunt mediocriter super altare. Prima cum dicit *suscipe deprecationem nostram.* Secunda quando sacerdos debet legere evangelium dicendo *Munda cor meum* vel *Sit Dominus.* Tertia cum dicit *et homo factus est.*<sup>86</sup> Quarto quando collocato calice vadit ad abluendum. Quinta cum dicit *Sanctus.* Sexta cum nominatur Beata Virgo in *Communicantes.* Septima post consecrationem hostiae antequam elevetur. Octava ante *Pater noster* cum dicit *et praestas nobis.* Nona cum nominatur Beata Virgo in oratione *Libera nos quaesumus Domine.* Decima quando dicit *Agnus Dei.* Undecima in perceptione. Duodecima post perceptionem si vadit ad piscinam. Et omnes istae inclinationes fiunt ante

*Tracts on the Mass* (London, 1904), pp. 181–188. This edition is based on a Roman missal printed at Lyons in 1507; variants are given from missals dated 1508 and 1515. The edition is based on texts that are late and corrupt; we use it here to supply a few doubtful variants which are indicated in our notes by the date of the missal.

We do not pretend to give a definitive edition of the *Indutus planeta*; our intention is rather to give a reliable text based on a limited number of early manuscripts. The treatise is

also found in: Mende, ms. 1, fol. 168<sup>v</sup>–170<sup>v</sup> (xiv century); Assisi ms. 338 fol. 7–11 (xiv century); Col. S. Isidore, ms. 1, 39, fol. 1–7<sup>v</sup> (xv century), etc.

<sup>79</sup> Title *om.* P. missa] *add.* (privata et conventuali) V. (privata et feriali) 1507.

<sup>80</sup> stat (stet) OC.

<sup>81</sup> altare] finis *add.* OP.

<sup>82</sup> Domine] *per merita* . . . indulgere *om.* O.

<sup>83</sup> revertitur (vadit) V.

<sup>84</sup> vivi] et Perceptio etc. *add.* V.

<sup>85</sup> fiunt (fiant) O.

<sup>86</sup> factus est] in Credo *add.* O.

medium altaris. Vertens se ad populum tantum cum dicit *Orate pro me fratres* parum se inclinat.

☿ De osculo altaris.

Item nota quod primo osculatur sacerdos altare dicta oratione *Oramus te Domine*. Secundo ante collectam primam ubi dicitur *Dominus vobiscum*. Tertio post evangelium cum dicitur *Dominus vobiscum*. Quarto antequam dicitur *Orate pro me fratres*. Quinto post *Te igitur* ante *uti accepta*. Sexto post *Supplices* cum dicit *ex hac altaris participatione*. Septimo finita oratione *Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti*. Octavo ante postcommunione cum dicit *Dominus vobiscum*. Nono <sup>87</sup> cum dicit ultimo *Dominus vobiscum*. Decimo completa oratione *Placeat tibi*.

☿ De modo osculandi.

Et nota quod omnia oscula supradicta fiunt demissis manibus super altare. Ante collocationem autem calicis et post perceptionem fiunt in medio altaris; post collocationem vero calicis et ante perceptionem a sinistris calicis prope hostiam. Et nota quod numquam osculandus est liber nisi ad evangelium.

☿ De elevatione <sup>88</sup> manuum <sup>89</sup> et extensione.

Circa elevationem manuum sacerdotis et extensionem notandum est quod semper elevat manus sacerdos mediocriter ita quod elevatio non excedat humeros nec nimis deprimitur; sitque distensio in latum <sup>90</sup> semper moderata et aequalis in missa et quando stat versus altare et quando se vertit ad populum, praeterquam in oratione *Unde et memores* ubi specialis fit mentio <sup>91</sup> passionis ubi <sup>92</sup> aliquantulum fiat prolixior distensio brachiorum usque ad proximas sequentes signationes. In omni vero junctione manuum similis elevatio praecedat aequalis scilicet et moderata.

☿ De prosecutione missae.

Postquam osculatus fuerit <sup>93</sup> sacerdos altare, completa oratione illa *Oramus te Domine*, vadit ad dextrum cornu altaris et ibidem stans sine aliquo versu praecedente incipit legere Introitum cum ministro vel ministris; similiter et Kyrieleison. Deinde vadit ad medium altaris et ibi incipit *Gloria in excelsis Deo* si est dicendum; quo finito vel non inchoato si non est dicendum, osculatur <sup>94</sup> medium altaris et vertens se ad populum dicit *Dominus vobiscum*. Quo dicto vertit se ad librum qui est in dextro cornu altaris dicens *Oremus* et ibidem <sup>95</sup> terminat orationem et si plures dicantur ultima similiter ibidem <sup>96</sup> terminatur. Quando vero dicendum est *Flectamus genua* sacerdos stans ad dextrum cornu altaris et non conversus ad populum incipit absolute *Oremus* sine *Dominus vobiscum* et facto modico intervallo postquam dixerit <sup>97</sup> *Flectamus genua*, dicit *Levate*. Deinde absolute <sup>98</sup> prosequitur collectam; si diaconus ministrat, ipse dicit *Flectamus genua* et *Levate*. Finita collecta legitur lectio una vel plures,<sup>99</sup> singulis lectionibus singulis praemissis collectis, in quibus omnibus idem modus observatur praeterquam in ultima oratione quae praecedit epistolam in qua semper vertens se ad populum ut praedictum est dicit *Dominus vobiscum*. Deinde legitur epistola semper ante gradum contra medium altaris in missa conventuali; in privatis autem semper ab ipso sacerdote super dextrum cornu altaris. Dum vero legitur epistola a subdiacono, sacerdos extendit corporale quod subponitur calici super altare ita quod longitudo corporalis in longitudine altaris extenditur nec explicatur propter pulverem usque ad obla-

<sup>87</sup> Nono] cum dicit . . . Decimo *om.* 1507.

<sup>88</sup> elevatione (junctione) V.

<sup>89</sup> manuum] et extensione *om.* P.

<sup>90</sup> latum [latere] V.

<sup>91</sup> mentio (commemoratio) P.

<sup>92</sup> ubi (in quo) P. Legg's text is quite corrupt at this point.

<sup>93</sup> fuerit (sit) V.

<sup>94</sup> osculatur (osculatus) V.

<sup>95</sup> ibidem terminat (ibi determinat) V.

<sup>96</sup> ibidem terminatur (ibi determinatur) V.

<sup>97</sup> dixerit (dicit) V.

<sup>98</sup> absolute *om.* V.

<sup>99</sup> plures singulis . . . collectis *om.* O.

tionem calicis; hoc faciat <sup>100</sup> diaconus si ministrat. Corporale vero quod subponitur calici habet quatuor plicas in longitudinem et tres in latitudinem. Quo peracto in missa conventuali vadit sacerdos ad sedem; lecta vero epistola et gradualis, et aliis quae ante evangelium legenda sunt cum ministro vel ministris in sede perfectis, subdiaconus parat calicem in loco suo collocando hostiam super patenam et vinum tantum calici <sup>101</sup> infundendo et sic paratum ponit super altare. In missa vero privata si non affuerit subdiaconus parat sacerdos calicem antequam incepta fuerit <sup>102</sup> missa vel post evangelium secundum quod opportunum sibi visum fuerit. Sacerdos vero antequam legat evangelium, super medium altaris inclinatus, dicit *Sit Dominus in corde* <sup>103</sup> vel *Munda cor meum* et signans se signo crucis legit evangelium super sinistram cornu altaris. Finito evangelio osculatur librum et reversus ad medium altaris dicit *Credo* si est dicendum; sin autem osculatur altare et vertens se ad populum dicit *Dominus vobiscum*; reversusque ex parte dextra altaris dicit in medio *Oremus* et legit offertorium.

Quales autem et quot ministri et qualiter se debeant habere in missa ordinata <sup>104</sup> vel sollempni, praesente vel non praesente episcopo, in Ordinationibus divini officii declarabitur.

¶ De oblatione calicis et hostiae.

Si missa simplex conventualis vel privata fuerit, sacerdos accipit patenam cum hostia duabus manibus mediocriter elevatis et dicit *Suscipe sancte pater etc.* Interim vero minister ad dextram sacerdotis assistens offert ampullam cum aqua quam benedicens sacerdos infundit calici dicens *Deus qui humanae substantiae etc.* Et nota quod tam in privatis missis quam in conventualibus et ordinatis tempus et ordo infundendi aquam in calicem idem penitus observatur. <sup>105</sup> Deinde accipiens calicem cum <sup>106</sup> duabus manibus mediocriter elevatis offert eum dicens *Offerimus tibi Domine calicem etc.* Hostia vero <sup>107</sup> collocatur ad sinistram, calix autem <sup>108</sup> ad dextram. Deinde cooperitur calix corporali simplici plicato quod superponitur <sup>109</sup> calici cum hac oratione *In spiritu humilitatis etc.* Postea fit signum crucis super hostiam et calicem cum oratione *Veni sanctificator etc.* ita quod primo ducatur <sup>110</sup> manus super hostiam secundo super utrumque, et sic semper fit quando communiter utrumque signatur; et parum inclinatus super altare vadit ad abluendum manus suas. <sup>111</sup>

¶ De benedictione vero incensi et incensatione et aliis quae pertinent ad sollempnitatem habebitur in Ordinationibus.

Deinde rediens ad medium altaris inclinatus dicit *Suscipe sancta Trinitas*; qua finita erigens se osculatur altare et vertens se ad populum dicit *Orate* <sup>112</sup> *pro me fratres*; circumstantes vero respondent <sup>113</sup> *Suscipiat Dominus etc.* Deinde regirans <sup>114</sup> se ex parte dextra <sup>115</sup> dicit secretam vel secretas stans contra medium altaris; quibus completis, elevatis et extensis manibus secundum formam superius taxatam, dicit *Per omnia saecula saeculorum.* <sup>116</sup> Finita vero praefatione dicit *Sanctus* cum ministris mediocriter inclinatus super altare et signat se signo crucis cum dicit *Benedictus qui venit.*

Deinde inclinatus coram altari junctis manibus dicit *Te igitur clementissime*

<sup>100</sup> faciat <facit> OP.

<sup>101</sup> calici *om.* O.

<sup>102</sup> fuerit <sit> V.

<sup>103</sup> Prayers are given in full in P.

<sup>104</sup> ordinata <conventuali> O.

<sup>105</sup> observatur <observetur> V.

<sup>106</sup> cum *om.* O.

<sup>107</sup> vero <autem> P.

<sup>108</sup> autem <vero> OP.

<sup>109</sup> superponitur <supponitur> P.

<sup>110</sup> ducatur <ducit> P.

<sup>111</sup> suas] P inserts here the prayers for incensing.

<sup>112</sup> Orate] pro me *om.* OP.

<sup>113</sup> repondent <respondeant> O.

<sup>114</sup> regirans <vertens> P.

<sup>115</sup> dextra] ad librum *add.* P.

<sup>116</sup> saeculorum] P inserts here the text of the various prefaces.

*Pater*; <sup>117</sup> erigens se osculatur altare cum dicit *uti accepta habeas*, faciens tres cruces dicendo *haec dona, haec munera, haec sancta sacrificia*. Deinde elevatis et extensis manibus sicut superius dictum est prosequitur canonem usque *Quam oblationem tu Deus*. Postea facit tres cruces continue super hostiam et calicem communiter dicens *benedictam, adscriptam, ratam* et elevatis iterum manibus dum <sup>118</sup> dicit *rationabilem acceptabilemque*, facit iterum duas cruces dicens *corpus et sanguis*, primam super hostiam, secundam super calicem.

Cum vero perventum est ad *Qui pridie quam pateretur* ductis plane digitis super pallam altaris accipit hostiam dicens *accepit panem* et parum elevans signat eam dicens *benedixit* et dicto *Hoc est corpus meum* et adorato Corpore Domini cum mediocri inclinatione <sup>119</sup> levat illud reverenter ita quod a circumstantibus possit videri; postea deponit in loco suo. Deinde coopertum calicem accipit cum duabus manibus et parum elevans dicit *accipiens et hunc praeclarum calicem*; deponit iterum super altare dicens <sup>120</sup> *item tibi gratias agens*; deinde signat dicens *benedixit* et iterum elevans dicit *accipite et bibite usque in mei memoriam facietis*. Deinde deposito calice <sup>121</sup> dicit *Unde et memores*, <sup>122</sup> extensis brachiis aliquantulum in modum crucis ut praedictum est. <sup>123</sup>

¶ Nota <sup>124</sup> quod ab hoc loco usque ad purificationem manuum sacerdotis jungendus est index cum pollice praeterquam in signationibus et cum tangitur Corpus Domini; ante vero hunc locum et post dictam purificationem, cum levat manus et extendit, separatur parum pollex a digitis ceteris sibi invicem copulatis; abhinc autem usque ad proximum *Per omnia* fiant signationes sicut in missali signantur et inclinationes sicut supradictum est; hoc addito quod cum in fine hujus orationis *Nobis quoque peccatoribus* dicitur *per Christum Dominum nostrum* sine responsione *Amen*, dicit sacerdos *per quem haec omnia* quia istud pendet de fine praecedentis.

Dicto autem *et praestas nobis* discooperit calicem et accipiens Corpus Domini signat ter cum ipso super calicem a labio in labium <sup>125</sup> dicens *per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso*; elevatis autem digitis cum Corpore Christi signat bis inter se et calicem a labio calicis incipiens et dicens quod sequitur *et tibi Deo patri etc.* Quo finito tenet Corpus Domini super calicem et parum elevato calice cum ambabus manibus dicit *Per omnia saecula saeculorum*. Dicendo autem *Oremus, praeceptis salutaribus moniti etc.* reponit calicem et hostiam in locis suis et corporale calici superponit. Cum vero venerit ad *Pater noster* elevat manus et extendit sicut prius usque ad *da propitius pacem* ubi accipiens patenam signans <sup>126</sup> se simpliciter cum ipsa submittens eam hostiae et discooperiens calicem facit fractionem super calicem frangendo hostiam per medium et ponens illam partem quae est in sinistra manu in patenam et illam vero quae est in dextra frangit per medium et particulam quae remanet in sinistra manu post fractionem conjungit parti quae est in patena. Alteram vero quae remanet in dextra erectus sacerdos tenet super calicem et parum elevato calice dicit *Per omnia saecula saeculorum* et iterum deposito calice ter <sup>127</sup> signat super sanguinem cum particula quam tenet in dextra dicens *Pax Domini sit semper*; quo dicto mittit particulam ipsam in sanguine dicens *Fiat commixtio*. Deinde cooperto calice dicit *Agnus Dei* ter parum inclinatus manibus dimissis super altare. Postea

<sup>117</sup> From here on P gives the full text of the Canon and inserts phrases of the *Indutus planeta* for rubrics.

<sup>118</sup> dum] om. V.

<sup>119</sup> cum mediocri inclinatione (mediocri inclinatione facta) O.

<sup>120</sup> dicens] item tibi . . . signat dicens om. O.

<sup>121</sup> calice] et reposito corporali super calicem

add. P.

<sup>122</sup> memores] extensis . . . praedictum est om. V.

<sup>123</sup> ut praedictum est (juncto pollice dicit) P.

<sup>124</sup> Nota quod . . . fine praecedentis om. P.

<sup>125</sup> labium (labii) V.

<sup>126</sup> signans (signat) O.

<sup>127</sup> ter (tertio) VO.

inclinatus ante altare dicit *Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti apostolis*; qua finita erigit se et deosculatur altare dans pacem ministro dicens *Pax tecum. R. Et cum spiritu tuo. Iterum inclinans se ante altare dicit Domine Jesu Christe fili Dei vivi et Perceptio corporis tui. Quibus dictis erigens se* <sup>128</sup>

removet corporalem desuper calicem et reverenter accipiens patenam elevat aliquantulum et cum manu dextra accipit Corpus Domini et tenet super patenam dicens *Panem coelestem etc.* Deinde dicit ter *Domine non sum dignus etc.* Quo dicto signat se cum corpore quod tenet in manu et reverenter sumit dicens *Corpus Domini nostri Jesu Christe etc.* Hoc supradicto modo solebat fieri in curia a tempore vero bonae memoriae Gregorii IX. —signat <sup>131</sup> se cum patena in qua jacet Corpus Domini et ab eadem patena non cum manu sed lingua sumit et discooperiens calicem si quae reliquiae Corporis Domini remanent in patena cum digito vel pollice reponit eas in calicem.

Deposita patena cum reverentia accipit calicem dicens *Quid retribuam Domino etc. Calicem salutaris etc. Laudans invocabo etc.* Quibus dictis signans se cum calice dicit orationem *Sanguis Domini nostri etc.* Et extunc percipit sanguinem. Perceptione vero facta vadit ad cornu altaris dextrum et purificationem calicis accipiens dicit *Quod ore sumpsimus et Corpus tuum etc.* Quibus dictis purificationem digitorum factam super calicem in calice dimittens declinat <sup>132</sup> ad abluendum manus; qua ablutione facta assumit quod remanserit in calice et inclinans eum super patenam et plicato corporali lectaque communionem in dextro cornu iterum sumit si quid remansit in calice. Quo finito revertitur ad medium altaris et complet missam sicut praedictum est. <sup>133</sup> Qua completa benedicat populum dicens *In unitate Sancti Spiritus benedicant vos Pater et Filius. Amen.*

<sup>128</sup> erigens se] The text of V differs widely from that of O and P for the communion. We give in the first column that of OP; in the second that of V. Legg's text agrees here substantially with V; so too does the rubric for the communion in C. Both texts attempt to give the two different practices of receiving Communion, *cum manu* or *cum lingua* and both are agreed that the former is the *prior consuetudo* of the Roman church.

et reverenter accipiens patenam dicit *Panem coelestem.* Deinde dicit ter *Domine non sum dignus*; quo dicto signat se cum patena in qua jacet Corpus Domini et ab eadem patena non cum manu sed lingua sumit et discooperiens calicem si quae reliquiae corporis remanent in patena cum digito vel pollice reponit eas in calicem. Liceat tamen quibus magis placuerit sumere Corpus Domini manu de patena secundum <sup>129</sup> priorem Romanae curiae consuetudinem <sup>130</sup> et tunc signat se cum Corpore Domini quod elevatum de patena tenet in manu.

<sup>129</sup> secundum . . . consuetudinem] (sed prior est curiae romanae consuetudo) 1508, 1515.

<sup>130</sup> consuetudinem] et tunc . . . in manu om. 1507, 1508, 1515.

<sup>131</sup> signat . . . calicem] OP insert rather awkwardly the rubric for communion *cum lingua.*

<sup>132</sup> declinat (declinet) P.

<sup>133</sup> praedictum est] O ends here.

# Albertus Magnus on Aristotle's Second Definition of the Soul

WILLIAM GORMAN

## I

IN THE *Summa Theologica*, Book II, Tractate XII, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3 (which is contained in the Jamme edition Vol. 18, p. 349a–350a), Albertus Magnus considers Aristotle's second definition of the soul rather briefly, with no objections cited, with only a few explications of the terms of that definition and of his understanding of its relation to the previous definition. But the passage is notable for a firm explicit statement (not to be found in corresponding *Summa de Creaturis*) as to how these definitions and their stated relation to one another affect what we are to understand of the rational soul. Further, the intervention, between the writing of the *De Creaturis* and the writing of the *Summa Theologica*, of certain works of St. Thomas on the soul, particularly his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, makes relevant to our discussion the citation of St. Thomas' understanding of the meaning of and relation between these two definitions.

In this discussion, I intend to state first the content of this brief passage; then, to compare it verbally, where it calls for comparison, on three points, with the text of Aristotle; to address my statement of my understanding of Albert's text to the three points of difference between it and Aristotle's text; and then to conclude.

In this passage, Albert states as Aristotle's other definition this: "*anima est principium et causa huiusmodi vitae, physici scilicet corporis organici*." He states further that Aristotle says in Book II *De Anima* that this is a definition as principle of a demonstration *propter quid* and the cause through which the previous two definitions (that as *entelechia* and that as *species* and *ratio*) are demonstratively concluded.

He states further that Aristotle says that these two previous definitions are imperfect not only because they merely say *quid est* the soul and not *propter quid talis est substantia et species*; but also because by them one cannot know the causes of the accidents *per se* and the operations which *per se* convene to the soul. (Commenting on this second imperfection, he refers us to the first book of the *De Anima* where he says Aristotle says generally of such like definitions that they are dialectical and vain.)

Next, Aristotle's illustrative geometrical example is lengthily explained; and then on the established pattern, the syllogism in which one definition of the soul is concluded from the other is set up:

Omne quod est principium et causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore in toto et in partibus, est actus et ratio et species ipsius.  
Anima est per se principium et causa operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore secundum totum et secundum partes.  
Ergo, Anima est actus et ratio et species.

In closing, Albert remarks on the inapplicability of the middle and major terms of the above to the *rational soul*:

Anima rationalis secundum quasdam partes suas nec principium nec causa est corpori operum vitae et accidentium per se, sicut secundum intellectum agentem

et adeptum. Ergo secundum illas nec est actus nec ratio, nec species alicuius corporis, sed separata et separabilis ab ipso.

He closes: "Et his est intellectus definitionum Aristotelis."

## II-A

Since the first three paragraphs witness Albert saying five times: "*Aristoteles dicit*," it is relevant to consult the *De Anima*. The immediate passage in question is chapter II of Book II (413a10-414a29). In that chapter, we cannot find the new definition as Albert states it here any one of the three times he states it. After having said that animate things differ from inanimate "*in vivo*" and saying that "*multipliciter autem ipso vivere dicto . . . dicimus ipsum vivere, ut intellectus et sensus, motus, et status secundum locum*," and after showing forth these different senses of living, Aristotle states (413b11) (in the Moerbeke translation):

*Anima horum quae dicta sunt, principium; et his determinata est, vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo, motus.*

Later in the chapter at 414a12, Aristotle says:

"*Anima autem hoc quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo.*"

In comparison, then, two points appear:

- 1) Aristotle in neither of his statements of the 'new' definition makes any mention of the body or kind of body;  
whereas Albert, in each of his statements does:
  - a) *causa huiusmodi vitae, scilicet physici corpori organici*
  - b) *causa operum vitae et per se accidentium in tali corpore*
  - c) *causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore in toto et in partibus.*
- 2) Aristotle, in both statements, makes an enumeration of the operations, faculties or modes of living which he declares the soul to be principle of (and of these *intellectio* is one);  
whereas Albert makes no mention at all of the works of life in the first, and in his second and third refers to them generally as '*operum vitae et per se vitae*'—without attaching any enumeration.

## II-B

To make a second comparison of the text of Albert with that of chapter II of the *De Anima*:

Albert states that Aristotle says this definition is as principle of a *propter quid* demonstration and is cause through which others, which merely state *quid est*, are demonstratively concluded. Now Aristotle nowhere in chapter II says explicitly that the new definition is a principle of a *propter quid* demonstration of the old. At the beginning of the chapter, he does state that we must seek again about soul "for it is necessary that the definitive ratio show not only *quid sit*, *sed et causam inesse*." ("Because not only must the discourse expressing the definition announce what is in fact, but it must also contain the cause and bring it to light.")

Aristotle goes on to give an example from geometry of two definitions, one of which is as principle stating the cause of the thing, the other has *ratio conclusionis*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In this connection it might be said that in this introduction to chapter II, a strong pre-

sumption is created that the definitions of soul would be similarly related as principle and

But it is important to note that Aristotle did not explicitly state that such was his view; it is important because St. Thomas did not think that such was Aristotle's view:

After explicating the geometrical example, St. Thomas comments in Book II, 1.3 of his commentary on *De Anima* (Pirotta ed. #252):

"It must be attended to that this example which is here induced, is like that which he intends in connection with the soul, in one point (*quantum ad aliquid*); namely as to this, that a definition of soul is to be demonstrated; but not as to this: that it will be demonstrated by a demonstration *dicente propter quid*."

In #253: St. Thomas states the syllogism Aristotle intends to set up thus:

That which is first principle of living is *actus et forma* of living bodies  
But soul is first principle of living in those things which live.  
Hence, the soul is *actus et forma* of living bodies.

He then adds:

"Now it is manifest that this demonstration is *ex posteriori*. For from this, that the soul is form of living body, is it the principle of the works of life, and *not conversely*."

In effect, then, St. Thomas does not think that Aristotle meant to say what Albert states Aristotle says, for the reason that if Aristotle meant that, he would be mistaken.

## II-C

It seems pertinent to compare the text of Albert with that of Aristotle on one more point:

In Albert's third sentence, which begins *Aristoteles iterum dicit* it is said that the first two definitions, as *actus* and as *ratio et species*, are imperfect "because through them one cannot know the causes of the accidents *per se* and of the operations which convene *per se* to the soul." This again, and even more clearly, is interpretation of Aristotle, not citation. Aristotle does speak of definitions, which do not make known the properties or facilitate conjecture about them, as dialectical and vain. But this, as Albert notes in his next sentences, was in Book I, chapter I (403a) not in Book II, chapter II. Aristotle does not explicitly say anywhere that he considers the definition of soul as act or form an instance of those definitions which are dialectical and vain, because they do not make *per se accidentia* known. Albert, it would seem, merely infers that because Aristotle begins again in chapter II to discuss the soul and because he was dissatisfied with previous definition, that previous definition was dialectical and vain. (Also, Aristotle does not say anywhere that properties are superiorly demonstrable from the new definition . . . Indeed, if we take Aristotle's statements of the new definition, the properties, the proper operations, are present in the definition as *differentia*.)

I have noted these differences between the text of Albert and that of Aristotle (to the material of which Albert is clearly referring), not because St. Albert, despite his '*Aristoteles dicit*,' is to be construed here or judged here as pretending to faithful

conclusion of a *propter quid* demonstration, since it might seem strange that Aristotle would go out of his way to give an example of a kind of relation between two definitions which is not the kind of relation between the two definitions at hand. And indeed, by consulting the

commentary of G. Rodier on this point in the second volume of his edition of the *De Anima*, it will be seen that Albert is not alone in feeling that the geometrical example indicated the kind of relation Aristotle thought existed between the two definitions of the soul.



commentary or literal rendition of the sense of Aristotle; but rather because, regardless of what Aristotle said or meant to say, I think that an explanation of what Albert means here and an explanation of the textual differences from Aristotle will coincide. I think, that is, that there is a reason for what Albert says here and also a reason for the differences from Aristotle's text; and that the reason for both is the same. The presence of the differences then provides key-clues to the grasp of Albert's understanding of the soul. And so I propose to direct my exposition of the sense of what Albert says to these three questions:

1) Why might Albert be predisposed to feel that Aristotle said, though he did not explicitly say, that the two definitions are related in a *propter quid* demonstration since, as we have seen, though perhaps the text of Aristotle suggests that, it does not suggest it so inevitably as to make St. Thomas construe him as saying it?

2) Why, in his statements of the new definition does Albert make mention of the body and give no enumeration of the works of life, as that enumeration is contained in Aristotle?

3) Why does Albert feel that Aristotle's general remark in Book I about dialectical and vain definitions is applicable to the first of his own definitions of the soul set up in chapter II of Book II?

### III-A

To the first, then: It seems to me eminently intelligible that Albert should have no hesitation about construing the relations between the terms 'soul,' 'principle' and 'act' or 'form' as a relation in which 'principle' is the middle term of a *propter quid* demonstration. For this is what one would expect him to do as a good philosopher consistent with himself in the measure that this is possible. That is, what Albert, with Avicenna, said for Aristotle about Aristotle's first definition and first chapter is clearly consonant with what Albert, without Avicenna directly so far as I know, has Aristotle saying here. For if soul is said to be *actus*, not because it is so in itself but only as a consequence of a certain relation it bears to the body, from which relation it is designated *actus*, *actus* being in the body as if the fundament of that relation, then there can be a middle between soul and *actus*, namely that term which states the relation more definitely in its cause. And this is just exactly according to Albert what is done by the term 'principle of life of this kind, namely of physical organic body' or 'principle and cause of works of life and *per se* accidents in such a body.' To call the soul the act of the body when it is not so in itself, without stating what it is so, is insufficient. Albert, in discussing the first definition of the soul, had to repair this insufficiency. And he now construes Aristotle as going on in chapter II to similarly repair the insufficiency — and he construes Aristotle as saying in chapter II just what Albert had said for him in discussion of the definition in chapter I: namely that to the extent that and because the soul is cause (efficient) or works *of and in* the body, it is called *actus*.

It is pertinent, for the corroboration of all this, to recall sentences from Albert's discussion of the previous definition. I take them only from the discussion in the *Summa Theologica*. In the *Solutio* of q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, (Vol. 18 Jamme ed. p. 347b), Albert says:

"This definition of Aristotle says what the soul is, according as it is form and species and substance of animate body in which with regard to the whole and the parts it does the operations of life. It is not given of the soul as it is in itself." And later in the same article (Vol. 18, 348a), the same point is made:

"The soul has a double definition, one according as it does the works of life in the body and in its organs, and in this way it is defined by Aristotle as entelechy of

physical organic body having life in potency . . . the other is given of the soul as it is in itself and as it is separable from the body."

Further, in answer to objection 1, which is from Gregory and expresses the fear that if the soul is entelechy it will be dependent on body for being and without body will be nothing, Albert says (348a):

"Gregory would be saying well, if the soul considered in itself were entelechy *secundum essentiam*. But this is not true, for it is not entelechy except through the animation which it makes (*animationem quam facit*) in the body through the works of life (per opera vitae). In itself it is an incorporeal spirit, always living, as Plato says."

It is seen then from these quotations that already in the discussion of the first definition, Albert, by disengaging the idea of soul from the idea of act or form, has in effect stated the *propter quid* syllogism which at the end of discussion of the second definition he attributes to Aristotle. It is *according as, to the extent that it does, because it does*, the works of life in the body and in its organs, that the soul is called *actus*. To call soul *actus* designates a relation between it and the body; to say it is the principle of works of life in the body is to state the reason why there is that relation. Because the soul and the body are conjoined in this as-if causal relation (a relation, which is seen in the corresponding *Summa De Creaturis* passage, of as-if efficient causality), the *actus* of the soul which is in the body (because the act of anything seems to be in the agent) is as if the effect of that causal activity on the part of the soul. The demonstration consequently, is truly *propter quid*.

### III-B

The second question about differences was: Why has Albert placed in the new definition the body, and omitted from its statement, the enumeration of the works of life, as Aristotle gave it, namely; vegetation, sensing, local motion and intellection? The answer to this seems clear. He does so, in order that he might conclude, as he does at the end of his passage, that the rational soul, according to certain of its parts, is not *actus nec ratio nec species alicuius corpore*, because it is not according to them principle or cause of works of life in body. If it is only insofar as it is causally responsible for acts in the body (*operum vitae in tali corpore; principium et causa operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore secundum totum et secundum partes*) that the soul is denominated *actus*, then to the extent that it is principle of operations (those of the agent and acquired intellect) which are not in the body, it is not called *actus* nor *ratio* nor *species*, but is separate and separable.

Clearly, then, to his purpose it was important that in a definition from which the definition of soul as *actus* (as he understands the latter) is to be concluded, he should say works of life in such a body *secundum totum et secundum partes*. He could not have the statement of the new definition say merely *works of life* and enumerate them, with intellection included as one, for by that manner of understanding Aristotle, St. Thomas, some years before, had proved that the intellectual soul was form and act of the body, a conclusion which St. Albert had already in discussion of the first definition disproved. St. Thomas' understanding of and use of the material in Book II, chapter II, of Aristotle's *De Anima* is indicated in his *Summa Theologica*, P. I., q. 76, a.1, c:

"Whether the Intellectual Principle is United to Body as its Form?

We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is attributed: for instance that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowl-

edge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; so a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform *each of all these vital actions* is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, feeling, and local movement; and *likewise* the primary principle whereby we understand. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. *This is the demonstration used by Aristotle in II DE ANIMA.*"

Consequently, since Albert did not believe that such a conclusion was the truth of the matter, the transformation of the middle term, consisting of putting body in it and leaving intellection out, was essential to his use of it.

Again, returning to the discussion of the first definition in his *Summa Theologica*, it is clear that Albert, following Avicenna, has already committed himself to decisions which determine the statement and use he has made here of the new definition. To cite again, the statement (q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, Vol. 18, p. 347b) about double definition:

"One is according as it does the works of life in the body and its organs . . . and in this way it is defined by Aristotle as entelechy . . . the other, which is given of the soul in itself and as it is separable from the body, especially according to *the part which is the act of no body*, that is, the intellective, according to which part it does the works of life in itself (*secundum quam partem opera vitae operatur in seipsa*)."

The contrast here is clear between works of life in body and in itself, in the one case permitting definition of soul as act, in the other a definition of the soul as it is in itself.

Objection 10 in the same article states that the definition of the soul as entelechy is badly given; for Aristotle says that it applies universally, and yet intellect, which is of the soul, is not act of any body."

To this Albert replies (Vol. 18, 348b-349a):

"The definition is well given and applies to every soul which is act of body and *has nothing except what is act of the body*. But the intellect is the act of no body: and for this reason the definition does not convene to it."

(And this is the point where Albert goes on to show that since part is not act, the whole rational soul cannot be.)

This text states then, that that soul is *actus* which has "nothing except what is act of the body." And we understand from this the presence, in the new definition as Albert states it in syllogism, of "*in toto et in partibus*": "*Omne quod est principium et causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore IN TOTO ET IN PARTIBUS est actus et ratio species ipsius.*"

It is clear, then, that the decisions made which yield this second difference from the text of Aristotle are controlled by decisions already made about with what reservations the soul can be said to be act. The use of body in the definition was crucial to Albert's consistency with himself.

### III-C

Inquiring regarding the remaining difference, the pattern is seen to be the same. Albert, with no direct textual authority from Aristotle, has interpreted him as saying that the definition of the soul as form is a dialectical and vain definition "be-

cause it does not make us know the causes of the accidents *per se* and the operations which *per se* convene to the soul."

Though, as I have said, it would be difficult to imagine what this would mean in Aristotle since his new definition, far from making the essential operations known, contains them as *differentia*, it is clear what Albert can mean.

By those operations which "convene *per se* to the soul" he means those which are not acts of the body, those operations of the intellective part which the soul does in itself (*operatur in seipsa*—in statement about double definition). Those operations which convene *per se* to the soul are contrasted with those which are acts of the body or done in the body. Now since it was said in the reply to Objection 10, previously quoted, that the definition of the soul as act applies to every soul which is the act of body and *nihil habet nisi quod est actus corporis*, but not to a soul which has a power, the operation of which is not the act of a body but an act in the soul itself, it is clear that from a definition of the soul as act one could never make known those operations which convene *per se* to the soul, any more than one could make known from a definition of man as essentially a transitive agent his immanent operations. And so, such a definition is dialectical and vain.

Again, then, it is the decisions made in discussion of the first definition which induce Albert to apply a disparaging remark of Aristotle's about a certain kind of definition to Aristotle's own first definition of the soul.

#### IV

From this examination of Albert's discussion in his *Summa Theologica*, of the second definition of Aristotle it seems possible to conclude several things:

1. That Albert's discussion of the second definition is eminently intelligible in the light of his discussion of the first definition of Aristotle.

2. That Albert's whole use of the material of chapter II of Book II of the *De Anima* is controlled by the attempt, which succeeds, to make *his* Aristotle of chapter II consistent with *his* Aristotle of chapter I.

3. That, therefore, if Albert's positions in discussion of chapter I were Avicennian because in agreement with Avicenna in meaning and clearly borrowed language, then his positions in discussion of the second definition can be called Avicennian by logical derivation. For though there seems no direct borrowing here from Avicenna, positions of marked Avicennian influence rationally control what is said here.<sup>2</sup> Albert, that is, remains Avicennian because he remains consistent with himself.

4. Further, that on the interpretation of Aristotle's chapter II and on the truth of the matters concerned there, Albert is in unequivocal disagreement with St. Thomas. No interpretation of passages is needed to establish this disagreement. Indeed seldom do two men so clearly disagree. One thinks chapter II is correctly cited and used to prove that the intellective soul is the form of the body; the other that it is not. One thinks that because the soul is act and form it is principle; the other that because the soul is principle it is act and form. Either they are using these words, act and principle, to mean the same thing or they are not. If they are, they certainly do not agree and one of them is right, the other wrong, and only one of them a Thomist. If they are using the words to mean different things, it is possible, though improbable, that they could be in agreement on the truth of the

<sup>2</sup> For the bifurcation taken from Avicenna between soul in itself and soul as act control his: (1) statement of the second definition; (2)

his interpretation of relation between the two definitions; (3) his use of Book I.

matters concerned; but even then, one would hardly call one who used essential words like act and principle so entirely differently, a Thomist.

At any rate, it is clear that if St. Albert knew of St. Thomas' commentary on chapter II of *De Anima* and of his use of chapter II material in Question 76, he was not impressed. In a discussion of chapter II material, he is more concerned to preserve the integrity of his original Avicennian positions than he is to confront himself with Thomas' interpretation and use of that material.

# An English Pilgrim-Diary of the Year 990<sup>1</sup>

"For every wight which that to Rome went,  
halt nat o path nor alwey o manere."

Chaucer, *Troilus* ii, 36-7.

FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, JR.

## I

THE pilgrim-diary associated with Sigeric, archbishop of Canterbury (990-94), commends itself at once to the student of medieval history, geography and literature; for this little document with its catalog of twenty-three Roman churches and its list of seventy-nine *submansiones* or stopping places between Rome and the Channel is extraordinarily detailed for the period and is rich in information. Viewed as a literary work, better perhaps as a sketch or a skeleton of a literary work, it is, as W. J. Moore recently and rightly observed, "the only complete itinerary of an Anglo-Saxon pilgrim to Rome which we possess."<sup>2</sup> It is, accordingly, well worth such study as one may care to devote to it. In the following pages I have attempted to identify the sites in the itinerary portion in the text and, where possible, to account for the often curiously distorted forms of many of the *submansiones*.

## II<sup>3</sup>

989. Hēr was Siric tō arcebiscope gehādod . . . siþþan fērde tō Rōme æfter his pallium.

Hic consecratus est Siricus ad archiepiscopatum Cantie . . . hic Siricus (*partly erased*) ivit ad Romam pro palio.

This entry for 989 (more rightly 990) in the bilingual annals (Old English and Latin) in British Museum Ms. Cotton Domitian A.VIII (fol. 58v),<sup>4</sup> contains a simple statement of a not particularly remarkable event.<sup>5</sup> It tells us that Sigeric

<sup>1</sup> I wish at the outset to thank my friend Mr. Charles Niver for calling my attention to the first instance to this text as edited by Hook and by Miller and subsequently for many useful references. Mr. Niver is at present exploring the implications of certain portions of Archbishop Sigeric's route with special reference to the art of the time.

Attention is also called at the outset to the list of abbreviations in §VI below.

<sup>2</sup> W. J. Moore, *The Saxon Pilgrims to Rome and the Schola Saxonum* (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1937), p. 86. The next document of this kind known to me is Sæwulf's travel-diary to the Holy Land of A.D. 1102-3, edited with a translation by Wm. R. Brownlow in the *Palestine Pilgrims' Text Soc.*, Publ. 21, London, 1892; this is, of course, post-Conquest.

<sup>3</sup> In this section I have for the convenience of the reader ventured to repeat a page or two (text and footnotes) from my article "The Rome of Two Northern Pilgrims: Archbishop Sigeric of Canterbury and Abbot Nikolás of Munkathverá," *Harvard Theological Review* XXXIII (1940) 267-89.

<sup>4</sup> Thorpe's and Plummer's *F*-text, now being edited by Mrs. Marie Hoffmann of Strassburg i. El. and myself. For a careful study of the language (late West Saxon with numerous Kenticisms) of the OE portions of the text see C.-H. Fernquist, *Studier i modern Språkvetenskap* XIII (Uppsala, 1937), 41-103, summary pp. 52-3 §4. It may be noted here that, while the present annal does not occur in other versions of the Old-English Chronicle, a very similar entry under what is surely the correct date 990 does occur in the Easter Table (a Canterbury document) in Brit. Mus. Ms. Cotton Caligula A. XV, fol. 132v: "990: Hēr Siric biscop fōr tō Rōme," ed. Felix Liebermann, *Ungedruckte angelnormannische Geschichtsquellen* (Strassburg i. El., 1879), p. 3. The present annal, in reflecting a specialized interest in Canterbury affairs, is characteristic of *F*, beyond all question a Canterbury book; see Charles Plummer, *Two Saxon Chronicles parallel* II (Oxford, 1899), xxxvi §28.

<sup>5</sup> On numerous English pilgrimages to Rome in the seventh and eighth centuries see Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-89, 126-7 (chronological table);

(also known as Siric),<sup>6</sup> archbishop of Canterbury, went to Rome,<sup>7</sup> — probably in the summer of 990<sup>8</sup> — to receive the pallium from the pope, then John XV (989–96). Such an entry would not detain us long if some unknown member of the archbishop's retinue had not made this typical journey particularly memorable by jotting down a set of notes which amounts to a sketch, if not a full picture, of the archbishop's sojourn in Rome and of his return-itinerary from Rome to the Channel. Composed in Latin and preserved in Brit. Mus. Ms. Cotton Tiberius B.V., fol. 22v–23r,<sup>9</sup> these notes constitute in effect an Anglo-Latin pilgrim-diary of the late tenth century. That the unknown author was an Englishman is likely, for he speaks at the outset of “our archbishop” (*archiepiscopi nostri*). Nothing more is known about this diarist.

The text of the diary has been printed twice in full and a third time in part by as many different persons; none indicates obligations to his predecessor. The editions, none quite accurate, are:

1. Hook. First edition (I, 434 fn.: “never been printed”). Hook gives the complete text but does not identify either churches or places.

2. Stubbs. Stubbs gives the complete text; he does not identify the churches though he identifies correctly many of the places, some very difficult, in the itinerary.

3. Miller (p. 156: “noch nirgends erwähnt”). Miller omits the list of churches altogether but identifies many places correctly; on pp. 30–1 he gives a description of the Ms. and an analysis of its contents. This partial edition suffers especially from Miller's lack of familiarity with the specifically Old-English letters employed here and there; see, for example, *Martinweð* (stop 73).<sup>10</sup>

As Miller (p. 31) observed, the expression “*archiepiscopi nostri*” at the beginning of the text suggests that the diary was written during Sigeric's lifetime and hence not later than 994, the year of the archbishop's death. The general accuracy of the data makes it indeed probable that the work was composed or compiled in the course of the journey itself, that is in the year 990. Script and internal evidence point to the early part of the eleventh century, probably before 1016,<sup>11</sup> as the date

for the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries see Jung, pp. 15–31; and for the twelfth century P. B. Schaeffer, *Englishmen in Italy in the Twelfth Century: Rome* (unpubl. Harvard diss., 1923).

<sup>6</sup> For a biographical notice see Wm. Hunt in *The Dictionary of National Biography* under “Sigeric or Siric”; also Hook, pp. 431–9, and for scattered notes on Sigeric's association with Ælfric, abbot and great English writer, see C. L. White, *Ælfric: a New Study of his Life and Writings* (Yale Studies in English II, Boston, 1898), Index under “Sigeric.”

<sup>7</sup> The period of Otto III and Crescentius II; for a brief statement on this period see Léon Homo, *Rome médiévale 476–1420* (Paris, 1934), pp. 85–6, also Hook, p. 433. For Italy in the second half of the tenth century see EI XIX, map facing p. 808 (art. “Italia”).

<sup>8</sup> See Stubbs, p. 391, n. 1 bottom; Plummer, *op. cit.*, II, 173 under the year 989. Miller, p. 31, thinks that the journey could scarcely have been made before the spring of 991, so Hook, p. 433, but cp. p. 434, footnote line 3 for the 990 date; also White, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>9</sup> A partial analysis of the contents in *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* V (1880), 637–40.

<sup>10</sup> Some use has been made of this important little document by students of medieval travel-routes, e.g. E. Oehlmann, “Die Alpenpässe im Mittelalter,” *Jahrb. f. schweiz. Geschichte* III (1878), esp. p. 250; Aloys Schulte, *Geschichte d. mittelalterl. Handels u. Verkehrs zwischen Westdeutschland u. Italien mit Anschluss von Venedig* I (Leipzig, 1900), 67; and J. E. Tyler, *The Alpine Passes—the Middle Ages (926–1250)* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 8–9, 15. These writers, and sporadically a few others, in the main follow Stubbs' identifications of the stopping places (*subman-siones*) in the itinerary part of the diary. There has, however, been only one thorough-going study of the itinerary, in this case limited to the stretch between Rome and Lucca, namely that by Julius Jung, “Das Itinerar des Erzbischofs Sigeric von Canterbury und die Strasse von Rom über Siena nach Luca,” *Mitteilungen d. Instituts f. österreichische Geschichtsforschung* XXV (1904), 1–90; see *art. cit.* pp. 15–6 for a pointed comment on the comparative neglect of this document.

<sup>11</sup> See Heinrich Henel, *Studien zum ae. Computus* (in Max Förster's “Beiträge zur engl. Philologie,” Vol. XXVI, Leipzig, 1934), p. 34 and note 64. I may add that the hand of the

of the present text, which is accordingly at least one transcript and very likely more than one, removed from the prototext (*Urtext*). That the present copy reflects, partially at least, the work of a scribe or scribes who were quite unfamiliar with the names of many of the *submansiones*, will be seen in the following section.

## III

We may now turn to the text itself or rather to that part of it that includes the *submansiones*.<sup>12</sup> The text is printed as closely as possible according to the Ms., while all corrections and even the expansion of the commonest abbreviations are confined to the commentary on the individual names (§IV below). To facilitate cross-reference the *submansiones* are, however, numbered parenthetically with arabic numerals in order, an order which, as will be seen, is also the order in which they were reached.

Iste sunt submansiones deroma usq: admare .i. urbs roma (1) .ii. iohis .viii. (2) .iii. bacane (3) .iiii. suteria (4) .v. furcari (5) .vi. scē ualentine (6) .vii. Scē. flauiane (7) .viii. Scā. cristina (8) .ix. Aqua pendente (9) .x. Scē petir inpail (10) .xi. Abricula (11) .xii. Scē quiric (12) .xiii. turreiner (13) .xiiii. Arbia (14) .xv. Seocine (15) .xvi. Burgenoue (16) .xvii. Ælse (17) .xviii. Scē martin infosse (18) .xix. Scē gemiane (19) .xx. Scē maria glan (20) .xxi. Scē petre currant (21) .xxii. Scē dionisii (22) .xxiii. Arneblanca (23) .xxiiii. Aqua nigra (24) .xxv. Forcri (25) .xxvi. Luca (26) .xxvii. Campmaior (27) .xxviii. Luna (28) .xxix. Scē stephane (29) .xxx. Aguilla (30) .xxxi. Puntremel (31) .xxxii. Scē Benedicte (32) .xxxiii. Scē modesanne (33) .xxxiiii. Philemangenur (34) .xxxv. Metane (35) .xxxvi. Scāe domnine (36) .xxxvii. Floricun (37) .xxxviii. Placentia (38) .xxxix. Scē Andrea (39) .xl. Scē cristine (40) .xli. Pamphica (41) .xlii. Tremel (42) .xliii. Uercel (43) .xliv. Scē Agath (44) .xlv. Eueri (45) .xlvi. Publei (46) .xlvii. Agust' (47) .xlviii. Scē remei (48) .xlix. Petrescastel (49) .l. Ursiores (50) .li. Scē maurici (51) .lii. Burbulei (52) .liii. Uiuæc (53) .liiii. Losanna (54) .lv. (fol. 23<sup>r</sup>) Urba (55) .lvi. Antifern (56) .lvii. Punterlin (58) .lviii. Nos (58) .lix. Bysiceon (59) .lx. Cuscei (60) .lxi. Sefui (61) .lxii. Grenant (62) .lxiii. Oisma (63) .lxiiii. Blæcuile (64) .lvx. Bar (65) .lxvi. Breone (66) .lxvii. Domaniant (67) .lxviii. Funtaine (68) .lxviiii. Caðeluns (69) .lxx. Rems (80) .lxxi. Corbunei (71) .lxxii. Mundloðum (?) (72) .lxxiii. Martinwæð (73) .lxxiiii. Duin (74) .lxxv. Aðerats (75) .lxxvi. Bruwæi (76) .lxxvii. Teranburh (77) .lxxvii. Gisne (78) .lxxx. Sumeran (?) (79): Oisma

That the names of the *submansiones* have not been well transmitted, will be clear in the discussion of all too many of the items in §IV below. In anticipation, a few general comments may be made: e's and o's of the prototext have been ignorantly confused, as in *Arne* for *Arno* (23) and *Tremel* for *Tromel* (42); similarly *a* is miswritten for *o* in *Suteria* for *Suterio* (4) and *blanca* for *blanco* (23). In several instances a series of minims has proved ambiguous: so *iner* for *nier* (13), *Sefui* for *Sefu* (61)

diary is the same as that of the immediately preceding list of tenth-century popes and the marginal list of English bishops. This list of bishops is printed by Pauli and Liebermann in *Neues Archiv. d. Gesellschaft f. ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* V (1880), 639-40 and, with some additional discussion, by Louis Duchesne in *Le Liber Pontificalis* II (Paris, 1892), xv. Ælfric's *De Temporibus*, discussed by Henel, immediately follows the diary on fol. 23<sup>r</sup>. Stubbs's statement (p. 391, n. 1) that "the Ms. is contemporary with Sigeric's pontificate" can no longer be viewed as right.

<sup>12</sup> For the beginning portion, containing the

list of the churches visited in Rome, see the editions cited p. 232 above and, more accurately, in my art. cit. *Harvard Theological Review*.

A brief note on the word *submansio* f., not recorded in DuCange or J. H. Baxter and Chas. Johnson, *Medieval Latin Word-List* (Oxford, 1934). Lat. *mansio* "overnight stopping-place" is, of course, familiar from Classical times; the present compound might thus be expected to mean "sub-station" or "minor stopping-place" and the like, but it is obviously used by Sigeric's diarist without distinction for major and minor stopping-places on the route.



and *aniant* for *amant* (67). The Insular *s* and *r* have been confused: *r* read for *s* in *furcari* (5) and *s* for *r* in *modesanne* (23). In addition to these there is good reason to suspect other errors of various sorts, discussed under the individual names. The names of some of the stops have apparently been very much distorted, for example, *Philemangenur* (35).

Some scribe seems to have had difficulty with the roman numerals used in connection with the stops: unlikely the scribe who, I assume, first supplied them. A confusion of minims has quite possibly taken place between (2) and (3), leading to the ultimate alteration of an earlier sequence ".vii. .iii." to ".viii. .iii."; *lxv.* is miswritten *lux.*, while an earlier *lxxviii.* or more probably *lxxxix* (since "9" is usually though not always written *ix.*) is presumably miswritten *lxxx.*; that a stop has dropped out between (78) and (80) seems, in view of the very short distance involved, a less likely alternative.

The treatment of the Ms. abbreviation *scē* and, more commonly, *scē* is in the case of many stops in Italy noteworthy. *Scē* and *scē* are, of course, to be expanded respectively to *Sancte* and *Sanctē* (as if for a Latin gen. or dat. sing. fem. -ae). *Sancte* without the hooked *e* is used only before the name of four male saints: *Petir* (10), *Quiric* (12), *Martin* (17) and *Gemiane* (19); elsewhere *Sanctē* with the hooked *ē* is employed indifferently before the names of male and female saints. *Scā* (Lat. *sancta*) before *Cristina* (8) and — very oddly — *scāe* (Lat. *sanctae*) before *Domnine* (36) are exceptional. Now, except perhaps in the case of *Sancta Cristina* (8) the diarist most likely wrote in all cases *scē* (for OE *sancte*, a by-form of *sanct* "saint"); this abbreviation a later scribe, perhaps Continental and unfamiliar with OE *sancte*, would seem to have misinterpreted as standing for Lat. *sanctē*, i.e., *sanctae* and "corrected" the *scē* of his Vorlage to *scē*. This gratuitous alteration seems to have been left in most cases by his successor except in the case of \**scē domnine* which was expanded to *scāe domnine* (36) as though *Domnine* were the female saint *Domnina* instead of the St. *Domninus* here actually meant. A penchant of some intermediate scribe to hook his *e*'s appears also in the historically unjustifiable *Ælse* (17) for *Else* or *Elsa* and perhaps also in *blæc-* (64). That a Continental scribe may have been concerned in the transmission of the text is further suggested by the confusion of Insular *s* and *r* noted above.

To place the blame or to establish at all exactly the succession of errors great and small in our text is, with a unique Ms., scarcely possible, but it is clear, I think, that we have to do with a textual tradition involving one or more persons between the prototext and our surviving copy. That the roman numerals were not in the prototext seems also quite possible in view of the curious separation by roman numerals of the suburb *Antifern* (56) from the town of *Urba* (55) and the possible false division of syllables between *pail* (10) and *Abricula* (11), unlikely to have occurred had the roman numerals ever been rightly in place.

The return journey of the English pilgrims may be supposed to have begun on the third day after their arrival in Rome.<sup>13</sup> The city of Rome (1) is mentioned as the point of departure and immediately thereafter "*Iohannis viiii*" (2); the significance of this somewhat uncertain item is discussed below. From here on the route followed was a well trod one, often along Roman roads (cp. the references to the *Antonine Itinerary*), running through Italy (3–48), over the Great St. Bernard Pass (between 48 and 49), through part of French Switzerland (49–56) and across north-eastern France (57–78) to a point (79) presumably near Wissant on the French coast.

<sup>13</sup> See *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit., p. 276.

## IV

In the commentary which now follows, the *submansiones* or stops are discussed in the order of their appearance in the diary, that is, in the order reached. After each name is given, if known, a modern identification (including province, canton or department), also references to special studies and to some large-scale map; for only on such a map are many of the localities—often quite small and today insignificant—to be found.<sup>14</sup> For general convenience reference is, where possible, made to Andree's *Allgemeiner Handatlas* and to some recent guide-book. Ordinarily I have not found it particularly relevant or helpful to cite corresponding entries from other itineraries since illustrative material of this kind can readily be assembled from the writings of others.<sup>15</sup> To emphasize the continuity of Roman routes I have, however, wherever possible referred to the *Antonine Itinerary* (IA) and also make occasional use of the pilgrim-diary of the Icelander Nikólás, abbot of the Benedictine foundation at Munkaþverá (Eyjafjarðar sýsla), whose forms at times help to explain those of the present text.<sup>16</sup> Other discussion, especially of the nature of the distortion of a name, is given where this justifies an otherwise unpromising-seeming identification. Note the key of abbreviations (§VI below).

*Urbs Roma* (1), the city of Rome. Lat. *Roma* is used though OE had a thoroughly naturalized *Rōm* f. Rome, scarcely to be viewed as a *submansio*, is evidently only noted as the point of departure for the return-journey.

*Iohannis.viii.* (2), "of John IX." If the Ms. is right (Miller misreads the roman numeral as "*viii*"), this item might naturally be supposed to refer somehow to Pope John IX (898–900). But Jung p. 31 (and n. 4) draws the obvious conclusion that this item (2) must refer to something in the Vatican and identifies it as the tomb of John IX (with epitaph quoted by Mann p. 102), located in the outer porch of the old St. Peter's. Mann (101–2) assumes some regular halting place—unlikely—associated with John IX but hazards no definite suggestion. This monument seems, however, scarcely to be worthy of such prominence in the itinerary, and I should like to venture an alternate identification. I begin with the suggestion that Ms. *.viii.* may be an error for *.vii.*, arising from an erroneous joining of the minims of *.vii.* of an earlier text with the immediately following *.iii.* which preceded *Bacane* (3); see also p. 234 above. If this suggestion is right, the supposedly original *.vii.* would then refer to Pope John VII (705–7), who caused to be built in the old St. Peter's an oratory (*capella*) to the Blessed Virgin, close to the present Porta Santa. This oratory, demolished in 1609, was reputedly most beautiful and was especially famed for its mosaics: see Eugen Müntz, *Revue archéologique*, new ser. XXXIV (Sept. 1877), 145–62; art. "Jean VII" by Henri Leclercq in the *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* VII, ii (Paris, 1927), esp. col. 2200 ff.; and E. W. Anthony, *A History of Mosaics* (Boston, 1935), pp. 137–9. This oratory may have been known to Sigeric and the members of his retinue even before their trip to Rome, if not otherwise, easily through the notice in Bede's *Chronicon*, i.e. in chap. 66 of Bede's *De Ratione temporum* (*Patrolog. Lat.* XC, Paris, 1850, col. 596 under A.D. 708): "*Iohannes . . . fecit oratorium sanctae Dei genetrici opere pulcherrimo intra ecclesiam beati Petri apostoli.*" Accordingly, the present entry "*Iohannis viii*" may stand for "*(capella) Iohannis vii*" "(oratory) of Pope John VII" where the English visitors

<sup>14</sup> For the modern student many of the identifications of Stubbs and Miller, though often right, are frequently unsatisfying because of lack of documentation and precise justification. Both these scholars must have done considerable close investigation in order to have hit upon, as they have, the correct identification of various difficult names; but many of the

localities at issue are small and obscure and the identifications of Stubbs and Miller cannot be accepted on sight without qualifying cognomens and references to large-scale maps and special studies where such are available.

<sup>15</sup> E.g. Oehlmann, cited in n. 10 above.

<sup>16</sup> For literature see *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit., p. 277.

may have said their past prayers and made their last offerings before starting back to the Channel (*ad mare*). Mention of this famous chapel would, incidentally, quite fit in with the diarist's obvious interest in sightseeing.

From (1) to (8) the route follows the Cassian Way, IA 286, 1-5.

*Bacane* (3), Baccano (prov. Viterbo), a village on the edge of a now dried-up lake basin. GCT 143, Baed. RCI 431. Rom. *Baccanae* f. pl., also *Baccana* neut. pl.: IA 286, 4 on the route to Bolsena (8) and in Roman times an important road-junction (Nissen I, 260; II, i, 356). If the MS. -e is not an error for -o (see p. 233 above), we have here a survival of the Rom. form -ae (-e). PW 4. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1896), col. 2720; Jung 31-2; Matthias 62. The modern form Baccano may have been influenced by other Baccano-names (from Lat. adj. *bacchanal*), though the Rom. *Baccanae* can scarcely have anything to do with Bacchus or the like; see Pieri 333 "*baccano*."

*Sutera* (4), Sutri, prov. Viterbo. GCT 143, Andree 127 C2 and inset K7, Baed. RCI 130. Rom. *Sutrium*: IA 286, 3. The Ms. form is irregular: for -er- for vocalic *r* cp. *Adērats* (75); -a is surely a scribal error for *o* (see p. 233 above). The form *Sutera* may, however, reflect merely a popular association with, and partial adaptation to, OE *sūtere* m. "shoemaker." On the modern Sutri as a petrified locative see Serra 152. PW 7. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1931), col. 995-6; EI XXXIII, 31; Jung 32-3; Matthias 189; Tomassetti V, 626-44.

*Furcari* (5), miswritten for *Furcasi*, Forcassi, now a ruin on the Cassian Way about 1, 5 km from Vetralla, prov. Viterbo. Stubbs misreads *Furcasi*. GCT 143, Andree 127 C2 (Vetralla), Baed. RCI 129-30. Rom. *Forum Cassi*: IA 286, 3. On the Lat. name *Cassius* in place-names see Pieri 79 and on *forum* "market-place" see Gröhler II, 25-6. On the scribal confusion of *s* and *r* see p. 234 above. PW 13. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1910), col. 65; Nissen II, i, 344; Jung 33.

*Sancte Valentine* (6), epithet for Viterbo, prov. Viterbo. GCT 143, Andree 127 C2. The former Borgo S. Valentino *in silice* (*Urbs Sancti Valentini*) "on the flint paving blocks (of the Cassian Way)," with its church of S. Valentino destroyed *ca.* 1137, was once a suburb of Viterbo. Stubbs no doubt had this in mind with his tentative identification "probably Viterbo." Matthias 220-1. See esp. Cesare Pinzi, *Storia della città di Viterbo* I (Rome, 1887), 51-2, 127; Signorelli Index, p. 477 under "Valentino (S)" and "Valentino (S) Borgo"; also Jung 34-6. Miller's proposed Valentano (on the other side of the lake of Bolsena) cannot be right.

*Sancte Flaviane* (7), Borgo (or Vico) San Flaviano, epithet for Montefiascone (med. Lat. *Mons Faliscorum*), prov. Viterbo (Signorelli 76-7, 121 n. 13; Jung 36-7, GCT 137, Andree 127 C2, Baed. RCI 123). Borgo S. Flaviano was once a suburb of Montefiascone on the Cassian Way; there is still a twelfth-century church in Montefiascone dedicated to St. Flavian, built on the site of an older basilica (Baed. RCI 123; EI XXIII, 739-40; Matthias 144, 232).

*Sancta Cristina*, epithet for Bolsena, prov. Viterbo (GCT 137, Andree 127 BC2, Baed. RCI 117), where St. Christina was martyred and where there is an eleventh-century church dedicated to her (EI VI, 354; Jung 37-8; Aarbøgger 74). IA 286, 1: *Vulsinis*. So Werlauff 43 §87; Stubbs; Oehlmann IV, 303 n. 8; Kålund 17, 10: *til Kristinoborgar*; Matthias 68-9 under "Lago di Bolsena."

The route soon leaves the Cassian Way (which goes on to Chiusi; IA 285, 6: *Clusio*), bending slightly W around the end of the lake of Bolsena into the valley of the Paglia.

*Aqua pendente* (9), Acquapendente ("the precipitous water-course") at the confluence of the Quintaluna and the Paglia, prov. Viterbo (GCT 129, Andree 127 B2, Baed. RCI 57). Matthias 43, 226. On late and med. Lat. *aqua* "stream" "water-course" see Serra 234 n.1 and Gröhler II, 209-10, and cp. *Aqua nigra* (24). On this name and on *pendente* adj. "precipitous" see Pieri 290. The name refers

specifically to the Quintaluna which here joins the Paglia in a sharp 200 m drop (EI I, 375; Jung 39-43.)

*Sancte Petir in Pail* (10), "St. Peter's on the Paglia," an unidentified religious establishment farther down the Paglia (late Lat. *Palia*: Repetti IV, 22; Jung 43-6, esp. 43 n. 4). Ms. *Petir* represents OE *Peter*, gen. sing. *Petres* as in *Petres castel* (49). The Ms. form (*Pail*) of the river-name is noteworthy. Taking into account the initial *A-* of *Abricula* (11), which may have become detached from the end of *\*Palia* or *\*Pailia* of the prototext by false division, it is tempting to think that the river-name was originally written *Palia*. *Pail* is, to be sure, a conceivable anglicization of the Lat. or Ital. name (cp. late OE *Puille* for Apulia), but in the case of a small and relatively insignificant river adaptation to a foreign language is unlikely. Miller suggests that the site of this St. Peter's was near Radicofani, prov. Siena (GCT 129, Andree 127 B2), though Radicofani lies some 4 or 5 km back from the Paglia.

The route now appears to pass from the valley of the Paglia into that of the Orcia.

*Abricula* (11), Bricola in the Val d'Orcia (Repetti I, 361, VI, 33-4; Jung 46-7) on the Roman post-road on the right bank of the Orcia and almost due N of Radicofani. Unidentified by Stubbs and Miller. Bricola is documented from the eleventh century (*burgum Bricole*) and was in the Middle Ages a well-known hospice, dependant on S. Pietro in Campo di Val d'Orcia; it is now appropriately known as Spedaletto di S. Pellegrino (GCT 121, cp. Repetti V, 441-2). The Ms. reading is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Pieri 272 suggests that the name Bricola is based on Lat. *apricus*, adj., "exposed (e.g. to the warmth of the sun)"; Bricola would then mean "the sunny little spot," comparable to the numerous English Sunnyside's and the Norwegian Solbakke, nature names of similar meaning. If Pieri's etymology is right, as it probably is, then Ms. *Abricula* with the initial *A-* may be an older form than any hitherto recorded. Nevertheless, as suggested under (10) above, the *A-* may merely have come by false division from a preceding *\*Palia* or *\*Pailia*. Conceivably the prototext showed the preservation of both *a*'s: *Palia Abricula*, with reduction by haplography.

Then NNW to

*Sancte Quiric* (12), S. Quirico d'Orcia, in Sigeric's day known as S. Quirico in Osenna, prov. Siena (GCT 121, Andree 127 B1, Baed. RCI 55, Repetti V, 112 ff., VI, 223-4; Jung 49-7). The pieve, dedicated to St. Quiricus, dates from the beginning of the eighth century (Repetti V, 112; EI XXX, 750). The saint's name appears here in anglicized form. A by-form of this name, *Sanctus Clericus*, appearing in various later itineraries, seems to have arisen by popular etymology: e.g. *til Klerka borgar* (Kålund 17, 4); see also Jung 47 n.4 and 5 and Matthias 166 ("Quirico").

Then NW to

*Turre iner* (13), Torrenieri Montalcino in Val d'Asso (prov. Siena), 5, 5 km from (12) above (GCT 121, Baed. RCI 54, Jung 49-50, Repetti V, 542). Ms. *-iner* for *-nier* shows scribal confusion of a series of minims (see pp. 233-4 above). The first element is surely Lat. *turris* f. "tower" "turreted citadel," Ital. *torre* f., with the VLat. Loss of *-s* after an unaccented final vowel; see Gröhler II, 21-2 and Pieri 361 "*turris*." Repetti cites a late Lat. *Turris Nerii*; the second element is perhaps the Lat. name *Nerius* (Gröhler I, 272).

*Arbia* (14), R. Arbia, tributary of the Ombrone (Rom. *Umbro*). The name of the Arbia is not recorded early though there is no reason to doubt that this river-name is old: Repetti I, 103-4. As in *Ælse* (17) and *Arne* (23) the mention of the river presumably indicates a crossing. Miller and Jung (p. 51) reasonably suggest

Ponte d'Arbia (GCT 121, Baed. RCI 56), near the confluence of the Arbia and the Sorra.

Between here and Lucca (26) come several doubtful names. At times the route is not quite certain, but the general course is W and the obvious highway is that leading to Siena. The route presumably follows the W bank of the Arbia.

*Seocine* (15). A crux. Stubbs and Jung (pp. 51-7) identify this with Siena (GCT 120, Andree 127 B1), Rom. *Saena Iulia*; but if Siena is meant, then the Ms. form is much distorted. Miller suggests a location near Monteroni di Val-d'Arbia (GCT 120, Repetti III, 509 ff., Andree 127 B1); but it should be noted that Miller had already committed himself to the impossible interpretation of *Ælse* (17) as "possibly" Siena!

*Burge nove* (16). Stubbs's Borgo Nuovo refers, I suppose, to Borgonuovo d'Isola near Staggia in Val-d'Elsa, prov. Siena (GCT 113), where stood the old pieve of S. Stefano (Repetti I, 354), and this may well be right. Jung 57 n. 4: "Wo?" I do not understand Miller's "cp. Borgo Vecchio" (with its church of S. Lorenzo) at Colle di Malamerenda in Val-d'Arbia (GCT 120, S of Siena; Repetti III, 28-9). The Ms. spelling with -e's can scarcely be right and by common confusion of o and e (see p. 233 above) must stand for *Burgo novo* (Ital. *borgo* m. "fortified place" "castle"); the u of Ms. *burge* may reflect popular adaptation to the cognate OE *burh* f. The name is of the familiar type "*Castrum novum*" (Gröhler II, 14-5), "Neuburg," "Châteauneuf," "Newcastle," not lacking in Italian representatives (Pieri 288-9).

*Ælse* (17). R. Elsa, small tributary of the Arno. Repetti II, 53. The *Æ-* (vs. *E-*) does not seem to be historically justified; cp. Pieri 35 for an Etruscan etymon \**Helza* and p. 234 above. The place of crossing or meeting the river is uncertain. The *s* is, as in *Modesanne* (33), Insular in form. For similar indications of river-crossings cp. *Arbia* (14) and *Arne* (23). Miller misread the name "*As(y?)e*" and suggests Siena or a place in the vicinity; cp. (15) above.

*Sancte Martin in Fosse* (18), "St. Martin's in Foci," presumably a religious house and W of the Elsa (17). Miller misread the closely written -*ti-* of *Martin* as an *a* and placed his *Sce Maran* near Monteriggione (GCT 113, Andree 127 B1). Stubbs identifies this St. Martin's with S. Martino (a church?) in the district of Fusci, Fosci, now Foci, in the Val-d'Elsa (Repetti II, 330-1; Jung 59-60; GCT 113) and SE of S. Gimignano, very likely the next stop (19). On the Lat. personal name *Fuscus* in the district-name see Pieri 86; it is surely not Langobardic as Repetti suggests. Ms. *fosse*, like the mod. Ital. *Foci*, may well have arisen by popular etymology, in the present instance by a fancied association with Lat. *fossa*; modern Foci shows popular association with Lat. *fauces*, used toponymically for a gap.

*Sancte Gemiane* (19), very likely, as Stubbs would have it, S. Gimignano in Val-d'Elsa, prov. Siena (GCT 113; Andree 127 B1; Baed. RCI 23; Repetti V, 35-6; Jung 60-1, EI XXX, 653-4). If this is right, MS. *Gemiane* stands by the haplography of a series of minims for \**Geminiane* (cp. pp. 233-4 above), that is St. Geminian, bishop of Modena and eponymous of S. Gimignano. Miller misread *Germane*, i.e. (St.) Germanus, and suggests a site near Poggibonsi in Val-d'Elsa (GCT 113, Andree 127 B1).

*Sancte Maria Glan* (20). Stubbs and Jung identify this with the pieve of S. Maria Chianni di Gambassi in Val-d'Elsa (GCT 113, Andree 127 A1, Repetti I, 695; Jung 61-3). According to Repetti this pieve is documented from 1061, the present building dating from the thirteenth century. If Stubbs and Jung are right, as they well may be, we must suppose that Ms. *Glan* is miswritten for *Glan* or perhaps for *Clani*; see Repetti I, 692 ("Chiani") and on the Etruscan origin of this name Pieri 28-9. Miller suggests a site near Certaldo on the Agliena (GCT 113, Andree 127 B1), perhaps having in mind S. Maria a (A)sciano, due N of (19) on the E bank of the Elsa; but (A)sciano (Lat. *Axianu-*, Pieri 122) cannot formally correspond to Ms. *Glan*.

*Sancte Petre Currant* (21). Stubbs identifies as "S. Pietro, Corazzano" and by this would seem to refer to S. Pietro at Balconevisi (Repetti I, 254), a branch of the pieve of S. Giovanni at Corazzano in Val-d'Evola (GCT 112; Repetti I, 796, IV, 690 under "Quarazzana"; Jung 5, 63-4). Corazzano looks back to an earlier *Quar(r)atiana* < *Quadradiana*, in turn derived from the Lat. personal name *Quadratus* (Pieri 177). Stubbs's identification may be right; but, if so, the Ms. *Currant* must reflect a considerable distortion of a form standing between the older *Quar(r)atiana* and the modern Corazzano, perhaps by some popular adaptation to Ital. *corrente* f. "current" "stream." Miller suggests that we have to do with a S. Pietro on the Pietroso (GCT 112-3), near Castelfiorentino (GCT 113, Andree 127 A1); the river-name Pietroso "the stony one" cannot, of course, be directly connected with the name of (21).

*Sanctę Dionysii* (22), "St. Dionysius's." Hook and Stubbs misread as *Dionysii*. Stubbs, Miller and Jung (64-8) propose San Miniato between the Elsa and the Evola in the lower Val-d'Arno, prov. Pisa (GCT 105, Andree 127 A1, Baed. RCI 21, Repetti V, 79-80). Stubbs adds "San Genesio," that is Borgo San Genesio, earlier Vico Wallari, of San Miniato (Repetti I, 352-3). St. Genesius, Roman martyr, is, to be sure, prominent at San Miniato, but St. Genesius is not St. Dionysius, and I can find no connection between St. Dionysius and San Miniato or the Borgo San Genesio. If Stubbs's suggestion is right, a substitution of names has evidently taken place. A crux.

*Arne bianca* (23), R. Arno bianco, med. Lat. *Arnus albus*. Like *Arbia* (14) and *Ælse* (17) this river-name presumably indicates a crossing which Stubbs and Miller rightly suggest must have been near Fucecchio on the Arno, prov. Firenze (GCT 106, Andree 126 E4). The Arno bianco "was probably a branch . . . which was separated from the main course of the river [Arno] at the west slope of the hill of Fucecchio" (Repetti I, 147, II, 358 col. 1; Jung 68-9) and was perhaps near the once famous hospice of Altopascio in Val-di-Nievola (Repetti I, 76, Aarbøger 73). The present reference to the Arno bianco seems to be the earliest. The adj. *blanca* may refer either the clarity of the water or to its milky color (cp. Pieri 273 under "*bianco*") vs. *nigra* (24) below. On the difficult etymology of the name Arno see G. Battista, *Studi etruschi* I (1927), 332-5. The Ms. spelling is almost surely an error for *Arno blanco* (see p. 233 above) though it may be noted that Serra (p. 6) records a form *Arne* (for Arno?).

*Aqua nigra* (24), "dark or turgid stream." This "water," if a watercourse is here meant as in *Aqua pendente* (9), presumably refers to some small tributary of the Arno near Fucecchio, perhaps the Nievole, running from the now canalized and well drained marshes of Fucecchio and Bientina (med. Lat. *palus Blentina*, see Pieri 23), N of Fucecchio (GCT 105; Repetti I, 139 col. 1, VI, 172; Jung 69, esp. note 2). Or perhaps the so-called Arno nero is meant (Repetti II, 358 col. 1). For French place-names based on Lat. *aqua nigra* see Gröhler II, 211, for Swiss names see Jaccard 305, and on *nigra* in Italian names Pieri 289. Stubbs does not identify this site, but Miller evidently had something of this sort in mind in his explanation "near Galleno," a village about half-way between Fucecchio and Forci (25).

Ms. *aqua nigra* is very likely to be associated, if not identified with *Arnblacker* of Nikolás's itinerary (Kålund 16, 27-8: *þorþ, er Arnblacker heitir*), a village (*þorþ*) somehow identified with the Arno nero mentioned above (surely not with Arno bianco as Aarbøger 73).

*Forci* (25). Both Stubbs and Miller (with a query) suggest Porcari, prov. Lucca (GCT 105), about 9 km E of Lucca (26) and, I think, rightly. Porcari is an old settlement (Repetti IV, 581-3, VI, 200; Jung 77-8). Confusion of *P-* and *F-* is not startling palaeographically, while *-cri* may easily have arisen in the case of a strange word from a misinterpretation of *ci* to abbreviate *-cari*. The name Porcari seems to look back to a Lat. name-type *porcaria* (with reference to swine raising); see Gröhler II, 199; Pieri 266.

*Luca* (26), Lucca, prov. Lucca. Rom. *Lūca*. GCT 113, Andree 126 E4, Baed.

NI 531; Repetti II, 834-5 and VI, 126; Jung 1-10, 81-3; Matthias 130, 232; EI XXI, 556; PW 26. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1927), col. 1535 ff.; A. Solari, "Lucca, centro itinerario nell'antichità," *Bollettino storico lucchese* I (1929), 25-30; Magoun, *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature* XX (1938), 164 bottom ("Luca").

*Camp maior* (27), Camaioire in Versilia, prov. Lucca. GCT 104, Andree 126 E4, Baed. NI 532, EI VIII, 494. References to Camaioire begin after the middle of the eighth century (Repetti I, 398-9, VI, 39; Jung 80). The name corresponds to Lat. *campus maior*; the second element appears here in a CLat vs. VLat or Ital. form *maiore* or *maggiore*; on *campus* in place-names see Gröhler II, 130-2; Pieri 305-6.

The route now more or less parallels the coast to the mouth of the Magra (Rom. *Macra*; cp. IA 289, 2).

*Luna* (28), near Luni (prov. La Spezia), about 3 km NE of the mouth of the Magra on the Aurelian Way in the Val-di-Magra. GCT 96, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 276, EI XXI, 661-2 (extensive bibliography). This once famous Etrurian city, now the site of Roman ruins (including a colosseum), was in Sigeric's day still an episcopal see, destroyed by the Saracens in 1016. The name lives on in the designation of the surrounding region: La Lunigiana. On modern Luni (formally a petrified locative) vs. Roman *Luna* see Serra 155 fn (top); see further Repetti II, esp. 948-9; Matthias 131, and for ancient times PW 26. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1927), col. 1804 ff.; Nissen II, i, 283.

The route now turns up the Magra, along the so-called Via Romea or "Pilgrim Way," leading over the Cisa Pass (Strada della Cisa) in the Ligurian Apennines to Borgo San Donnino (36).

*Sanctę Stephane* (29), (Borgo) San Stefano di Magra (now merely a railway station), prov. La Spezia. GCT 95, Andree 125 D3. So identified by Stubbs and Miller. Documented since the ninth century (Repetti V, 136, VI, 224). Kålund 16, 15: *Stephānus-borg* surely refers to the same site (see Werlauff 41 and note 73).

*Aguilla* (30), almost certainly Aulla in the Val-di-Magra (prov. Massa) near the confluence of the Magra and the Aulella, with its abbey of St. Caprasius, founded ca. 884 (GCT 96, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 457, EI V, 361). Hook misread *Aquilla*. The etymology of Aulla is difficult and disputed. The present instance would appear to be among the earliest (cited as such by Bassi 35). The mod. form Aulla seems to have become established by ca. 1700 but the earlier forms *Avulla*, *Awulla* count heavily against any association with Lat. *aula* "court" "palace" (vs. Repetti I, 168 col. 1) or with VL \**acucula*, Ital. *aguglia* "needle" (used toponymically). Pieri 314 under "*lacus*" argues cogently for a derivation of Aulla from *l)agulla* < *lacun(u)la* "little pool" and, if he is right, we may have here not only a confirmation of his etymology but also a thoroughly archaic form. MS. *Aguilla* would in this case reflect a misreading of an *Agulla* of the prototext. See further Repetti I, 168-9; Emanuelle Gerini, *Memorie storiche . . . Lunigiana* II (Massa, 1831), 3-4; Silvestro Bassi, *Il Castello e l'abbazia dell'Aulla* (Aulla, 1927), pp. 33-5.

*Puntremel* (31), Pontremoli at the confluence of the Verde and the Magra, prov. Massa: "*clavis et ianua*" of the Cisa route (Schütte 45). GCT 84, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 457. Repetti (IV, esp. 543-4) knows of no certain reference to Pontremoli before the eleventh century; EI XXVII, 906-7 notes the present instance as the earliest. There is some disposition to identify Pontremoli with a Rom. *Apua* (Schütte 22 but cp. Giuliani, art. cit. infra, esp. pp. 227-28). The first element of the name is Lat. *pons* m., Ital. *ponte* "bridge": cp. Gröhler II, 147-8 and *Punt Erlin* (57) below. The second element is less certain but may well be derived from VLat *tremulus* m. "poplar" "aspen" (CLat. *populus* m.; see ML 8880); cp. the African site *tremulis* "at the poplar trees" (?) of IA 24, 1. The present name may thus mean "bridge by which poplars grow" or the like. Matthias 165. It may be



noted that there is a bridge Ponte Tremoli in Viterbo. The poplar enters into the composition of many European place-names; for Ital. examples see Pieri 254 ("tremula"), Olivieri 550 under "Tremolada"; for French examples see Longnon Index under "tremble," Gröhler II, 165 and Dauzat 119; and for French Switzerland Jaccard 470-1. For traditional but unlikely etymologies of Pontremoli (e.g. "shaky bridge") see Repetti IV, 543 col. 2 and Manfredo Guilianni, "Luni e la leggenda di Apua," *Archivio storico per le province parmensi* XXXIII (1933), 225, and on the Ligurian tribe of the *Apua* settled in the Upper Magra (no city *Apua*!) see PW 3.Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1895), col. 288.

*Sanctę Benedicte* (32), "St. Benedict's." The site of this Benedictine foundation must be sought up in the Ligurian Apennines between Pontremoli (31) and Berceto (33) and is quite likely on Montelungo in the Val-di-Magra (GCT 84), a spur of La Cisa, where before A.D. 1000 there was a Benedictine establishment, dependent on the abbey of St. Columban of Bobbio, whence the name of the chapel, later parish, of S. Benedetto a Montelungo (Repetti III, 412-3, VI, 15). This is no doubt what Stubbs had in mind by his "S. Benedetto, Val di Magra." Miller's suggestion of Berceto is surely wrong; see (33) below.

Between (32) and (33) the travellers, proceeding up the Val-di-Magra along the Via Romea (Pilgrim Route), must have crossed—though without special mention—the crest of the Apennines, presumably through the pass of La Cisa (1041 m) (Andree 125 D3, EI X, 447-8), near Berceto and known in the Middle Ages as *Mons Bardonis*, Ital. *Monte Bardone* or *Francesca* (Repetti I, 739-40, IV, 545 col. 1; Schütte 26 n. 1, 28 n. 1 and 2; Matthias 51-2 under "Apennin"). Nikolás's *Munbard* (Kålund 16, 6-7 bis and Aarbøger 70 and n.1) refers to the same, as does *Munt Bardon* in Wace's *Brut* 2872 (ed. Ivor Arnold, Soc. anciens textes français, Paris, 1938) and *Bardun* of Lawman's *Brut* 5264. There is, it may be noted, a *Montbardon* in the dep. Hautes-Alpes, France (DT Hautes-Alpes 96).

*Sanctę Modesanne* (33), miswritten for *Moderanne*, epithet for Berceto, prov. Parma (GCT 85, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 456-7), EI VI, 689). Hook and Stubbs misread *Moderanne*; on the Ms. confusion of Insular *s* and *r* see p. 234 above. This mention of St. Moderan (Moderamnus), bishop of Rennes (Brittany, France) is, as Stubbs saw, evidently by way of an allusion to Berceto, with which the saint was intimately associated (Schütte 25 and n. 2). Miller's identification of (33) with Fornovo di Taro (GCT 73, Andree 126 E3) cannot be right. For this same saint in French place-names see Longnon 433 §1929.

Between Berceto (33) and Borgo S. Donnino (36)—in an air-line about 40 km due N—come two stops whose identification is difficult. About midway is Fornovo di Taro (prov. Parma) at the confluence of the Taro and the Ceno, where the road from Berceto forks, one branch going to Borgo S. Donnino, the other to Parma (cp. Schütte 39 and map). We may reasonably assume that the Englishmen followed the familiar route Berceto—Fornovo—Borgo S. Donnino.

*Philemangerur* (34). This curious and doubtless distorted name must be imagined as lying on the route described just above. Fornovo di Taro (Lat. *Forum novum*, also *Forum Novanorum*; GCT 73), an important route-junction, would be the obvious stop (see Schütte 22 and n. 2; A. Solari, *Athenaeum* XVI, Pavia 1928-9, 350-5; EI XV, 719-20); nevertheless, any formal identification of Fornovo with Ms. *Philemangerur* is impossible without resort to palaeographic acrobatics. Formally somewhat more likely and geographically almost as likely is the village of Felegara (GCT 73) about 4 km N of Fornovo and on the road Fornovo—Medesano; cp. (35) below. If Felegara is a really old settlement, this may be our stop.

*Metane* (35), quite possibly Medesano on the left bank of the Taro, prov. Parma (GCT 73, Schütte map); if this is right, the Ms. form is of course distorted. Mede-



sano lies on the obvious route, where the road Fornovo-S. Donnino forks, one branch going on to Borgo S. Donnino (36), the other to Noceto. Miller's suggestion "near Parma" is quite indefinite, while Stubbs's "Costa Mexana, on the R. Verde" is far off the route that the Englishmen are clearly following. Modena (Rom. *Mutina*) is likewise geographically out of the question.

*Sanctae Domnine* (36), Borgo S. Donnino, since 1927 a part of Fidenza, prov. Parma (EI XV, 227-8). GCT 73, Andree 126 E3, Baed. NI 445. S. Donnino takes its name from St. Dominus, martyr of Parma; on the apparent confusion of gender in Ms. *scæe* see p. 234 above. Fidenza, into which S. Donnino is now incorporated, is the Rom. *Fidentia Iulia* (IA 288, 1). Matthias 70; for this saint in French place-names see Longnon 415 §1697.

We are now on a stretch of the Aemelian Way between Parma (Rom. *Parma*) and Piacenza (Rom. *Placentia*): IA route 287, 9-288, 3.

*Floricun* (37), quite probably, as Stubbs queries and Miller suggests, Fiorenzuola d'Arda, prov. Piacenza. GCT 72, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 445, Nissen II, i, 270; PW 12. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1909), col. 2754 ("*Florentia*," 2). Hook and Stubbs misread *Floricun*. The Lat. diminutive *Florentiola* (Fiorenzuola) cannot well lie behind Ms. *Floricun*, which is probably a distortion of *Florentia*, perhaps written *Florēcia* in the prototext. *Florentia* is the original name of this settlement, the diminutive *Florentiola* having been created later in an effort to distinguish this *Florentia* from the far more important Florence in the Val-d'Arno. See further EI XV, 429, Pieri 346 "*Florentia*," Matthias 91.

*Placentia* (38), Piacenza. Rom. *Colonia Placentia*. The name is here in its Lat. form. GCT 60, Andree 125 D2, Baed. NI 442, IA 288, 3; EI XXVII, 92-6; Matthias 158-9, 233.

Between Piacenza and Vercelli (43) the Roman road, running via Pavia (Rom. *Ticinum*) and Lomello (Rom. *Laumellum*) (cp. IA 347, 1-3), seems to have been followed by the pilgrims for only a short distance.

*Sanctæ Andrea* (39), "St. Andrew's." Stubbs's "Case di S. Andrea, on the river Lambro," evidently meaning Corte di Sant'Andrea, prov. Pavia (GCT 60), at the confluence of the Lambro brook (Rom. *Lambrus*) and the Po (Rom. *Padus*), is probably right. So Oehlmann III, 250 and Schulte I, 67.

*Sanctæ Cristine* (40), "St. Christine's," probably S. Cristina e Bissone (prov. Pavia), 2 km E of Cortecalone (Lat. *Curtis Olonae*, EI XI, 549) and 19 km E of Pavia. GCT 59. So Stubbs, Oehlmann III, 250 ("*Santa Cristina*"), Schulte I, 67.

*Pamphica* (41), Stubbs and Miller query Pavia (a name replacing in the ninth century Rom. *Ticinum*), on the Ticino about 3 km above its junction with the Po. GCT 59, Andree 125 D2, Baed. NI 132-5, EI XXVI, 542-9. Pavia would be the natural stopping place at this stage of the journey, though this identification (accepted by Oehlmann III, 250 and Schulte I, 67) offers formal difficulties. If Ms. *Pamphica* does stand for Pavia — and Pavia appears in many medieval itineraries as the station between Piacenza and Vercelli (see Oehlmann IV, 296-7) —, the Ms. form shows considerable distortion. We may begin by noting the eighth- and ninth-century forms *Papeia*, *Paveia*: see Egidio Gorra, "Il Nome di Pavia," *Bollettino della società pavese di storia patria* IV (1904), 536 n. i, 560-1, 566-7; also Olivieri 416-7 under "Pavia." If forms such as *Papeia* lie behind the Ms. *Pamphica*, one might assume that Ms. *-ica* represents a misreading of *-eia* and the *-m-* the expansion of an accidental mark or stroke mistaken for an *m*-abbreviation. Could *Pamphica* as a genuine by-form of *Papeia* or *Paveia* have stood in the prototext? Such a possibility finds some slight support in the entry *Pompeja super Padum*, a station in the itinerary (A.D. 1211-12) of the Frisian Abbot Emo, which Oehlmann (IV, 297 col. 1) and Schulte (I, 67) equate with Pavia; if this latter identification is correct, Emo's qualifying "on the Po" is obviously not quite right. A puzzle.

*Tremel* (42), Tromello on the Terdoppio, prov. Pavia, GCT 58, Andree 125 C2. On Ms. *Tremel* for *Tromel* see p. 233 above. On this name of uncertain etymology see Olivieri 555 under "Tromello."

*Vercel* (43), Vercelli at the confluence of the Sesia and the Canterana, prov. Vercelli. GCT 57, Andree 125 C2, Baed. NI 221, EI XXXV, 147-8; Mathias 209, 237. Rom. *Vercellae* fem. plur., an important Roman route-junction; Gröhler I, 226-7, Nissen II, i, 176. On the modern form Vercelli (petrified locative) see Serra 152 n. 1, (top). The name appears here in anglicized form, comparable to *Vercels* (probably from loc. pl. *Vecellis*) in the *Old-English Chronicle*, F-text sub ann. 1049; cp. OFr *Verzels* (Wace's *Brut*, l. 2868), later *Verceux*.

At Vercelli we come back to the Roman road of IA routes 350, 7—351—352, 1 (Vevey; Switzerland).

*Sancte Agath* (44), Santhià, prov. Vercelli. Hook misreads as *Agatha*, Stubbs *see* for *scē*. Lat. *Sancta Agatha*. GCT 43, Andree 125 C2, Baed. NI 221. Tradition identifies Santhià with the Rom. *Vicus viae longae*; more recent scholarship prefers identification with the free town of *Quadrata* (EI XXX, 781).

*Everi* (45), Ivrea on the Dora Baltea (Rom. *Dura maior*), prov. Aosta. *Eporédia* of IA 351, 1 (Nissen II, i, 169-72; PW 11. Halbb., Stuttgart 1907, col. 249-50), later *Ivoreia* (Oehlmann III, 234). The name is Celtic: Gröhler I, 40, 152. GCT 42, Andree 125 B2, Baed. NI 209, EI XX, 73-5. Note that the Ms. form preserves the original initial *E-* and the *-er-* (older *-or-*). For medieval German adaptations see Matthias 120 and further Constantino Vigro, "Il Nome di Ivrea," *Biblioteca della società storica subalpina* IV (Pinerolo, 1900), ix-xii; Scheffel 182; and for derived gentile names Serra 47.

With Ivrea the travellers leave the Lombard plain and proceed up the right side of the Val-d'Aosta (Scheffel 182) into the Pennine Alps.

*Publei* (46). The Ms. form would suggest the name-type \**Publicus* of Kaspers 146 §322: Publy (Jura, France), Publay (Haute-Savoie, France); yet neither this nor the Ms. form seems to correspond formally to the identifications hazarded thus far. Stubbs identifies it with "Poley, near Aosta," a place which I have not been able to find on any map or in any list of place-names; it is perhaps an error or misprint for Pollein mentioned below. Miller suggests "Plou near Verrès," apparently confusing "Plout" (GCT 29), 3 km up the river from Verrès with "Plou" (GCT 29) which is more than halfway up the valley between Verrès (now Castel Verrès: GCT 29) and Aosta (GCT 28). Oehlmann III, 235, 250 and Scheffel 183 equate the modern Pollein with *Publeia* of medieval itineraries and this identification is accepted by Schulte I, 67. Pollein (prov. Aosta) is, then, perhaps right.

*Agust'* (47), presumably abbreviated from *Agusta* as Stubbs expands; Miller misreads *August'*. Aosta, at the confluence of the Dora Baltea and the Buthier (Rom. *Dura Bautica*), prov. Aosta. Rom. *Augusta Praetoria* or *Salassorum*: IA 351, 3; PW 4. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1896), col. 2346; Nissen II, i, 171. GCT 28, Andree 125 B2, Baed. NI 213-4, EI III, 626-9; Matthias 50, 227. Ms. *Agust'* shows the familiar VLat. initial *a-* for *au-*. On the other European place-names with Lat. *Augusta* see Gröhler I, 339-40; Dauzat 122-3.

The route leaves the Val-d'Aosta and turns NW toward the Great St. Bernard pass (Rom. *Alpis poenina*, Nissen I, 159-60) to the last stop on what is now Italian territory.

*Sancte Remei* (48), San Remigio (formerly Saint-Rhémy), prov. Aosta, now an Italian customs frontier. Med. Lat. (*Villula*) *Remegius*, named after St. Remegius, bishop of Rheims, died 553. On this saint's name in place-names see Gröhler II, 422. GCT 28, Andree 125 B2, Baed. Swi. 334-5, Scheffel II, 180.

The travellers now proceed over the Great St. Bernard pass (2491 m), though this is not specifically mentioned (see map in EI II, 638 and text in same p. 639, col. 2, for this route). The pass was until about the thirteenth century commonly referred to in Latin as *Mons Iovis*, an obvious sanctuary name, in Old French as *Mon(t)gieu* and the like (the small level area at the top of the pass is still called "plan de Joux"), in Old English *Muntigiof* and the like (see E. Sievers-A. S. Cook, *An Old English Grammar*, 3d ed., §§192, 2 and 196, 3), and in Old Icelandic *Mundjo*, -ja (see R. Meissner, *Zs. f. deutsches Altertum* XLVII, 1903-4, 194-6). The medieval name is derived from a temple to Jupiter on this site, in turn perhaps *interpretatio romana* for the shrine of a Celtic divinity; the modern designation "Great St. Bernard pass" is late and is derived from the Augustine hospice founded ca. 980 by St. Bernard of Menthon (Haute-Savoie, France). In addition to Oehlmann, Schulte and Tyler cited in note 10 above, see additionally on the pass in the Middle Ages EI II, 644 col. 1 and XXX, 620-1 (art. "San Bernardo, Colle del"), W. A. B. Coolidge, "The Saracens in the Alps," *The Alpine Journal* IX (1879), 276 n.†, Joh. Hoops ed., *Reallexikon d. german. Altertumskunde*, art. "Alpenpässe" §6 (Vol. I, p. 69, col. 1), and for this and other sanctuary names in France Longnon 110-15.

*Petres castel* (49), "St. Peter's citadel," i.e., Bourg-St-Pierre in the little valley of the Valsorey (cant. Wallis). Now a Swiss customs frontier, formerly the site of a hospice whose importance diminished after the foundation by St. Bernard of his hospice at the top of the pass. TAS 592, Andree 83 D5, Baed. Swi. 370-1. Med. Lat. *Sancti Petri castellum*, also *abbatia Montis Iovis Sancti Petri* (Scheffel 180, 184). *Petres* is OE gen. sing.; *castel*, an early instance of Lat. *castellum* as a loan-word in English. On Lat. *castellum* in place-names see Gröhler II, 13-4.

The course continues on IA route 351 down the narrow Val d'Entremont.

*Ursiores* (50), Orsières (Germ. Urseren) on the Drance, cant. Wallis. TAS 529, Andree 83 D4, Baed. Swi. 368. Among early forms of this name may be noted *Ursaria* 972; the name presumably means "region frequented by bears" (Lat. *ursus*). Jaccard 321, 241 (Lousine), 362 (Praz du Sex); Studer 258 under "Ursern"; for this and other animal names in place-names see Gröhler II, 202 and Dauzat 22.

The travellers presumably passed through Martigny-Ville (med. Lat. *Martinia-cum*, Germ. Martinach: Gröhler I, 187, 266, Jaccard 263-4), Gallo-Roman *Octodurum*: IA 351, 5 (Gröhler I, 104), near the confluence of the Drance and the (Swiss) Rhône (TAS 526, Andree 83 C4, Baed. Swi. 342) and descend the valley of the Rhône (OHG, MHG *Röten*).

*Sanctę Maurici* (51), St. Maurice d'Agaune on the (Swiss) Rhône, cant. Wallis. TAS 483, Andree 83 D4, Baed. Swi. 323. Gallo-Roman *Agaunum* (Gröhler I, 154; Jaccard 3), at or near *Tarnaia* (*Nantuatum*) of IA 351, 6 (PW I. Halbb., Stuttgart 1894, col. 766). An Augustine abbey was established here in 515. A not well founded tradition associates this site with St. Mauritius, supposedly martyred nearby with 6666 of his so-called "Theban legion"; cp. Werlauff 18 and note 54, also C. Julian, *Revue des études anciennes* XXII (Bordeaux, 1920), 41-7. Jaccard 408.

*Burbulei* (52). Unidentified. Stubbs queries and Miller suggests Ver(s)-Vey (probably from Lat. *versus viam* "near the highway"), cant. Wallis, though there can be no formal connection. Schulte I, 67 leaves the site unidentified. Verve is a hamlet ca. 3.5 km down the valley beyond Aigle (Jaccard 505) and 1.5 km in from the Rhône. TAS 475. The Ms. form suggests a name-type *\*Burbiliacum* of Kaspers 218 §539: Bourbilly (Côte-d'Or, France) and Borbiago (part of the town of Mira, prov. Venezia, Italy). The site here referred to must be somewhere in the lower valley of the (Swiss) Rhône or on or near the shore of Lake Geneva between

Villeneuve (older name *Compendiacum*: Jaccard 102 under "Compengiez") and Vevey (53, below).

*Vivæc* (53), evidently Vevey (Germ. Vivis) on the Veveyse, cant. Waadt; so Stubbs and Miller. Rom. *Viviscum*: IA 352, 1. TAS 464; Andree 83 C3; Baed. Swi. 313; Studer 266; Jaccard 506-7; Mottaz II, 751-2; Gröhler I, 182. Ms. *Vivæc* cannot be quite right, though it is not altogether easy to retrace the steps of the error or even to determine its precise nature. The final -c may represent a misread -i of an original \**Vivæi* (cp. *Bruvæi*-76 below) or the -c may be right and the æ stand for an s of the diarist's \**Vivisc* (cp. Rom. *Viviscum*, Germ. Vivis): the latter interpretation is perhaps the more likely.

*Losanna* (54), Lausanne on the now canalized Flon and just in from Lake Geneva, cant. Waadt. TAS 438 and 438b, Andree 83 C3, Baed. Swi. 308-9. *Lacu Lausonio* of IA 348, 2 seems to refer to Lake Geneva: see Dauzat 204. The place-name has commonly been presumed to look back to a Celtic personal name \**Lausus* or \**Lousos* (so Gröhler I, 172; Studer 149-50; Jaccard 225-6; Mottaz II, 44-51), but more recently a strong case has been made out for a derivation from a sb. \**lousa* (\**lausa*) "slab of stone," perhaps with reference to a particular monolith (Pierre-Oupin) near the chateau of Vidy: the compound \**lous-onna* might then designate the guardian divinity of the rock (P. Aebischer, "Le nom de Lausanne," *Zs. f. schweizer. Geschichte* XI, 1931, 265 ff., esp. pp. 284-7, 295).

At Lausanne the route leaves the lake and, corresponding to IA 348, 2-3, turns NNW for some 25 km: see Grenier i, 166-7 (map) for the route Lausanne-Besançon.

*Urba* (55), Orbe (Germ. Orbach) on the Orbe, cant. Waadt. TAS 292, Andree 83 C3, Baed. Swi. 270. IA 348, 3: *Urba*. On this Ligurian name see Serra 126 n. 1; Studer 185; Jaccard 317; Mottaz II, 348-50. Gröhler I, 349-50. There was a former suburb of Orbe, known as *in Tabernis* "at the taverns," and this seems to be preserved in.

*Antifern* (56), perhaps Tavel, old suburb of Orbe (55). Stubbs "probably Yverdun," Miller "cp. Iverdun," but there can be no formal connection between *Antifern* and the modern and older forms of Yverdun (Gallo-Rom. *Eburodunum*: Studer 185 under "Orbe"; Jaccard 531-2; Dauzat 73; Gröhler I, 101, II, 184; Aebischer, *Revue Celtique* XLIV, 1927, 322-3). Apart from formal objections, there is also the matter of direction: the travellers are proceeding from Orbe to Pontarlier (57) in France, and Yverdun (Germ. Ifferten) on the lake of Neuchâtel (Andree 83 C3), though only 9-10 km. NE of Orbe, is at right angles to their route. The key to the correct identification of Ms. *Antifern* is almost surely to be found in the phrase: *in fine Tabernis sive Urbe*, quoted by Mottaz II, 349 col. 2; see also Jaccard 453-4: "Tavel" 3, p. 454 top; also Schulte I, 67 and n. 2. Ms. *-tifern* thus most likely stands for the diarist's *Tafern* or the like (Lat. *taberna* "inn" "tavern": see Gröhler II, 49-50) while the *An-* presumably corresponds to some preposition or conjunction, perhaps Lat. *in* or *ad*. Out of \**in* or \**ad tafern* of the prototext some scribe seems then to have fashioned an independent locality and duly provided it with a roman numeral (see p. 234 above).

The route now presumably goes up the valley of the Orbe through the Col de Jounge (Schulte I, 43; Grenier i, 166) and then down the valley of the Doubs into France.

*Punt erlin* (57), evidently Pontarlier on the Doubs, dep. Jura, France. Now a French customs frontier. CF XXV-21, Andree 83 B3 and 92 F3, Muirhead NEF 288. The name looks back to Rom. (*Pons*) *Ariorica* (IA 348, 4) or perhaps more rightly *Ariolica* (PW 3. Halbb., Stuttgart 1895, col. 835: "*Ariolica*," 3; Gröhler II, 147). On Lat. *pons* "bridge" "bridge-head" in place-names see *Puntremel* (31). If the identification with Pontarlier is correct, one must assume that the second element

is distorted, with an initial *e-* for *a-* and with an historically false final *-n* (perhaps a misreading for an Insular *r*). However, neither Ms. *-n* nor the modern *-ier* are historically justifiable; has the modern name at some stage been adapted to place-names in *-lier* < Gmc. *-lâri*? Cp. Longnon 215–6 §879–91. See further Grenier i, 137.

*Nos* (58), Nods, dep. Doubs. So and probably rightly Stubbs and Miller. Cf XXIV, XXV–20. Schulte I, 67 would identify Ms. *Nos* with Lods (Cf XXIV–20, Andree 92 F2), but Nods, on the main route from Pontarlier to Besançon is more likely right; see Grenier i, 167 (map). I know of no discussion of the etymology of this French name but suspect that it may be identical with Swiss Nods (Jaccard 380), a plural formation based on OFr *no* “trough” (in a geographic sense) with an orthographic *d* (see ML 5859 §3: *\*naucum*). Another possibility, though formally less likely, is Fr. *noue* f. “swampy ground” (ML 5853: *\*nauda*?, *\*nauza*?), represented in the Swiss La Noz and Combe des Noz (Jaccard 311); for French examples see Longnon 603–4 §2773. The location of Nods, dep. Doubs, suits either etymology.

*Bysiceon* (59), no doubt Besançon on the Doubs, dep. Doubs. Cf XXIV–20, Andree 92 F2, Muirhead NEF 281–4. Rom. *Vesontio* (Caesar), IA 348, 5: *Vision-tione*. Something is wrong with the Ms. spelling; one might imagine that the diarist wrote *Bysunceon* or the like. Gröhler I, 56; Serra 141, §52; Dauzat 125; Grenier i, 434 (map).

A Roman road leads to Seveux (61).

*Cuscei* (60), Cussey-sur-l'Ognon near the Bois de Cussey, dep. Doubs. Cf XXIV–19, Andree 92 E2. The site of a Roman bridge (Grenier i, 434, map). The name, perhaps better spelled *\*Cuscei*, looks back to Rom. *Cussiacus* (Longnon Atlas 177), in turn probably based on the personal name *Cusius* or *Cutius* (Gröhler I, 244–5; Kaspers 68 §106).

*Sefui* (61), Seveux-sur-Saône, dep. Haute-Saône. So Stubbs (with the most unlikely alternative “Savoyeux”) and Miller. Cf XXIII–18, Andree 92 E2, Muirhead NEF 182–3, Gröhler I, 100. Gallo-Roman *Segobodium* (PW 3. Halbb., Stuttgart 1921, col. 1076–7). Like Cussey (60) this is the site of a Roman bridge (Grenier i, 434, map). The Ms. spelling *-ui* is obviously miswritten for *-iu* (see p. 233 above); the *-f-* stands according to OE orthographic practice for *-v-*.

The route now presumably proceeds up the Salon, a tributary of the Saône, in the general direction of

*Grenant* (62), Grenant on the Saolon, tributary of the Salon, dep. Haute-Marne. Cf XXIII–18, DT Haute-Marne 83: earliest reference is *Granant* 1120. This not uncommon name-type (Longnon 52 §111) is based on a Gaulish *\*grano-nantos* “sandy valley” (Dauzat 72 note; on the element *nant-* see Gröhler I, 137).

The route now crosses the Langres plateau and turns down the Marne valley.

*Oisma* (63), Hûmes on the Marne and 6 km beyond Langres (Rom. *Lingones*); that this name is repeated at the end of the itinerary (i.e. after 80) seems not to have been noted. Cf XXII–17, Andree 92 E2. The place-name is based on the Gaulish tribal name *Os(s)ismi* “the bold ones”: Gröhler I, 83; Serra 105 (petrified locative pl.); Longnon 101–2 §399; DT Haute-Marne 88–9: *Usma villa* 921(?); Longnon Atlas 193. Miller’s suggestion that (63) is Ormancey, 9 km W of Hûmes, is most unlikely (Cf XXII–17, DT Haute-Marne 127–8: *Ormanceium* 1188).

Beyond Hûmes (63) the Englishmen leave the Marne and proceed some distance down the Aube before bending back N toward the Marne which they rejoin at Châlons (69).

*Blæc vile* (64). Stubbs and Miller (who misreads *Bloecuile*) identify this with [ 246 ]

Blessonville (dep. Haute-Marne, CF XXII-16), 7 km NE of Château-villain, though this offers formal difficulties, besides being somewhat N of the route to the Aube. For Blessonville see DT Haute-Marne 18: *Bleceum villa* 1231, with all later forms in *-cun*, *-con*. The Ms. form, if right, corresponds rather to a modern \*Blacqueville or the like, though no such name is to be found in the immediate vicinity (for such a name in dep. Seine-et-Loire see Longnon 296 §1236); the element *blac-* might formally correspond to Ligurian \**blacca* "thicket" (Gröhler II, 126). Nevertheless, the identification with Blessonville may be right, in which case Ms. *blac-* must be understood as distorted from a *blecun-* of the prototext: Ms. *a* coming from an *e* via a wrongly hooked *e* (see p. 234 above) and with the loss of *u* (for *un*) by haplography before the *u-* of *uile*: \**Blecū uile*.

*Bar* (65), Bar-sur-Aube, dep. Aube. CF XXI-15, 16; Andree 89 D4; Muirhead NEF 171. The name is based on a Gallo-Rom. *barrum* "obstruction" "barrier." Gröhler II, 110-12; DT Aube 10-11: *Barrum super Albam* 1061.

*Breone* (66), Brienne-le-Château near the Aube (Rom. *Alba*), dep. Aube. CF XXI-15, Andree 89 D4. Muirhead NEF 178. The name is based on an extended form of Gaul \**briga* "hill" "mountain." Gröhler I, 134-5; DT Aube 26-7: Merovingian *Brienna*.

*Dom Aniant* (67), Donnemont on the Meldançon, dep. Aube. CF XXI-14. The name corresponds to Lat. *Domnus Amandus* "St. Amandus." Ms. *aniant* stands for *amant* by the wrong division of a series of minims (see pp. 233-34), perhaps though some confusion with St. Aniane (cp. Gröhler II, 410; on St. Amandus in French place-names Gröhler II, 409). On names with *Domnus*, reduced from Lat. *dominus* in the familiar sense of "saint," see Dauzat 151, Longnon 389 §1525. DT Aube 59-60: first reference under 1152.

*Funtaine* (68), quite probably, as Miller suggests, Fontaine-sur-Coole, dep. Marne, some 20 km S of Châlons-sur-Marne (69). CF XXI-13; DT Marne: no reference before 1200. It may be noted that the Coole flows into the Marne just above Châlons (69), the next *submansio*. The name, based on late Lat. *fontana* "spring" "fountain," is a common name-type: Dauzat 24, Gröhler II, 225-6.

*Caðeluns* (69), Châlons-sur-Marne, dep. Marne. CF XXI-13, Andree 89 D4, Muirhead NEF 142-3. The Ms. form represents a normal OE and OFr correspondence to the Gaulish tribal name *Catalaunes* (Rom. *Durocatalaunum*: PW 6. Halbb., Stuttgart 1896, col. 1783: *Catalauni*). DT Marne 48, Longnon 103 §411, Longnon Atlas 121-2, Gröhler I, 88, Serra 97, Dauzat 126, Grenier i, 445 (map of the route Châlons—Rheims).

*Rems* (70), Rheims on the Vesle, between the Aisne and the Marne, dep. Marne. CF XX-11, 12; Andree 89 D3, Muirhead NEF 127-8. Rom. *Durocortorum* (*Remorum*): IA 362, 1, replaced by the tribal name *Remi*, later by the petrified locative *Remis*. PW 2d ser., I. Halbb., Stuttgart 1914, col. 589-90; Longnon 103 §409; Longnon Atlas 119-20; Gröhler I, 87-8; Serra 101-2 (as a petrified locative); Dauzat 126; DT Marne 225-6.

In the main the route now follows the highway Rheims—St. Quentin, NW across the Aisne (Grenier i, 445 map and 447 map).

*Corbunei* (71), Corbeny, dep. Aisne. CF XX, XIX-11; Andree 89 C3, Muirhead NEF 111. DT Aisne 76: *Corbenacum* 982, a formation on the personal name *Corbus* (Kaspers 239-40 §586, Skok 77 §93, Gröhler I, 206). From 906 Corbeny was the site of a priory dedicated to St. Marculf (Saint-Marcoul).

*Mund Loðum* (?), less likely *-uin* (72) (as read by Hook, Stubbs and Miller), Laon, dep. Aisne. Miller further misreads *Loderuin*. CF XIX-10, Andree 89 C3, Muirhead NEF 112-3. The earliest recorded name of this site is Gregory of Tours's Gallo-Rom. *Lugdunum*, probably meaning "the little fortification"; in the seventh century it is *Laudunum*. Longnon 32 §53; Gröhler I, 99; Grenier i, 447; DT Aisne 149-51: *Laudunum mons* 920. *Mund* (Lat. *mons*, *mont-*) refers to the solitary high hill above

the Ardon on which Laon is situated (Gröhler II, 71 ff.). The Ms. form of the second element, whether *-um* or *-uin* (cp. *Sumeran*-79 below) cannot be right; one wants *-un* and that is quite likely what the diarist wrote (for scribal confusion of minims see pp. 233-34 above).

The travellers now set out on a longish stretch of over 100 km between Laon (72) and Arras (75). The next name (73) is especially difficult.

*Martinwæð* (73). Miller misreads *Martinpoeder*. A crux. Stubbs makes three suggestions, of which the first two are conditioned on the location of (74) which is all but certainly Doingt near Péronne: (1) St. Martin on the Amignon (? for Omignon, CF XVIII-9); (2) Mont-Saint-Martin, dep. Aisne, 2 km S of Gouy near Le Câtelet on the road St. Quentin-Estrées (CF XVIII-9; DT Aisne 186: *Mons sancti Martini* 1123), a foundation apparently established in the twelfth century; (3) somewhat as an afterthought Stubbs mentions Martinpuich, dep. Pas-de-Calais (CF XVII-8; DT Pas-de-Calais 247-8: *Martinput* 1202; *Martini puteus* of Gröhler II, 235-6). On historical, geographical and formal grounds none of these are at all likely identifications. To return to *Martinwæð*. That the first element almost certainly refers to St. Martin is of little help since the number of place-names in this general region which include the name of this saint are, as elsewhere in France (see e.g. *La Grande Encyclopédie* XIX, 216-22), countless. The second element (*-wæð*) likewise offers difficulties. Formally *wæð* may be viewed as the late OE neut. sb. meaning "ford," a loan from ON *vað* n. "ford"; but *wæð* is apparently only recorded once in OE (*OEChron. D*-text, sub ann. 1073, where the corresponding *E*-text has the normal OE equivalent (*ge*)*wæd* n. "ford"). If, however, Ms. *wæð* is genuine and does mean "ford" here, one might think of it as rendering a Lat. *vadum* "ford" and that the whole name corresponded to a Lat. (*Sancti*) *Martini vadum* "St. Martin's ford," of which the second element might later appear in northern France as *-wez* (see Longnon 173-4, Gröhler II, 219-20) or *-gué* (cp. ML 9120). But I can find no Martingué or Martinwez or the like in the region; DT Somme has, to be sure, not yet been issued. One would expect *Martinwæð* to be near La Fère (dep. Aisne) or St. Quentin (dep. Aisne) or Ham (dep. Somme). A crux.

*Duin* (74), almost certainly Doingt on the Cologne (Rom. *Grusio* f.), 3 km E of Péronne, dep. Somme (CF XVIII-9, Andree 89 C3, Muirhead NEF 97). So Miller; Stubbs suggests hesitantly Douen (alternate older spelling of Doingt). Stubbs's second suggestion of Thun-l'Évêque on the Escaut, 7 km NE of Cambrai (CF XVIII-8) is formally quite unlikely. The early forms of Doingt are very varied, e.g. *Donincum*, *Donius* 977; later, among others, is *Doin*, close to the Ms. *Duin*. Doingt was early the site of an important fortification and of a priory (at least as early as 1117 and probably earlier). For early forms and history see Paul de Cagny, *Histoire de l'arrondissement de Péronne et de plusieurs localités circonvoisines* I (Péronne, 1869), 221-8. Swiss *Duin* (Jaccard 141) and Lat. *Duinae* (*Duennae*) *vicus* (Dennevy, Saône-et-Loire: Longnon 124 §514, Gröhler II, 248) are etymologically unrelated to Doingt.

*Aðerats* (75), Arras on the Scarpe, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVII-7, Andree 89 B2, Muirhead NEF 47. Miller misreads *Ad(d)erats* and queries Arras. The Gallo-Rom. name *Nemetocennum*, *Nemetacum* of IA 379, 2 (a very important route-junction) was later replaced by the Gaulish tribal name *Atrebatas* whence the later forms. PW 33. Halbb., Stuttgart 1935, col. 2381-2: *Nemetacum*; Longnon 103 §413; Longnon Atlas 125; Gröhler I, 89; Serra 96, 201 (as a petrified locative plur.); DT Pas-de-Calais 14-5. On Carolingian forms of the type *Adradis* behind Ms. *Aðerats* see Ettmayer, *ZONF* II (1927), 183; on *-er-* with epenthetic *e* cp. *Suteria* (4). On the route Arras—Thérouanne see Grenier i, 397-8 and 450 (map).

*Bruwæi* (76), Bruay on the Lawe, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVII-7, Andree 89 B2, Muirhead NEF 54. Miller misreads *Brusoei* (*-poei*?). Among the early forms are [ 248 ]

*Bruhaïum* 975, *Bruai* ca. 1000 (DT Pas-de-Calais 72-3); Kaspers 42 §49 notes that the etymological type is uncertain, perhaps *\*Brugacum*. The Ms. form with *-wai* (written with the OE *wynn*-rune) may reflect a folk-etymological association with OE *weg* m. "way" "route."

*Teran burh* (77), Théroutanne on the Lys, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVI-6, Andree 89 B2, Muirhead NEF 46. Rom. *civitas Morinorum*, later replaced by the Gallo-Rom. *Tarvanna*, *Tervanna* (PW 8. Halbb., Stuttgart 1932, col. 2451-2), whence the modern name. IA. 379, 1; Longnon 104 §417; Gröhler I, 152-3; DT Pas-de-Calais 366-7; Grenier i, 314 and n. 1 (perhaps a theophorous name). The old town was destroyed by Charles V in 1553; the present village, built at the end of the sixteenth century, is on the site of a suburb of the old town (Ancienne Ville). The Ms. form of the first element (*teran*) is almost surely miswritten for *terwan* or *teruan*; cp. Lawman's *Brut* (ca. 1175-85), v. 27943: *Teruane*.

*Gisne* (78), Guînes, about 7 km S of Calais, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVI-5, Andree 89 A2, Muirhead NEF 17 (middle). DT Pas-de-Calais 178-9: *Gisna* 807.

From Guînes to the Channel (the diarist's *ad mare*) there were in the Middle Ages two obvious routes, one to Calais, another via Sombres to the now sanded-up harbor of Wissant (DT Pas-de-Calais iii), and it is probably over the latter route that the English travellers passed.

*Sumeran* (?) (so read by Hook, Stubbs and Miller), less likely *Suineran* (79). The Ms. form is not absolutely certain and offers a palaeographical problem identical with that of *Mund Loðum* (-uin?) (72 above). If Stubbs's suggestion of the hamlet of Sombres, 2 km NE of Wissant (CF XV-5, Andree 89 A2), dep. Pas-de-Calais, is right, we have here a very early form; DT Pas-de-Calais 361: *Sombres* 1171, differs most significantly from the Ms. form in the lack of final *-n*. That an *n*-suffix may, however, have been original is suggested by the 1337 plur. form *Sombrenes* (in a terrier of Samer); no other name in the vicinity offers fewer formal difficulties.

The diarist ends his report abruptly without so much as a hint of a happy homecoming corresponding to the notice of the arrival in Rome (*Aduentus . . . ad Romam*) with which the text begins. All we have after *Sumeran* (?) is the curious repetition of the name *Oisma* as noted under (63) above. The modern reader may, however, think of the words chanted by Wagner's pilgrims (*Tannhauser* III, i) as they pass into the Wartburg valley:

Beglückt darf nun dich, o Heimat, ich schauen  
und grüssen froh deine liebliche Auen!  
Nun lass ich ruhn den Wanderstab!

## V

The significance of this pilgrim-diary for the student of the Middle Ages in general and of pre-Conquest England in particular is, on account of its more than concise style, potential rather than obvious; for in contrast to certain other medieval itineraries and guidebooks to medieval Rome<sup>17</sup> it is a skeleton to which flesh and blood must be added if we are to live over Archbishop Sigeric's trip with some sense of actuality. A few of the activities of the English party while in Rome are, to be sure, properly described, but in the main the diary is a rather bare list of names, properly speaking two lists: (1) a catalog of the Roman churches visited; (2) an itinerary of the home-journey from Rome to the Channel. The first problem is, then, to identify as precisely as possible the churches of Rome<sup>18</sup> and the sub-

<sup>17</sup> For many useful references see L. J. Pachtow, *A Guide to the Study of Mediaeval History* (2d rev. ed., New York, 1931), pp. 374-6; see

further *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit., n. 1.

<sup>18</sup> *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit.



*mansiones* or stopping places of the itinerary. The present paper has attempted to solve as far as is possible for the moment this second element in the first problem presented by the diary. But here a considerable number of localities still defy sure identification or identification at all;<sup>19</sup> it is to be hoped that these puzzles will yield to the combined efforts of the palaeographer (to suggest possible sources of distortion), the place-name student (with special knowledge of the regions traversed and special collectanea) and the historian. Once the first and particular problem of identification is out of the way, there arises the more general and really more significant question of why — when not due to the chance of nightfall, bad weather, broken bridges and the like —, why certain of the smaller places appear as *submansiones*. Had some of these a contemporary reputation for hospitality or special religious associations? The historian will be able to furnish satisfying answers to many of these questions and thus give us a broader insight into the conditions of what is probably not an untypical overland journey from Rome to Canterbury.

And finally, the present document deserves full recognition as a literary work. Not written in the grand manner, to be sure, it is, nevertheless, the earliest travel-diary from the pen of an Englishman and the only known document of its kind from Anglo-Saxon England: if short in words, it is long in meaning. With time and specialized study of the nature suggested above this little diary may yield to the student of England's past a harvest considerably richer than its short and often poorly transmitted text might appear to offer.

#### VI. Abbreviations

- Aarbøger Kr. Kålund, "En islandsk vejviser for pilgrimme fra 12. århundrede," *Aarbøger for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie*, 3d Ser., III (Copenhagen, 1913), 51–105.
- Andree Richard Andree, E. Ambrosius ed., *Andrees Allgemeiner Handatlas*, 7th ed., Leipzig, 1921.
- Baed. NI *Northern Italy*, 15th ed., Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1930.
- Baed. RCI *Rome and Central Italy*, 16th ed., Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1930.
- Baed. Swi. *Switzerland*, 28th ed., Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1938.
- CF *Carte de la France dressée par le service vicinal par ordre du Ministre de l'Intérieur à l'échelle du 100,000<sup>ème</sup>*, Paris: Hachette, 1879–94.
- Dauzat Albert Dauzat, *Les Noms de lieux: origine et évolution*, Paris, 1932.
- DT *Dictionnaire topographique de la France*, Paris, 1861 ff. After this general abbreviation follows the name of the department.
- EI *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*, Rome, 1929–37.
- GCT *Grande carta topografica del Regno d'Italia alla scala di 1:100000*, Istituto geografico militare, Florence: edition of the 1880's and '90's.
- Grenier i, ii Albert Grenier, *Archéologie gallo-romaine*, Pt 2, vol. i and ii, Paris, 1934 (constituting vol. VI of Joseph Dechelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique, celtique et gallo-romaine*).
- Gröhler Hermann Gröhler, *Ueber Ursprung u. Bedeutung der französischen Ortsnamen*, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1913–33.
- Hook W. F. Hook, *Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury*, vol. I, London, 1860, p. 434 for text.
- IA Otto Cuntz ed., *Itineraria*. Vol. I: *Itineraria Antonini Augusti et Burdigalense*, Leipzig, 1929. References are to the numbered sections of the Antonine Itinerary (IA).
- Jaccard Henri Jaccard, *Essai de toponymie: origine des noms de lieux habités et de lieux*

<sup>19</sup> Consider, for example, the uncertainties, varying in degree and kind, that still prevail in connection with (2), (10), (15), (18)–(22), (24), (32), (34), (35), (37), (41), (46), (52), (64), (73), (80) in §IV above.

- dits de la Suisse romande* (Vol. VII of *Mémoires et documents publiés par la Société d'histoire de la Suisse romande*), Lausanne, 1906.
- Jung Julius Jung, "Das Itinerar des Erzbischofs Sigeric von Canterbury und die Strasse von Rom über Siena nach Luca," *Mittheilungen des Instituts f. österreichische Geschichtsforschung* XXV (1904), 1-90.
- Kålund Kristian Kålund ed., *Alfræði íslensk: islandsk encyklopædisk Litteratur*, vol. I, Copenhagen, 1908.
- Kaspers Willy Kaspers, *Etymologische Untersuchungen über die mit -ACUM, -ANUM, -ASCUM und -USCUM gebildeten nordfranzösischen Ortsnamen*, Halle, 1918.
- Longnon Auguste Longnon, *Les Noms de lieux de la France; leur origine, leur signification, leurs transformations*, Paris, 1920.
- Longnon Atlas *idem*, *Atlas historique de la France*, vol. I, Paris, 1912.
- Ludwig Fr. Ludwig, *Untersuchungen über die Reise- und Marschgeschwindigkeit im XII. und XIII. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1897.
- Mann H. K. Mann, *The Lives of the Popes in the Early Middle Ages*, vol. IV, London, 1910.
- Matthias Walther Matthias, *Die geographische Nomenclatur Italiens im altdeutschen Schriftum*, Leipzig, 1912.
- Miller Konrad Miller, *Mappaemundi, die ältesten Weltkarten*. 3. Heft: *Die kleineren Weltkarten*, Stuttgart, 1895, pp. 156-57 for text.
- ML Wilh. Meyer-Lübke, *Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 3d ed., Heidelberg, 1935.
- Mottaz Eugène Mottaz, *Dictionnaire historique, géographique et statistique du canton de Vaud (Waadt)*, 2 vols., Lausanne, 1921.
- Muirhead NEF Findlay Muirhead — Marcel Monmarché edd., *North-Eastern France* (The Blue Guides), 2d ed., Paris, 1930.
- Nissen Heinrich Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, 2 vols in 3 pts., Berlin, 1883-1902.
- Oehlmann III, IV Ernst Oehlmann, "Die Alpenpässe im Mittelalter," *Jahrbuch f. schweizer. Geschichte*, references to vols. III (1878) and IV (1879).
- Olivieri Dante Olivieri, *Dizionario di toponomastica lombarda*, Milan, 1931.
- Pieri Silvio Pieri, *Toponomastica della Valle dell'Arno*, Rome, 1919; this is a separately printed supplement to the *Rendiconti* of the R. Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 5th ser., Vol. XXVII, Rome, 1918.
- PW August Pauly, Georg Wissowa et al. edd., *Paulys Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, new ed., Stuttgart, 1894 ff., cited by "Halbband" and column.
- Repetti Emanuele Repetti, *Dizionario geografico fisico storico della Toscana*, 6 vols., Florence, 1833-46.
- Scheffel P. H. Scheffel, *Verkehrsgeschichte der Alpen*. II: *Das Mittelalter*, Berlin, 1914.
- Schulte Aloys Schulte, *Geschichte des mittelalterlichen Handels und Verkehrs zwischen Westdeutschland und Italien mit Anschluss von Venedig*, vol. I, Leipzig, 1900.
- Schütte Ludwig Schütte, *Der Apenninenpass des Monte Bardone und die deutschen Kaiser* (Historische Studien, Vol. XXVII), Berlin: Ebering, 1901.
- Serra Giandomenico Serra, *Contributo toponomastico alla teoria della continuità nel medioevo della comunità rurali romane e preromane dell'Italia Superiore* (Biblioteca Dacoromanica condusă de Sextil Pușcariu, No. IV), Kolosvár, (Klausenburg, Cluj), Hungary, 1931.
- Signorelli Giuseppe Signorelli, *Viterbo nella storia della chiesa*, vol. I, Viterbo, 1907-8.
- Skok Peter Skok, *Die mit den Suffixen -ACUM, -ANUM, -ASCUM und -USCUM gebildeten südfranzösischen Ortsnamen*, Halle, 1906.
- Stubbs Wm. Stubbs, *Memorials of St. Dunstan, Archbishop of Canterbury* (Rolls Ser. No. 63), London, 1874, pp. 392-95.
- Studer Julius Studer, *Schweizer Ortsnamen*, Zürich, 1896.
- TAS *Topographischer Atlas der Schweiz*, Bern, 1870 ff.

- Tomassetti G. Tomassetti, "Della Campagna Romana nel Medio Evo," continued through several early volumes of *Archivio della società Romana di storia patria*; references to vol. and page.
- Werlauff E. C. Werlauff ed., *Symbolae ad Geographiam Medii Aevi ex Monumentis islandicis*, Copenhagen, 1821.
- ZONF *Zeitschrift für Ortsnamenforschung*, Munich 1925 f.

# A Technical Construction in Old English

## Translation Loans in -lic

L. K. SHOOK, C.S.B.

A DETAILED study of the OE grammatical terms appearing in Ælfric's *Latin Grammar*<sup>1</sup> sheds much light on the flexibility and self-sufficiency of English during the period of the Benedictine reform of the late tenth century. In these years, as scholars have so adequately indicated,<sup>2</sup> the English vocabulary was increased by numerous Latin loanwords of a technical nature. Many of these loanwords were neither direct borrowings<sup>3</sup> nor hybrids,<sup>4</sup> but were new formations sometimes known as semantic and translation loans,<sup>5</sup> and these are of special interest to the student of

<sup>1</sup> Julius Zupitza ed., *Ælfrics Grammatik und Glossar. Erste Abteilung: Text und Varianten* (Sammlung englischer Denkmäler, I), Berlin 1880. I have already made a complete analysis of the grammatical terms of Ælfric's *Grammar* and hope to publish it shortly under the title: *Ælfric's Latin Grammar: A Study in Old-English Grammatical Terminology*.

<sup>2</sup> See H. S. MacGillivray, *The Influence of Christianity on the Vocabulary of Old English* (Stud. z. angl. Phil., VIII), Halle 1902; Otto Funke, *Die gelehrten lateinischen Lehn- und Fremdwörter in der altenglischen Literatur*, Halle 1914; N. O. Halvorson, *Doctrinal Terms in Ælfric's Homilies* (Univ. of Iowa Studies, Humanistic Studies, V), Iowa City 1932; Otto Martz, *Die Wiedergabe biblischer Personenbezeichnungen in der ae. Missionssprache* (Beiträge z. engl. Philol., XXXIII), Bochum 1939. See also Otto Jespersen, *Growth and Structure of the English Language* (4th ed., New York 1923), pp. 40-46 and A. C. Baugh, *A History of the English Language* (New York 1935), pp. 97-110.

<sup>3</sup> As, for example, OE *alb*, *cāsus*, *part* from Lat. *alba*, *casus*, *pars/partem*.

<sup>4</sup> That is, words formed on a foreign base with a native affix, e.g. OE *declinian*, *declining* from Lat. *declinare*, *declinatio*.

<sup>5</sup> A semantic loan is a native word to which a new meaning has been added under the influence of a foreign word, e.g. OE *hād* "rank" "person" "sex" comes to mean "grammatical person" under the influence of Lat. *persona*. Similarly OE *hūw* "shape" "figure" is given the technical meanings "shape of a letter" "grammatical figure" "figure of speech" under the influence of Lat. *figura*.

A translation loan is a new formation made up of native elements translating a foreign word, e.g. OE *foresetnes* for Lat. *praepositio*, OE *gestrýnendlic* for Lat. *genitivus*. Sometimes, as in the case of *foresetnes*, the new term is constructed according to the pattern of the foreign original. Sometimes, as in *gestrýnendlic*, the new formation departs radically from the structural pattern of the original, and here the investigator is apparently confronted with a na-

tive speech-habit.

Although there has been up to the present no adequate study of the intriguing question of semantic and translation loans, the following works treat various aspects of the problem: Richard Heinzel, *Über den Stil der altgermanischen Poesie* (Strassburg 1875); Samuel Singer, "Beiträge zur vergleichenden Bedeutungslehre," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung* III (1902), 220; and *ibid.* IV (1903), 125; *Aufsätze und Vorträge* (Tübingen 1913); *Die deutsche Kultur im Spiegel des Bedeutungslehrowortes* (Tübingen 1912), p. 104 ff.; Oskar Weise, *Unsere Muttersprache* (Leipzig 1912); Sandfeld Jensen, "Notes sur les calques linguistiques," *Festschrift für Vilhelm Thomsen* (Leipzig 1912), pp. 166 ff.; Erik Wellander, *Studien zum Bedeutungswandel im Deutschen* (Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, Uppsala 1917), c. iv, 103; H. Marti, a dissertation entitled *Beiträge zu einem vergleichenden Wörterbuch der deutschen Rechtssprache* (Bern 1921); Fr. Mauthner, *Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (3 vols., Leipzig 1923); Samuel Kroesch, "Semantic Borrowing in Old English," *Studies in English Philology*, a miscellany in honor of Frederick Klaeber (Minneapolis 1929), p. 50 ff. For incidental discussion see Otto Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 41 ff.; Fried. Seiler, *Die Entwicklung des deutschen Kultur im Spiegel des deutschen Lehnwortes* (Halle 1912), III, 528, etc.; Albert Waag, *Die Bedeutungsentwicklung unseres Wortschatzes* (4th ed., Lehr i. B. 1921); and Harry de Velttheyme Velten, "Studies in the Gothic Vocabulary with especial Reference to Greek and Latin Models and Analogues," *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* XXIX (1930), 498.

The distinction between semantic loans and translation loans is said by some to be invalid. Kroesch, for example, calls all such terms "semantic borrowings." However, the fact remains that the difference, though meticulous perhaps, is real. In the case of a semantic loan, only a meaning has been borrowed, in the case of a translation loan, not only has the meaning been borrowed but also the very concept of the word as a distinct lexical unit.

the English language because they sometimes preserve native speech-habits and afford, accordingly, an insight into the nature of the language.

Adjectives and adverbs in *-lic*, *-lice* make up a relatively large group of the translation loans found in the writings of Ælfric. Structurally speaking, such adjectival and adverbial formations are of two kinds: 1. simplex + *-lic(e)*, e.g. *dædlic* "active," *tidlic* "temporal," *werlic* "masculine"; 2. present participle + *-lic(e)*, e.g. *gestryndelic* "genitive," *ðrōwiendlic* "passive." In the first case, the new term conforms to a pattern (viz. simplex + *-lic*) found not only in earlier OE, but in the related Gmc languages as well.<sup>6</sup> In the second case, the construction (present participle + *-lic*) apparently also evolves from a native speech habit since it follows no foreign pattern.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, judging from the translation loans in Ælfric's *Grammar*, this present participle + *-lic* construction has a technical force approaching or rendering that of Latin adjectives in *-ivus*.

### *Latin Adjectives in -ivus (-tivus)*<sup>8</sup>

The number of Latin adjectives with the *-ivus* suffix is large, but few of them are of frequent occurrence and almost none seem to be of popular origin. In the main they are technical terms used in the fields of agriculture, architecture, military science, music, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, law, religion, philosophy, rhetoric, and grammar.<sup>9</sup> Proportionately, grammatical terms constitute here a most significant group, covering the manifold subdivisions of the parts of speech and of the other chief grammatical categories. Although sometimes used substantively, these words are adjectival in form and can always, at least by implication, be regarded as modifying one or more of the following substantives: *vox*, *vocabulum*, *nomen*, *declinatio*, *casus*, *gradus*, *verbum*, *modus*, *pronomem*, *particula*, *adverbium*, *coniunctio*, *praepositio*, *littera*, *syllaba*, *species*.

No less than forty-eight Latin grammatical terms in *-ivus* appear in Ælfric's *Grammar*. These are: *ablativus*, *abnegativus*, *accusativus*, *activus*, *adiectivus*, *adversativus*, *appellativus*, *comparativus*, *completivus* (or *expletivus*), *confirmativus* (or *adfirmativus*), *congregativus*, *coniunctivus*, *copulativus*, *dativus*, *defectivus*, *denominativus*, *deortativus*, *demonstrativus*, *desiderativus*, *diminutivus*, *derivativus*, *discretivus*, *disiunctivus*, *dubitativus*, *expletivus* (or *completivus*), *frequentativus*, *genitivus*, *imperativus*, *inclinativus*, *indicativus*, *infinitivus*, *intentivus*, *interrogativus*, *iurativus*, *meditativus*, *nominativus*, *optativus*, *ortativus*, *passivus*, *relativus*, *remissivus*, *subiunctivus*, *superlativus*, *vocativus*.

<sup>6</sup> The more common adjectival form in early OE is a simplex, e.g. *leof* "dear," but compounds with *-lic*, e.g. *leoflic* "dear," are to be found. Cp. Go. *ibnaleiks* "equal," lit. "having an equal body," OHG *wiplich*, ON *kvennlig* "womanly." There appears to be no difference in meaning between the simplex and the compound with *-lic*. See Jakob Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik* (Göttingen 1831), III, 122; Fried. Kluge, *Nominale Stammbildungslehre der altgermanischen Dialekte* (3d ed., Halle 1926), pp. 114-115, #237; Karl Uhler, *Die Bedeutungs-gleichheit der altenglischen Adjektiva und Adverbia mit und ohne -lic, -lice*, Heidelberg 1926. For a contrary opinion, see Moritz Scheinert, "Die Adjektiva im Beowulfepos," (Paul-Braune) *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* XXX (1905), 345 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. early modern Germ. *thuendlich* "active." See Ernst Leser, "Fachwörter zur deutschen Grammatik von Schottel bis Gottsched:

1641-1749," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung* XV (1913), 59.

<sup>8</sup> This group of Latin adjectives has been treated at length by Breitmeyer in a dissertation presented to the University of Geneva. See Jules Breitmeyer, *Le Suffixe latin -ivus* (Geneva 1933). The main linguistic problem is the source of the *-i-* before the IE *-wo-* suffix. Several explanations have been offered, e.g. Karl Brugmann, *Grundriss d. vgl. Grammatik d. idg. Sprachen* (Strassburg 1892), II, 128, n. 2; ("Verdunkelte Nominal-komposita des griechischen und des lateinischen Wörter auf *-ica*, *-icus*, *-icius*, *-ix* und Verwandtes," *Indogermanische Forschungen* XV (1903), 25 ff.; Hermann Hirt, "Zur Bildung auf *-i-*," *IF* XXXI (1912), 5; Antoine Meillet, *Études sur le vocabulaire du vieux slave* (Paris, 1905), p. 365, but none is entirely satisfactory. The pre-Latin history of the suffix is not pertinent here.

<sup>9</sup> For word-lists see Breitmeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-271.

All show the expanded *-tivus* suffix. With one exception (*primitivus*) they are formed on the base of the perfect participle (e.g. on *adiec-*, *deriva-*, *pass-*, *posses-*) + *-tivus*. The base of *primitivus* is not a perfect participial stem but *pri-mi-* (IE \**pri-*) which appears also in Lat. *pri-mi-tiae*, f. pl., and *pri-mi-tus*, adv.

The fundamental sense of the suffix is probably "having the character or form of." In the case of the grammatical terms this sense varies between a passive and a quasi-active force. *Infinitivus* "having the character of being unlimited," *derivativus* "having the character of having been derived," *adiectivus* "having the character of having been added" are, for example, passive. *Imperativus* "having the character of expressing a command," *negativus* "having the character of expressing negation" are quasi-active. The majority of grammatical terms in *-ivus* are of this latter quasi-active type.<sup>10</sup>

There are a number of instances in Latin where the *-ivus* suffix is replaced by alternative suffixes without change of meaning; sometimes, for example, by *-icius* (*adiecticius* beside *adiectivus*), or *-orius* (*negatorius* beside *negativus*). Other suffixes, *-ibilis*, *-alis*, turn up, though usually with a slight variation in meaning.

### OE Renderings of Latin Adjectives in *-ivus*

The frequency of the *-ivus* (*-tivus*) suffix in grammatical terminology is reflected in Ælfric's OE grammatical terms. Although he does not in every instance render these technical terms according to the same pattern, it is clear that an OE adjectival formation of present participle + *-lic* is by far the favorite method and was obviously felt to approach in meaning the Latin adjectives in *-ivus*.

The following methods of handling grammatical terms in *-ivus* may be distinguished.

#### 1. Present participle + *-lic*.

1. *ætbrēdendlic* for *ablativus*.
2. *ætēowigendlic* for *demonstrativus*.
3. *geāgnigendlic* for *possessivus*.
4. *āhyldendlic* for *possessivus*.
5. *āsciendlic* for *interrogativus*.
6. *āscirigendlic* for *disiunctivus*.
7. *āslacigendlic* for *remissivus*.
8. *ātēorigendlic* for *defectivus*.
9. *bebōdendlic* for *imperativus*.
10. *bīcnigendlic* for *indicativus*.
11. *gecīgendlic* for *vocativus* and *appellativus*.
12. *clīpigendlic* for *vocativus*.
13. *edlesendlic* for *relativus*.
14. *forbeodendlic* for *deortativus*.
15. *foresettendlic* for *praepositivus*.
16. *forgifendlic* for *dativus*.
17. *gefyllendlic* for *expletivus* and *completivus*.

<sup>10</sup> Under "Adjectifs à valeur passive," Breitmeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290, lists: *definitivus*, *translativus*, *infinitivus*, *subiunctivus*, *derivativus*, *impositivus*, *subiectivus*, *positivus*, *adiunctivus*, *propositivus*, *putativus*, *praepositivus*, *traductivus*, *antecantativus*, *postcantativus*, *adiectivus*, *depositivus*, *iunctivus*, *compositivus*, *deductivus*, *aspirativus*, *commixtivus*, *proscriptivus*,

*accomodativus*, *additivus*, *appositivus*, *inclinativus*, *refractivus*. (The italicized terms appear in Ælfric's Grammar.)

The remaining grammatical terms in *-ivus*, that is, by far the greater number, have the quasi-active force. (Adjectifs à valeur voisine de l'actif.)

18. *gadrīgendlīc* for *congregativus*.
19. *mistihtendlīc* for *deortativus*.
20. *nemniendlīc* for *nominativus*.
21. *oferstīgendlīc* for *superlativus*.
22. *ofgangendlīc* for *derivativus*.
23. *smēagendlīc* for *meditativus*.
24. *gestrīnendlīc* for *genitivus*.
25. *swerīgendlīc* for *iurativus*.
26. *syndrīgendlīc* for *discretativus*.
27. *tyhtendlīc* for *ortativus*.
28. *tōgeīecendlīc* for *adiectivus*.
29. *twīyniendlīc* for *dubitativus*.
30. *geðēodendlīc* for *copulativus*.
31. *ðrōwiendlīc* for *passivus*.
32. *underðodendlīc* for *subiunctivus*, and *coniunctivus*.
33. *ungeendiğendlīc* for *infinitivus*.
34. *waniendlīc* for *diminutivus*.
35. *gewilniğendlīc* for *desiderativus*.
36. *wiðmeten(d)līc* for *comparativus*.
37. *wiðsacendlīc* for *abnegativus*.
38. *wrēğendlīc* for *accusativus*.
39. *gewīscendlīc* for *optativus*.

2. Present participle.

1. *fæstniğende* for *confirmativus*.
2. *gelōmlācende* for *frequentativus*.
3. *ofcūmende*<sup>11</sup> for *derivativus*.
4. *ofgangende* for *derivativus*.
5. *sēðende* for *adfirmativus*.

3. Substantive or adjective + *-līc*.

1. *dādīc* for *activus*.
2. *edwistlīc* for *substantivus*.
3. *geornfullīc* for *intentivus*.
4. *wiðerrādīc* for *adversativus*.

4. Past participle.

1. *frūncenned*<sup>12</sup> for *primitivus*.

5. Circumlocution.<sup>13</sup>

1. *geīhte tō ððrum naman* for *adiectivus*.<sup>14</sup>
2. *forma stæpe* for *positivus*.
3. *oðer stæpe* for *comparativus*.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Ofcūmende* and *ofgangende* are variants of *ofgangendlīc*.

<sup>12</sup> *Frūncenned* appears on the surface to be an attempt to imitate the past participle at the base of the Latin terms, but in view of the fact that *primitivus* is the one Latin grammatical term with the *-ivus* suffix which is not founded on a past participle, it is probably wiser to regard *frūncenned* as a figurative rendering of

*primitivus*.

<sup>13</sup> Circumlocutions are less frequent than one might expect. It is only in the very early part of the *Grammar* that Latin terms in *-ivus* are rendered by phrases, except of course, for the degrees of comparison where the technical term is clearly the more cumbersome.

<sup>14</sup> Elsewhere rendered by *tōgeīecendlīc*.

<sup>15</sup> Also rendered by *wiðmeten(d)līc*.

4. *Þridde stæpe* for *superlativus*.<sup>16</sup>
5. *eal ðæt of naman cymð* for *denominativus*.
6. *Ðā getācniad̃ on ānfealdum* for *collectivus*.

From the foregoing analysis it becomes immediately apparent that the analogy between Ælfric's "present participle + *-lic*" adjectives and Latin adjectives in *-ivus* is close. Where Latin shows an occasional substitution of *-icius*, *-orius*, *-ibilis*, *-alis* for *-ivus*, OE has an almost equally rare substitution of a present participle, a substantive + *-lic*, or a periphrasis. But the cases where the present participle + *-lic* construction is used to render a Latin adjective which is not an *-ivus* word are even more rare. They are *clīpigendlic* "vowel" for *vocalis* and *āwendendlic* "changeable" for *mobilis*. It is hardly safe, however, without fuller investigation of all OE words formed on the pattern present participle + *-lic*, to speak of this pattern as "the usual rendering" of Latin terms in *-ivus* or to designate it as "the OE technical-adjective pattern," but in view of the consistency with which Ælfric employs it throughout the *Grammar* it may well be described as "a technical pattern."

<sup>16</sup> *Oferstīgendlic*.